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Lenda: Njoftim për përfundimin e fazës mentoriale të tezës të magjistraturës për kandidatin Arianit BEKTESHI

Në bazë të kësaj shkrese e njoftojmë Këshillin mësimor-shkencor të Fakultetit të Administrimit Publik dhe Shkencave Politike, se ka mbaruar faza e punës mentoriale për tezën e magjistraturës me titull

“The Impact of Nationalism on the Social Developments of The Republic of Macedonia”

i kandidatit ARIANIT BEKTESHI student në studimet e Ciklit të Dytë në UEJL-Tetovë.

I propozojmë Këshillit mësimor-shkencor të Fakultetit Fakultetit të Administrimit Publik dhe Shkencave Politike, të ndërmer hapat e mëtejshëm procedural konform Rregullores për studime Master, në përcaktimin e Komisionit për vlerësimin përfundimtar të tezës së magjistraturës.

Mentor,

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Introduction

I would like to start this essay with three quotes, from three respectable figures on their concept of Nationalism. Helen Caldicott, a physician, author of many books, as well as an anti-nuclear advocate once said “Patriotism is nationalism, and always leads to war.” Arundhati Roy also an author and political activist wrote “Nationalism of one kind or another was the cause of most of the genocide of the twentieth century.” (Roy, 2003, f. 47) And lastly George Will, a newspaper columnist and political commentator said “Nationalism is blamed for this century’s wars, but nationalism need not mean militarism. And the nation-state has been the laboratory of liberty.” There are many quotes a person can find just by searching the internet, most of what you would find on nationalism are negative, similar to Helen Coldicott and Arundhati Roy. But there are also positive thoughts on nationalism such as George Will. I decided to start of this introduction writing about nationalism, because it has become aware lately even in the Balkans that there is much confusion on the term Nationalism, it is seen as something negative, that is bringing discrimination and ethnic conflict not only in Macedonia, but throughout all the Balkans. Is it good? Is it bad? Who does it benefit? These are just a few questions that I will try to answer in this work while focusing on Macedonian politics.

The topic of Nationalism in Macedonia is an important topic today, in fact it has been since the independence of Macedonia and before. Nationalism affects not only the state in international relations, not only in internal political policy, but also effects the citizens of the country directly. I have chosen two terms that briefly explain the importance this thesis; Political Importance and Social Importance.

Political Importance: Politics tells us how a society must be set up and how one should act within a society. The citizens within this political system must be allowed to fully

function according to the “nature of man”¹, if this doesn’t happen, the citizens will either rebel, as seen in the 2001 conflict, or the system will eventually collapse. Unfortunately the situation in Macedonia, even today, is anything but natural. The essay will be full of examples on how the system in Macedonia does not allow the citizens to fully function according to their nature.

Social Importance: Using the same thought as Aristotle, a person survives and flourishes based on their ability to exercise and use their reason. The appropriate role of government is important to improve the lives of the people. If the government does not defend and uphold the individual rights of the people, the people will either protest or flee from Macedonia. This unfortunately has been happening for a long time now, and the Ohri Agreement hasn’t stopped the people from protesting or from fleeing the country (Pajaziti, 2016).

When the people start seeing a healthy future for themselves and for their family in Macedonia, only then will the protests and fleeing stop. In order for this to happen, it is important for the government to change its priorities. The importance of this thesis paper is that it will help us better understand the mistakes or actions our government is making, how to undo these mistakes or actions and find a solution that will help the people live naturally in a safe protected life with purpose for a future in their own land.

In order to better understand the current complex situation Macedonia finds itself in today this thesis will discuss analyze and try to understand the following three main sections.

The aim of the first section is to have a better understanding of the history and identity of the country and its people. The section will be divided into four main and different histories of Macedonia; by Macedonian historians, Albania historians, Greek historians, and Bulgarian historians. Part two of this section is to have a better understanding of the role of

¹ “The nature of man” as defined by Aristotal: “The ability to reason separates man from all other living organisms and supplies him with his unique means of survival and flourishing.” (Younkins, 2005, f. 83)

Macedonia in ex-Yugoslavia, and finally a narration of understanding Independent Macedonia. The aim of this section is to analyze and better understand the political activities from both ethnic Macedonian politics as well as ethnic Albanian politics in Macedonia today.

The aim of the second section will be on understanding the concept of nationalism and its unending role in Macedonia. This section will be divided in two main parts; Nationalism before and after the 2001 Conflict. This section will help us better understand the change, if any, that the uprising in 2001 had and is having on the country.

The aim of the third section will be discussing analyzing and understanding the current hot topics in the political arena today such as; the name conflict between Macedonia and Greece, Skopje 2014, and the New Nationalisms (ethnic hatred re-expressed).

Understanding that in this type of field of study there is rarely ever just one clear solution in any given problem, and taking into consideration all the documents shared, analyzes made, and topics that will be discussed in this essay, four different solutions will become clear in the final chapter, one more likely than the other, but all four solutions worth discussing exclusively.

Chapter I
History/Identity

Section I **History/Identity**

There is no doubt to how important history is for people and for a nation. It is a backbone for the healthy survival of many countries that exist today. It has been studied over and over by many brilliant minds in the past and the present, each year giving rise to new facts that either change how we view our past or supporting what we have already learned. But no matter where the sources come from, a knowledge seeker should always question his readings. There are two main types of historians, the first type of historian is the person who searches databases from around the world, combining, analysing, and comparing to come up with the truth of a past that is long gone. The second type of historian is the type that has a purpose of twisting facts and findings to forge a false history that supports their own political agenda.

This chapter will discuss the history of Macedonia in five different views. How can it be possible that a country could have five different versions of its history shared to the world? The answer is simple, the reason why Macedonia has five different versions of its history is because the history the government of Macedonia shares with its people neglects the history of the people that live inside Macedonia, which in return causes major conflicts between Macedonia and its neighbours; Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian and Macedonian versions of the history of the country is very contradicting. This chapter will briefly go through the five different versions, while highlighting the major areas that are disputed between the three, analysing, comparing and contrasting each history to find a logical meaning to all the conflict.

Ancient Macedonia Thesis

History of Ancient Macedonia is, if not the most, one of the most important topics discussed in Macedonia today. But I will not discuss much of the Ancient Macedonian history in this chapter because discussing the existence, the culture, or the language of Ancient Macedonia is not an important part of this topic. What I will focus on is what link today's inhabitants of Macedonia claim they have with Ancient Macedonia. This link between Macedonia and Ancient Macedonia is what is questioned not only by Greeks, Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians and many other foreign historians, but it is also questioned by Macedonians themselves, as will be seen farther into this Thesis. The followings are history taken strictly from Macedonian popular beliefs that fuel their identity which in return plays a major role in the politics of the state. I will restrain from commenting and analysing this information until the appropriate time within this chapter.

The following will be a brief timeline of important events in Macedonian popular history that form today's Macedonian culture.²

Timeline:

6th century: Slavs enter Macedonia and mix with the locals.

9th century: the brothers Sts. Cyrilus and Methodius of Salonika created the first Slavic alphabet, translating Christian scriptures in the language used by the local Slavs. They spread literacy and Christianity among the Slavic People of the Balkans establishing the first Slavic University, the Ohrid Literacy School, which closely resembles the modern alphabet used by the Macedonians, Russians, Serbs, Montenegrins and Bulgarians.

² The following historical information is mostly taken from an online source, www.historyofmacedonia.org. The information on this website is I believe part of the Macedonian historical belief of which are mostly contested.

10th century: First Macedonian medieval state was created, with its centre being Ohrid, led by Emperor Tsar Samuil.

13th and 14th century: short lived Serbian and Bulgarian states. Macedonia remained a Byzantine territory until the Ottoman Turks conquered Macedonia in 1389.

18th century: Turks abolished the Ohrid Archbishopric which had been keeping the Macedonians spiritually alive since Tsar Samuil.

1876 The Razlovci Uprising, insurrection in eastern Macedonia which signaled the national liberation struggle.

1878-1879: The Macedonian Kresna Uprising, insurrection which adopted a constitution known as The Rules of the Macedonian Uprising Committee.

19th century: Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria freed themselves from the Ottomans, which then claimed Macedonian territory. Thus in the 19th century Macedonian national awareness arose.

From the 19th century the national identity of the Macedonian people arose, from this point on there are many questions as to who was behind the making of modern day Macedonia. I will not go through the history in detail, but I will mention some specific parts in history that are debated.

As can be seen from the above timeline, there has been many uprisings, some not mentioned above, until the 1900s. The Razlovtsi Insurrection in 1876 and followed by the Macedonian Kresna Uprising in 1879 both uprisings lead by Dimitar Popgeorgiev. I will not go into detail surrounding these uprisings just yet. There is a purpose why I chose to mention these two uprisings; it will be made clear later in this chapter.

To continue, in 1884 the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was established in aims to liberate Macedonia from the Ottoman rule. This is a very important date, because the VMRO of today is the leading political party of Macedonia, it claims ideological descent from the old IMRO. IMRO changed its goals a few times, but in general the goals remained the same. The first set of goals were; “1. *The goal of the Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization is to unite any and all dissatisfied elements in Macedonia and the Adrianople Vilayet without regard to their nationality so that political autonomy can be gained for these two regions.* 2. *The Organization opposes any other country's intentions to divide and conquer these two regions.*”³ Three prominent Macedonian heroes came out of this revolutionary organization; Hristo Tatarchev, Dame Gruev, and Gotse Delchev. This organization also established the Ilinden uprising, an armed uprising against the Ottoman regime.

Following the Young Turk Uprising⁴, and the retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans, the Balkans were divided up where some nations gained more territory than others. According to popular Macedonian history, at this time Macedonian land was divided into Greece and Serbia. Thus the objectives of the IMRO changed and started rebelling against Greece and Serbia, creating a new autonomous state in new Yugoslavia. These are the borders that remain to this day.

This was a very short summary of Macedonian history from popular Macedonian point of view. The following part of this chapter will discuss the historical contradictions between the Greek and Bulgarian view of Macedonian history as well as the brief look into the Serbian and Albanian point of view on Macedonian history and identity.

³ Hristo Tatarchev wrote in his memoirs (Gabor, 2013, f. 13)

⁴ Young Turk Uprising caused the start of the second Constitutional Monarchy in the Ottoman Empire, reinstating the parliament as well as reinstating the 1879 constitution. For more information on this and the Young Turks see (Hanioglu, 2001)

Greek Contradiction

I will discuss the Greek contradiction first because it goes back into an ancient time. Going back so far and making an argument that a nation of today belongs to and is a direct line to a people such as ancient Greek, ancient Macedonia, or Illyria is not easy, in Macedonia's case, according to Greece, it is impossible. The following part of this chapter will describe Greek history on ancient Macedonia, and how today's Macedonians have no correlation with ancient Macedonia.

As mentioned above in this chapter, Macedonians claims to be ancient Macedonians, and direct decedents of Alexander the Great, basing this solely on the fact that the Macedonians of today reside in the territory of ancient Macedonia. According to Greek historians, ancient Macedonia was an ancient "Greek kingdom of Macedonia", and the people of Macedonia spoke a dialect of Greek. Greek historians also claim that Alexander the Great while creating the largest empire in the ancient world that stretched from the Ionian Sea to the Himalaya Mountains also spread Greek culture to these distant areas.

This contradiction of ancient history by the Greeks brings up an important question; if today's Macedonians are not ancient Macedonians, what are they? According to Greece, Macedonians of today are Slavic Macedonians, not connected in any way to the ancient Macedonians. Therefore it is not just the name of Macedonia that is contested by Greece be used to refer to the current state of Macedonia; also contested by Greece is the Macedonian identity that is being stolen from ancient Greece. As a result vetoing Macedonia's acceptance into NATO, and also preventing Macedonia from getting a date for the start of negotiations with the EU. All of this can easily destabilise an already weak country. Why is Greece going to such trouble given its economic collapse to prevent Macedonia to claim an ancient history? Answer is as follows; Greece is worried that by accepting Macedonia as Macedonia, and also

accepting Macedonians as the ancient Macedonians, sooner or later Macedonia would claim Greek land that belong to ancient Macedonia, witch as a result would cause another conflict in the region.

To quote Vedran Kuljanin, a research analyst at the NATO Association of Canada, “Greece views the term “Macedonians” as all Greek citizens living in the province of Macedonia, while seeing their northern neighbour’s name as a threat to Greek territory, history, and culture. It views citizens of the Republic of Macedonia as Slavs instead of sharing a bloodline with Macedonians, and feel that as long as the nation uses the name Macedonia and celebrates Macedonian history, it is stealing a part of Greek culture” (Kuljanin, 2016). The quote is self-explanatory, there is a conflict of history in the region between Greece and Macedonia, where one (Macedonia) is trying to identify itself with an ancient race (reasons will be made clear in the following chapters), and the other (Greeks) are threatened of a history and identity that they believe belongs to them is being stolen by a Slavic people that has no direct attachment to the ancient Macedonians.

Bulgarian Contradiction

The Bulgarian contradiction is much more modern then fellow neighbour Greeks contradiction. The Bulgarian contradiction starts around the 9th century when Macedonians claim that that is when their national Identity was awakened. If we look back to the section of Macedonian history starting from the 19th century, we can find contradictions by the Bulgarians for just about every activity from then and forward. The following will be a brief Macedonian history that is contradicted by Bulgaria, using the same timeline as a used above,

but taken mostly from Roumen Daskalov and Tchavdar Marinov in their book *Entangled Histories of the Balkans*.⁵

In the 9th century we have the brothers Sts. Cyrilus and Methodius of Salonika. They are both national heroes of both Macedonia and Bulgaria. Bulgaria of course claims that Sts. Cyrilus and his brother Methodius were Bulgarians that translated the Christian scriptures to Old Bulgarian.

In the 10th century Tsar Samuil was Emperor of the first Bulgarian Empire from 997 to 1014 his capital was in Ohrid. In this case we have Macedonians that claim he was the Emperor of Macedonia, and the Bulgarians that claim he was the Emperor of Bulgaria. Serbians used to claim he was Emperor of Macedonia, but modern day Serbian historians reject that claim and agree with Bulgarians historians, giving Tsar Samuil Bulgarian background.

1878-1879 The Kresna and Razlovci Uprising was an important date mentioned in Macedonian history, the initiators for the Kresna and Razlovci uprising were Lyubed Karavelov and Stefan Stambolov (Marinov, 2013). What is surprising while exploring the backgrounds of these two people is that Lyubed Karavelov was born in Koprivshitsa, a city near Sofia, he was an important figure of the Bulgarian National Revival. Stefan Stambolov was a Bulgarian politician born in Veliko Tarnovo, who served as Prime Minister and regent of Bulgaria, he was considered as one of the founders of modern day Bulgaria. Therefore was the Kresna and Razlovci Uprising an ethnic Macedonian uprising? As we can see, according to Bulgarians, it was not a Macedonian uprising but rather a Bulgarian uprising.

⁵ The following is mostly gathered from (Marinov, 2013) . To add, I believe that to Bulgarians, these historical events are common knowledge, where many of these historical figures are also celebrated in Bulgaria as well as Macedonia.

Until this point of time, Bulgaria was still not an independent country, with this in mind, could these uprisings have been Bulgarian uprisings spread over Bulgarian populated land? It is a big possibility given the background of the key figures mentioned. This leads us to look at the Treaty of San Stefano as well as the Treaty of Berlin. In the Treaty of San Stefano, Bulgaria declared independence, trying to keep its Bulgarian population all inside its borders stretched out to the west including nearly all of Macedonia. This supersized Bulgaria alarmed the neighboring states as well as the great powers, resulting to the Treaty of Berlin, where the borders envisioned by Bulgaria were reduced to the borders as we know them today, while the Kosova Vilayet , Manastir Vilayet and the rest of present day Macedonia remained under Ottoman Rule. Bulgaria could not extend its borders as much as it wanted, but it had another option, explained in the following paragraph.

In 1884 the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) was established, the founders being Hristo Tatarchev, Dame Gruev, Petar Pop-Arsov, Andon Dimitrov, Hristo Batandzhiev and Ivan Hadzhinikolov. As we look back to Macedonian history, we learned that this organizations purpose was to gain political autonomy for the two vilayets. According to Bulgarian history, this was not the main purpose. Dr. Hristo Tatarchev one of the founders said *“We talked a long time about the goal of this organization and at last we fixed it on autonomy of Macedonia with the priority of the Bulgarian element. We couldn't accept the position for "direct joining to Bulgaria" because we saw that it would meet big difficulties by reason of confrontation of the Great powers and the aspirations of the neighboring small countries and Turkey. It passed through our thoughts that one autonomous Macedonia could easier unite with Bulgaria subsequently and if the worst comes to the worst, that it could play a role as a unificating link of a federation of Balkan people.”*⁶ As seen with this quote from a founder of the IMRO, as was the IMRO a secrete Macedonian-Adrianople

⁶ The quote is retrieved from (Основањето на ВМРО) , memoirs from Dr. Hristo Tatarchev.

Revolutionary Organization, it had secret Bulgarian agendas. When Bulgaria declared independence, it could not create a Great Bulgaria, the foreign powers would not let that happen, but what it can do, what it tried to do, was create another Bulgarian state, Macedonia. Krste Misirkov, said to be one of the most outstanding names in the Macedonian culture and history, wrote *“We can call the Uprising whatever we like, but in fact it was only a partial movement. It was, and still is, an affair of the Exarchists: that is, a Bulgarian ploy to settle the Macedonian question to its own advantage by creating a Bulgarian Macedonia”* (Misirkov, 2008).

Taking into consideration the Bulgarian background of the founders of the IMRO, as well as their purpose, also adding the fact that Big Bulgaria was refused, while the desire of a Big Bulgaria was present, there is intent on the desire to create a second Bulgarian state that would sometime in the future attach itself to Bulgaria. Unfortunately for Bulgaria, a new identity arose copying the ancient Macedonian identity with help from the Yugoslavian government.

Albanian Contradiction

What I believe is important in this section is to know and understand the official Albanian States view on Macedonia. A declaration of the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “Macedonia has “died” with Alexander the Great, it does not support neither Athens nor Skopje on this issue, instead the integration of Skopje in NATO and EU is more important.” (IBP, 2012, f. 162)

Albanians in general are not threatened by Macedonians claim of their so called ancient background. The problem is that Albanians are not included into Macedonian history.

Albanians are over 25% of the general population of Macedonia (Kostadinova, 2002, f. 34), but when a curious person searches Macedonian government websites to learn about the country's culture, nothing can be found about Albanians, as if Albanians don't exist, or are not important enough to be factored in. This causes confusion, hatred, feeling of being discriminated and a state of not feeling a part of, or not belonging to this country.

Not only are Albanians not included into the general culture of Macedonia, but when they rarely are, the Albanians are labelled as "mountain people" and the "Albanian nation descended in Macedonia together with the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century". These not being just a view of one person, or a nationalistic Slavic Macedonian organization, these are words taken from the last Macedonia's encyclopaedia written by the Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences (MANU). "Mountain people" is what MANU and the Macedonians believe for over 25% of their population. How would that make an Albanian ethnic citizen feel when the state in which they live in discriminate so openly, and tries to devalue a whole community in front of the intellectual world? It would make them feel the urge to revolt! And that is what happened.

What is the Albanian history in Macedonia? If we go as far back in time as Macedonians do (Ancient Macedonia), Illyrians lived in many cities that exist in today's state of Macedonia, such as Heraklea (Bitola), Lyhrida (Ohri), Uskane (Kicevo), Scupi (Skopje), Oenej (Tetovo). According to many historians, as well as Merita Dollma explains in her book *Albanian Regions*, these are ancient cities inhabited by Illyrians (Dollma, 2014, f. 226). Then, there is the question of Alexander the Great, was he Macedonian? Was he Greek? There are many historians who would make Alexander the Great half Albanian, coming from an Illyrian grandmother, and/or an Illyrian mother.⁷ Therefore Alexander the Great is as

⁷ Eurudice I of Macedon was an Illyrian Princess which married Phillip II, she is the peternal grandmother of Alexander the Great. (Encyclopedia, 2004) also William Woodthrope Tarn, in his book *Alexander the Great*

much Albanian as he is Macedonian or Greek.

Skipping through time, we see ourselves in the Ottoman era. The last 200 years of Ottoman rule saw Albanians divided into 4 Vilayets, Janina, Shkodra, Kosova and Manastir. The last two Vilayets lay in the present western region of today's Macedonia. Vilayet of Kosovas capital was Skopje for most of the time, Vilayet of Manastir capital was Manastir (today Bitola). A Flemish Magazine back in December 21, 1912 publicised the ethnic composure of the vilayets in the Balkans, according to *Ons Volk Ontwaakt* (De Godsdiensten op den Balkan., 2009) Vilayet of Kosovo had about 418.000 Albanian Muslims, 250.000 Bulgarian Christians, and 113.000 Orthodox Serbs. The Vilayet of Manastir had 219.000 Albanian Muslims, 331.000 Christian Bulgarians. The statistics do not mention any Macedonian ethnicity. On the other hand, in other sources where Macedonian ethnicity is mentioned in the statistics of population, there is no mention of Bulgarian, therefore there is much manipulation when it comes to population statistics over there years as well as to this day.

To continue with a few Albanian historical moments that have happened in today's Macedonia are as follows: in 1908 Congress of Monastir (today's Bitola) was held by Albanians where they created the first Albanian alphabet which was later in 1910 confirmed and established. There are also many different people born in different cities in Macedonia that have had a big role in advancing Albanian nationality such as: Moisi Arianit Golemi from Dibra around the 1400s, Mehmed Pashe Qyprillu an important member of Ottoman government who also founded the city of Veles. Mehmet Pasha Deralla, born in Gostivar, one of the signers of the Declaration of the Albanian independence. Gerasim Qiriazi born in Manastir; Ibrahim Temo, born in Struga; Haxhi Vehbi Agolli, born in Dibra also a signer of the Declaration of the Albanian Independence; Parashqevi Qiriazi born in Manastir, having a

Volume 1, says "Alexander certainly had from his father (Philip II) and probably from his mother (Olympia) Illyrian, i.e., Albanian, blood."

major impact on the educational system of Albania; Josif Bageri from Dibra; Dervish Hima born in Ohri; Mefail Shehu from Kicevo; and of course Mother Teresa. They all have a significant amount of importance for the Albanians in Macedonia.

To conclude this section, the historical issues between the Albanian community and Macedonian government is an issue of neglect, more so than an issue of contradiction. The Albanian community wants to be included, not rejected from the history of Macedonia.

Serbian Contradiction

While researching, I came across a book called *The Ideology of Serbian Nationalism*. The author Prof. Lazo M. Kostic wrote about every state in the Balkans and how they are, or are not part of the Serb identity.⁸ Kostic writes about the Macedonian language, saying “the Macedonian language ‘was an interim form between Serbian and Bulgarian’... The Macedonians never had their literary language, nor did they have their literature or literacy until WWII...there are no Macedonian written monuments, only Serbian and, to a lesser extent, Bulgarian” (Kostic, 2011, f. 726). Kostic continues by quoting Dr Kajica Milanov: according to Milanov, there are two main different Slavic dialects spoken in Macedonia, one is closer to the Serbian language, the other closer to the Bulgarian language, today’s official Macedonian language is a mixture of these two dialects. According to Kostic, the reason why the Macedonian language was created was to shrink “Serbdom” as much as possible. He says it was the Yugoslav communists that created these new languages and therefore the new Macedonian identity was created to damage the Serbian nation as much as possible (Kostic, 2011, f. 728).

⁸ (Kostic, 2011) It is noteworthy to say that the publisher of this book is the Serbian Radical Party. Keeping this in mind, Serbian fascism plays a large role in the logical makeup of this book. Therefore the information gathered from this book needs to be read in a skeptical manner. The information I choose to share from this source is to show Serbian popular belief of their reality in the Balkans.

There is much written about Serbs in Macedonia in Kostic's book, some logically acceptable, such as the above quotes on language. Personally I would rather not write much more quoting Kostic's book, except to add that on page 465 the author mentions Pjeter Bogdani as an Serbian Catholic Archbishop of Skopje. This reminds me of Mother Teresa, how the government labels her "skopjanka" once even planning on giving a statue of Teresa to Rome but inscribed in Cyrillic, or erected monuments in Skopje inscribed in Macedonian and English but neglecting Albanian (France-Presse, 2016). But what do Pjeter Bogdani and Gonxhe Bojaxhiu have in common? They are both Catholic, both important to the city of Skopje, one is labelled as Serb from Serbian propaganda, the other labelled as Macedonian by Macedonian propaganda. To zoom out a bit more, what do these two issues have in common? They both seem similar, both using the same methods to steal identities. To be blunt, Macedonian politics have learned from their Serbian neighbours on how to create and enforce their identity. Even though Kostic in his book makes Serbs seem like the victim, it is supposed that Serb politics itself has created the Macedonian identity in order to minimize Bulgarian influence in Macedonia as much as possible, not the other way around as Kostic noted "to shrink Serbdom".

Section II

Independent Macedonia

Macedonia declared independence on September 8, 1991 by referendum. 75.8% of the population voted, 95.5% of which voted for independence. The independence was not recognised until April of 1993 because of Greek opposition due to the name "Macedonia", which was solved by being recognised as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. As a new country, Macedonia faced many issues which have still been lingering on disturbing the stability of the state every few months. Conflicts ranged from internal to external, as

mentioned previously in this chapter, identity conflicts between Macedonia and Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, as well as internal issues between Macedonian government and the Albanian community which will be discussed more thoroughly in upcoming chapters.

Besides the Identity conflict that had already been an issue since the creation of the Macedonian identity during the Yugoslav era, Macedonia as a new state created new conflicts with its citizens by discriminating against a large community, starting off by adopting a mono cultural constitution that treated other ethnicities within the country as second rate citizens. In other words, Macedonia was created for Macedonians, as the famous VMRO slogan of the 1890s “Macedonia for the Macedonians” (Rossos, 2008, f. 94).

Chapter II

Nationalism Before and After 2001 Conflict

Section I

What is Nationalism?

What is Nationalism? Is it bad? Is it good? Do we, as a state or as an individual, need it? Or can we do without it?

Before analysing nationalism, I would like to define the word Nation. Hence what is a Nation? The definition of Nation taken from the online Oxford Dictionaries is “a large body of people united by common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory”. For the most part, just about everybody has an understanding of what Nation is, what I would like to do is to go into a bit more detail of two different types of Nations that exist before analysing Nationalism. The two types are as follows: Civic Nation & Ethnic Nation.

Civic Nation (Ignatieff, 1995) is defined in principle as a community of common citizens of that nation having equal rights and being united in patriotic practices and values regardless of one’s ethnicity, race, colour, religion, gender or language. An example of a civic nation is the United Kingdom in that it is composed of four countries: England, Scotland, Wales and North Ireland. The British Prime Ministers website used the phrase “country within a country” (Cameron, 2003). This shows that these different ethnic people were united into a nation not by its ethnicity, language or religion, but united by a democratic community that vests equal rights to its citizens that are united in shared sets of political practices and values.

Ethnic Nation (Ignatieff, 1995) is defined by ethnicity, language, religion, customs and traditions. In ethnic nation it is not the state that creates the nation (as is true in a civic nation), it is the nation that creates the state. What holds these people together is not shared sets of political practices and values, but it is their ethnic characteristics that hold a nation together. Examples of an ethnic nation today are basically all the Eastern European nations.

Now that we have some idea to what a nation is, we can get back to the main topic of this chapter, Nationalism according to Albert L. Guerard (Guerard, 1957) from Stanford University “nationalism is militant hatred. It is not love of our countrymen: that, which denotes good citizenship, philanthropy, practical religion, should go by the name patriotism. Nationalism is passionate xenophobia. It is fanatical, as all forms of idol-worship are bound to be.” This quote brings us to patriotism. Similar to Guerard, many people believe that nationalism is the antonym of patriotism, meaning that nationalism is bad and patriotism is good. There is confusion to the definitions of these two important words by the people and by some politicians, therefore I will take some space into this chapter in explaining the two.

Patriotism defined: “Love of and devotion to one’s country”. (Merriam-Webster Patriotism)

Nationalism defined: “1. Devotion to the interests of culture of ones nation. 2. The belief that nations will benefit from acting independently rather than collectively, emphasizing national rather than international goals. 3. Aspirations for national independence in a country under foreign domination.” (Merriam-Webster Nationalism)

In other words, we can see by these two definitions that patriotism is just a feeling we have to one’s country, whereas nationalism is our actions of patriotism to one’s country. If by these definitions we see that nationalism and patriotism go together hand in hand to improve and support one’s ethnic, cultural, linguistic identity, why is nationalism criticized so much as seen nowadays in Albania and Macedonia. Does Albert L. Guerard definition of nationalism exist only in Eastern Europe where there are “ethnic nations”? On the contrary, nationalism exists all around the world in different levels. It is these different levels that make nationalism immoral, it is also these different levels that make patriotism immoral. The extreme level of nationalism that taints this word is fascism, in the same hand the extreme level of patriotism is chauvinism.

Therefore nationalism doesn't only belong to East Europe, and patriotism to West Europe and the USA. Nationalism and patriotism belongs to the world; it all depends on the extent of nationalism, the internal situation of the nations questioned, and how the state is using nationalism to handle its internal/international affairs. Michael Billig in his book "*Banal Nationalism*" addresses this point; he says that nationalism is related to extremists and guerrilla figures working in existing structures of states to create their own homeland on the expense of the current state (Billig, 1995, f. 5). This is where the accepted view of nationalism becomes immoral it overlooks the nationalism of the West nation states. Nationalism is not as obvious in the Western nation states as is in the Eastern nation states, but it does exist. According to Michael Billig, nationalism strikes these Western states in times of crises, such as the Falkland's, the Gulf Wars, or 9/11. To touch 9/11 a bit; ever since 9/11 there is created hatred toward Islam and the Arab world. Is this not nationalism at its worst's level?

Going back to the original definition of nation state and viewing it from a different perspective. Can nationalism be positive or negative to a nation state seeing that a nation state is a country that is created by a nation, and therefore works for that nation? Nationalism can be dangerous if different nations or groups live inside that same country. The state will constantly feel threatened by the other groups that live within it, and therefore try to find ways to protect itself. This is usually in the expense of the smaller groups within that nation state. While this happens the groups within the state start feeling threatened, and therefore patriotism and nationalism start arise to higher levels than before. This is where everything gets out of control, and where healthy patriotism and nationalism to protect the state becomes chauvinism and fascism against smaller and less powerful communities.

Unfortunately it still may not be clear, is nationalism moral or immoral? I believe nationalism is a defence mode for states and groups of people that identify themselves as a

community belonging to a common culture, language and/or ethnicity. It's as Jimmy Carter (the 39th president of the US) once said "A strong nation, like a strong person, can afford to be gentle, firm, thoughtful, and restrained. It can afford to extend helping hand to others. It's a weak nation, like a weak person, that must behave with bluster and boasting and rashness and other signs of insecurity." At the end, a state cannot do without nationalism, nation states that are created by nations are kept alive by nationalism. Without it their livelihood is at constant risk. It can be argued that this is the reason to why the Balkans is knee deep in conflict, many nations in a small limited territory that are a constant danger to each other.

Section II

Balkan Nationalisms

Now that we understand to a better extent what a nation, nationalism and patriotism is, we can discuss nationalism in the Balkans. To do this, will have to see where nationalism came from, and how it ended up in the Balkans. It is not clear exactly when and where nationalism came from, but it is the effect of a few different historical happenings in the 18th century such as the American Revolution and French Revolution. Before this, people were mostly loyal to their cities or leaders rather than to their nation, for example the people of the American Colonies that were loyal to the King of England were called Loyalists at the time, on the other hand those who wanted independence were called Patriots or Americans. It would be straying from the topic to start and discuss the American and French revolution, therefore briefly put, these two revolutions created two of the first modern states that pushed for popular sovereignty from the Kings and Queens of the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of France, hence the loyalties moved away from loyalty to their leaders/Kings and Queens to loyalty towards their nation/state, creating two of the first modern states.

There are a few theories that caused all of this. Two major theories are the modernist perspective (Motyl, 2001, f. 508) , and the primordialist perspective (Motyl, 2001, f. 272).

The modernist perspective perceives that nationalism arises from a state having a language that all citizens in that state know, having an economy able to provide for the society, and of course having a government with authority able to keep the people in the society united. Karl Marx at the time gave an example of the British colonial rule in India, according to Karl Marx, British colonial rule in India brought development in India which before that was a “rural idiocy of its feudalism”(Kostic, 2011)

The primordialist perceives that nationalism is based on evolutionary theory. Meaning that, nationalism is a result of human evolving into identifying themselves with groups, such as ethnic groups. What makes these groups long lasting is that they usually identify themselves linked on the lines of common ancestry, such as the Greeks of today linking themselves with the ancient Greeks, Macedonians of today claim to have a common ancestor with Alexander the Great, and also Albanians of today being the direct descendants of the Illyrians.

As noted above, globally speaking nationalism is a fairly new way of life, therefore it is fairly new in the Balkans as well. What I would like to discuss next is the start of nationalism in the Balkans, choosing only a few Balkan countries; Macedonia and its neighbours, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia.

The following will be a brief explanation of the start of nationalism in the Balkans.

The Greeks gained independence in 1832. According to Wesley M. Gewehr in his book *The Rise of Nationalism in the Balkans, 1800-1930*, the Greeks were the most privileged in the Ottoman Empire therefore, being the first to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire. In the following we will try to explain the beginning of nationalism that lead to the independence of Greece with the help of Wesley M. Gewehr.

After the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottomans saw the Greek Church as a means to control the Christians of the Balkans, and therefore the Greek Church was given the authority over all other branches of Christians in the Balkans (Gewehr, 1931, f. 13). Thus, the Turks marked all Christians in the Balkans as Greeks, similar to how all Muslims were marked as Turks. Gewehr mentions that the Greek Church was so successful in the functionality of the Church that it became as “burdensome and oppressive as the domination of the Turks.” The Greek Church was well organised, and very well educated, and held high positions within the Ottoman Empire to an extent of dominating the economics of the Ottomans.

Another thing that helped the Independence of Greece was the amount of freedom its provinces had in relation to the Slavs in the region. According to Gewehr, some of its provinces had so much autonomy that it could have amounted to independence (Gewehr, 1931, f. 14).

What really kick started Greek Nationalism was the revival of the Greek Language by Adamantios Korais. While classical Greek was read by the well-educated and clergy, the majority of the population did not know it and spoke a mixture of Turkish, Albanian and Slavic tongue (Gewehr, 1931, f. 15). Korais created a new Greek language which mixed classical Greek with the native tongue of the region. Therefore according to Gewehr, this is when the Greeks became conscious of their Greek identity, and hence forwards stopped calling themselves “Romaioi” (as they have been doing ever since the Roman Empire) and started calling themselves Hellenes. (Gewehr, 1931, f. 15)

Ali Pasha “lion of Janina” was also an important factor in the success of the fight for the independence of the Greeks. Ali Pasha became so powerful in the Balkans that he was seen as a major threat to the Ottomans, and in 1820 the Sultan declared him guilty of treason, and ordered him replaced. Ali Pasha of course did not accept this and called for the Greeks

and Albanians to unite against the Ottomans for an independent and united state, the Greeks refused not wanting to be part of the tyrant Ali Pasha's war for independence. After years of successful resistance Ali Pasha was assassinated in 1822.

The revolt and later assassination of Ali Pasha, with the help of Greek privileged position in the Ottoman Empire, the revival of their national identity, and the same religion they share with the Russians leading to support from Russia, that started with the League of Friends that started in Russia in 1814, the Greeks were ready to start the war for independence in 1821, and finally became independent in 1832 with much smaller borders than it has today. But with the Treaty of Sevres signed on August 1920, Greece did become the most beneficiary in the Balkans leading to today's Greek Borders. (Gewehr, 1931, f. 102)

The **national awakening in Serbia**, roughly around 1804 was the beginning of Serbian uprisings against Ottoman rule which led to the independence of Serbia as a state in 1878. However, Serb Nationalists today claim that Serbian nationalism started in 1389 at the Battle of Kosova⁹. As we stated earlier, nationalism is a new trend, started by the American Revolution as well as the French Revolution, both of which started in the 18th century. Saying that Serbian national awakening started roughly 500 years before nation states (as defined earlier) existed, is an exaggeration. What is also worth noting is that the facts of the Battle of Kosova in 1389 are very unclear. Serbian history books say it was a battle between Serbs and Ottomans, on the other hand many other historians say it was a fight between a union of

⁹ Seselj quotes English scientist Elisabeth Hill "The same spirit of Kosovo urged the Serbs to make a choice in 1914, the choice that ultimately created Yugoslavia. The same spirit urged the Yugoslavs to make their choice on the 27 March 1941. There were many Kosovo battles as of 27 March. The spirit of Kosovo, which lives even today, carries one message for all of us – not just for all the Serbs but for all the Yugoslavs and all the nations in the Balkans – it encourages us to neither make compromises or create something temporary, deceptive, opportunistic, but to keep the faith for which the Serbian Tsar Lazar died for good and at any cost. We are all responsible for each other. We have a mutual responsibility. We chose to be allies in the war that just ended, but our mutual future is to gain peace by reviving the Kosovo spirit. And the more we take part in the revival of that spirit, the more we will contribute to the spiritual reconstruction of Europe" (Seselj, 2011, f. 649)

Christian kingdoms against the Ottomans¹⁰. Taking into consideration the earlier definitions of nations and nationalism, during the Middle Ages loyalties rested upon kings, queens, and cities, not on nations. Therefore it is more logical that the battle was between a union of Christian Kingdoms against the Muslim Ottoman invasion.

Now that we have taken the 1389 Battle of Kosova out of the nationalist equation, we can discuss 18th century national awakening of a Serbian state with the help of Gewehr. (Gewehr, 1931, fv. 16-21). According to Gewehr, the Serb nationalism was directly linked to the Serb Church. Even though oppressed by the Greek Church, the Greek Church did not have enough time to destroy the Serb Church, possible because of the geographical distance Serbia has in relation to the Istanbul, and therefore escaped much of the oppression from the Turks. In the beginning of the 19th century the Serbs were enjoying the mild rule of Hadji Mustapha Pasha who the Serbs even called “mother” (Gewehr, 1931, f. 16). According to Gewehr, this all changed when the Sultan was forced to send his disobedient but privileged Janissaries to the farthest Pashas, one of which happened to be Serbia. The situation grew intolerable when the Janissaries killed “mother” Hadji Mustapha Pasha, and forced the Sultan to replace him with a puppet figure for the Janissaries. With this started the plundering of the Serb, when Sultan Selim the III threatened the Janissaries that he will arm the Christians (Serbs), the Janissaries started killing the Serb leaders, and thus the revolt of Serbia that started in 1804, ended with the independence of Serbia in 1878. This is brief historical facts that lead to the independence of Serbia, but also is the main reasons that lead to an uprising for the Serbian national awakening.

Serbian Nationalism started a bit earlier, in the book *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States*, Milorad Ekmečić gives the Serbian Church credit for the start of Serbian nationalism when the Serbian church councils were held from 1769-1787

¹⁰ “Lazar unified all the noblemen as his allies, except for the Balšićes.” (Seselj, 2011, f. 31)

(Vjekoslav, 2002, f. 8). Since that date, the Serbian Church has had a massive role in Serbian nationalism, as well as Serbian politics up to this day. The historian of modern Serbia Michael. B. Petrovich pointed out that “the Serbian Orthodox church was a cultural and quasi-political institution, which embodied and expressed the ethos of the Serbian people to such a degree that nationality and religion fused into a distinct ‘Serbian faith.’ This role of the Serbian church had little to do with religion either as theology or as a set of personal beliefs and convictions” (Vjekoslav, 2002, f. 6). A Serbian archpriest recalls being taught as a child: “The Serbian heaven is blue; the Serb God reigns in heaven; angel Serbs stand around him; and serve their Serb God.” According to Michael Radu “More so than in the rest of Catholic or Protestant Western Europe, Orthodox churches of Eastern Europe have long been openly and actively involved in national politics and are intimately and historically connected with the region's dominant post-communist ideology—nationalism.”(Ekmecic)pg8

Another important fact was the amount of saints inaugurated by the assembly of bishops. “From the beginning of the systematic worship of the national saints in the late sixteenth century to the present, the Serbian Orthodox Church canonized 76 saints who were all ethnic Serbs. Most Serbian national saints are Church leaders and clergy, with 22 rulers and statesmen, several peasants and artisans, and six women.” (Vjekoslav, 2002, f. 8)

These all prove the massive role the Serbian Church had on Serbian nationalism and its role in politics of the Serbian state.

Moving forward to **Bulgarian national** awakening, because of being much closer to Constantinople, the Bulgarians were the Christian who suffered the most by the Ottoman oppression. But what sparked the awakening of their national identity was not the Turks, it was the Greek Church. As mentioned earlier, the Christians of the Balkans were all labelled as Greek (Rumlar), according to Turkish law, religion was the ethnicity (Gewehr, 1931, f.

35). The Phanariote clergy¹¹ oppressed the Bulgarians to a level that Greek was the language of the upper class and the towns, while peasants even though spoke Bulgarian identified themselves as being Greek, Bulgarian schools were closed, and many manuscripts were destroyed (Gewehr, 1931, f. 34). But in 1762 Father Paisi, a monk of Mt. Athos, wrote a history book of Bulgaria, after him a slavonic scholar, named Venelin, wrote a similar book about Bulgaria. This sparked curiosity amongst the educated Bulgarians abroad, and in 1835 the first Bulgarian school was opened in Odesa, followed by many others. The Greek Church of course did not welcome this, and therefore a long struggle between the Bulgarians and the Greek church with the Sultan started and lasted for about 100 years. By this time, Russia in fear that the Bulgarian Church would ask the pop for protection of the Bulgarian Church, forced the Sultan to accept the Bulgarian Church, and therefore received the title Exarch (Gewehr, 1931, f. 35). As mentioned above, the Turkish Law identifying religion as nationality, the Bulgarian Church became a major factor in Bulgarian nationality. According to Gewehr, this was the first time the influence of Greek Church was challenged which led to bloody conflict in the region, specifically Macedonia (Gewehr, 1931, f. 35).

With a solid national identity, Bulgaria was now ready to fight for independence, but waited for the right moment, which came in 1876, when the Serbs declared war on Turkey, a few months later an uprising started in Bulgaria, where the massacres of Batak caused Europe to finally be aware of the Bulgarians. In 1877 the Russian-Turkish war started, where Russia marched through Romania and Bulgaria up to Istanbul. On the other hand, England worried about the growing influence of Russia in the Balkans, sent a fleet to Istanbul where the Treaty of San Stefano was signed between Russia and Turkey.

The Albanians were the last to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1912. According to Gewehr, the sudden change of Ottoman Empire policies by the Young Turks

¹¹ Phanariote clergy was an elite group with Greek identity under the Ottoman Empire that was treated as a representative for all Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Empire.

(Gewehr, 1931, f. 82) sparked the Albanian national awakening. Albanian schools were to be replaced by Turkish schools and the Turkish language would be now the language of instruction. This led to Albanian revolts every year from 1909 to 1912, until its independence in 1912. The borders were to include the districts of Shkodra, Manastir, Kosova and Janina. These regions were all claimed by Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, which caused much more problems for Albania after its independence.

At last we reach the **Macedonian national** awakening. According to Gewehr, after the independence of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, Macedonia was attacked with massive propaganda by their respective churches trying to convert their nationalities. They did this by either their Church or education, according to Gewehr, this wasn't hard to do because most of the villages in Macedonia spoke two or more languages, and therefore they can "magically" (Gewehr, 1931) pg80 change from one ethnicity to another. To add to all the confusion in Macedonia, Serbia and Greece sent "komitadjis" (patriotic brigands) which according to Gewehr, caused much violence, pillage and assassinations (Gewehr, 1931, f. 81). Many Bulgarians fled Macedonia to Bulgaria. What is noteworthy to add, is that in 1912 Serbia and Bulgaria signed a treaty where they agreed that northern Macedonia would be given to Serbia, while southern Macedonia would be given to Bulgaria. Bulgaria and Greece also signed a similar treaty with contemplated military actions against the Ottoman Empire, and so the Balkan League was secured, and war started with Montenegro declaring war on October 8. After it ended with the Treaty of London in 1913, Bulgaria asked for the Macedonian land agreed upon by the treaty signed between Serbia and Bulgaria. But Serbia rejected, and so did Greece for the reason that Greece had already occupied that land. The start of the second Balkan war started when Bulgaria attacked Serbia. Unfortunately for Bulgaria, Greece and Romania joined the side of Serbia, and Bulgaria lost the war for Greater

Bulgaria with the Treaty of Bucharest, leaving all central and southern Macedonia to Greece and Serbia.

This is where everything in Macedonia reaches another level of confusion, where national Macedonian awakening is argued to be Bulgarian national awakening (Explained in more detail in Chapter 1).

Section III

Macedonian Nationalism before 2001

Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia declared its independence in 1991 from Yugoslavia. For the purpose of this thesis we will divide Macedonian history into two parts; before the 2001 conflict, and after the 2001 conflict.

Before 2001, nationalism in Macedonia was at its worst form, it was discriminatory on all levels, from individual to state. First of all, there is clear evidence of state discrimination even from the fundamental set of rules that the state is obligated to follow written in the Macedonian Constitution of 1991, the preamble of the Constitution of The Republic Of Macedonia state the following:

“Taking as starting points the historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom...and particularly the traditions of statehood and legality of the Kruševo Republic...as well as the historical fact that Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanics and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia, and intent on the

establishment of the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign and independent state, as well as a civil and democratic one.” (Liotta & Jebb, 2004, f. 65)

This clearly overlooks the real demographics of the state. The statement groups Albanians in the same section as Turks, Vlachos, Roma and other nationalities, in reality Albanians are overwhelmingly larger in numbers than the other ethnic groups it was placed with. The population of Albanians in Macedonia is large enough to have a massive impact in the economics and politics of the country, thus it should be on an even floor with Macedonians.

Second discriminatory action taken was the destruction of the Albanian University of Tetovo. In December of 1994 the Macedonian government bulldozed the University of Tetovo, in February of 1995 a man was killed in clashes between Albanians and Macedonian police in protests over the University of Tetovo. While Albanians protested to open the University of Tetovo, in February 23 1995 Macedonian students protested in Skopje to prevent the University from opening. In May 1995 the dean of the university of Tetovo is sentenced to 2 ½ years in jail for inciting February 17 riots outside the university.

(Chronology for Albanians in Macedonia, 2004) According to the Macedonian constitution Article 45 states “citizens have a right to establish private schools at all levels of education, with the exception of primary education, under the conditions determined by law” even though Article 45 of the Constitution allows private schools at all levels (the Albanians were willing on financing the University themselves (Abrahams, 1996, f. 42), the government rejected the request to open The Private University in Tetova and on February 17 1995 two days after the University officially opened, one ethnic Albanian was killed by the police about twenty were injured due the Police declaring the University illegal.

Third discriminatory issue in Macedonia was from the naming of streets, schools, and even a new-born name (Pajaziti A. , 2012, fv. 11,12). Professor Mustafa Ibrahim from the

faculty of Languages, Cultures and Communications gives an example of an Albanian neighbourhood in Skopje that Albanians called Hasanbeg, during the Serbian era it was called Singelic, once Macedonia declared independence its name changed to Metodija Andonov Chento (Ibrahimi, 2014, f. 535). According to Ibrahimi all the toponyms that Bulgaria had changed to fit its history during WW2, they were changed to Serbian historical names when Serbia took over, and after Macedonian independence those Serbian names were changed to Macedonian historical names. Therefore again according to Ibrahimi, and also Pajaziti in his book *Culturological Studies Albanians in Macedonia* where forced to use Slav toponyms such as Bitolla, Skopje, Kicevo etc., instead of Albanian toponyms such as Manastir, Shkup, Kercova etc. The situation became so oppressive that even in a radio broadcast Albanians were forced to present themselves as “Ju flet radio Kicevo, ju flet radio Skopje” (Ibrahimi, 2014)

These three issues mentioned very briefly are not the only discriminatory issues the Albanians have had in Macedonia before 2001, there had been many more, such as in November of 1992 the assembly of Macedonia approved to give citizenships to all Macedonians that live outside of Macedonia, otherwise you would have to live in Macedonia for 15 years to get citizenship (Chronology for Albanians in Macedonia, 2004). Or in July 1997, the government sent special police force to Gostivar to take down an Albanian and Turkish flag from the town hall, where the police ended up shooting dead two young Albanians (Chronology for Albanians in Macedonia, 2004).

Albanian Nationalism before 2001

As Sir Isaac Newton said "every action has an equal and opposite reaction," even though he was talking about the third law of motion in mechanics, the same quote can be

applied to Albanians reaction to the discriminatory actions and policies of the Macedonian government throughout the 1990s.

First, the Macedonian Constitution caused a lot of upset amongst the Albanians in Macedonia, it made them feel like second class citizens, a minority group that lives in a country that is not its own. Nevzat Halili leader of the PDP (Party of Democratic Prosperity) said in response to the constitution is:

“What we need are radical changes in the Macedonian Constitution. Albanians in Macedonia should be recognized as a constitutive people. There are three categories of citizens in Macedonia. Macedonians are first-class citizens, Albanians are second class, and Serbs and others are third class” (Liotta & Jebb, 2004, f. 66).

Many ethnic Albanians protested and in November 1991 a referendum for autonomy of Ilirida was organized by Albanians where 99% of the voters voted for autonomy that political entity. After the Macedonian government refused to accept the referendum as valid, in March 1992 about 40000 Albanians demonstrated in Skopje to not recognise the independence of Macedonia until autonomy of the Albanian communities are recognised by the government of Macedonia. (Chronology for Albanians in Macedonia, 2004)

Second, after many protests, and clashes between ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian police, which left many injured and dead, in Oct 13 1994 “Reuters reported that the current Albanian demands include more education and media in their own language, more representation in central and local government, an Albanian-language university and a change in the constitution to put them on equal footing with the Macedonian majority.” (Chronology for Albanians in Macedonia, 2004) This is the moment when the conflict shifted to the University of Tetova.¹² Protests and demonstrations were organized by ethnic Albanians demanding the University of Tetova be recognised. After the Macedonian police bulldozed

¹² Discussed in the previous section of this chapter.

the University building, many other protests arose by ethnic Albanians where on February 1995, five Albanians were arrested, and convicted for “hindering the work of the police,” (Abrahams, 1996, f. 47). Fadil Sulejmani, rector of the university, was arrested on the same day charged with “inciting the Albanian population in Macedonia to resistance and civil disobedience” (Abrahams, 1996, f. 47). According to Abrahams, Sulejmani’s conviction was based on a press conference he held on February 15 where he said “if the police try to prevent us from working, 200,000 Albanians will rise to our defence, and they have guns and grenades” (Abrahams, 1996, f. 47).

Third issue that came up in the previous section, Macedonian Nationalism before 2001, was toponyms, while the Macedonian government provoked the ethnic Albanians by naming their neighbourhoods, streets, schools to Macedonian historical leaders, Albanian mayor Rufi Osmani decided to raise the Albanian and Turkish flag outside the town hall of Gostivar. In order to lower tensions, the Macedonian government passed a law allowing the flags to fly outside the town hall only on specific holidays. But tensions only reach new levels when on July of 1997 the Macedonian government sent in police to take down the flags, in the proses killing two ethnic Albanians, a third man was beaten by the police and later died from his injuries. 312 people were arrested including the mayor Rufi Osmani which spent 2 years in jail until presidential amnesty in 1999. (Chronology for Albanians in Macedonia, 2004)

In conclusion to this section there are a number of other cases of Macedonian nationalism at its worst, on the other hand, we also saw cases of Albanian nationalism, examples that where closer related to the definition of nationalism, which is: a group of people trying to keep alive their language and culture using legal international law “persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop their

ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity and to maintain and develop their culture in all its aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will”¹³ These tense situations, provocations caused a ‘tug-of-war’ between ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian government, a ‘tug-of-war’ that escalated into the armed conflict of 2001.

Section IV

The Ohrid Agreement

All of these incidents and more added to the start of the 2001 conflict between the National Liberation Army (NLA) and the Macedonian government and military, which lasted just about under six months, left about 250 dead and more than 170,000 forced to flee their homes (Kim, 2002, f. 11). With the intervention and help of NATO and the international community, the Ohrid agreement was signed in August 13 2001, and soon after a ceasefire and disarmament of the NLA on January of 2002.

The Ohrid Agreement was signed to firstly stop hostilities between armed ethnic Albanian rebels and the Macedonian government, secondly to give more rights and equality to the large Albanian community in Macedonia, and at the same time also improving the lives of other minorities in Macedonia.

The Ohrid agreement forced a number of different amendments to the Macedonian constitution, starting from the preamble; which was discussed earlier as devaluing the Albanian community as just another minority in Macedonia. The new preamble

“The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, taking over responsibility for the present and future of their fatherland, aware and grateful to their predecessors for their sacrifice and dedication in their endeavours and struggle to create an independent and sovereign state of Macedonia, and responsible to future generations to preserve and

¹³ Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE (1990), Paragraph 32.

develop everything that is valuable from the rich cultural inheritance and coexistence within Macedonia, equal in rights and obligations towards the common good -- the Republic of Macedonia, in accordance with the tradition of the Krushevo Republic and the decisions of the Antifascist People's Liberation Assembly of Macedonia, and the Referendum of September 8, 1991, they have decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia as an independent, sovereign state, with the intention of establishing and consolidating rule of law, guaranteeing human rights and civil liberties, providing peace and coexistence, social justice, economic wellbeing and prosperity in the life of the individual and the community, and in this regard through their representatives in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, elected in free and democratic elections, they adopt" (Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 2001)

As we can see, the new preamble treats all the citizens as equals, and does not mention Macedonia being "...a national state of the Macedonian people."¹⁴

Another amendment was to the use of languages in Macedonia. According to the Ohrid Agreement, Article 7 section 1: "the Macedonian language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, is the official language throughout the Republic of Macedonia and in the international relations of the Republic of Macedonia." Article 7 section 2: "Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official language, written using its alphabet..." (Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 2001), therefore with this amendment, the language issue is presumed, theoretically, solved with the Ohrid Agreement.

Another important amendment was the educational system, before the Ohrid Agreement education was a source of major conflict and casualties as mentioned earlier in

¹⁴ Refer to section V, Macedonian nationalism before 2001 conflict

this chapter. Section 6.2 of the Ohrid agreement states that “State funding will be provided for university level education in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population of Macedonia, on the basis of specific agreements... The principle of positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment in State universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia until the enrolment reflects equitably the composition of the population of Macedonia.” (Education Reform: Ohrid Agreement)

Therefore with these additions to the constitution, the problem of education is presumed, theoretically, solved.

Expression of identity was also a major problem before the Ohrid Agreement. One of many major incidents was the Gostivar incident of 1997 also mentioned earlier in this essay. Section 7.1 of the Ohrid agreements states: “With respect to emblems, next to the emblem of the Republic of Macedonia, local authorities will be free to place on front of local public buildings emblems marking the identity of the community in the majority in the municipality, respecting international rules and usages.” (Official Language and Symbol: Ohrid Agreement) Hence another hot topic presumably and theoretically solved.

Another serious issue was employment in Macedonia. Up until 2001, Albanian made up only 3.1 percent of the police and military, and only 10 percent of all public servants. (Brunnbauer, 2002) The Ohrid agreement addresses this in section 4.2 “Laws regulating employment in public administration will include measures to assure equitable representation of communities in all central and local public bodies and at all levels of employment within such bodies, while respecting the rules concerning competence and integrity that govern public administration. The authorities will take action to correct present imbalances in the composition of the public administration, in particular through the recruitment of members of under-represented communities. Particular attention will be given to ensuring as rapidly as possible that the police services will generally reflect the composition and distribution of the

population of Macedonia, as specified in Annex C.” (Matrix) The Ohri agreement also addresses the importance of the police by also implementing section 3.3, stating that “In order to ensure that police are aware of and responsive to the needs and interests of the local population, local heads of police will be selected by municipal councils from lists of candidates proposed by the Ministry of Interior, and will communicate regularly with the councils. The Ministry of Interior will retain the authority to remove local heads of police in accordance with the law.” (Police Reform: Ohrid Agreement) According to this law, the Ministry of the Interior, proposes no less than 3 candidates for the head of the police in the given municipality, whom at least one candidate should belong to the ethnicity of the majority in that municipality. This amendment helps the situation in that having an Albanian head of police, or even having many Albanians or other community police officers, is the start of creating trust between the citizens and the police.

One last section we would like to take into important consideration, written in the Ohrid Agreement, is Municipal Boundaries. Section 3 of Annex B states that “The Assembly shall adopt by the end of 2002 a revised law on municipal boundaries, taking into account the results of the census and the relevant guidelines set forth in the Law on Local Self-Government.” (Detailed Implementation Timeline: Ohrid Agreement) This section is very important because up till this point, municipalities were divided in a way that the major cities were always headed by ethnic Macedonians, which then discriminate the rural Albanian citizens.

There are many more amendments to the Macedonian Constitution that affect the lives of all of the other ethnic groups living within Macedonia (Matrix) .With the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, the country can now move forward to a more democratic and European way of life. But as will see in the next section, the difficulties in the small Balkan country are long from ending.

Section V

Macedonian Nationalism after 2001

Macedonia had a lot to do following the 2001 conflict and the signing of the Ohrid Agreement. It had to now implement the Ohrid Agreement into its constitution and law. But as nationalism existed before 2001, it still existed after 2001. Many Macedonians felt threatened by the Ohrid Framework Agreement, their country was now not their own, the country now also belongs to the minorities. We see this during the discussion of the new preamble in the Ohrid agreement, the opposition (VMRO and Democratic Alternative) opposed the new Preamble because it did not mention Macedonians separate from the rest. (Brunnbauer, 2002)

As far as the State University of Tetovo was concerned, it took three years after the Ohrid Agreement, and ten years after the University was founded in 1994 for the government to finally recognize the university in January of 2004. The question is, how much support does the government of Macedonia spend on the education of ethnic Albanians compared to Macedonians? Abdylmenaf Bexheti's gathers important information and statistics for 2010 that shines a light on the injustice we face in practice, even though the constitution gives us equal rights of education. Bexheti firstly takes example of two high schools "Dedo I. Maleshevski" a school composed of 1058 Macedonian students, and compares its finances with "Sami Frasheri" composed of 525 ethnic Albanian students. The school budget for Dedo I. Maleshevski in 2010 was 48.250 denars per student, in contrast to 28.900 denars per student in Sami Frasheri. In conclusion the Macedonian school receives 67% more budget than the ethnic Albanian school (Reka, 2011, f. 172). Bexheti then goes on to compare two new public universities, State University of Tetova (SUT) and Goce Delchev, Shtip. According to Bexheti, the annual income per student in SUT is 22.873 denars in 2010, compared to 48,000 denars per student for Goce Delchev. This is equivalent to 110% higher

budget given to Macedonian students in Goce Delchev then ethnic Albanian students in SUT (Reka, 2011, f. 174). This shows that there is much work to do when it comes to really having an effect directly in the lives of the Albanian community in Macedonia. This shows that even though the constitution has shifted to improve the lives of the other ethnic groups in Macedonia, there is still governmental discrimination to prevent this from happening.

Another important part of the constitutional amendments is freedom of cultural expression. Amending the constitution is one thing, but implementing it is something totally different. The following data is taken from Abdylmenaf Bexheti in his scientific study of the distribution of public funds in Macedonia in 2010. According to Bexheti, of the total budget for musical purposes only 2% is given to ethnic Albanians, for Albanian cultural manifestations, only 11% of the total budget is awarded, for art and gallery 6% of the total budget, for cultural heritage 6% of the total budget, for projects with international UNESCO cooperation 0% go to the Albanian community (Reka, 2011, f. 171). Not forgetting that the official ethnic Albanian population in Macedonia around 25.1%, the budget awarded for Albanians is roughly 6% of the total. On the other hand, not only is Macedonian cultural activities favoured and financed a great deal more, we see major activity in the religious sectors concerning the Macedonian Orthodox Church. After 2001 there was a massive movement to add as many symbols to the new country as possible to make it as Macedonian as possible, “crosses were being mounted on clock-towers in Bitola and Prilep” in Vodno a 67 meter high “Millennium Cross” was constructed in 2002. Ali Pajaziti mentions in his book *Culturological Studies* that “national television initiated its program with a religious pray, there was Christinization of the police forces with special religious plates prayer given by the bishop Stephan, MOC was invited to give its blessing on sports events, or events organized by the government” (Pajaziti A. , 2012, f. 14). All this was a means to Christianize the state while ignoring and supressing a large Muslim community.

The above mentioned are just a few governmental discriminatory issues against ethnic Albanians as well as against minorities in Macedonia. These actions also reflected how the people feel, and how they express themselves in everyday life. One of the worst years between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians came in 2012 between January and May. In this 3 month period there were 7 deaths and about 10 injuries caused by ethnic conflict. In February 28, a Macedonian police officer killed two ethnic Albanians in Gostivar for a parking spot. On March 7, five ethnic Albanians were beaten up in a bus in Skopje. There will always be conflicts similar to these, which give the impression that they are supported by the government, and even the news. Thus what about Albanian nationalism? Has it reach a level as dangerous as to cause physical harm, and ethnic hatred?

Albanian Nationalism after 2001

Albanian nationalism after the 2001 conflict and the Ohrid Agreement is mostly seen active in the political arena. Not to be mistaken with retaliation by the Albanian community as a reaction towards the chauvinistic chants by Macedonian fan groups in games or the beatings of Albanian school children by Macedonian mobs. These reactions were mostly protests held in the capital city to make the international community aware of the discrimination Albanians face in their daily lives. What is important to mention is the nationalistic declarations by various political groups every time there is a major conflict, or right before an election.

Just like the Macedonian political parties using nationalism/patriotism to promote their political party, the Albanian political parties do the same. Not just the one in power DUI (Democratic Union for Integration), but also the Albanian opposition and even new political parties that pop up every time there is an election. This method does cause instability in the state. When one party uses a nationalistic declaration, the other party must respond with the

same language, otherwise its seen weak by its citizens. Some examples of these declarations are as follows:

Back in 2013 elections, there where an exchange of declarations between Nikolla Gruevski and Fatmir Dehari with Izet Mexhiti. Gruevski had come to Kicevo to hold a meeting for the upcoming elections, in this meeting he said “They want, with displaced citizens 10, 20 and 30 years, to take Kicevo. People of Kicevo, this time we have to go to the end and tell them who Kicevo belongs to ... Dehari wants to artificially change the demographic structure by bringing the Diaspora. I would say that this is not correct, dishonest and unethical. This is nothing more than ethno nationalism. Therefore we must not allow Dehari ruin our peace, therefore we have to massively go out to the polls and support candidate Despotovski and the joint list.”

As a response, Fatmir Dehari responded saying “If based on a description that I made with the citizens of this country in the US, I think that he is wrong, the reason already being very familiar ... Description of a blessed reality by God and derives solely from the RM Constitution and the laws of the country voted in this parliament, in Macedonia's parliament, it has nothing to do with the call for greater Albania or natural Albania ... Macedonia is not one or the others, Macedonia is the everyone's, not as the prime minister or anyone else thinks, "said Fatmir Dehari, candidate of DUI for Kicevo”

Izet Mexhiti responded similarly saying “Fatmir Dehari and I talked about the Albanian administration, we talked about the national flag, we talked about the Albanian language, we talked about Albanian Struga, Albanian Kicevo, Albanian Cair not having even a millimeter of difference while celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Albanian state from Albanian cities here. We again talk about this, we do not pretend to change borders, they can be done in the united Europe, the removal of borders, and it is true that both Kicevo, Struga and Cair are in Macedonia but we should not forget that Macedonia is ours”

And so Stojanco Angelov decided to hop on the war of words saying “Izet Mexhiti and Fatmir Dehari can say as many times as they want that their speeches are taken out of context, but the point is clear. They both speak about Ethnic Albanian and the Macedonian cities that will be part of this Ethnic Albania”. (Mexhiti dhe Dehari reagojnë ndaj deklaratave të Gruevskit, 2013)

Both used nationalism and patriotism to get their citizens wound up to vote. Fortunately in Kicevo or Struga this didn't cause unrest in the cities, or even clashes between the two groups. The most it did was bring people out to vote in masses, which show how much nationalism plays a role in every citizen's lives.

Another example we would like to share took place in Butel. A cross 55 meters high was planned to be placed in the town of Butel. The Albanian population of this town saw the cross as a provocation from the government, and therefore protested by gathering at the location of the cross and disturbed the building of the cross that had already started. Similar to the earlier example, there was a change of speeches by Macedonian officials and Albanian officials, specifically members of DUI. Ermira Mehmeti is quoted saying “We are here to say that in the Albanian settlements they can not do whatever they want, crosses, lions, bears ...what they want let them do at the other side of the bridge, where they made the zoo, but on this side we are for symbols that reflect multiethnicity and the spirit of tolerance” (Inaonline, 2016) The protests didn't end peacefully this time around, Todor Petrov, one of the initiators for the project was attacked in a restaurant in Skopje, police charged three people, one of them being a DUI member (Marusic S. J., New Cross Sparks Ethnic Protests in Macedonia, 2016). Around the same time, Izet Mexhiti was also attacked by Macedonians after he declared that “they will not withdraw until the commune comes up with a decision” (albeu, 2016)

On the other hand there are other opinions to this particular conflict that has to do more with politics than it does with citizens of Butel. Independent Balkan News Agency published: “In the protest there were only DUI officials and militants and no ordinary citizens! The protest remained a protest of DUI’s officials and not a protest of Albanians. This government will not be able to stay in power by provoking clashes between Albanians and Macedonians and it will not win the coming elections by orchestrating such conflicts” (Pajaziti N. , 2016)

To conclude, nationalism as good as it could be, can be used and is most likely used to gain political points. This misuse of nationalism is what taints a term that can have positive developing effect on a state if it is used properly, if it is not, the only use is for individual or party gain.

Section VI

Macedonia’s Nationalisms vs Natural State (multiculturalism)

Macedonia today exists as a Nation State, as the IMRO of the 1890s slogan was “Macedonia for Macedonians”, VMRO today lives on the basis of that slogan. This is the main cause of the ethnic problems Macedonia has today. Instead of being a multicultural state, it goes beyond its sources to become something that it is not, a homogeneous and monoethnic state. There are many reasons as to why the Macedonian government acts in such a way, most of the reasons are explained earlier in this chapter.

Ethno-nationalism was seen many times during the implementation of the Ohrid agreement in Macedonia amongst many levels, but why? The division between the Macedonian and Albanian citizens kept them ignorant of each other, more so the Macedonian population had little idea about Albanians because only a handful of Macedonians knew the Albanian language/culture to really understand what ethnic Albanians wanted. Many

Macedonians believe that Albanians in 2001 fought for a Great Albania, therefore threatening their country's sovereignty, many others believed that Macedonia is a country for Macedonians, therefore nobody else should be claiming anything more than a minority deserves. As mentioned before, Tito's Yugoslavia created a Macedonia to separate the people residing in Macedonia from the Bulgarian identity, therefore creating a State for Macedonians and thus strengthening Macedonian nationalism by employing Macedonians in government and making them a part of the creation of the new State (as noted in Macedonia's original preamble and as well the current preamble to an extent). Now with the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, the country has to share the government, has to share the limited number of offices provided by a government, therefore giving up power to satisfy the Albanian community. By giving up power in the state, many Macedonians feel threatened that the Albanians will not work for independent Macedonia, but would work for their own personal interests which are not the interest of the Macedonian state, after the 2016 elections, where VMRO is having a tough time convincing DUI to stay in coalition, protests have broken out against the formation of a new opposition lead government where VMRO would be opposition. Many ethnic Macedonians are protesting their fear of losing the sovereignty of Macedonia to a so called "Tirana Platform" which leads to more rights for the Albanian community, and a move to a more multi ethnic state. To quote one of the protests leaders "This will not be the last day. The battle will continue, as long as Gjorge Ivanov is the President, the man who defends our country's sovereignty, we will be here to give him our support, as he supports us" said Bogdan Ilievski. (Marusic S. J., Macedonia Protesters Wield Cardboard Shields Against New Coalition, 2017)

Speaking of power, the police force as well as the military needs to accept more Albanians into its organisations. Now an organization that is the strength and power of a country is shaken up by having to accept members of what once was the NLA into its ranks.

Recently Talat Xhaferi was appointed Minister of Defence, this caused upset amongst the Macedonian community because, how could a former NLA Commander that fought against the Macedonian army in 2001 be appointed defence minister? It is understandable that once not far from today Talat Xhaferi was seen as a “terrorist” , and now he is defending Macedonia, it is most likely not easy to swallow. But what many seem not to accept is that Macedonia is not for ethnic Macedonians anymore, it is for all of its citizens living inside Macedonia.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, nationalism becomes more prominent when a state feels it is threatened. All through Macedonian history, whether we take it starting from its independence in 1990, or earlier from the establishment of the IMRO in the 1890s, Macedonian identity has always been challenged and questioned. This has always been a threat to the new state, a threat that forces the government to react in not a pleasant way against everybody who threatens it. To repeat John Carters words again in this section “A strong nation, like a strong person, can afford to be gentle, firm, thoughtful, and restrained. It can afford to extend helping hand to others. It’s a weak nation, like a weak person, that must behave with bluster and boasting and rashness and other signs of insecurity.” Macedonia is not a strong nation, it is a weak nation, an insecure nation that has turned all its energy to promoting the thing that it is threatened by the most, it promotes its ethnicity to an extent rarely seen by a modern nation. The Macedonian government spends so much time and money on promoting an ethnic Macedonian culture that it neglects its poor economy, it neglects the fact of being a multicultural state and by doing so it neglects the other cultural groups that make up a significant part of the country’s population. These other cultural groups in Macedonia, one of witch being the ethnic Albanians, have felt neglected and discriminated against. The Albanian people in Macedonia have felt as if they don’t belong to the state because of being neglected from state jobs, from state history books, from state

educational finances as well as cultural state finances, they feel as if they don't exist in the state of Macedonia. This lack of attention or negative attention (will go into detail later in the essay) cause the national identity of the Albanians in Macedonia to be threatened, and therefore they react in a similar aggressive way which causes the Macedonian government to feel even more threatened and therefore leading to the conflict of 2001 between Macedonian government and ethnic rebel Albanian citizens of Macedonia, as well as the political conflicts after 2001 between the same two groups of communities.

In short, Macedonia acts as a homogeneous state but at the same time having a multicultural population.

Chapter III

Major Hot Topics in the Political Arena Today

While trying to understanding the problems Macedonia has faced and the threat it feels towards many different groups in Macedonia mentioned from the previous few chapters, this following chapter will discuss 4 major and currently hot topics in the political arena today.

- I. Name dispute between Macedonia and Greece.
- II. Culture dispute between Macedonia and Bulgaria.
- III. Skopje 2014.
- IV. New Nationalisms: ethnic hatred re-expressed.

Section I

Name Dispute Between Macedonia & Greece.

The Macedonian/Greek conflict is a conflict as old as the state of Macedonia is itself. A brief history lesson on the dispute is as follows: Since the independence of Macedonia, Greece has continuously rejecting its right as a new state to use the name Macedonia. The reason for this is because Greece worries that by accepting the name Republic of Macedonia, in the future, Macedonia will lay claim to Greek territories, as well as laying claim to an ancient Macedonian culture the Greeks claim for themselves. The Macedonian government, on the other hand, in the past years has done everything in its power to promote the ancient Macedonian identity on its citizens and showcase it to the world. For everything Macedonia does towards promoting it's (for many people, false) ancient Macedonian culture, Greece finds a way to protest it, Dora Bakoyannis (foreign Minister of Greece) said "It was a counterproductive act which goes against the logic of an interim agreement and does nothing to contribute to improving bilateral relations" (Bakoyjinnis Invites UN Envoy Nimetz to Adress Skopje Airport Name Change, 2007), Antonio Milososki (ex-Macedonian foreign

Minister) said “the decision was a "goodwill" gesture, with which we wanted to pay our respects to this historic person who brings peoples and countries together...We didn't have any intention to monopolise the name" (Dispute over Alexander Airport, 2006) .The dispute to this day is ongoing and seems as there is no solution in sight. It is causing Macedonia many problems being those external as well as internal. Greece has vetoed Macedonia’s membership to EU in 2009, and continuously blockaded membership within NATO, which they will most likely continuously do until they are satisfied with a new name for Macedonia. The people are beginning to get restless, and are also very much divided as to what steps their government should take. According to 2010 polls conducted by daily “Dnevnik”, 51% believe that the talks between Macedonia and Greece should be abandoned, 48% said that talks should go on. Those who represent only the ethnic Macedonians, the percentage to abandon talks were even greater at 63%. These polls are important at understanding the effect of the dispute has on the citizens of Macedonia.

This issue has been dragging for a long time with very little if at all movement to a solution. There have been many proposals such as “Republika Makedonija-Skopje" was proposed in 2005 by UN special Representative Mathew Nimetz. Nimetz proposed that Macedonia itself can use the name Republic of Macedonia within the country, but in the international arena Republic of Macedonia – Skopje would be used (Buechsenschuetz, 2005). Even though Macedonia showed interest in this option, Greece rejected it. In 2008 Nimetz proposed a few more names such as ”New Republic of Macedonia”, “Republic of New Macedonia”, ”Republic of Upper Macedonia”, “Republic of Macedonia-Skopje” (Peshkopia, 2015, f. 198). Macedonia rejected this proposal saying that “all had been rejected by one or the other side over the last 15 years" (Peshkopia, 2015) pg198. In 2010 Greece proposed the name “Northern Republic of Macedonia”. Nicola Gruevski declared he would reject this proposal and call for a vote on a new name (Peshkopia, 2015, f. 202). Both Macedonia and

Greece have met many times over the years proposing many different names that each rejected for one reason or another. Considering the proposed names and the reasons rejected, there is no reason any future proposal would be accepted unless there is heavy pressure by the international community.

The international community is also concerned regarding the name dispute. According to the International Crises Group (ICG):

“An indefinite delay to NATO and EU integration could undermine what has been achieved in stabilising the country, with consequences that would be particularly harmful not least for Greece itself. The name dispute is more than a bilateral issue between Skopje and Athens. It risks derailing the main strategy of both NATO and the EU for stabilising Macedonia and the region through enlargement and integration. Member states should not allow the organisations’ credibility to fall victim to an intractable dispute involving one of their fellow members. The ICG recommends that other NATO and EU member states “actively encourage Athens to unblock Macedonia’s integration into both organizations and to respond positively to Skopje’s concessions on the country’s name.” (Macedonia's Name: Breaking the Deadlock, 2009, f. 1)

The concerns the ICG has are very serious considering the many other problems Macedonia faces within its country. The Albanian population can get restless with the dispute that has nothing to do with them except keep them from moving forward, while at the same time see Albania move forward. It is possible that if this problem persists with no hope of it being solved, including the many other problems mentioned in this thesis as well as the many more

that will be discussed, the Albanians can ask for referendum to separate and join Albania, almost similarly to what is going on with Crimea in Ukraine.

Section II

Culture Dispute Between Macedonia & Bulgaria.

Similarly, but not as popular to the international community as the name dispute, Bulgaria has its own issues with Macedonia concerning Macedonia's culture and language. The following information is extracted from Lyubomir Ivanov in his book *Bulgarian Policies on the Republic of Macedonia* (Ivanov, 2008). He writes about the Macedonian identity and state having been created by the Serbian politics in 1889 which was supported by the Communist international in Moscow in 1934, later between 1944 and 1991 with intense work and careful planning they were successful in creating a Macedonian identity and state using "typical totalitarian communist regime by terror and repression against those who considered themselves Bulgarian" (Ivanov, 2008, f. 11). In Ivanov's book, he mentions "30,000 executed, another 120,000 sent to concentration camps and prisons, while rewriting history through education and the media, falsifying authentic historical evidence and artefacts, and by counterfeiting historical monuments" (Ivanov, 2008, f. 11). Ivanov continues to explain how the Macedonian government even today has adopted the former methods adding newer methods to keep the "Macedonist Doctrine"¹⁵ alive.

Ivanov continues to discuss the identity issue in Macedonia today, there seems to be a statement that says "ethnic Macedonians, and ethnic Bulgarians in Macedonia constitute a single entity and there is no difference between them" (Ivanov, 2008). There are two different versions of this; one side says that "single entity" means that they are solely Macedonians,

¹⁵ Ivanov uses this term in his book, regarding to the forced ethnic and cultural change to the Bulgarian population in "Vardar Macedonia".

while the other side says that they are solely Bulgarian. But both these interpretations as well as the statement are wrong. According to Ivanov, since there does exist a group that identify themselves as Macedonian, and another group that identify themselves as Bulgarian, it is not possible that they are a “single entity” and therefore the Bulgarian state demands Skopje to recognize the Bulgarian minority in Macedonia.

The next major issue Bulgaria has with Macedonia according to Ivanov in his book is the education system teaching history that is falsified.¹⁶ Bulgaria would like text books to change, removing history that did not exist, Ivanov in his book stresses that Macedonia can continue to exist without stealing the accomplishments of others, and start recognising its Bulgarian historical heritage. (Ivanov, 2008)

Two other issues Ivanov mentions in his book are the need to restore the destroyed or falsified inscriptions in churches, monasteries, water fountains etc. as well as the restoration of the 471 Bulgarian military cemeteries in Macedonia which Ivanov adds is a sensitive issue for Bulgaria.

Bulgaria also places a considerable amount of importance to the Bulgarians that live in neighbouring Macedonia, specifically Greece, Albania and Kosova. Bulgaria is concerned that Macedonia has invested much, and has been successful in turning a large part of its Bulgarian population in Greece, Albania and Kosova to identify themselves as Macedonian. Ivanov adds that now with Bulgaria being part of the EU¹⁷, Bulgaria can invest more into countering Macedonia in these states by strengthening its presence in Albania and Kosova by sponsoring joint non-governmental projects, as well as granting Bulgarian citizenships and university scholarships to individuals of Bulgarian origin. (Ivanov, 2008)

¹⁶ Refer to the first chapter of this essay “History and Identity – Bulgarian Contridiction” for more depth.

¹⁷ Bulgaria became part of the EU in January 1, 2007

In conclusion to this section, according to an article in Balkan Insight (Marusic S. J., More Macedonians Apply for Bulgarian Citizenship, 2014) unofficial estimates suggest that between 40,000 and 100,000 citizens of Macedonia have gained Bulgarian citizenship since 2001. This fact suggests that Bulgaria has worked much to return the Bulgarian identity to the Macedonian citizens, and therefore now can demand more than before for its state interests, meaning more trouble for Macedonia.

Section III

Skopje 2014

Brief facts for Skopje 2014 project are as follows: the Skopje 2014 project was officially announced in 2010, it is financed by the government of Macedonia, about twenty buildings and over forty monuments are planned for the project. Depending on who you ask, the estimated range of the project is between 80 million euros to over 600 million euros, while the ex-Prime Minister Gruevski declared that official cost was 207 million euro (BIRN, 2016).

There are pros and cons to the project, not only between the Macedonian government and its neighbours, as has been usually the case in this chapter, but also between the citizens of Macedonia themselves.

Firstly will spend some time discussing the issues Macedonia's neighbours have with Skopje 2014. We have discussed earlier in this chapter the conflict Macedonia has with Greece regarding the name "Macedonia". Just like the name of the country, Skopje 2014 has had similar issues with monuments erected, such as "Warrior on a Horse" sculpted by Valentina Stefanovska which stands 14.5m in height in the centre of Skopje, its estimated

cost is about 7.5 million euros, and also “Warrior” that stands on the main entrance to the Old Bazaar, it stands at 15m in height, and cost about 2 million euros (BIRN, 2016). Even though these two monuments do not have official identities of specific people in history, they do give a resemblance of Alexander the Great (Warrior on a Horse) and Phillip II of Macedon (Warrior), in most literature, they are referred to as Alexander and Phillip. These two monuments as well as naming the airport of Skopje “Alexander the Great Airport”, and also the naming of a highway that leads to Greece as “Alexander of Macedon” adds up to what is already tense relations with Greece, and will surely not help Macedonia’s aspirations for NATO and EU membership.

Similar to Greece, Bulgaria also does not approve of the monuments erected in Skopje 2014. As mentioned earlier in this essay, there are many national heroes that both these two countries identify with such as, Goce Delchev, Dame Gruev, Nikola Karev, Gjorche Petrov¹⁸ and many more monuments that cause conflicts between Macedonia and Bulgaria.

Both these countries, Greece and Bulgaria, feel threatened by “Skopje 2014”, they both feel and believe that the government of Macedonia is trying to steal a part of their history, or rejecting to belong to a part of their history. Until these issues are settled, there will always be conflict between the two that will prolong Macedonia’s advancement in all aspects. The citizens of Macedonia will be and are suffering for these policies which lead us to the conflict arisen within Macedonia concerning “Skopje 2014”, between different ethnic groups, but as well between ethnic Macedonians.

The Government, specifically the party in power VMRO with its leader Nicola Gruevski, have had a tough time defending the project. According to Maja Muhic and Aleksandar Takovski, the government’s defence for Skopje 2014 is based around three key intentions:


¹⁸ Refer to Chapter I: History/Identity, section Bulgarian Contradiction.

“the project contributes to the growth of the local economy, to the development of tourism and to the reification of subjugated history” (Muhic, 2014, f. 146). The benefit of economic growth was presented by Macedonia’s Minister of Culture Elizabeta Kanceska Milevska in 2013, which defended the project by saying that Skopje 2014 “encourages the growth of industry, creating new jobs, and contributing to the accumulation of additional income from the number of tourist visits” (Muhic, 2014, f. 147). While the opposition attacks the project by bringing into light “financial embezzlement, circumvention of local government laws, urban planning, and building permits, the non-transparent manner of planning and decision making, an unprofessional and devastating architectural concept, an aesthetic kitsch, a “cultural rape” that demonstrates a lack of understanding of national and cultural values, an expression of political totalitarianism” (Muhic, 2014, f. 147). On the other hand we have the supporters of the Skopje 2014 project that say “something is being done... at least someone is making efforts in this country... I see new buildings, monuments and objects, I see difference” (Muhic, 2014, f. 150) similar to what the Minister of Culture Elizabeta Kanceska-Milevska said when she was asked about the opposition against “Skopje 2014”, she responded by saying “something is being built” (Muhic, 2014, f. 147) But how much does this “something” cost? According to Milevska at a press conference in 2013, she said the total cost of the project was 207 million euros, but other sources suggest that the total is well over 400 million, according to “Skopje 2014 Uncovered” the cost surpasses 480 million euros in 2014, in (2016) the price is well over 600 million euros (BIRN, 2016).

To give a conclusion for economy, besides spending so much money on monuments, and not enough on schools, hospitals, business, and all the other things that have a direct impact on the lives of the citizens, it does seem that “Skopje 2014” has given tourism a boost. As of 2010 when the project was first presented, there has been a significant rise in tourism. As we

can see from the following graph, there was a slight decrease in tourists from 2008 to 2010, from 2010 onward

Foreign Tourists in Skopje (Knoema, 2016)



to today, there has been a regular increase of tourists with a slight larger increase from 2014 to 2015. This helps the government in the long run defend the project in the eyes of its ethnic Macedonian citizens, but how fair have the monuments been distributed to represent all ethnicities in the state?

We started off this part of the essay picking and dividing the monuments, squares, buildings and other project into different cultural groups. We found that a bit complicated, so what we decided to do is name all the Albanian cultural project, find the total cost to them, and compare it with the total cost of Skopje 2014 using the information gathered by BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network). This method simplifies the section a lot because frankly there are not that many Albanian cultural projects in “Skopje 2014”. Out of the 34 monuments in the project, 3 represent the Albanian ethnic group; those 3 are Josif Bageri (145.102€), Nexhat Agoli (152.652€), and Pjeter Bogdani (153.516€), which is a total of 451,127 euros. What surprised me while doing this research was that Skanderbeg’s monument in Skopje was not even part of Skopje 2014, it was placed there in 2006 four years before Skopje 2014 was first presented in 2010. To continue with the 5 squares that are part of the project, one is reserved for the ethnic Albanians, it is the Skender Bey Square

(13,878,835€). From the 27 buildings that are part of the project we have picked out one that represent the ethnic Albanians, Mother Theresa Memorial Home¹⁹ (2.359.878 €). Therefore out of the 136 total structures that are part of the Skopje 2014 project, 5 are part of the Albanian culture which add up to 16,689,840€ of the total ~640,000,000€. Therefore in Skopje 2014 Albanians are represented with ~2.6% of the total amount spent on all projects.

To conclude, yes tourism has gone up since Skopje 2014 was presented which helps the finances of the city to a degree, but most of what these tourists see when they come to Skopje is a monocultural city, an all Macedonian culture, a culture mixed with ancient Greek, Christian Orthodox and Slavic Balkan culture, while excluding Albanians, as well as minorities such as the Turks, Vlachs, Roma, etc. This is proof that even though VMRO says Skopje 2014 is about increasing tourism, creating jobs, and solidifying their culture, the main reason is to counter Greece and Bulgaria in their propaganda²⁰ on rejecting an ethnic Macedonian identity in Macedonia. Muhic and Takovski discuss this issue eloquently in their paper “Redefining National Identity in Macedonia” (Muhic, 2014, fv. 142,145). The following are a few quotes taken from them:

“SK 2014 is a de-Ottomanization process aimed at cutting off or at its best, obliterating the Ottoman heritage and breaking away from Islam. Even if it does aim at crafting a mono-ethnic, Macedonian, Christian Orthodox sentiment, it does so against the multi-ethnic reality and legacy of the country. As Koteska (2011) observes “SK 2014 produced a line of ethnic, gender and class divisions. Namely, the bronze mania serves only to build up the dominant Macedonian identity and the demographic exclusivity, while the

¹⁹ Listed under Albanian culture even though this can be debated, the Memorial Home itself does not mention anything regarding Mother Teresa’s Albanian origin.

²⁰ Propaganda can be based on lies, personal/state interest, but also on fact.

ethnic minorities (Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Serbs, Roma, etc.) are not being adequately represented.”

“SK 2014 corresponds perfectly with the sentiment of many Macedonians to detach themselves from the Ottoman past and from Islam, mistakenly correlated with the Albanian population who are often looked upon as enemies of the state by the Macedonian... Clearly Skopje 2014 aims at creating a Macedonian, Orthodox Christian national identity amidst competing neighbouring agendas, and the multicultural setting of the country. It does so by tearing apart, fragmenting and creating discontinuous segments of the organic tissue of the history of this region and country for the benefit of a few and the loss of the vast majority of Macedonian citizens.”

Therefore, we can conclude that even though “Skopje 2014” has had a positive effect on tourism which in return brings cash inflow into small business in the capital city, there are also much negative effects on the country as a whole. It has caused the rise of ethnic conflict within the country, as well as deepened conflicts with its neighbours. Considering all the information provided, I believe the negatives outweigh the positives, and therefore Macedonia has lost much more than it has gained from “Skopje 2014”.

Section IV

New Nationalisms: Ethnic Hatred Re-expressed

Since the 2001 armed conflict between the Macedonian government and Albanian rebel fighters in Macedonia, there has been many events of ethnic hatred between the two groups. But what is important is that these ethnic clashes are mostly due to state provocations which then reflect on the citizens of the country. For example in 2009, protests erupted over the content of the first published national encyclopaedia of Macedonia by the Macedonian

Academy of Arts and Sciences. The ethnic Albanians were provoked with derogative terms such as, "Šiptari", and claiming that Albanians were mountain farmers who arrived in this area in the sixteenth century (Report, 2011, f. 14).

In 2010 Police shot four Albanian men in a border shoot-out, among them ex-NLA leadership member (Four Killed in Macedonia-Kosova Border, 2010). Police say they tried to stop a van they suspected of smuggling arms across the border, when the men inside the van opened fire.

In 2012 an ethnic Macedonian police officer, while off duty, shot and killed two ethnic Albanians in Gostivar. The police version of events was that the police officer was attacked by a gang and opened fire for self-defence, but an eyewitness had a different version of what happened, the witness said that there was an argument between the off duty police officer and the two Albanians about a parking space, the off duty officer was smacked on the face, and so the officer reached for his gun and killed both men. Protests followed demanding "the police to apologize and withdraw their claims that the police fired in self-defence" (Dimovski, 2012)

Adding these few examples in this section to the many others provided, but also with many others that are not mentioned in this thesis, the effect of state discrimination is reflected in sports. There have been regular racist chanting of Macedonian sports fans in different games. In the Men's European Handball Championship in 2012, the Macedonian fans chanted "Death to Šiptars!"²¹ Albanian fans retaliated by shouting "Kauri"²² in other sport matches. In January of 2012, tensions rose when in a village carnival, Macedonians put on masks making fun of Muslim Albanians, later on Albanians retaliated by setting fire to a

²¹ "Šiptars" is used by Serbs and Macedonians as a derogatory form of saying Albanian. The official term used by Serbs and Macedonians is "Albanac/Albanci"

²² "Kauri" is a derogatory Albanian word adopted from Turkish "Gâvur" meaning a non-muslim, or in English "Infedel", and similar to the Arabic "Kafir".

church and burning the Macedonian flag (Marusic S. , 2012). These ethnic conflicts between the two have been going on for years, in 2013 the Helsinki Committee reported 116 such incidents in that year, and said the authorities often down played them as routine acts of violence.

“Over 80 per cent of the hate attacks “involved ethnic Macedonians and Albanians”, the report noted... Most of the incidents took place in the capital, Skopje, and in western ethnically-mixed parts of the country, in Tetovo, Gostivar and Struga and Kumanovo. One example, the committee said, was last week’s incident in Radisani, a suburb near Skopje, predominantly populated by ethnic Macedonians, where two hand grenades were thrown at the home of an ethnic Albanian family. Police officially treated this and a series of other attacks on the same household as ordinary “violence”.” (Marusic S. , 2014)

According to Uranija Pirovska, head of the Helsinki Committee, the authorities stay silent about ethnic violence, the crimes are either not reported or the police investigate them inadequately (Marusic S. , 2014). This causes major lack of trust Albanians have on the government and police force.

In conclusion to this chapter, it can be said that the state ignores or tries to hide ethnic violence, or as Uranija Pirovska claims, the state supports it. This chapter makes sense with a quote from James Madison who once said “The means of defence against foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home.” It seems that the more pressure put upon Macedonia by its neighbours concerning Macedonia’s identity, the more ethnic tension arises within the country. The more Macedonia is provoked from abroad, the more the government pushes back at home causing the “tyranny”.

Chapter IV

Solutions

Section I

Sincere peace between Albanians and Macedonians

Can there be peace between Albanians and Macedonians? Can these two communities learn to live peacefully with each other? Maybe a more important question is, do they want to live peacefully with each other?

Before 2001 conflict, there existed two major groups that fought over power. Macedonians fought to keep the power they had, on the other hand ethnic Albanians fought to gain power which would put them on an even playing field in Macedonia. We have seen through this thesis the importance the government sees in promoting its national identity, not just promoting it to the world, but also promoting it within the country. The government of that time used the conflict it had with the ethnic Albanians in order to unify the other citizens of Macedonia. Steven M. Buechler and F. Kurt Cylke, Jr. discuss this theory in a section named “Conflict Promotes Social Integration” in their book *Social Movements Perspectives & Issues*. When we integrate this theory in to the conflicts within Macedonia, we can understand (in a different few which is less discussed) how important it has been for the leader of the Macedonians to have that enemy which it found within the country. “The group leaders might try covertly to maintain their enemies” (Steven M. Buechler & F. Kurt Cylke, 1997, f. 8), meaning that the Macedonian government at that time used the conflict to unite its ethnically different people in Macedonia. It was a conflict between “ethnic Albanians” and “ethnic Macedonians” though those Macedonians being themselves with different identities, such as Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek, Albanian orthodox, etc. This worked until the ethnic Albanian stopped resisting, and fought back causing the 2001 conflict. I believe the government of that time believed that they would crush the uprising and thereon continue using the Albanians as a tool to integrate their own people into one ethnic Macedonian group,

“conflict leads to a centralization of the internal structure of the group” (Steven M. Buechler & F. Kurt Cylke, 1997, f. 8).

When both sides were forced to end armed conflict, sit down and sign the Ohrid Agreement, the government needed another method to unite and promote the ethnic Macedonian identity. But how would it do this with a stronger Albanian opposition? Another theory in *Social Movements* is “The Self-Limitation of Conflict” (Steven M. Buechler & F. Kurt Cylke, 1997, f. 9). Since now both Albanians and Macedonians work within the government for control of the state and economy, they have the same interest and therefore limit the conflict so that they do not destroy their mutual interest. To quote the book:

“In consequence, standards arise to restrict conflict so that it is reduced to a regular competition following rules of the contest: medieval warriors develop a code of honour, economic struggle becomes politically regulated, and the struggle for power turns into peaceful elections... a conflict group has an interest in maintain the unity of its enemy; otherwise it would be hard to get a decisive victory” (Steven M. Buechler & F. Kurt Cylke, 1997, f. 9).

In the case of Macedonia, the government wants to keep just one Albanian political party, as it is easier to control then dealing with many. This did take care of the armed conflict, but it still has not solved the issue of Macedonian identity. As we seen earlier in this essay, Macedonia has been politically attacked many times by Bulgaria and Greece questioning the identity of the Macedonian people. This is when “Skopje 2014” came into play. Skopje 2014 main purpose is to inject ethnic identity into the people of Macedonia, as the famous political theorist Vladimir Lenin ones said “a lie told often enough becomes true.” This is when everything gets complicated, and we can not explain the situation with the theory used earlier “Conflict Promotes Social Integration” because this theory is between two interest groups, instead, now we have many different interest groups within both sides. In the book *Social*

Movements, the author names this theory “Cross-Cutting Conflicts” (Steven M. Buechler & F. Kurt Cylke, 1997, f. 11). This theory relates to many different interests conflicting within each other to a point where neither group becomes powerful enough. For example, in the Macedonian side, we have conflicting interests concerning the Macedonian identity. Macedonians themselves are divided into whether they are Slav, Bulgarian, Serbian, ethnic Macedonian or even orthodox Albanian. A few of the sources I have used in this essay read against the theory that ancient identity of Macedonia came from Macedonians themselves, but many of them do have one mutual conflict which is against the Albanian community that is trying to gain more power in government. On the other side, the Albanian side, we have new interest groups coming to life because they don’t believe the current Albanian political party is doing a good job representing Albanians in the government. At the same time, there are many people that agree with the Albanian opposition that the current Albanian political group is not doing enough, but still has an interest in keeping it in power because they believe that this is the only way they can keep their jobs. The authors in *Social Movements* call this “grid-lock”, “there is conflict in so many directions that no one dimension can become very intense the reason being that any one individual is a member of several different conflict groups” (Steven M. Buechler & F. Kurt Cylke, 1997, f. 11).

To sum up, after the 2001 conflict, we no longer have two groups in conflict with each other, but groups within those groups in conflict, where neither group is superior to the other. The Macedonian government on one hand keeps playing the patriot card, keeps building controversial monuments claiming them to be of ethnic Macedonian background to mobilize the people around itself on the backs of others who reject the idea. Mentioned earlier in this thesis was the discriminating chants in sports activities, where the police and government does not do much to stop and prevent them. Maybe because these small conflicts between sports fans is what the government needs to keep its people reminded of the main threat, the

Albanian threat, and therefore it'll keep them together. There is also the issue of "Monstrum" which I haven't mentioned in the essay until now because the case is ongoing. Many people believe that it is a setup by the Macedonian government,²³ taking into consideration the theories of conflict mentioned in this section, it might be so, to cause a conflict so that the people can rally around the current government (that is full of internal conflict) against the new "Islamic terrorist threat".²⁴ At the same time trying to get sympathy and new alliances with other countries around the world that are facing Islamic terrorism, by possibly setting up a major conflict in order to rally its people around one global cause.

Returning to the main question of this section, is peace possible between Albanians and Macedonians? Anything is possible if there is a will. The current government most powerful wing, VMRO, does not want peace between the two main ethnic groups in Macedonia, it uses the conflict to stay into power and it uses the conflict to promote the Macedonian identity.

Section II

Federal Macedonia

A definition for federalism by Professor Christopher Hughes²⁵ is as follows

"Federalism is the imperialism of Republics"²⁶. The only republican way in which a

²³ Not only do many citizens in Macedonia believe it is the work of Macedonian conspiracy, but in a three day visit president of Albania Bamir Topi made to Macedonia he stated the following "The message goes to every citizen, Macedonian or, This place is destent to move toawrds total harmony between all ethnicities. I would like for the media to do the same, isolate malicious nacionalistic interpretations , apart of which come naturally from Serbia. Hence things need to be scanned, and worked in a realistic manor." (Koha, 2012)

²⁴ From the day of the killings that took place in Smilkovci Lake Killings on 12 April 2012, the government jumped on the opportunity to blame ethnic Albanians for the murder. This went on until Bamir Topi made a 3 day visit to Macedonia on April 19 2012 (9 days after the killings), stating the following "Each nationalistic or ultra-nationalistic reflex or a climate of prejudice harms relations between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia as well as regional relations," (Staff, 2012) Former Macedonian prime minister Vlado Buckovski regarding the same case declared that "until the investigation of the murder was complete, lending an ethnic aspect could only further complicate the situation, which was "already tense enough"."

²⁵ "Christopher Hughes was, from the 1950s to the 1980s, the dominant figure in British Swiss Studies. Without him there would probably have been no academic study of the country and no Centre for Swiss Politics. So his contribution needs to be known and celebrated, as happened at a seminar held in his honour in Canterbury in September 2006." (CJ Hughes, 2015)

republic can add another republic to its area, without losing its own identity and without reducing the new republic to the status of a colony is by federalism” (Hughes, 1990).

There are many definitions found for federalism, this definition by Professor Christopher Hughes had a key word in it that helps the issues we face in Macedonia. That key word is “identity”, a word the Macedonian government protects by immeasurable amounts. The technical definition of federalism is sharing the power of government by distribution between the national or central government, and provinces (such as in Switzerland or Belgium) or states (such as in the USA).

There have been calls for federalism a few times in Macedonia short history mostly coming from ethnic Albanians. The first was from PDP (Party of Democratic Prosperity) in January of 1992 calling for a referendum to create a federal state with two republics, one being Republic of Ilirida. Also in 2014 Nevzat Halili, leader of the National Movement of Ilirida declared to identify the union of the Confederate Republic of Ilirida and Macedonia (Shpallet Republika e Ilirides, 2014). In August 2012 Selam Elmazi, leader of the Organization of the Protection of the Human Rights, started gathering 100 thousand signatures for the support of the creation of the Federalization of Macedonia in to two federations, one for Albanians and the other for Macedonians (Koha, Ilirida Nis Mbledhjen e Nenshkrimeve Per Federalizim, 2012). Even the former Prime Minister of Albania Sali Berisha proposed a federal Macedonia in March 19 2016, his exact words where “federalization of Macedonia is the only chance of solving the inter-ethnic crisis” (META, 2015). These calls for federalization have been rejected by the Macedonian government and other Macedonian intellectuals. According to Tanja Karakamisheva a professor of justice, “Federalization is defining and re-designing of the state with long term damage to the people and its Macedonian Identity.” (META, 2015)

²⁶ Imperialism of Republics isnt referring to the older definition of imperialism, where empires acquired land, but he is referring to a new kind of imperialism where the purpose is economic gain, not a colonial gain as was before.

To continue on and analyse the concept of federalism in Macedonia, we would firstly like to briefly analyse the federal system of Belgium as an example of a federal systems that may work for Macedonia, and then conclude by discussing if this is an option that can be taken seriously by our leaders, or if it is just marketing used to gain political points by those same leaders.

Starting off with Belgium and quoted directly from the *Belgian Constitution*:

Article 1

Belgium is a federal State composed of Communities and Regions.

Article 2

Belgium comprises three Communities: the Flemish Community, the French Community and the German-speaking Community.

Article 3

Belgium comprises three Regions: the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels Region.

Article 4

Belgium comprises four linguistic regions: the Dutch-speaking region, the French speaking region, the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital and the German-speaking region. Each municipality of the Kingdom forms part of one of these linguistic regions. The boundaries of the four linguistic regions can only be changed or corrected by a law passed by a majority of the votes cast in each linguistic group in each House, on condition that a majority of the members of each group is present and provided that the total number of votes in favour that are cast in the two linguistic groups is equal to at least two thirds of the votes cast. (Belgium 1831 (rev. 2014), 2014)

The constitution of Belgium, there are three main languages in Belgium, corresponding to three ethnic groups: Dutch speakers, which are Flemish that live in the region of Flanders, the French speakers, which are French that live in the region of Walloon, and finally the German speakers that live near the border with Germany within the Walloon region. The borders within Belgium are clear, and rules of usage of language is straight forward (in Flanders Dutch is spoken, in Walloon French is spoken with German spoken in 9 eastern municipalities, in the capital both languages are spoken) (The Federal System of Belgium, 2016).

The competencies for communities are as follow:

“The communities' competences are listed: Cultural matters: for example, fine arts, cultural heritage, museums, radio and television, tourism. etc.; Teaching; The use of languages; "Customisable" matters: for example, health policy, family policy, disabled policy, etc.

The region's competences are listed: Regional development and town planning; Environment and water policy; Renovation and nature conservation; Housing; Agricultural policy and maritime fishing; Economy; Energy policy; Subordinate powers; Employment policy; Public works and transport.

On a federal level, legislative and executive authorities are in charge of a series of interests that remain common to all Belgians: defence, the territory's security, a proportion of international relations, social security, economic and monetary union, etc.” (The Federal System of Belgium, 2016)

Switzerland has a similar federal system to Belgium, but Switzerland has a much more stable federal system than Belgium, the main reason for this is the way the two were created. “This country (Belgium) is the product of Napoleonic wars as well as of the will of the great powers, and the wishes of the people were never taken into account ... This was

different from Switzerland, he said, where the cantons had gradually become allies to defend themselves against their larger neighbours." (Swiss and Belgian Federalism go Different Ways, 2007)

Neyrinck's opinion does not help promote a federal system in Macedonia. It might solve the issues the two major ethnic groups have between each other temporarily, but on the long run, the Macedonian state was not self-created similar to that of Switzerland, it was created by the will of the great powers, where the people were ignored. Karl J. Fredrick says that federation is a "union of groups united by one or more interests or common objectives but retaining their group character for the other purposes", while federalism is "the process of achieving or maintaining a union of groups which retain their perspective identities." (Mafos, n.d.) The Macedonian identity is constantly being challenged. If federalisation ever did happen, the Macedonian people would be left alone to deal with their identity, suffering alone while not being able to use taxes provided by the Albanian west region of federal Macedonia which they have freely used and are still using today because of the every strong central government they have created. Over time, we would assume that the Albanian region would get financially richer because of very few if any conflict it would have within itself and therefore cause a friendly atmosphere for new investments, as well as using its gathered taxes for its own region instead of giving it up to the central government who spends endlessly on promoting a mono-ethnic projects. On the other hand the Macedonian federation would be in constant attacked politically and economically and therefore would most likely be left behind. Creating a richer west Albanian region compared to a weaker east Macedonian region. This would most likely lead to the Albanian region wanting to break off to end being held back by the east Macedonian region, and therefore leading to a possible end of Macedonia as we know it today.

The final question to the Federalization of Macedonia is how would you divide it? We can probably agree that if we accept the Belgian example of federalization we can make the capital city Skopje bi-lingual and separate from the other two regions. But where do you draw the line dividing the two different federations? A possibility would be to add another law that is in the Belgian constitution: Article 4 says “The boundaries of the four linguistic regions can only be changed or corrected by a law passed by a majority of the votes cast in each linguistic group in each House”. Therefore we would have western majority Albanian cities under a Albanian federation, the eastern side under Macedonian federation, with an option to change borders with majority vote in the cities who choose to change federations.

Section III

Changing the Borders in the Balkans

Before analysing borders and border changes in the Balkans, we need to understand what the definition or functions of a border is. While researching we came across a few explanations of border that will be quoted to help us understand the concept of the term.

Anna Moraczewska uses Malcolm Andersons explains the term using three features of a border that helps put a definition for the term, to quote:

“First they are an instrument of state policy when governments change the place and function of the borders for specific benefits to the state, citizens or their own. Second, the policies and actions of state authorities are determined by the degree of control they exercise over a particular border: for the state to strive to be the exclusive source of power and influence is possible only when state borders are impermeable – closed to external penetration. Finally borders are determinants of national identity – associated with people’s sense of unity and with the myth about the natural cohesion of territory, which

can be transformed as a result of wars, revolutions or political turbulence in the territory of a state.” (Moraczewska, 2012, f. 330)

According to Elva Fabiola Orozco Mendoza; “these borderlands have been created with the intention of establishing differentially, that is, they are socially produced to create hierarchies seeking to seize control over the fate of certain groups or, trying to keep others at distance... The Borderland is produced by feelings of alienation and discomfort with the dominant culture that denies others as equals and rejects them for all that they represent. However the Borderlands is not only a space created by peoples discomfort, it is something else.” (Orozco-Mendoza, 2008, fv. 41,42)

Bowon Chang in his thesis on *The Power of Geographical Boundaries* used Benedict Anderson phrase “Imagined Community.”

“National borders create imagined communities, in which are limited by boundaries and are sovereign where people tend to be presumably aware of their sovereignty with finite frontiers (Anderson 1983, 7). This factor about state sovereignty imposes more political implications on borders such as nationality and regional identity.” (Chang, 2010, f. 2)

We can conclude that nationality and identity is a very important concept to keep in mind while creating new borders and/or destroying existing borders. For Macedonia, this thesis supports the government’s strategy of strengthening the states identity, because without a strong national identity borders will always be threatened. We can also reach another conclusion to how important borders are for a country; Even though we hear in the news over and over by our politicians that borders are not going to be important with the entrance to the European Union, in fact borders are important, borders protect the identity of the community within, whether it is an “imaginary community “as Benedict Anderson believes, or if it is a

community made up of a people with 100's of years of identical history, background and language.

What would happen if Macedonia's borders did change, in a peacefully scenario where the border is peacefully decided and therefore the country split creating two homogenous countries. There might be a domino effect where many other conflicting areas within Europe itself might want to follow Macedonia's example and split. Just by searching "active separatists' movements in Europe" we come up with 31 disputes. Besides Macedonia in the Balkans, we can find examples in Serbia, where Hungarians would declare the autonomy of Vojvodina, and the Bosniaks of Sanjak, wanting autonomy or unification with Bosnia, or Albanians of the Presheva valley demanding unification with Kosova. In Bosnia we have a similar situation with the Republika Srpska wanting to create their own state. We can find similar separatists conflicts in the EU also. As mentioned before, there have been calls to divide Belgium into Flanders and Walloons. The Spanish have issues with the Basque people, the Catalans people and the Galicians wanting to separate and each create their own country or unite with another. Not to mention them all, there are many border disputes in Europe alone, therefore there is a theory that if borders do change in the Balkans, it will have a domino effect through Europe which will bring a lot of instability.

To continue with the problem in Macedonia, as noted many times through this work, is that it is not a monocultural society, it is a country of mixed ethnicities, cultures and languages. If federalization is not possible, and dividing the borders is not an option because of the domino effect, the only way to prevent changing the borders of Macedonia, and to stabilize the country within, is for the country to create a new identity that will include every society within it. For example, the most obvious current conflict in Macedonia, which is holding the country back, is its name. Why not give Macedonia a name that every ethnicity within the country can identify with? There have been countries before with such names such

as Chzechoslovakia, which clearly is a combination of two ethnic groups, the Czechs and Slovaks, but of course this country did not survive and it peacefully separated in 1993²⁷. We can still find current countries in Europe, one of which was mentioned a few times before, Belgium, composed of French, Flemish and German. Even though they each have a different identity and language, the identity and language of the state includes all the ethnic groups within. This is probably one of the main reasons why after the problems it faced back in 2007, that were hinting to divide the country, Belgium is still united today.

To conclude, history has proven that it is possible to change the borders of a country, it has also proven that the easiest way to do so peacefully is if certain administrative issues such as federalisation of the country have already been placed. In the previous section we did discuss federalism, if somehow our politicians can make federalisation happen, with a lot of compromise, future generations will be able to decide if they want to divide peacefully or live together peacefully. If federalization is not possible, then we believe the Identity of the country needs to change, moving us to the following section of this essay, status quo.

Section IV

Status Quo

Macedonia has now had 25 years as an independent state, 15 years since the 2001 ethnic conflict, Macedonia has still not found a way to become a stable democratic and multi-ethnic country. Adding corruption to the continuous ethnic conflict in the country it is logical to conclude that without some kind of change this country will never reach its potential, and will probably be pulled and dragged along by the major powers.

²⁷ Czechoslovakia was a federal country that was created after the dissolution of Austria-Hungary at the end of WWI. Therefore it is logical to see that dissalution of a federal country (with defined inner borders) is easier to seperate then a country like or similar to Macedonia, where there are no defined inner borders seperating the two ethnic groups.

We believe there is always a solution if there is will for a solution. But if sincere peace is not possible, if federalism is not possible, if border change is not possible, if changing the countries identity is not possible, all of which are not possible because of the lack of will from the Macedonian politics, there is still an option of stabilizing the state that may possibly work. That option is changing the voting system.

Currently Macedonia has a Closed Party List Proportional Representation voting system. In short, in this system, citizens vote for the political party as a whole, not having any influence on which candidate will be elected. This system leaves much room for criticism because the political party leaders have the power to appoint members to parliament that are or could be in reality unwanted by the citizens for whatever reason. This is the first thing that should change in Macedonia, to give more power to the citizens, which would also make the Members of Parliament more liable to the citizens of their work.

There are two possible systems to choose from over the current Closed Party List. The first is the Most Open List, to define it shortly, this system gives the power to the voters by getting the candidate with the most votes elected to parliament, the only time the party list is needed is to break a tie between candidates.

Taking power away from the politicians will most likely not be accepted lightly, therefore moving to the next option, possibly an acceptable compromise between the two. This system is called the Arbitrary List. In this system, the political parties choose candidates in fixed places, as well leaving some places empty or some candidates unplaced. Therefore whoever gets the most votes gets moved up to one of the places left empty and/or replaces a candidate that is not fixed. In this system the political party guaranties candidates it wants to parliament, but also gives the voters a direct hand in candidates the voters want representing them in parliament.

The issue does not end here for the Albanian community. Another step can be taken to represent the Albanian community to the fullest in the Macedonian Parliament. There are currently 2 political parties with members in parliament, DUI (Democratic Union for Integration) 10 MP, and Alliance for the Albanians 3 MP. While DUI and Alliance for the Albanians is part of the government in coalition with Social Democratic Union, Besa is left in the opposition. This division of the Albanian vote damages Albanian interest in parliament, where many people that voted for Besa are left in the opposition and not represented fairly in parliament. One can say that this group of people is discriminated against now not just by being Albanian, but also by not being part of the winning political party. To add to the confusion, new political parties regularly pop up before elections dividing the votes more causing the Albanian community to be under-represented in parliament.²⁸

A way the Albanian community can fix this issue is by having separate elections that will vote for one united party that will be then voted for in the general parliamentary elections. In other words, a few weeks before the general parliamentary elections, ethnic Albanians will have their own elections, possibly a Most Open List system, where all ethnic Albanian political parties will take place. Once the elections are finished, the Albanian political parties will combine to form one party, where the leader would be the leader of the political party with the most votes, and the new list of candidates will be proportionally chosen depending on the votes their parties receive. For example if a political party A received 50% of the total votes, that party will get 50% of the united parties MP representing the Albanian community. Respectively when general elections take place, and the united Albanian party wins 20 seats in parliament, party A that received 50% of the votes in the first

²⁸ New Democracy (Imer Selmani) founded 2009, Albanian Democratic Union (Bardhyl Mahmuti) founded 2007, National Democratic Revival (Rufi Osmani) founded 2011, Besa Movement (Bilall Kasami) founded 2014, Movement for Reforms of Democratic Party of Albanians (Ziadin Sela) founded 2015, Uniteti (Gezim Ostreni) founded 2015. According to Florence Stafa <http://www.shekulli.com.al/p.php?id=60952>, as of 2014 there were 17 Albanian political parties, adding the two latest parties created by Ziadin Sela and Gezim Ostreni in 2015, the number of political parties reach 19.

election, will get 10 seats in parliament, the other Albanian parties will also get their seats compared to how many votes they get in the first election between Albanian political parties. This new system will cause the Albanian community to win more seats in parliament, and also cause no seats to be in opposition, they will all be in alliance and represented with the majority seats, being a much bigger factor in parliament as well as representing all groups in the Albanian community.

Even though federalization and even border change could benefit Albanians, it would most likely not benefit ethnic Macedonians, proven over and over again in this essay is that continuing as it is will not make things better for the people in Macedonia, therefore some kind of change is needed. In order to keep the state with its borders as is, while gaining the support by all ethnic groups in the state, the last option of electoral change is a good option to start with that would stabilize the country as a whole, without threatening Macedonians battle for identity. Work is not done with electoral change, Macedonia does need to go through some kind of identity-inclusion. What we mean by “identity-inclusion” is that without changing Macedonians will for an identity, add an already existing identity into the core of Macedonia, like mentioned earlier, change the name of the state to include the Albanian community, or even change the symbols such as the flag to include an Albanian symbol or a neutral symbol that even the Turks, Roma, Bosniaks, and Serbs can identify with. This is the only way possible to integrate an indigenous people into a new state. As good as some of this options seem to be, one question remains, is there a will by our leaders to fix the issues we have within? A topic that includes ethnic tension, state interest, international interest, corruption, etc. this is a topic that merits an research of its own.

Conclusions

A number of issues were discussed in this essay from the past, present and future. It is clearly seen how important the historical past is for the politics of Macedonia, how the politicians have used history to create and/or enforce an identity on the people, which in return affects the lives of its citizens.

It seems like history is still in the making and still being written, each group has their own story to tell which conflicts with the other. Sooner or later a true history will be accepted by all groups, until this happens peace will always be questioned because history and identity is the bases of a community, it is as important in uniting a people as is language. If we can't unite a people within a unique similar identity, there will most likely always be clashes between groups. Politics and citizens will always be threatened by one another, as explained in Chapter II nationalism will continue to spike to fascism, and patriotism will continue to spike to chauvinism, not leaving the people to peacefully learn to live with each other. Many examples were given throughout this essay, specifically in Chapter III, that have argued how politics are many times the source of clashes between the two major communities in Macedonia, the only way possible for ethnic violence to end is explained in Chapter IV. As also mentioned in that very chapter, the politics of Macedonia need to want peace for there to be peace, the biggest question is if politics in Macedonia are interested in creating and keeping peace between the two major groups in the country. The way they do politics shows that they are not interested in keeping the peace in Macedonia. With the name conflict with Greece, Identity conflict with Bulgaria and Greece, ethnic conflict within Macedonia between Albanians and Macedonians, NATO membership stalled, EU membership not even being a topic in the news, there is a long and difficult road to a peaceful Macedonia.

Eugene V. Debs in an anti-war speech made in 1918 said: "In every age it has been the tyrant, the oppressor and the exploiter who has wrapped himself in the cloak of

patriotism, or religion, or both to deceive and overawe the people." Back in 1918 when this speech was made, Macedonia had not yet gained independence, but as we have seen in this thesis Eugene V. Debs words make as much sense today in Macedonia as it had at that time around the globe.

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