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POST GRADUATE STUDIES - SECOND CYCLE

DIPLOMACY

THESIS:
CULTURE AND DIPLOMACY: SCANDINAVIAN CASE

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ABSTRACT

Diplomacy is an old activity, dating back to ancient Greece and Rome, but today international agendas changed considerably - changing with them the character of diplomacy: a fast developing international system opened doors to many new actors, including international organizations, transnational corporations, and important interest groups; diplomacy has thus become more global, complicated and fragmentary**.** It is therefore tempting to see the modern public diplomacy as "old wine in new bottles".

One of its key dimensions is the cultural diplomacy which has increasingly more major role in international relations. This led to notion of cultural diplomacy. The interdependence between public and cultural diplomacy becomes more visible in the light of the soft power. What is the soft power? Can it be measured, and if "yes", how? These are the key issues as covered by the Thesis arguing that no country has a monopoly on soft power, that is, any organization, country and culture, can develop soft power. In this context, there are presently a number of attempts to measure soft power of the countries through a composite index. The later includes the one as published by the Institute for Government (IfG) and the media company Monocle in 2010.

Despite there is no perfect composite index, the most important question is "how a country can effectively use its soft power?" Joseph Nye has developed his own model for the conversion of soft power into a desired outcome. As stressed by Nye himself "the first step in the process of converting soft power into a successful outcome is identifying the resources that will affect the target(s) in question". The use of attraction must however begin with a clear account of available resources and an understanding for where they will be effective; without a full and clear picture of these resources, there can be little hope of deploying soft power in a strategic, coordinated, and – ultimately – effective way. It is why a national inventory of soft power assets is essential. This challenge is easy enough to identify, but much more difficult to address. In addition to their previous success in managing their soft power, the Nordic (i.e. Scandinavian) were against among the "most visible" countries in the ranking made by the Soft Power 30. Can the Balkan countries follow the Nordic model of using soft power?

The Thesis advocates that these countries may still have their own original story to tell to international publics. But they should nevertheless firstly take the very first decision: making their national and regional inventory of soft power assets. This would be the real challenge as well as an opportunity for any of the Balkan states.

KEY WORDS: new public diplomacy, culture, cultural diplomacy, interdependency, hard power, soft power & smart power, Nordic model, *IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index*.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War, international agendas changed considerably - changing with them the character of the very diplomacy. As Brian White says, "diplomacy has become more global, complicated and fragmentary". Thus, changes in diplomacy are especially visible by the involvement of many new actors in the area of international cooperation. A fast developing international system opened doors to many new actors, including international organizations, transnational corporations, and important interest groups. Modern diplomacy, is increasingly defined as a multisided, loosely constrained and multidimensional game. There is not just one mode of play. Instead, like all the most fascinating games, modern diplomacy is intricate and involves considerable strategy that can be employed in several ways. While traditional diplomacy is often portrayed by an image of somber negotiations over highly polished wooden tables in ornate rooms, it is now much more than that. In other words, modern diplomacy is a far-ranging communications process. Consequently, new terminology appeared in the diplomatic repertoire including (among others) "new public diplomacy" and "cultural diplomacy" then later being defined as the deployment of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy, is now frequently seen as a subset of the practice of public diplomacy, a government's communication with foreign audiences in order to positively influence them. As indicated, the later in nothing else but very clear reflection, i.e. a direct consequence of the increasing role and meaning of the culture in foreign policy which has grown into an unimaginable level over the last decade. This raises however the key question: "Where do the boundaries between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, and between cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations, lie?"

In addition, the aforesaid new terminology also includes the term of "Soft power in foreign policy" which means the use of cultural operations, dialogue and attempts to convince others, in contrast to hard power, the use of military intervention and political power. As a consequence, the discussion on any aspect of modern public diplomacy has taken on a new quality and dimension concerned. In the recent evolution of international relations, intangible soft power is an engine that drives the relations among nations or groups of nations. Soft power comes from such side factors as ideologies, social systems,

organization mechanisms, lifestyles, development models, cultural traditions, values, ethnic characteristics, religious beliefs, information resources, interdependence, mutual trust, etc. In this sense, soft power can be called cultural power. In today's international society, competition over comprehensive national power focusing on cultural power has been an important phenomenon in the development of international relations.

Taking into account of the above mentioned, in a world where inequality is on the rise alongside an increase in income, it becomes of paramount interest for anyone to find a nation or a group of nations which manage to have well-performing economic and social indicators. This curiosity about finding a "successful model" leads also to the Nordic Model. Namely, for decades the Nordic countries (incl. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) have served as a successful example of modern democracy, where political and economic developments have come simultaneously with the protection and promotion of civil and human rights. In the 2012 Soft Power Survey, which ranked countries based on their attractiveness and international influence, all four made it into the top thirteen most powerful states in the world. Despite historical, cultural, and societal similarities, each of the four Scandinavian countries has managed to develop an individual and tailor-made public diplomacy strategy that reflects their society's own values and characteristics but also differentiates between them.

This outstanding and unique example that the Nordic countries have set has inspired many regions across the world, leading many countries to partially follow the Nordic framework of development, cooperation, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. In the above light, one may pose the following question: Can the Balkan states emulate the Scandinavian, that is, the Nordic model of soft power as well?

Based on the above, the Master thesis is composed of following **three parts**:

The *first part* is entitled "Interdependency between public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy". It contains two chapters: the first one entitled "The new (modern) public diplomacy" provides for a brief historical background and definition of diplomacy it is completed by an effort to answer on the question what is the new (modern) public diplomacy. The second chapter entitled "Cultural diplomacy as a key dimension of public diplomacy" explains the notion of culture and provides a more detailed explanation in relation to the key questions: "Is there a need to categorizing cultures?" and "Is there any

common culture of diplomacy?" It concludes later with defining the very cultural diplomacy and its relations to the very public diplomacy.

The *second part* is entitled "The soft power as a leading concept in the modern world affairs". Following a detailed introduction of the very title, this part is then divided in two chapters: the first one outlines the key reasons because of which the soft power has increasingly more important role in the modern world affairs, while the second one deals with the most practical issue about the measurement of the very soft power, while outlining the framework for that aim, the IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index. It ends with outlining the strategic status of soft power in the present international relations.

The *third part* is entitled "The Scandinavian soft power as successful model of public diplomacy". Following its specific and detailed introduction, this part is divided into three chapters: the first one outlines the increasing Nordic Soft Power; the second is focused on the very Scandinavians as model for permanent soft power. The chapter concludes with outlining the basic features of the Nordic Model of Soft Power.

The Master thesis itself ends with conclusions which are formulated as a synthesis of all key points as illustrated in previous parts of the Thesis. The later *de facto* is the key general framework within which the Thesis argues that the Balkan states including the Republic of Macedonia can emulate the Nordic model of soft power.

1.2. Purpose of the study

The thesis is designed to encourage more comprehensive critical academic and political thinking in the Balkan states (especially the Republic of Macedonia) about the resources that contribute to its soft power, as based on the key findings as outlined in the Thesis including the ones related to the Nordic model of soft power.

1.3. Research question

Is the Scandinavian model of soft power suitable for the Balkan states? And if "yes", how the Balkan states may have such a visible soft power on the international scene?

1.4. Research Hypothesis

Any newcomer in Soft Power-related international scene should firstly have a full and clear picture of its resources, since otherwise there can be little hope of deploying its soft power in a strategic, coordinated, and – ultimately – effective way. This applies to any of the Balkan state. Making national and regional inventory of soft power assets is thus essential and first step to be undertaken by any of these states.

FIRST PART: INTERDEPENDENCY BETWEEN THE NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACYAND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

CHAPTER II: THE NEW (MODERN) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

2.1. Brief historical background and definition of diplomacy

The term *diplomacy* is derived via French from the ancient Greek *diplōma*, composed of *diplo*, meaning "folded in two," and the suffix-*ma*, meaning "an object." The folded document conferred a privilege—often a permit to travel—on the bearer, and the term came to denote documents through which princes granted such favors. Later it applied to all solemn documents issued by chancelleries, especially those containing agreements between sovereigns. Diplomacy later became identified with international, and the direct tie to documents lapsed (except in diplomatic, which is the science of authenticating old official documents). In the 18th century the French term *diplomate* ("diplomat" or "diplomatist") came to refer to a person authorized to negotiate on behalf of a state.

The aforesaid sufficiently indicates that the diplomacy is an old activity, dating back to ancient Greece and Rome: Homer's *Iliad and* Thucydides' The Peloponnesian Wars contained many references to diplomatic missions, treaties, negotiations, and other concepts associated with diplomacy. Ancient Rome also engaged in extensive diplomacy, although the Roman Empire is more noted for its military conquests. As far as is known, the first professional diplomatic corps appeared in the Byzantine Empire following the collapse of Rome in 476 AD. Byzantium established the world's first department of foreign affairs, developed strict and complex diplomatic protocols, and actively sought intelligence about friend and enemy alike.

In aforesaid context, one should also mention **Muhammad** (c. 22 April, 570–08 June, 632) who is documented as having engaged **as a diplomat** during his propagation of Islam and leadership over the growing Muslim *Ummah* (community). He established a method of communication with other tribal or national leaders through letters, assigned envoys, or by visiting them personally, such as at Ta'if. Instances of written correspondence include letters to Heraclius, the Negus and Khosrau. Although it is likely that Muhammad had initiated contact with other leaders within the Arabian Peninsula,

some have questioned whether letters had been sent beyond these boundaries[1]. When Muhammad arrived in Medina in 622, local tribes, mainly the Banu Aus and Banu Khazraj, had been feuding for several decades. Muhammad addressed this by establishing the Constitution of Medina: a document which regulated interactions between the different factions, to which the respective parties agreed. This was a different role for him, as he had remained only a religious figure during his time in Mecca. The result was the eventual formation of a united community in Medina, as well as the political supremacy of Muhammad. Muhammad also participated in agreements and pledges such as "Pledges of al-`Aqaba", the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, and the "Pledge of the Tree". He reportedly used a silver seal on letters sent to other notable leaders who were requested to convert to Islam[2].

The art of diplomacy was carried to the next higher (some might say lower) plane in Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Italian city-states of the era engaged in constant intrigues against each other. During this era, diplomacy was identified with behind-the-scenes scheming, duplicity, and double-dealing. Niccolo Machiavelli of Florence, whom many consider the father of “realist” views of the international system, stressed in his book *The Prince* (1532) that rulers should use whatever means they had at their disposal to stay in power. Western European diplomacy continued to evolve in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly in France. Under Louis XIV, the minister of foreign affairs, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis of Torcy, became an important adviser to the “Roi Soleil” (English: Sun King). Louis XIV also established embassies with permanent ambassadors who served as his official representatives in all major European foreign capitals. For the first time, international treaties and agreements also required exact and specific wording.

The next stage in the evolution of Western diplomacy began at the end of the Napoleonic Wars with the 1815 Congress of Vienna. Throughout the nineteenth century, diplomatic practices were formalized and regularized. Ambassadors and their embassies attained an immense international importance, often creating and implementing their country’s foreign policy on the scene with little control from their home capital.

1 *Forward, Martin (1998). Muhammad: A Short Biography. Oxford: One world. ISBN 1-85168-131-0.*

2 *Haykal, Muhammad Husayn* (1993). The Life of Muhammad. Indianapolis: American Trust Publications. *ISBN 0-89259-137-4*.

Diplomats were drawn almost exclusively from the nobility. Most diplomacy was conducted in secret. More often than not, diplomacy was bilateral, directly between two countries. For the most part, nineteenth-century diplomacy sought to preserve the European balance of power as diplomats tried to maintain a rough *status quo* in Europe and in the colonial empires.

Later, the World War I is frequently viewed as the watershed between "old" diplomacy with its emphasis on *elitism, secrecy, bilateral agreements, and the importance of the embassy*, and "*modern*" diplomacy with its emphasis on competency, openness, multilateral agreements, and personal conduct of affairs. With many people believing that nineteenth-century diplomacy's practices had caused World War I, it was perhaps inevitable that old diplomatic practices would change.

Following World War I, more and more countries began to emphasize competency as opposed to class connections in their diplomatic corps. Increasingly, diplomats came from a wider cross-section of society. This democratization of the diplomatic corps came in part from the belief that *elitist diplomacy* had lost touch with reality and as a result had spawned World War I. Competency – at least in theory – replaced class connections as a prerequisite for the diplomat. In theory, open diplomacy also replaced secret diplomacy. Many people, particularly U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, believed that secret treaties concluded by secret diplomacy had been a primary cause of World War I. Wilson and others therefore called for "open covenants, openly arrived at." Thus, following World War I, *open diplomacy* became an ideal of modern diplomacy.

So, too, did multilateral diplomacy, in which many countries participated in diplomatic activity. Woodrow Wilson again led the way with his appeals for a League of Nations. Even after the league failed, the world's statesmen eventually created the United Nations. The states of the world also began to meet more frequently in conferences to discuss specific issues. Importantly, beyond these world bodies and multilateral conferences, an immense network of multilateral contacts also developed between states following World War I, the creation of a string of International Governmental Organization (IGOs) being an important feature of that period.

After World War I, personal diplomacy on the part of leaders of states also replaced reliance on ambassadors and embassies as a hallmark of diplomacy. One criticism of "old" diplomacy's reliance on ambassadors who operated relatively independently of control

from their home government was that an ambassador might be working at cross-purposes to the home government. Some experts believed that this was one cause of World War I. Following World War I, in part because of this belief and in part because of technical breakthroughs in transportation and communications, many governments placed tighter reins on ambassadors and embassies. They relied more and more on personal diplomacy conducted by senior members of the government, usually the president and secretary of state in the United States, and their equivalents in other countries. These changes led to a new emphasis on summitry"[3] and public diplomacy.

By the end of the Cold War, international agendas changed considerably - changing with them the character of diplomacy. As Brian White says, **diplomacy has become more global, complicated and fragmentary**[4]. Thus, changes in diplomacy are especially visible by the involvement of many new actors in the area of international cooperation. A fast developing international system opened doors to many new actors, including international organizations, transnational corporations, and important interest groups. Diplomacy that, from the middle of the 15th century, was known as an important tool of foreign policy became wider in the post-Cold War era.

In fact, the transformation of diplomacy has not been completed yet. Nowadays, for instance, governmental diplomacy must deal with various non-state actors that shape its agenda. As Giandomenico Picco points out, "diplomacy, one of the last monopolies of a government, is now accessible to and performed by NGOs as well as individuals who have one main characteristic: credibility "[5] At the same time it would be a big mistake to consider that the role of governmental diplomacy has declined. "Although the entry of these new players has ended the effective monopoly diplomats once enjoyed over international relations, governmental diplomacy continues to have an important role"[6].However, as a result of communication and transportation revolutions and the concomitant process of political centralization in highly developed countries, "**public**

[3] **Summitry** means the practice of conducting international negotiations by summit conferences. Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 2012 Digital Edition, William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1979, 1986 © Harper Collins Publishers 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2012.

[4] White, B. „Diplomacy" in Baylis, J., Smith, S. (ed), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. P. 393.

[5] Picco, A. „A New International System?", Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 4/2 (2005), p. 32.

[6] Riordan, S. The New Diplomacy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003. p. 130

diplomacy" has become a critical part of the diplomatic repertoire. At the highest level, leader-to-leader and summitry diplomacy – superpower summitry during the Cold War – is certainly the main evolving characteristic of modern diplomacy and the epitome of "public diplomacy.[7]"

Against the above brief historical background one may in general outline the following key points in terms of defining the very **notion of diplomacy**. Before doing the later, one should however firstly take into account the fact that the diplomacy is often confused with ***foreign policy,*** despite these terms are not synonymous. Diplomacy is the chief, but not the only, instrument of foreign policy, which is set by political leaders, though diplomats (in addition to military and intelligence officers) may advise them. Foreign policy establishes goals, prescribes strategies, and sets the broad tactics to be used in their accomplishment. It may employ secret agents, subversion, war, or other forms of violence as well as diplomacy to achieve its objectives. Diplomacy is the principal substitute for the use of force or underhanded means in statecraft; it is how comprehensive national power is applied to the peaceful adjustment of differences between states. It may be coercive (i.e., backed by the threat to apply punitive measures or to use force) but is overtly nonviolent. Its primary tools are international dialogue and negotiation, primarily conducted by accredited envoys (a term derived from the French *envoyé*, meaning "one who is sent") and other political leaders. Unlike foreign policy, which generally is enunciated publicly, most diplomacy is conducted in confidence, though both the fact that it is in progress and its results are almost always made public in contemporary international relations. On the other side, the purpose of foreign policy is to further a state's interests, which are derived from geography, history, economics, and the distribution of international power. Safeguarding national independence, security, and integrity—territorial, political, economic, and moral—is viewed as a country's primary obligation, followed by preserving a wide freedom of action for the state. The political leaders, traditionally of sovereign states, who devise foreign policy pursue what they perceive to be the national interest, adjusting national policies to changes in external conditions and technology. Primary responsibility for supervising the execution of policy may lie with the head of state or government, a cabinet or a nominally

[7] Rousseau R., From Ancient Greek Diplomacy to Modern Summitry, published in The Diplomatic Courier 2011.

nongovernmental collective leadership, the staff of the country's leader, or a minister who presides over the foreign ministry, directs policy execution, supervises the ministry's officials, and instructs the country's diplomats abroad.

The purpose of diplomacy is to strengthen the state, nation, or organization it serves in relation to others by advancing the interests in its charge. To this end, diplomatic activity endeavors to maximize a group's advantages without the risk and expense of using force and preferably without causing resentment. It habitually, but not invariably, strives to preserve peace; *diplomacy is strongly inclined toward negotiation to achieve agreements and resolve issues between states*. Even in times of peace, diplomacy may involve coercive threats of economic or other punitive measures or demonstrations of the capability to impose unilateral solutions to disputes by the application of military power. However, diplomacy normally seeks to develop goodwill toward the state it represents, nurturing relations with foreign states and peoples that will ensure their cooperation or—failing that—their neutrality. When diplomacy fails, war may ensue; however, diplomacy is useful even during war. It conducts the passages from protest to menace, dialogue to negotiation, ultimatum to reprisal, and war to peace and reconciliation with other states. Diplomacy builds and tends the coalitions that deter or make war. It disrupts the alliances of enemies and sustains the passivity of potentially hostile powers. It contrives war's termination, and it forms, strengthens, and sustains the peace that follows conflict. Over the long term, diplomacy strives to build an international order conducive to the nonviolent resolution of disputes and expanded cooperation between states. Diplomats are **the primary—but far from the only—practitioners of diplomacy**. They are specialists in carrying messages and negotiating adjustments in relations and the resolution of quarrels between states and peoples. Their weapons are words, backed by the power of the state or organization they represent. Diplomats help leaders to understand the attitudes and actions of foreigners and to develop strategies and tactics that will shape the behavior of foreigners, especially foreign governments. The wise use of diplomats is thus a key to successful foreign policy.

The above sufficiently indicate that the basic aim of traditional diplomacy is twofold: to protect and guide the individual interests of states and to promote global norms and values characterizing the growing sense of a community of states and international unity. The above provide sufficient basis for analyzing the question under the next sub-chapter.

2.2. What is the new (modern) public diplomacy?

The answer on this question may be found (in practical terms) in the light of the key message Melissen, saying that *"it is tempting to see public diplomacy as old wine in new bottles*"[8]. Namely, the 21st century is still very young. Yet, it has already faced remarkable challenges such as the 9/11 attacks, the rise of new mass technologies, a global financial crisis, the emergence of new powers, the Arab Spring, Syrian crisis and consequently the present European migration –refugee's crisis, etc. These profound changes have made the conduct of traditional diplomacy – focused on bilateral relations between states, supplemented by international organizations – more difficult, while adding significant new activities to the diplomat's portfolio.

Diplomacy, as above indicated, is often defined in terms of the mechanisms of *representation*, *communication* and *negotiation* through which states and other international actors conduct their business. All three functions of diplomacy are however increasingly being challenged in the new millennium. There are more actors, more channels and more issues to deal with. In other words, the present diplomatic arena is thus made of different types of diplomats. Besides traditional diplomats in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, diplomacy is nowadays made (*among others*) by: *i.* economic and commercial diplomats from other ministries who follow different goals and adopt new codes and procedures; *ii.* transnational companies playing an increasing role in international politics and trying to make their interest prevail with the activities of business and corporate diplomats, and *iii.* civil societies being represented in the international and diplomatic arenas by national and transnational NGOs with their respective diplomats. Thus, the diplomat is not the only actor in the diplomatic scene. The newcomers in the diplomatic scene defend specific interests, which diverge from the traditional 'high politics' issues dealt with by political diplomats. Business and corporate diplomats promote transnational business development, economic and commercial diplomats defend foreign direct investments and economic multilateralism, whereas NGOs' diplomats try to bring unsocial-economic and ecological development issues on the diplomatic agenda. A clear example of how these developments impinge upon the

[8] Melissen J., "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice"- Introduction on the New Public Diplomacy Soft Power in International Relations; Palgrave Macmillan 2005, p.122.

traditional concept of diplomacy is given by the inclusion of NGOs' diplomats specialized on commercial issues in the national diplomatic delegations of least developed countries.

Against the above short background, one may claim that post-modern economic diplomacy is defined by the overlapping zone of interests of the three new categories of diplomats and consists of shaping socio-economic and ecological development policies, negotiating the global economic governance architecture, setting the standards for multilateral organizations and managing multi-stakeholder coalitions and alliances. This new state of play, however, entails some uncertainties. Applying for example the definition of diplomacy as "a discourse with measured incentives and disincentives whose failure cannot rule out the use of force" to non-state actors can be worrisome. In other words, the new roles played by state and non-state actors in the diplomatic arena need to be accompanied by a new sense of responsibility, which as such, clearly indicate a new challenge in this field.

Taking into account the above, the answer to the question of how to respond to the many challenges facing the 21st century diplomat that emerged from the rich and lively debate could best be captured (among others) by the concept of *networks,* as analyzed from the perspective of the abovementioned three diplomatic mechanisms (*representation, communication and negotiation*). This looks as following:

- ***First*** **representation:** there are more actors and they are increasingly part of various networks in addition to the traditional hierarchy in which diplomacy is embedded. Many important areas of today's international relations (*human rights, development cooperation, health, sustainable development and others*) would be unthinkable without the active contribution of the NGO community and other non-state actors. Global governance today is becoming inconceivable without the new role – and responsibility – of the emerging powers. These challenges require more thinking in terms of an 'outside-in' perspective. Inter- and transnational networks allow for processes of socialization and learning. To a considerable extent the lines between the multiplicity of different actors tend to become blurred; they share common interests and they are interconnected. Attempts by traditional diplomacy to exclude these actors risk to be short-sighted. Illustrative examples range from the inclusion of NGOs in official government delegations or conflict prevention,

over multinational corporations asking for diplomatic training to the rotation of diplomats between academia, business and government.

- ***Second*** **communication:** there are more channels of communication, in particular e-tools, which function as networks. The World Wide Web has consequences fora profession which relies so much on words and communication. In the past, the advent of the telegraph was also decisive as the first real-time information tool. The media (print, broadcast, social) and diplomacy need to be seen as complementary to each other. The diplomat has to work with journalists and modern media. Public diplomacy has become increasingly important and "diplomats must go where people are".
- ***Third*** **negotiation:** there are more issues to deal with and the diplomats or Ministries of Foreign Affairs are no longer 'gatekeepers' but part of larger vertical and horizontal networks, encompassing key words like 'summitrisation' and 'sectoralisation' of diplomacy. For many domestic issues there are experts in national Ministries or other government offices who have also established networks of foreign contacts with their homologues in other countries and international organizations.

In sum, finally, and as judged against the above, one may conclude that the modern diplomats must learn to share their competence with other officials, scientists and private actors and to work together. They have become 'managers of complexity', able to insert political understanding into complex problems and to enhance coherence across issues and between interests and values. They are coordinators, facilitators and team workers. In a word, they should be a 'master of managing relationships or simply an excellent networker[9].

Of course, the aforesaid points are not designed to single out and/or produce any comprehensive definition of the new or modern public diplomacy but rather to stress its increasing multilayered face. The latter is due to the fact that there are increasing number of scientific and political debates and various statements which may bring certain confusion about the meaning of the very public diplomacy, its goals and ways of activity. Therefore, it is very practical to establish (at least) a minimal definition or joint

[9] International Conference, 25-26 October 2011, Challenges Facing the 21st Century Diplomat: Representation, Communication, Negotiation and Training, Conference Report.

denominator on the concept of the modern public diplomacy, with a view to establishing what the new public diplomacy basically is or isn't as well as what it in the existing conditions can do and what can we reasonably expect from it.

To this aim, and in concluding this part of this sub-chapter, the key terms and definitions offered by the Fletcher School`s personalities (being directly involved in the field) which may serve in a way to the aforesaid purposes[10], and which in the same time clearly reflect the evolution of public diplomacy from its inception as a concept in the 1960's up-to today.

"By public diplomacy we understand the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions".

Edmund A. Gullion (former diplomat)
Dean of the Fletcher School
March 1966

"The most important roles public diplomacy will have to play for the United States in the current international environment will be less grand-strategic and more operational than during the Cold War. Support of national policy in military contingencies is one such role, and probably the most important".

Carnes Lord (former Deputy Director USIA)
Professor of Statecraft and Civilization
October 1998

[10] More information see in www.fletcher.tufts.edu (*Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,* which is the oldest school in the United States dedicated solely to graduate studies in international affairs*)*.

"Public diplomacy - effectively communicating with publics around the globe - to understand, value and even emulate America's vision and ideas; historically one of America's most effective weapons of outreach, persuasion and policy".

Jill A. Schuker (former Senior Director for Public Affairs at the National Security Council)
July 2004

"Public diplomacy may be defined, simply, as the conduct of international relations by governments through public communications media and through dealings with a wide range of nongovernmental entities (political parties, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, educational institutions, religious organizations, ethnic groups, and so on including influential individuals) for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments".

Alan K. Henrikson
Professor of Diplomatic History
April 2005

"Public diplomacy that traditionally represents actions of governments to influence overseas publics within the foreign policy process has expanded today - by accident and design - beyond the realm of governments to include the media, multinational corporations, NGO's and faith-based organizations as active participants in the field".

Crocker Snow Jr.
Acting Director Edward R. Murrow Center
May 2005

Scholars now also speak of the *New* Public Diplomacy[11]. This term is compatible within the definition above but also draws attention to key shifts in the practice of public diplomacy. These are:

i). the international actors are increasingly non-traditional and NGOs are especially prominent;

ii). the mechanisms used by these actors to communicate with world publics have moved into new, real-time and global technologies (especially the Internet);

iii). these new technologies have blurred the formerly rigid lines between the domestic and international news spheres;

iv). in place of old concepts of propaganda Public Diplomacy makes increasing use of concepts on one hand explicitly derived from marketing—especially place and nation branding—and on the other hand concepts growing from network communication theory; hence, there is

v). a new terminology of public diplomacy as the language of prestige and international image has given way to talk of 'soft power' and 'branding;'

vi). perhaps most significantly, the *New* Public Diplomacy speaks of a departure from the actor-to-people Cold War-era communication and the arrival of a new emphasis on people-to-people contact for mutual enlightenment, with the international actor playing the role of facilitator; and

vii). in this model the old emphasis on top down messaging is eclipsed and the prime task of the new public diplomacy is characterized as 'relationship building.'

The relationships need not be between the actor and a foreign audience but could usefully be between two audiences, foreign to each other, whose communication the actor wishes to facilitate. Again, as the following grid will show, the aim of managing the international environment remains consistent[12].

[11] The key exploration of this idea is Jan Melissen, ed., *The New Public Diplomacy,* London: Palgrave, 2005.

[12] Cull Nicholas J., Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past, University of Southern California, Figueroa Press Los Angeles, 2009.

Figure 1. The old and new Public Diplomacy

Dominant Characteristics		*Old public diplomacy*	*New Public Diplomacy*
1) Identity of international actor		State	State and non-state actors
2) Tech. environment		Short wave radio Print newspapers Land-line telephones	Short wave radio Print newspapers Land-line telephones
3) Media environment		Clear line between domestic and international news sphere	Blurring of domestic and international news sphere.
4) Source of approach		Outgrowth of political advocacy & propaganda theory	Outgrowth of corporate branding & network theory
5) Terminology		"International image" "Prestige"	"Soft power" "Nation Brand"
6) Structure of role		Top down, actor to foreign peoples	Horizontal, facilitated by actor
7) Nature of role		Targeted messaging	Relationship-building
8) Overall aim		The management of the international environment	The management of the international environment

In addition, one should also note that the new public diplomacy is based on a number of principles which distinguishes it clearly from other related topics. These principles can help to give a basic overview of the concept and are as follows:

- *"dialogue, not monologue. To awaken understanding and wanting to understand;*
- *integration in the other diplomacy from the beginning;*
- *cooperation with non-state partners;*
- *work after the network method, not the hierarchical method;*
- *coherence between the public diplomacy work at home and abroad;*
- *tailored solutions for assignments: "There is no common definition or common behavior which fits everyone";*
- *honest and reliable information, not propaganda, and*

- *observer role, i.e. registration of other countries' behavior in the area with later reporting back to the home country.[13]"*

In concluding, the public diplomacy can make impacts on several levels depending on how successful the public diplomacy initiatives are conducted, for how long they run and how many resources are invested in them. The possible achievements for public diplomacy are listed below in a hierarchical order:

- *"Increasing people's familiarity with one's country (making them think about it, updating their images, turning around non-favorable opinions)*
- *Increasing people's appreciation of one's country (creating positive perceptions, getting others to see issues of global importance from the same perspective)*
- *Engaging people with one's country (strengthening ties – from education reform to scientific co-operation; encouraging people to see us as an attractive destination for tourism, study, distance learning; getting them to buy our products; getting to understand and subscribe to our values)*
- *Influencing people (getting companies to invest, publics to back our positions or politicians to turn to us as a favored partner)[14]".*

So the goals of public diplomacy can span a vast area from basically introducing the country to targeted audiences or dispelling any misperceptions they might have about it to actively engaging people with the country by attracting people there for sightseeing, studies or making investments or political deals. The hopes of what to expect of public diplomacy initiatives relies on how the relations already are and in which areas mainly are sought strengthened – be it political, economic or cultural relations.

[13] Andreasen, U. (2007) *Diplomati og Globalisering – En introduktion til Public Diplomacy*, Museum Tusculanums Forlag Københavns Universitet: Copenhagen.

[14] Ibid. INVEST MAcedonia is classical example as well, www.invest-in-macedonia.com .

CHAPTER III: CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AS A KEY DIMENSION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

3.1. Notion of culture

Before analyzing the interdependency between culture and diplomacy, as reflected in the term of cultural diplomacy, it is necessary to state or at least to indicate what the word culture implies. According to Hofstede, culture is defined as "the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one category of people (i.e. social group) from another."[15] In contrast to personality, culture is not individual but collective. Furthermore, mental programming suggests that information has been internalized by an individual, leaving him unable to judge outside of his program's purview. Hofstede applies the same definition of culture to professional cultures, such as the diplomatic one[16]. Another approach to defining culture is to state its key aspects. In this regard, ***first,*** culture is a quality of society, not the individual; ***second,*** it is acquired through the process of individual acculturation or socialization; and ***third,*** each culture is a unique set of characteristics dictating behavior in every aspect of an individual's life[17]. Culture is the social identity individuals start to develop when they become aware of belonging to a social group[18]: national cultures as well as political, economic, social, and historical elements form a national identity.

According to the aforesaid classifications, one may compare the culture to a program since it (*among others*) contains information about the very society in which individuals find themselves: it provides information about social roles, the structure of relationships, etiquette and how everyday life should be arranged[19]. Culture is a guideline for social interaction, but it is only valid in the social context in which this program is internalized among its members; therefore, it is necessary to understand the other members of the global society and their program.

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15 Geert Hofstede, "Diplomats as Cultural Bridge-Builders," *Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy*, ed. Hannah Slavik (Malta, Geneva: Diplo Foundation 2004), p.26.

16 Hofstede, "Diplomats as Cultural Bridge-Builders," p.26.

17 Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures, International Communication in an Interdependent World* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 2004), 11.

18 William B. Gudykunst, "Cultural Variability in Ethno linguistic Identity," in *Language, Communication and Culture*, ed. Stella Ting-Toomey and Felipe Korzenny (Newbury Park: Sage 1989), 223.

19 Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, 12.

At this point, one should recall that the very diplomacy deals with culturally diverse groups by means of interactions and negotiations (as stressed above). The negotiation style of each participant is formed by one's own cultural "program." As different cultural groups communicate differently, the culture of a negotiation party influences its negotiation style. Therefore, the probability of mistakes and misunderstandings increases when the interaction is cross-national. While sovereignty and equality are the rational backbones of international relations, culture is its distinctive emotional differential; the hidden dimension which projects as much impact as political or economic power on decision-making.

"Effective public diplomacy is a two-way street that involves listening as well as talking. In order to get others to want the same outcomes you want, you have to understand how they are hearing your messages and adapt accordingly. Preaching at foreigners is not the best way to convert them. Too often political leaders think that the problem is simply that others lack information, and that if they simply knew what we know, they will see things our way. All information goes through **cultural filters**, and declamatory statements are rarely heard as intended".[20]

3.2. Is there a need to categorizing cultures?

The aforesaid suggests the need of any approach *to categorizing cultures*. In other words, in order to cope with cultural differences and to train cultural awareness and intercultural competence, it is useful to distinguish between different cultures. Hofstede[21] categorizes cultures into four dimensions, differentiating between *i.* collectivistic and individualistic societies; *ii.* masculine and feminine societies and distinguishing the level of authority between the two genders[22]; *iii.* uncertainty avoidance (i.e. boldness versus cautiousness); and *iv.* long-or-short-term orientation (in their social contact).

[20] Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy" published in University of Southern California, 01st January 2010.

[21] Hofstede, "Diplomats as Cultural Bridge-Builders," 28.

[22] Erika Svedberg, "Feminist Theory and International Negotiations," *International Studies Perspectives* 3, No.2.

The ground-breaking ethnologist Edward T. Hall[23] distinguishes between cultures of high or low context. In high context societies, people have close connections over a long period of time, decisions and activities are focused on relationships, and communication is more unspoken and less verbally explicit. In low context societies, by contrast, people usually have more connections of shorter duration or for a specific reason, individuals are rule and task-orientated, and information is communicated explicitly. Whereas low context cultures pursue an individualistic negotiation style, high context cultures focus on building a relationship. In other words, low context negotiators are interested in the outcome of negotiations—they want to find solutions to a problem. High context negotiators are more interested in attending to relationships by means of negotiations[24].

Nevertheless, the overall structure of every negotiation is regulated by protocol along with a specific type of negotiation style, such as: circular, linear, functional, task-centered or personal[25]**.** Further developing Hofstede`s definition of culture, it is possible to classify cultures in the following categories: multi-active, linear-active, and reactive cultural groups. Multi-active groups are characterized by a high level of flexibility and are generally disinterested in schedules and punctuality. Reality is more important to them than appointments, and they are willing to invest time in human transactions[26]. In contrast, linear-active groups address tasks on an individual basis, while concentrating on a fixed schedule. They stick to plans and facts, and separate social from professional aspects. In contrast to multi-active and linear-active groups, reactive cultures listen and try to see the whole picture before they become active.

In addition, in order to handle concrete intercultural negotiation situations, it is also useful to classify cultures not only according to dimensions or groups, but also according *to regions.* Namely, there is almost a common agreement that each region of the globe has its own cultural peculiarities, whether it is Asia, the Arab world, or Latin America. On the basis that the cultural background matters for diplomacy, cultural specificities have to be

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[23] Edward T. Hall, *Beyond Culture*, 39, 53, 105-113; Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall, *Understanding Cultural Differences: Germans, French, and Americans* (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press 1983); Edward T. Hall and Mildred Reed Hall, *Hidden Differences, Studies in International Communication: How to Communicate with the Germans* (Hamburg: Stern 1987).

[24] Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, 36.

[25] Alena Korshuk, "On Intercultural Training of Diplomats," in *Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy*, ed. Hannah Slavik (Malta: Diplo Foundation, 2004), 408.

[26] Richard D Lewis, *When Cultures Collide: Leading Across Cultures*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2006), 30.

taken into account. The way of thinking, speaking, and behaving is deeply rooted in an individual's particular culture, and hence also influences his conduct during diplomatic affairs. For effective and successful diplomacy at all levels, the influences of regional and national cultures should also be taken into consideration[27]. In this regard, for example, the preponderance of American power in international relations and American history are inherent in the self-image of the nation and its representatives, and correspondingly influence its culture. It not only provides Americans with a sense of pride, but also gives them a distinct impetus to act with self-assurance. American society is dominated by a pervasive emphasis on achievement, which is perpetuated by historical events such as the pioneers conquering the vast prairie or astronauts landing on the moon. The American culture is characterized by a strong optimistic tendency: it is possible to solve nearly every problem through active effort, and hard work leads to happy endings[28]. American negotiators are characterized by their "can-do" approach. There exists a strong belief that the environment can be manipulated for someone's own purposes. The approach's main features are to set an objective, to develop a plan, and then to act to change the environment in accordance with that plan. As a result, not much space exists for cultivating personal ties[29]. Against the background of a low context culture, American negotiators typically establish their positions clearly from the onset. They are interested in quickly discussing details and proceeding on an offer and counter-offer basis. The volatility of life that prevailed in the early days of the U.S. is reflected in its low-context society. People have more connections of a shorter duration and for a specific reason than longstanding relationships. Therefore, important transactions are based on contracts rather than ties of sentiment, so that all obligations have to be spelled out and ambiguities resolved. American society is also a linear-active one. The historical experience of the days of land grab and gold rush, when time was essential for future success, is still presenting the American mindset. Schedules and deadlines seem to loom over everything ("*Time is money*"). Changing schedules or appointments or deviating from the agenda is difficult to accept. Americans prefer dealing with one thing and one person at a time

[27] For a comprehensive overview about national and cultural peculiarities and their influence on the intercultural communication and negotiation process: Richard D. Lewis, *Finland, Cultural Lone Wolf,* 179-563.

[28] Glen Fisher, Mindset, *The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations* (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press 1988), p.52.

[29] Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, p. 37.

rather than handling several tasks simultaneously[30]. The worldwide prominence of the English language is further shaping the American culture. There are 375 million native speakers and an estimated 1.1 billion people who speak English as a second language; no other language seems to be as pervasive. It is widely used as the dominant language in international organizations and forums. Hence, being a native-speaker creates an inevitable advantage and strengthens one's self-confidence at the negotiating table.

3.3. Is there any common culture of diplomacy?

To determine whether a global culture of diplomacy exists, comprehensive diplomacy as a term must be defined. To recall: the aim of diplomacy is twofold: to protect and guide the individual interests of states and to promote global norms and values characterizing the growing sense of a community of states and international unity. Modern diplomacy is a rule-governed activity involving communication, negotiation, and representation between states, international organizations and trans-national participants. These rules help to avoid or settle conflicts. In the 21st century, diplomacy is ubiquitous and increasing in practice; non-state actors are more willing to engage in diplomatic methods and practice a distinct type of diplomacy. Right at this point where the above illustrated aspects of the culture (on one side) and the **diplomacy** (as outlined above, on the other side) jointly impose the question of the existence of a common culture of diplomacy shared by all participants involved in the interactive process of diplomacy; in other words, beyond the diversity of state-based diplomatic cultures, is there a common culture of diplomacy? Indeed, a range of similarities can be found in the diplomatic profession. These behavioral similarities create an *esprit de corps:* diplomats reap the benefits of a similar professional education and diplomatic training, sharing the same social rules such as restraint, politeness, tolerance, patience, empathy, and mutual confidence. Furthermore, they have similar professional experiences. They are accustomed to the same procedures, follow the same rules, and display the same behaviors that suggest the reality of a common diplomatic culture. This diplomatic culture could be defined as "the accumulated communicative and representational norms, rules, and institutions devised to improve relations and avoid war between

[30] Lewis, *Finland*, p. 179-180.

interacting and mutually recognizing political entities". Despite these similarities, however, some original cultural differences remain, which make it difficult to speak of a common culture of diplomacy. Individuals are formed by their cultural backgrounds which can never be truly neglected because they are unable to erase what Hofstede termed the "programming of the mind" The social identity achieved by a long lasting socialization process cannot be abandoned by means of professional training, no matter how intense this training might be. Moreover, abandoning national culture would also cause problems because diplomats would not be able to identify with their own cultural background, making it almost impossible to fulfill their job as "servants of national interests." Finally, a serious factor affecting diplomatic traditions is the emergence of a diverse set of actors partaking in activities traditionally reserved solely for representatives of states. As a result, the culture among diplomatic participants becomes more open; diversity is more common. However, not all of the new actors in diplomacy are experienced in dealing with foreigners and intercultural situations. Their acculturation stays in many cases only task-related and is rarely adapted outside the negotiator's professional environment. Similar to career diplomats, they never lose their own programming of the mind as their internalized culture. Therefore, even under the presumption that a common culture among diplomats exists based on a universally accepted protocol, it does not conclusively prove the existence of a unique common diplomatic culture.

3.4. Defining cultural diplomacy

In the light of the key points as underlined in previous sub-chapters, it becomes easier to arrive to the presently very popular term of cultural policy. As above indicated, the cultural diplomacy itself stands out from the other two concepts – public diplomacy and nation branding – in that it is still not a fairly new concept like the others, but it is just as old as traditional diplomacy itself. When relations were maintained between states, there has always been an exchange of ideas, language, art and religion taking place.[31]. Cultural diplomacy is in short the *official effort to facilitate exchange and spread of culture*

[31] Arndt, R.T. (2005) *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, Potomac Books: Washington D.C.

around the world whether it is within music, art, philosophy or values[32]. The effort to spread one's culture can have several different causes such as economic promotion or the hope of transferring one's values to people in other countries and thereby create better relations. Of this reason cultural diplomacy can be seen as overlapping public diplomacy significantly[33]. Consequently, different governments attribute very different importance to cultural diplomacy but often it has been a quite neglected niche area compared to the more traditional diplomatic activities. In the United States for example it has since the end of the Cold War been a much neglected area despite rhetoric stating otherwise – cultural diplomacy saw several significant budget cuts throughout the 1990s and the cultural diplomacy organization USIA was even closed down. Other countries have practiced a more successful cultural diplomacy than the United States – amongst these United Kingdom, Germany and the former Soviet Union. Most noteworthy though is France with an annual spending on cultural diplomacy of more than one billion US dollars and positions in the French cultural diplomacy is very prestigious[34].

An important note on cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange is that cultural exchange does not necessarily constitute cultural diplomacy. The key word in this relation is *diplomacy – the cultural exchange has to take its basis in an official initiative for it to be classified as cultural diplomacy*. The reason for this being that non-official cultural exchange might bring the same or better benefits than the officially planned and funded exchanges, but they are too erratic and unpredictable to include in measuring the success or failure of cultural rapprochement[35].

One of the most cited definition of cultural diplomacy is the one given by Lenczowski, who defines it as follows:

"Cultural diplomacy may be defined as the use of various elements of culture to influence foreign publics, opinion makers, and even foreign leaders. These elements comprehend the entire range of characteristics within a culture: including the arts, education, ideas, history, science, medicine, technology, religion, customs, manners,

[32] See: Fatmir Fazliu, Diplomacia publike, ISPN, 2015.

[33] U.S. Department of State (2005) *Cultural Diplomacy – the Linchpin of Public Diplomacy*, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54374.pdf [accessed 2nd of February 2009].

[34] Schneider, C.P. (2007) *Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy That Works*, The New Public Diplomacy – Soft Power in International Relations, Jan Melissen (ed.) pp. 147-168, Palgrave Macmillan: London.

[35] Andreasen, U. (2007) *Diplomati og Globalisering – En introduktion til Public Diplomacy*, Museum Tusculanums Forlag Københavns Universitet: *Copenhagen.*

commerce, philanthropy, sports, language, professional vocations, hobbies, etc. and the various media by which these elements may be communicated. Cultural diplomacy seeks to harness these elements to influence foreigners in several ways: to have a positive view of the United States, its people, its culture, and its policies"[36]

This signifies how very diverse the area of cultural diplomacy is and how vast an area it is used to influence. Furthermore, it gives a better idea of how closely related this area is with that of public diplomacy. They do clearly overlap in several areas even if they are not the same. The previous sections clearly indicated how and why culture should play a role in public diplomacy as a distinct activity, broadly defined as cultural diplomacy. It has set out a practical agenda for integrating the work of cultural institutions into the existing structures and working practices of public diplomacy, which de facto confirms the **interdependency between the new public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy.** This may be better understood in the light of the following c*ore elements of cultural diplomacy:*

❖ ***Actors and government involvement***

Cultural diplomacy is a diplomatic practice of governments – mostly single governments, but also groups of governments such as the European Union, and sub-national governments. In this respect, Fox's argument – that the term cultural diplomacy implies the involvement of government 'to whatever extent' in the business of projecting the nation's image abroad - is persuasive. Cultural diplomacy is carried out in support of a government's foreign policy goals or its diplomacy, or both. Because of its connection to foreign policy or diplomacy, cultural diplomacy usually involves directly or indirectly the government's foreign ministry, or at sub-national level, the ministry of international relations (as, for example, Quebec). The recent cultural diplomacy of New Zealand, for instance, whilst administered by New Zealand's cultural ministry, nevertheless involves its foreign ministry, both in terms of setting cultural diplomacy policy and implementing activities arising out of that policy in accordance with New Zealand's foreign policy objectives.

[36] Lenczowski, J. (2007) *Keep the purpose clear*, *The Public Diplomacy Reader*, J. M. Waller (ed.), The Institute of World Politics Press: Washington pp. 196-197.

❖ ***Objectives***

Cultural diplomacy is undertaken for a range of purposes, although the purpose does not in itself serve to distinguish cultural diplomacy from contiguous practices. Traditionally, governments have said that they undertake cultural diplomacy to achieve idealistic purposes - to develop mutual understanding, combat ethnocentrism and stereotyping, and prevent conflicts. These idealistic objectives frequently include the idea of a two-way relationship based on mutual exchange, although in practice cultural diplomacy has tended not to be nearly as reciprocal as its practitioners intended. Cultural diplomacy's functional objectives also include advancing trade, political, diplomatic, and economic interests, developing bilateral relationships across the board, including economic, trade, political, cultural and diplomatic elements, connecting with groups abroad that are important to the cultural diplomacy practitioner (such as diasporas), and helping to maintain bilateral relationships in times of tension. Cultural diplomacy can also advance the interests of other countries, not just the interests of the country carrying out the diplomacy. The cultural diplomacy of India, for instance, with its heavy focus on providing scholarships to students from neighboring countries to study in India, serves to advance India's interests and those of its neighbors, as well as the interests of the students themselves.

❖ ***Activities***

Cultural diplomacy incorporates activities undertaken by, or involving, a wide range of participants such as artists, singers and so on, but also the manifestations of their artistry (such as a film), the promotion of aspects of the culture of a state (language, for instance), and the exchange of people, such as academics. Activities undertaken within cultural diplomacy's scope manifest an aspect of the culture of the polity the government represents. The range of activities is wide and is no longer limited to 'high culture'; cultural activity is viewed less as being produced for, and viewed by, elites. More often, it includes cultural activity targeted at the wider population. Examples of this broader scope of cultural diplomacy includes educational scholarships, visits of scholars, intellectuals, academics and artists both domestically and abroad, cultural group performances, artist performances and exhibitions, seminars and conferences, the operation of libraries, festivals abroad and support for festivals of other countries held

domestically, establishing and maintaining professorships and chairs in universities abroad, the commissioning of busts, statues and portraits of national leaders, the presentation of books and musical instruments to visiting dignitaries and diplomatic missions abroad, an essay award and an annual lecture and sports.

❖ ***Audiences***

In addition to targeting audiences in other countries with manifestations of the culture of the 'sending' state, cultural diplomacy also incorporates supporting manifestations of another country's cultural activity at home, as this may help advance the national interests of the sending state. Furthermore, cultural diplomacy's audiences may include members of a national diaspora. Reaching India's sizeable diaspora has long been a focus of the work of the cultural centers operated by India's cultural agency, the India Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR).

In addition, while dealing with cultural diplomacy, one should also take into account similar practices. Namely, the term cultural diplomacy is used interchangeably with other related and overlapping terms, particularly **public diplomacy**, **international cultural relations and propaganda**, but although cultural diplomacy is a subset of public diplomacy (a government's communication with foreign audiences), it is not synonymous with it, as there are instances of public diplomacy, such as keeping informed media organizations, which do not involve a state's culture. Nor is cultural diplomacy a synonym for international cultural relations: some of such relations do not involve government, or contribute to foreign policy goals or to diplomacy (a pre-requisite for cultural diplomacy). And whilst cultural diplomacy may on the face of it seem like **a more benign form of governmental propaganda,** the practice's commitment to engagement with its audiences, combined with the inherent honesty of culture, serve to distinguish it from propaganda. The differences amongst these respective terms are explicated in the following sections.

The world does not stand still, though, and in the future, the public diplomacy dividend will increasingly go to countries that respond to the challenges and opportunities posed by the latest phase of globalization. The rise of new technologies, the new possibilities offered by the internet, the growth of global communication and the proliferation of cheap international travel are providing individual citizens with the tools to influence politics from the comfort – and anonymity – of their own homes.

One should not underestimate the enormity of the cumulative impact of the changes described above; they challenge the basis of current public diplomacy policy and practices, and require wholesale systemic change and adaptation. The forces of globalization used to be the preserve of countries and corporations, but now, globalization has reached the level of the individual. While the first period was characterized by the globalization of *countries*, and the second by that of *companies*, the defining characteristic of this new era is the ability of *individuals* to reap the benefits of globalization and connect with other people on a truly global level. Thanks to computers, email, fiber-optic networks, teleconferencing and dynamic new software it is possible for individuals to collaborate and compete in real time with more people from more corners of the planet on more kinds of work and on a more equal footing than ever before**.** The rise of social software and social networking tools means that people are connecting, organizing and collaborating in new ways. The internet has become a basic and important tool for all the major cultural institutions in any country; no major concert hall, theatre, gallery or any other institution could survive without a website, an online booking service and an email update. Many are developing their websites to act as virtual versions of their physical work. From photographing and describing paintings and objects on searchable databases, to digitizing content, they are investing more time and money increasing vast stores of online content. The latter is (among others) completed by increasingly higher level of immigration to all developed countries, and thus diaspora communities have become an important and constant feature of life in those countries, such as the EU`s major member states.

"The growth of new technologies, global communications, travel, migration and new democratic expectations of citizens means *that we are all diplomats now.* This is especially true for the major EU member states, which have so many external links. This can be a challenge as well as an opportunity, and we need to ensure that we are well equipped to deal with this new reality".

SECOND PART:
THE SOFT POWER AS A LEADING CONCEPT IN THE MODERN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Introduction

For the purposes of better understanding the key points as contained in this part, it is necessary to recall in general about *what is the power in international politics*. Power is in general an essential element of human existence and we can find signs and manifestations of power in every dimension of social life, from interpersonal relations through economic transactions, to religious and political disputes. We know that power has a variety of forms, and features. *It can be however exercised with different degrees of intensity- with force and violence or, on the contrary, with kindness and politeness,* etc. States have always interacted using a variety of instruments along a spectrum from coercive intervention at one end to bland expressions of friendship at the other.

"Traditionally, the test of a great power was 'strength for war'. War was the ultimate game in which the cards of international politics were played and estimates of relative power were proven. Over the centuries, however, as technologies evolved, the *sources of power have shifted*. Today, the foundations of power have been moving away from the emphasis on military force. A combination of factors - nuclear weapons that are too awesome to use, the difficulties of building empires in an age of nationalism, the unwillingness of western societies to send their troops into battle - have conspired to make war a last resort for most advanced countries. In the words of British diplomat Robert Cooper, *'A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer*.' War remains possible, but it is much less acceptable now than it was even half a century ago. For most of today's great powers, the use of force would jeopardize their economic objectives. Even non-democratic countries that feel **moral constraints** on the use of force have to consider its effects on their economic objectives. As Thomas Friedman has put it, countries are disciplined by an "**electronic herd**" of investors who control their access to capital in a globalized economy"[37].

[37] Joseph S. Nye, Re-ordering the World: The long-term implications of September 11, published by The Foreign Policy Centre (http://www.fpc.org.uk).

Force remains important as we saw on September 11, 2000 and in Afghanistan. But it is also important to mobilize international coalitions and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges...; no country in the world today is great enough to solve the problem of global terrorism alone.

There is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may secure the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. It is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. This aspect of power is **"soft power" -** *getting people to want what you want*[38].

Power in the global information age is becoming less coercive among advanced countries. But most of the world does not consist of post-industrial societies, and that limits the transformation of power. Much of Africa and the Middle East remains locked in pre-industrial agricultural societies with weak institutions and authoritarian rulers. Other countries, such as China, India, and Brazil, are industrial economies analogous to parts of the West in the mid-twentieth century. In such a variegated world, all three sources of power - military, economic, and soft - remain relevant. However, as stated by Joseph S. Nye, *if current economic and social trends continue, leadership in the information revolution and soft power will become more important in the mix*[39].

But, before exclusively dealing with the soft power-related key issues, it would be still very useful if we recall on Nye`s model (Figure 2) to understanding the power relations of the international relations while incorporating soft power. Namely, this model is to see the international struggle of power as a game of chess – but played on three interrelated boards rather than just one. The top board is the classical struggle between states for military dominance and centers itself on security policy, alliance building, maintenance of a balance of power etc. On the second board the game of economic growth is played where issues can be anything within the financial and the economy policy realms – trade agreements, anti-trust laws etc. The bottom board game of power is dedicated to a multitude of international issues such as international crime, climate change or for example the *Olympics*. It's on this board soft power comes into play. Some political actors fail to acknowledge other spheres than the classical power game of

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] *Ibid.*

military muscle though[40] – a blunder that can have severe repercussions for the state's standing in the two other spheres[41]. The tripartite division of the forms of power is followed by key words attached to each in relation to type of behavior, primary currencies and government policies. Here it is seen how soft power really is markedly different from the other two. Where military and economic power both utilize very direct means to gain power, soft power uses more subtle and difficult to evaluate means. Where the two types of hard power is signified by terms such as coercion, deterrence, sanctions and threats the soft power keywords include attraction, values and culture. The thing which is possibly most important to notice in the table the vast amount of primary currencies soft power is spanning – *values, culture, policies and institutions* – while the government policies are limited to diplomacy. This is the area which is explored more thoroughly later in this part of the Thesis.

Figure2: Tripartite division of the forms of power[42]

	Behaviors	**Primary Currencies**	**Government Policies**
Military Power	*coercion* *deterrence* *protection*	*threats* *force*	*coercive diplomacy* *war* *alliance*
Economic Power	*inducement* *coercion*	*payments* *sanctions*	*aid* *bribes* *sanctions*
Soft Power	*attraction* *agenda setting*	*values* *culture* *policies* *institutions*	*public diplomacy* *bilateral and multilateral diplomacy*

As mentioned above there is interplay between the three chessboards of power. Using hard power without analyzing possible impacts on its soft power can be very counterproductive. Even if a state actor has significantly more military power than any potential opponents, the unrestrictive use of force will possibly lead to mistrust,

[40] This point is illustrated well by the famous Joseph Stalin quote: *"The Pope? How many divisions has he got?"* Stalin apparently only recognized military power here and not the vast amount of soft power held by the papacy.

[41] Nye, J., 2004, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, p.4-5.

[42] Ibid, p. 31.

alienation of allies and neutrals and in turn restrict the freedom of action for the state actor in the long run to restore goodwill, avoid possible sanctions or boycotts and ultimately avoid unfriendly alliance building to create a balance of power. The classic illustration of some of these points is the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Another of the many examples of a time where a state actor ignored the importance of soft power which in turn led to repercussions in other areas was China after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, through which event China destroyed its power of attraction and was hit hard in the economic realm through trade embargoes and boycotts[43].

[43] Ibid, p.25-29.

CHAPTER IV: WHY SOFT POWER HAS INCREASINGLY SIGNIFICANT ROLE?

Introduction

As was in general indicated above, the present increasing role of the soft power (especially during the last decade) is due to series of fundamental forces at work. More specifically, it is about following two significant 'power shifts' which have altered the context in which states wield influence and formulate policy options[44]. The ***first*** of these shifts is a transition of power from West to East, and to some extent to the South. The developed countries of the West are still recovering from the effects of the global financial crisis, meaning they have fewer military and economic sources at their disposal and are searching for more cost-effective ways of retaining their influence in world politics. Concurrently, the emerging powers, including the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are turning their economic resources into greater political and military power, occupying increasingly prominent roles in the international system in the process[45]. More profoundly, there has been a slow but significant shift away from the preponderance of Western power in the world, albeit temporarily disguised first by victory in the Cold War and then by the US's return to hard power after 9/11. The increasing evidence of the latter's failure in Iraq and Afghanistan damaged Britain through its association with the US. Accordingly, Britain, like most other Western states, has suffered from a crisis over how best to pursue its international goals – through power and self-assertion, or multilateralism and consensus-building.

The ***second*** shift is a diffusion of power away from states and towards civil society. While states remain the most important political bodies in the international system, their ability to influence people and events is being rapidly eroded by technological advances, especially in computers and telecommunications (e.g. the Internet and mass media). The speed and ease of access to information across cultural, societal, political and national boundaries has created a more informed and, arguably, more activist global public debate

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[44] Matthews, Jessica T. (1997) Power Shifts. *Foreign Affairs*. 76 (1), p. 50– 67 and Nye, J. (2012) Power Shifts in the 21st Century. *The Montreal Review* [online] May 2012. www.themontrealreview.com/2009/The-Future-of-Power-Joseph-Nye.php [Accessed on 19 February 2015].

[45] Zalman, Andy. (2012) How Power Works in the 21st Century. *The Globalist.*17 July 2012.

that increasingly challenges the legitimacy of established regimes, and spills over easily from one state to another[46]. This is not a new phenomenon, as the events of 1848, 1917–19, 1968 and 1989 illustrate. But the international environment has certainly become more complex and multi-layered, with the result that the instruments of efficient armed force and strategic deterrence (traditionally important for example to Britain) are becoming far less relevant to the concerns of a modern European society. Part of this set of changes is technological and economic globalization, a process that generates flows and connections across territorial boundaries, but also across regional and cultural divides. This has enabled a range of (benign and malign) actors – intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations (MNCs), identity groups and the media – to play a more active role in politics than ever before, and on a much larger scale. These *transnational* players produce networks on a range of diverse issues, blurring the already fuzzy boundaries between foreign and domestic politics and thus complicating policy at home and abroad[47].

Yet such *processes* do not necessarily produce the universalization of values on which soft power might be thought to rest. While they can act to dissolve existing power structures, the result can be the uncovering of sharp clashes in belief systems, as the fall-out from the 2011 'Arab Spring' demonstrated. Thus, on one hand *soft power becomes more important*, because the ideas and beliefs of ordinary people have come more into play in international politics, while on the other it is by no means clear who will be attracted to what model or set of attitudes.

In addition, a related development is also the fact that the internal composition of most developed societies is becoming less homogeneous as the result of both permanent migration and more transient forms of personal mobility (e.g. temporary migrant workers and foreign students). The presence, behavior and political attitudes of diverse ethno-cultural identity groups mean that governments can no longer assume that the support of their domestic environments can be taken for granted, or mobilized in the form of nationalist enthusiasm[48]. It also challenges the idea of the national interest,

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[46] Tehranian, Majid. (1997) Global Communication and International Relations: Changing Paradigms and Policies. *The International Journal of Peace Studies.* 2 (1), p. 39– 64.

[47] Castells, Manuel. (2007) Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society. *International Journal of Communication.* 1, p. 238–266.

[48] Hill, Christopher. (2013) *The National Interest in Question: Foreign Policy in Multicultural Societies.* (Oxford, Oxford University Press).

raising some uncomfortable questions about identity, about what a country's role in the world should be, and about whom foreign policy ultimately serves. On the other hand, **ethno-cultural minorities** are in themselves potentially a source of soft power – their levels of integration/assimilation, their social and economic 'success', their feeling of 'belonging', all speak to the outside world about the success of the community they belong to – as with the image conveyed by the London Olympics of 2012. Conversely, if the balance between diversity and integration is not handled well, this can quickly tarnish the picture which a government is seeking to project outwards. Consequently, the increasingly complex and arguably 'non-polar'[49] international order has forced states to change their approach to the conduct of international politics in two substantial ways, both of which create favorable conditions for the use of soft power.

- ***Firstly****,* they must reconsider their approach to diplomacy so as to find new ways of engaging their audiences, particularly given that straight forward propaganda (defined as the 'deliberate attempt to influence the opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values to serve the interest of the propagandists and their political masters'[50] is no longer such a viable option.
- ***Secondly***, they must engage with the various traditional and public diplomacy networks that operate in the international system, given that threats like crime, terrorism, pandemics, climate change and environmental degradation require extensive cooperation between state and non-state actors.

The funnel model by which public participation in international relations takes place mostly through the medium of government is long out-of-date. Furthermore, *transgovernmentalism,* where the sub-units of governments come together across national boundaries to solve particular global issues and engage in a range of new ways with various sections of the public, is now also an important feature of world politics. Indeed, the borders between governmental and societal networks are inherently fuzzy because elites generate a vast array of professional and personal networks across state boundaries – occasionally on public view at jamborees like Davos. In the British case this

[49] Haass, Richard N. (2008) The Age of Non-Polarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance. *Foreign Affairs.* 87 (3), p. 44–56.

[50] Welch, David. (1999) Powers of Persuasion. *History Today*. 49 (8), p. 24–26.

applies more to the transatlantic and Commonwealth scene than to that of the EU, given the nature of shared legal traditions and long-standing security relationships[51].

4.1. The nature of soft power

The above illustration of the soft power sufficiently indicates its basic nature. Namely, and as compared with hard power, soft power has a number of distinctive attributes: it is *relative, intangible, and context based*.

Soft power is a term relative in two senses. Soft and hard are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The distinction between them is one of degree[52]. Compared with military power, economic power is soft; but economic power (aid or sanction) is hard power compared with culture. *Second*ly, "all power depends on context – who relates to whom under what circumstances – but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of a willing interpreter and receivers[53]. A number of contextual variables affect the deployment of soft power by one country to another and the effect of such efforts on the latter, including geographic proximity, cultural similarity, historical relations and economic ties. Soft power is context specific, i.e. a form of soft power is relevant to only one specific country or a specific group in that country.

Soft power in general is not controlled by the government or a single organization. Soft power comes in various sources owned by non-state actors. However, there are exceptions: in a communist state such as China, as the party still controls almost all vital resources, particularly the media, the party/state does have a control over the use of soft power, either in the form of public diplomacy or state propaganda. Some authors further classify soft power into two types: *high soft power* targeted at elites; *low soft power* targeted at the broader public[54]. The impact of hard power is normally direct and

51 Hill Christopher and Sarah Beadle, The Art of Attraction Soft Power and the UK's Role in the World, March 2014.

52 Nye, 2004.

53 Ibid.

54 Kurlantzick, Joshua. (2005) The Decline of American Soft Power. *Current History*. December, p. 419–424.

immediate, straight and visible. In comparison, the effect of soft power is indirect and takes much longer to appear. It may take years to produce the desired outcome[55].

4.2. Does only soft power matter?

While some continue to voice doubts over the efficacy and relevance of soft power – the former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously stated that the United States could rely on its vast hard power capabilities alone – it is widely regarded as an *indispensable way for states to exert influence in today's world*. The mechanisms of soft power are apparently well-suited to cope with the conditions of globalization. For one thing, they provide governments with the reach that is required in a 'world of global markets, global travel, and global information networks'[56]. Traditional state-to-state relations can be maintained through existing bi-and multilateral diplomacy networks like the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agencies (e.g. the World Health Organization), the World Bank, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These provide the ***fora***[57] which enable the coordination of action, whether on a universal basis or in groups of the like-minded. Participating in these networks also has practical advantages in that it offers states the ability to shape the agendas and rules of the multiple regimes which characterize modern international life. Additionally, states can use the instruments of public diplomacy via the media and Internet to communicate with other societies in the hope of shaping their perceptions and their environment[58]. This strategy is becoming increasingly important as governments realize that international politics is as much about "whose story" prevails as about military or economic supremacy[59]. They simply cannot afford to neglect the several billion people worldwide who use the web every day, or to let their image be constructed wholly by outsiders.

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55 Nye, J. *‚Soft Power: the Means to Succeed in World Politics* (New York, Public Affairs, 2004), p.99.

56 Slaughter, Anne-Marie. (2004) *A New World Order.* (Princeton, Princeton University Press).

57 This means forums, that is, instances.

58 Wallin, Matthew. (2013) *The Challenges of the Internet and Social Media in Public Diplomacy*. (Washington DC, The American Security Project).

59 Nye, J. (2010a) *Soft Power and Public Diplomacy*. British Council Parliamentary Lecture, London, 20 January 2010.

A *second advantage* of soft power is that the mechanisms associated with it are regarded as a legitimate way of conducting international relations by a variety of actors – weak states as well as strong; nonstate actors as well as governments. In a world where attempts to exert 'command power' are increasingly regarded with suspicion, co-optive power presents a welcome alternative. As such, soft power strategies are perceived to be benign and positive in their impact, whereas hard power can damage the status of even a superpower. The United States is a case in point: its overt reliance on *force majeure* – most evident during the Vietnam War, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the global War on Terror (especially the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay) – as well as its tendency to take a unilateral stance on major global issues such as climate change and international criminal justice – has resulted in a 'crisis of credibility'[60] and a loss of prestige that are difficult to recover[61]. In contrast, multilateral diplomacy conducted in organizations like the UN and the EU is generally deemed more acceptable: the former because it represents almost every country in the world and embodies universally desirable goals such as peace, international security, global justice and human rights[62], and the latter because of its self-styled character as a "civilian" and "normative power"[63].

This is however not to say that hard power is no longer relevant in international politics – no amount of soft power is able to move Iran or North Korea away from developing nuclear weapons if they are not ready to be persuaded[64]. Moreover, realist commentators like John Mearsheimer and Robert Kagan are still highly skeptical of what can be done with soft power, understandably given that sovereign states by definition pursue distinctive interests. Much conflict therefore has a zero-sum element. Yet it is becoming more and more difficult for states to justify the use of force, in its various manifestations. Even developed countries confident in their hard power assets increasingly understand that in normal conditions attempts to impose solutions deliver

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60 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. (2004) *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership.* (New York City, Carnegie Council Books for Breakfast).

61 Kurlantzick, Joshua. (2005) The Decline of American Soft Power. *Current History*. December, p. 419–424.

62 Popovsky, Vesselin and Turner, Nicholas. (2008) Legality and Legitimacy in International Order. *United Nations Policy Brief. 5*, p. 1– 8.

63 Manners, Ian. (2002) Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 40 (2), p. 235–258.

64 Jervis, Robert. (2013) Getting to Yes with Iran: the Challenges of Coercive Diplomacy. *Foreign Affairs.* January/February, p. 1–8.

relatively few of the goals that are important to them. Indeed, the historical record has shown that hard and soft power need to work in conjunction with each other in order to deliver the desired result: The British could not have sustained their Empire through hard power alone, even if the territory had originally been taken by force. Co-option and bluff were crucial. The same was true for American influence in Western Europe after the Second World War, as their massive troop presence was not useable against the countries in which it was based[65]. Conversely, it may be argued that the collapse of the former Soviet Union was (in part) due to its failure to combine hard and soft power successfully. The USSR started well in space in 1957, but lost the race to the moon. The sporting successes which it shared with its Warsaw Pact allies were soon seen to be tainted by excessive control of the athletes and at times the use of drugs. In post-Soviet Russia, Vladimir Putin has learned some of these lessons, in that he combines tough-minded nationalism with cultivating his personal charisma – a mix which seems to appeal to the peoples of the Russian-speaking, Orthodox, world. Consequently, at this point, one should again refer to the very famous Nye, who speaks about the **combination of co-option and coercion**, which is referred to as '**smart power'**[66]. As he stated, this combination is an important tool in the arsenal of states even in the military sphere, as it recognizes that winning wars may rely as much on an appeal to hearts and minds as it does on success on the battle field. This means consolidating a victory so as not to 'lose the peace', often by restoring a country to a point of stability and fostering the conditions which might prevent further conflict and/or terrorism. As such, Hillary Clinton has said that smart power is an essential element of '21st century statecraft'[67]. Its value has also been implicitly recognized by President Obama's acknowledgement that while the leaks by the CIA employee Edward Snowden have damaged security they have also allowed for a useful debate on surveillance and privacy which might ultimately help rather than hinder the US's need fora positive global reputation. Yet, for the moment, this signal of a possible

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65 Corthorn, Paul. (2013) Governments and Soft Power in International Affairs: Britain and the Boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. *Open Democracy* [online] 6 August 2013. www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/paul-corthorn/governments-in-international-affairs-britain-and-boycott-[Accessed on 8 February 2016].

Nye, J. (2003) US Power and Strategy after Iraq. *Foreign Affairs*. 82 (4), p. 60–73. www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power [Accessed on 19 February 2016].

67 The Daily Beast.(2013) *Hillary's Farewell Speech: Read the Transcript* [online] 1 February 2013. www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/02/01/hillary-s-farewell-speechread-the-transcript.html [Accessed on 12 February 2016].

change of approach is heavily outweighed by the reputational damage incurred through the drone attacks in Pakistan, Somalia and the Yemen[68].

There are some important traps, moreover, into which enthusiasts for soft power can fall. The concept tends to lead us towards the view that image is all, neglecting the substance of actual foreign policy and its tangible impact on the lives of others – for good and ill. This is a serious form of self-deception. Equally, in its association with ideas, values and culture, it necessarily downplays the significance of geography, locality and the differences between societies, and this can inhibit the impact of soft power. This is not to restate the objections from classical realism, but rather to note that if a country hopes to project influence through attracting others, it must be prepared to acknowledge that they will be doing the same, and that international diversity means a degree of *zero sum competition* in soft as well as hard power. Lastly, while countries like the UK have had to draw in their horns since the end of empire in terms of ambitions to a 'global role', the idea of soft power could seduce them back into over-estimating their importance in theatres and regions outside their own neighborhood. A stress on the ideational character of foreign policy can produce new forms of ethno-centrism and misperception, as we have already seen with the pursuit of democratization and good governance. If we add in the virtual dimension encouraged by soft power there is an even higher risk of detachment from the realities on the ground, and the resentments at perceived arrogance which are likely to follow.

As was stressed above, the impact of hard power is normally direct and immediate, straight and visible. In comparison, the effect of soft power is indirect and takes much longer to appear. It may take years to produce the desired outcome. The relevance of effectiveness of soft power depends on the perception of the target country audience on the host country; ultimately, they are the deciders of what is attractive to them and what is not. One reason behind the decline of American's soft power in Europe over the last decade is that since the end of Cold War, much of this soft power has lost its relevance as the old enemy of Soviet Union is no longer in existence.

In aforesaid context, however, one should also add that there are some views in the literature according to which only the West or the countries with democratic institutions

[68] Ibid.

can produce soft power. According to those views, for example, communist countries like China, despite its rich culture, have not been able to develop soft power. This is not true. ***No country has a monopoly on soft power. Any organization, country and culture, can develop soft power*** - the question is not who can or cannot develop soft power but to *whom* it is soft power. To some, terrorist organizations such as the Taliban or Al-Qaeda have soft power. It is undeniable that whilst American has seen a decline in its soft power[69], China`s soft power is now on the rise, primarily in Southeast Asia, but also in Africa and Latin America[70]. China`s nation image in developing countries, particularly in Africa, is much more positive than in the West.

The aforementioned sufficiently indicates the following question: **whether the sources of soft power are universal or vary from one culture to another?** Both China and India have rich cultural resources, but do they have the same type of soft power? If cultural power is soft power, why does a country like Egypt with a history of seven thousand years seem weaker compared with the US, founded only two hundred years ago? Clearly, culture *per se* is not soft power but sources of *potential* soft power. Whether a cultural asset can be converted into soft power depends on other factors. The answer on the above and / or similar questions leads to the very important issue of *how can soft power be measured, taking into account its diversified sources, and why it is measured,* as illustrated in the next chapter?

[69] Nye, J. (2004c) The Decline of Americas Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry. *Foreign Affairs*. 83 (3), p. 16–20.

[70] Nye, J. (2006) Think Again: Soft Power. *Foreign Policy* [online] 23 February 2006. www. foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_ again_ soft_ power [Accessed on 18 February 2016].

CHAPTER V: MEASURING OF SOFT POWER

5.1. Why there is a need of a framework for soft power measurement?

There is presently a huge number of literature dealing with the issue related to soft power measurement, all of which clearly point that the aim for such a framework (incl. establishing relevant index table) is to push the debate on soft power forward – not for the sake of arguing who is better than whom, but to encourage critical thinking about the resources that contribute to a nation's soft power. The latter is true because there is presently increasing number of countries rushing towards the development of soft power strategies; their efforts will be fruitless without a precise understanding of where they derive their soft power, and where it will be effective[71].

The first comprehensive attempt to measure soft power through a composite index was created and published by the **Institute for Government** (IfG) and the media company ***Monocle*** in 2010. The *IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index* combines a range of statistical metrics and subjective panel scores to measure the soft power resources of about 26 countries. The metrics are organized according to a framework of five sub-indices including culture, diplomacy, education, business/innovation, and government. This index is said to measure the soft power resources of countries, and does not translate directly into ability influence. *Monocle* has published an annual *Soft Power Survey* since then. As of 2014/15, the list is calculated using around 50 factors that indicate the use of soft power, including the number of cultural missions, Olympic medals, the quality of a country's architecture and business brands. In addition, there is the ***Soft Power 30***, which includes a foreword by Joseph Nye, is a ranking of countries' soft power produced and published by the media company *Portland*. This ranking is based on "*the quality of a country's political institutions, the extent of their cultural appeal, the strength of their diplomatic network, the global reputation of their higher education system, the attractiveness of their economic model, and a country's digital engagement with the world*". The aforesaid group of such an effort include the *Elcano Global Presence, the latest report*

[71] Gallarotti Giulio M., Soft Power: What it is, Why it's Important, and the Conditions Under Which it Can Be Effectively Used? *Wesleyan University*, January 2011.

of which scores the European Union first for soft presence when its member states are excluded and the EU is considered as a whole.

5.1.1. IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index

As mentioned above, the *Institute for Government*, working with *Monocle Magazine*, created the world's first composite index for measuring soft power according to objective and subjective metrics. Each iteration of the index represents a marginal improvement in capturing a comparative view of states' soft power resources. The aim of its initial research project has been to both improve the overall understanding of soft power, and draw attention to how important resources contributing to states' soft power actually are. This is an especially significant point given the austerity-driven mind-set that currently pervades most western governments.

Following the methodology of its surveys, *IfG-Monocle* collected a broad set of statistical metrics and *subjective* data (50 metrics in total), comparing countries according to the quality of their government; diplomatic infrastructure; cultural output; capacity for education; and their appeal to business. The data is then normalized, grouped into sub-indices, and calculated using our composite index formula to arrive at a single score for each country included in the study. The results of the index provide a comparative snapshot of states' soft power resources. As such, the rankings are not an absolute measure of states' influence, but rather their potential for influence. In fact, many states routinely undermine their own soft power with poorly-conceived policies, short-sighted spending decisions, domestic actions, or clumsy messaging.

Figure 3: Component parts of soft power



When a **country's culture** promotes universal values that other nations can readily identify with, it makes them naturally attractive to others. The reach and volume of cultural output is important in building soft power, but mass production does not lead to mass influence. As a result, IfG`s measures of culture focus on capturing both the quality and the international reach of a country's cultural output. The **Culture sub-index** includes measures like the annual number of visiting international tourists, the global reach of a country's music industry, and even a nation's international sporting success. The **Government sub-index** is designed to assess a state's public institutions, political values, and major policy outcome metrics. A successful model of domestic government is an important feature of a nation's overall attractiveness. By including measures like individual freedom, human development, violence in society, and government effectiveness, the Government sub-index gauges the extent to which a country has an attractive model of governance. The **Diplomatic sub-index** aims to measure the diplomatic resources and global footprint of states. Essentially it explores the ability of states to shape a favorable national narrative and engage international audiences. The Diplomatic sub-index combines various measures for how globally engaged and well connected a country is. By testing the relative strength of a country's diplomatic infrastructure, this sub index gives a sense of how well a country can reach international audiences. This sub-index includes metrics on the number of diplomatic missions abroad, membership in multilateral organizations, and Overseas Development Aid. The ability of a country to attract foreign students, or facilitate exchanges, is a powerful tool of public diplomacy, even in the most adversarial of countries. The **Education sub-index** aims to capture the relevant factors and includes measures on the number of foreign students in a country and the relative quality of its universities. Though it may seem more hard than soft, the **Business/Innovation sub-index** is not a measure of economic power or output. Rather, this sub-index aims to capture the relative attractiveness of a country's economic model in terms of its openness, capacity for innovation, and quality of its regulation. Economic factors can contribute to soft power as well, though in practice it can be difficult to distinguish between the hard and soft elements of economic power. The European Union's eastward expansion into the former Soviet Bloc through an attractive economic model has been pointed to as an example of soft power. Taking account of softer economic factors, IfG included metrics for innovation, corruption, and competitiveness.

In addition, and as stated above, the subjective side of soft power cannot be discounted. Rather than attempt to design against subjectivity (which we deemed impossible), the IfG`s index embraces the *subjective nature of soft power*. Taking into account existing literature on soft power and based on some of the most common mediums through which people interface with foreign countries, IfG developed six subjective metrics to complement the quantitative data gathered for each of the sub-indices described above. Working with *Monocle* editors, they both assembled an expert panel to assess countries on the following criteria: reputation of embassies and diplomats; appeal of soft power icons; quality of national airline; cultural output; cuisine; and international political leadership. The combined scores for the panel categories were weighted significantly less than objective indicators. The quantitative data used for the sub-indices account for 70 per cent of the total weighting of the index. The remaining 30 per cent of the index comprises the subjective elements. But, as with any other index, IfG`s index is also *not without its limitations and weaknesses*. The subjective nature of soft power makes comparison across all countries difficult. Moreover, the intricate bi-lateral dynamics of foreign relations – where soft power is brought to bear – cannot be fully rendered by a comparative index. As Nye has emphasized "soft power is a dance requiring partners"[72]. Finally, the index is unable to capture flashpoint events in real-time (see the recent Chilean miners' saga or China's condemnation of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee). In other words:" *Without a full and clear picture of these resources, there can be little hope of deploying soft power in a strategic, coordinated, and – ultimately – effective way. It is why a national inventory of soft power assets is essential. This challenge is easy enough to identify, but much more difficult to address"*. Soft power is notoriously difficult to measure for three main reasons. ***First,*** it is inherently subjective and its influence is often dependent on the target question"[73]. As Nye has previously argued, what attracts in Paris might repel in Riyadh. ***Second***, it can be ephemeral. Soft power reserves that have been built up over decades can vanish overnight with a few bad decisions. ***Finally,*** the sources of soft power are numerous and can be difficult to measure. In short, categorizing and quantifying soft power at the national level is a complex and demanding task with few methodological precedents on which to build.

[72] Nye, J. (2006).

[73] As taken from The Soft Power 30 Report | Foreword.

As a conclusion, regardless of the subject, **no composite index is perfect.** However, the creation of the very index marks in any case an important first attempt in moving beyond the standard opinion surveys that have dominated soft power metrics.

Figure 4: Overview of the final rankings and scores according to the selective ranking-indexes.

Portland's The Soft Power 30 2015[1]	
Rank	**Country**
1	United Kingdom
2	Germany
3	United States
4	France
5	Canada
6	Australia
7	Switzerland
8	Japan
9	Sweden
10	Netherlands
11	Denmark
12	Italy
13	Australia
14	Spain
15	Finland

Monocle's Soft Power Survey 2014/15	
Rank	**Country**
1	United States ▲
2	Germany ▼
3	United Kingdom ▼
4	Japan ▲
5	France ▼
6	Switzerland ▼
7	Australia ▼
8	Sweden ▼
9	Denmark ▲
10	Canada ▼
11	Spain ▲
12	Italy ▼
13	Netherlands –
14	New Zealand ▲
15	South Korea ▼

Elcano's Global Presence Report 2015 Soft presence	
Rank	**Country**
–	European Union[10]
1	United States
2	United Kingdom
3	Germany
4	France
5	Japan
6	China
7	Russia
8	Spain
9	Italy
10	Canada
11	Australia
12	Netherlands
13	South Korea
14	Turkey
15	Sweden

In concluding, if the combined effects of the major global shifts outlined above are shaping a world better suited to the exercise of soft power, then those countries most adept at its use will enjoy a significant advantage over their counterparts. This naturally leads to the latest (but, the most important) question of **how a country can effectively use soft power**. Joseph Nye's own model for the conversion of soft power into a desired

outcome comprises five steps, as shown in the **Figure 5**. The first step in the process of converting soft power into a successful outcome is identifying the resources that will affect the target(s) in question. At this point, and as was argued in previous sections, and in line with Nye's own model for deploying soft power**, the use of attraction** must begin *with a clear account of available resources and an understanding for where they will be effective.* It is at this first hurdle of using soft power that most governments fall. But this is understandable as the difficulty of measuring soft power is well documented. In other words, without a full and clear picture of these resources, there can be little hope of deploying soft power in a strategic, coordinated, and – ultimately – effective way. It is **why a national inventory of soft power assets is essential. This challenge is easy enough to identify, but much more difficult to address.** As stressed above, the soft power reserves that have been built upon over decades can vanish overnight with a few bad decisions. In short, categorizing and quantifying soft power at national level is any case a complex and demanding task with few methodological precedents on which to build.

Figure 5 - Soft Power Conversion Process[74]



[74]Source: Nye, J. (2011) The Future of Power, New York: Public Affairs.

5.1.2. Strategic status of Soft Power in international relations

In terms of concluding this chapter, one may underline the following key characteristics of the soft power:

- ***Traditional*:** A country's soft power as the deepest source of cultural power comes into reality through a long historical evolution. A people's mode of thinking, ideology, cultural traditions, ethnic customs, social system, economic regime, style of life, etc. are the cumulative results of the evolution of forms of social production. In this process, every element of soft power is always influenced by the cultural tradition, and the development of every culture has its own distinct trajectory. Soft power develops in this circulated, contradictory, but progressive movement with its own specific tradition.
- ***Timely*:** Soft power is intangible, but not a mirage. Its formation, development and change in strength is related to the background of the times and with domestic and international society. Only soft power which represents the mainstream of the times develops constantly. Especially in modern society, soft power has close relations with scientific and technological progress, the information society and the knowledge economy. Soft power increases with the endless invention of various new tools and means in international society. The rise in information technology makes mass media a very dynamic and influential means. As advanced mass media enter international society, its impact on international relations expands dramatically and becomes an important hallmark of a nation's power.
- ***Pervasive:*** Soft power itself has a strong capability to spread and compete. With the rising tide of the information revolution and the development of the internet culture, soft power reaches beyond the limits of geographical boundaries, national ethnicity, time and space. It powers the progress of society and impacts extraordinarily on the lifestyle and behavior standards of human beings. In international society, when a variety of soft powers interact with one another, competition and rivalry become inevitable, thus leading to disputes and conflicts. However, soft powers also attract and promote each other, usually coming to collective identity after interaction, mutual adjustment, learning, and imitation.

- ***Changeable:*** Soft power is not a static entity but a dynamic process. It is a great changing system, in which the formation and transition of power depends on the contradictory movement of its various components. Unlike nationality, national strategies and ethics, diplomatic, cultural and educational power, and the quality of government require a shorter time period to be formulated and developed and hence are more changeable. As all these have something to do with human influence, they have greater uncertainty and mobility and are much easier to adjust and transform.
- ***Inter-dependent:*** Soft and hard powers are interdependent and every country should develop both in constructing its comprehensive national power. While increasing material power, a country should improve its spiritual power. One without the other would not be effective. If the development of soft power is overlooked or ignored, it is difficult for hard power to maintain its sustained development. Yet, while soft power needs substantial media, many physical products carry rich cultural contents, express broad cultural information, and in practice play a mental role. Thus, soft and hard powers correlate with, improve and confine each other in strong complementarity. Soft power is needed to make and implement national strategy and mobilize and unify national will. Thus, a strong national leadership is indispensable to stimulate the people's enthusiasm and use their zeal to create and increase its comprehensive national power in great forward leaps. The interdependence and complementarity of soft and hard powers increase geometrically in a so-called physical-mental relationship.

As judged against the above, one may conclude that soft power plays an especially important role in the development and enhancement of comprehensive national power. "Intensified competition over comprehensive national power in today's world involves economic power, scientific and technological power, defensive power, and cultural power as well"[75]. Culture as a kind of soft power has been a significant part of comprehensive national power. It has been a strategic option for many countries to strengthen their international influence and competitiveness through cultural development. In the competition of comprehensive national powers, a nation's hard power cannot be

[75] Nye, J. (2006) Think Again.

improved without the development of its soft power. However, many always emphasize the rivalry over hard power, while overlooking the competition of soft power focused on cultural power. According to Cline's "function of national power," the "strategic goal" and "national will" are two major components of soft power. Such soft powers as strategy and will determine the effectiveness of national material power. In international society, national strategy and its implementation aim at a nation's survival, development and international influence. These reflect national interests as discussed above. The degree of national cohesiveness, leadership and governmental efficacy and people's concern over national strategy and interests all belong to factors of will. Obviously, both the making and implementation of national strategy and the mobilization and guidance of national will are closely related to the level of governmental leadership. No matter how many people a country has, it cannot constitute a strong national power without united will. Strategy and will are evidently relevant to the shape of a nation's internal power. If national leaders can design correct strategy, mobilize a whole population, and unify the national will, they can increase the efficiency and effectiveness of inherent or potential hard power. This is the reactive role of soft power that Cline proposed in his function of national power. Soft power is the first choice in handling international relations. Joseph Nye analyzed the role of soft power in his *Bound to Lead*. Economic power, he wrote, like other forms of power, cannot be gauged simply by tangible resources, for the other side of power must be considered. To make another country change may be a directive or even dictatorial application of power, the major means of which includes attraction ("carrot") or threat ("stick"). On the other hand, there is another way to apply power indirectly. In international politics, a country can achieve its expectations because other countries would take it as an example or accept a system conducive to such results. In this sense, it is equally important in international politics to give directions, to establish the environment, and to stimulate reforms in other countries. Nye called this power co-optive: if a country's ideology and culture are attractive, others would like to imitate and follow. At present, the United States has stronger traditional hard power than any other country. It also has resources of soft power in ideology and institution that can assure its leadership in the newly interdependent countries[76].

[76] Ibid.

From this strategic perspective, Nye pointed out that the United States should enhance the co-optive power of its culture and the attraction of its lifestyle in order to become preponderant not only in hard power, but also in soft power. This will establish its ideological domination throughout the entire world. To do this, the key is whether the United States has the political leadership and strategic perspective to translate those soft power resources into real power in this period of transition in international politics[77]. Soft power plays a strong reactive role in international politics. Its positive impact can help a country make feasible national strategy, guide national enthusiasm, shape united will and strong cultural power. Thereby it can promote the development of comprehensive national power, improve the country's international status, and increase its international contribution and influence. On the contrary, if the national strategy is infeasible, blind or dangerous, the soft power would misguide people and play a negative role, leading to loss of national enthusiasm, a frustrated national will, and reduction in hard national power. The damage would be incalculable. The international status and competitiveness of such a country would decrease dramatically to zero. Any country, in drawing up its national strategy, must pay attention to creating better surroundings; to making its development model, values, lifestyle and corresponding systems attractive, appealing and inspiring; and to incorporating both tangible and intangible power in order to assure the achievement of national interests. Therefore, soft power is always the first option or tool for countries to deal with various affairs in contemporary international relations.

Due to the increasing influence of soft power in international relations, major powers in the world stress the enhancement of their soft powers. As early as the 1980s, former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone proposed a strategic plan to "create a culturally developed country." French President Chirac suggested making a cultural Europe and establishing a European cultural community. Russian President Putin began to carry out his "cultural expansion" strategy as acting president. In September 1992, former U.S. President Bush highlighted in his "Agenda for American Revival," "Our political and economic connections are supplemented by the attractiveness of American culture in the world. This is a new kind of soft power we can use". In late November 2000, the outgoing President Clinton held a seminar on American culture and foreign relations aimed at

[77] Ibid.

drawing up an American cultural foreign strategy for the 21st century. In the national security strategy report, Clinton clearly set "encouraging the development of foreign democracy" as one of three pillars of the US security strategy and foreign policy. It stated, "expanding the great family of democratic and free market countries is in all the strategic interests of the United States.[78]" In the face of aggressive cultural expansion of US-led Western countries, developing countries feel challenged. President Jiang Zemin pointed out recently, "It is vital for most developing countries to maintain and upgrade the excellent traditions of their national cultures, carry forward their national ethics, absorb good the cultural achievements of others, and keep cultural development abreast of the times"[79].

78 Gallarotti, 2011.

79 Ibid.

THIRD PART: THE SCANDINAVIAN SOFT POWER AS SUCCESSFUL MODEL OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Introduction

As mentioned in previous part, the Government sub-index uses a range of metrics that capture political values like freedom, human rights, democracy, and equality. It also includes measures of government effectiveness and broad metrics on citizen outcomes like Human Development Index scores. Given that they tend to top all composite indices on government, well-being, and prosperity, *it is no surprise to see* ***the Nordic*** *and Northern Europeans topping the Government sub-index.* An attractive, functioning, and free political system is definitely a draw to international audiences and it serves the Nordics and Northern Europeans well as a source of soft power.

As Joseph Nye put it, "Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from attraction."[80] Indeed, a positive perception of a state or region among foreign publics results in tangible benefits such as the increase of foreign direct investment, a boost in tourism, and enhancement of international cooperation opportunities. But attraction is generated not so much by an artificial "image" that a country wishes to project through nation branding campaigns. Rather, it is determined more by the country's ability to engage foreign individuals and organizations in a dialogue on core values and ideas. Such an effort, defined as "public diplomacy," is about creating international bonds, fostering mutual understanding, and abolishing stereotypes. This then facilitates the achievement of a country's specific foreign policy goals. It is the instrumentalization of soft power: the power of one's attraction and reputation overseas[81].

The concept of a Scandinavian or Nordic model first emerged in the 1930s to refer to what was believed to be the distinct political and social systems of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Although the idea of a Nordic model grew in prominence in the twentieth century, scholars and policymakers have still contrasting views on its usefulness.

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80 Nye, J. (2006), p.33.

81 Ibid.

CHAPTER VI: THE INCREASING NORDIC SOFT POWER

Introduction

The increased effects of Scandinavian countries` soft power (including Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) is well-illustrated already in the 2012 Soft Power Survey, which ranked countries (as mentioned above) based on their attractiveness and international influence. According to this Survey, all the aforesaid Nordic countries made it into the top thirteen most powerful states in the world[82].The success of the Scandinavian states in generating soft power can be attributed to at least two factors: *individualized public diplomacy strategies and the ability to use regional cooperation as a tool for advancing foreign policy goals*. Despite historical, cultural, and societal similarities, each of the four Scandinavian countries has managed to develop an individual and tailor-made public diplomacy strategy that reflects their society's own values and characteristics but also differentiates between them.

With a credo that "it is sometimes possible for a country to do very well by doing good,"[83] Norway pursues a niche diplomacy, skillfully utilizing its comparative advantage of traditions in peace mediation efforts. Sweden on the other hand invests heavily in dialogue with foreign publics on human rights' protection, including women's rights. Denmark and Finland, meanwhile, focus on the innovative nature and openness of their societies which makes them attractive to immigrants and to high-tech companies seeking to invest overseas. Through different "attractive causes," the Nordic states are able to build trust and credibility among foreign societies, which strengthens their soft power and ability to influence international agendas. In addition to their country-focused public diplomacy strategies, the Scandinavian states use regional cooperation in getting the message across to international publics. The task of coordinating foreign policy messaging is facilitated by the fact that many of the strategic goals of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are in sync.

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82 http://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2012

83 Henrikson Alan K., 'Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The Global "Corners" of Canada and Norway', in: Jan Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2005), p. 68.

Firstly, the Nordic States prioritize engagement with international organizations and the strengthening of the United Nations system. Secondly, they perceive themselves as the world's peacemakers attempting to influence international policy in three important areas: environmental policy, international security, and global welfare. Thirdly, the Nordic states have consistently built an international reputation for generosity by providing humanitarian aid and development assistance to under developed countries. Finally, all four states are proud of their historic legacy of non-engagement in international conflicts and socialist internationalism which heavily influences their foreign policies' discourse.[84]

In sum, these Scandinavian states' tailor-made public diplomacy strategies, combined with close regional cooperation in promoting joint foreign policy objectives, have given them credibility and respect within the international community. A clear "Scandinavian brand" is used not only to attract tourism or foreign investment, but also to channel important foreign policy messages embedded in shared Scandinavian values and ideas for the future of the world.

[84] Hilson Mary, *The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945*, Reaction Books, London 2006, p. 116 – 147

CHAPTER VII: SCANDINAVIANS AS MODEL FOR PERMANENT SOFT POWER?

Introduction

The above mentioned success in managing their soft power of previous years resulted two years ago (2015), when some of the Scandinavians have been again among the "most visible" countries *in the ranking made by the Soft Power 30*[85], as was shown in *Figure 4*. It very well indicates the Scandinavians are very skilled not only in identifying their soft power reserves but also in addressing it (in terms of the *Soft Power Conversion Process* as shown in *Figure 5).* In this regard, it worth recalling that the soft power reserves that have been built upon over decades can vanish overnight with a few bad decisions. It is obvious that the Scandinavians are making good decisions concerned. In addition, one should also recall that the Soft Power 30 is designed not for the sake of arguing who is better than whom, but to encourage critical thinking about the resources that contribute to a nation's soft power. In this regard, it appears that the Scandinavians know how to use this comparative analytical tool as well.

For the purposes of the key aim of the present Thesis, it is worth to illustrate what specifically Portland states in relation to the bellow mentioned individual Nordic countries as to their country analysis, weaknesses*, which is followed by Portland Recommends to each of them:*

7.1. SWEDEN

- ***Country Analysis***

As Scandinavia's largest country by population, Sweden has long been held up as the ideal model of a successful social-democratic state. High life expectancy, low pollution, high levels of civic engagement and low unemployment all contribute to Sweden's image of a harmonious, peaceful society. Many on the left of politics cite the Swedish model of large welfare programs and extensive government intervention as the source of success. Former leader of the UK Labour Party Ed Miliband even travelled to the country in 2013

[85]http://softpower30.portland-communications.com/ranking**2015** .

to get advice on how to achieve successful policy outcomes. Sweden is not the most assertive actor on the global stage and has long adopted a Swiss-style neutral posture. Sweden has remained outside of the NATO club, despite neighbors Norway and Denmark signing up as original members in 1949. But a cautious and neutral approach serves Sweden well, as most of the world trusts them to 'do the right thing in global affairs'. Sweden's attractiveness is built on the foundation of an inclusive and tolerant attitude. Swedes welcome a higher proportion of asylum seekers than any other European country. People may associate Swedish culture with ABBA and the Eurovision Song Contest, but in reality the cultural brand draws a deep well, from excellence in design to widely popular neo-noir TV dramas.

- ***Strengths***

Sweden comes top - or very near it - on a host of rankings on prosperity, well-being, government effectiveness, economic competitiveness and even happiness. The Swede`s have built a modern, high-functioning society that is greatly admired throughout much of the world.

- ***Weaknesses***

Beyond a strong commitment to delivering overseas development aid, Sweden does not have much of a presence on the international stage. A slightly more involved and assertive Sweden certainly wouldn't go amiss in global affairs.

- ***Portland Recommends***

Sweden enjoys a great deal of credibility, and finishing in the top ten is a very good result. If it wanted to take a more active role on a few key global challenges, it would be well placed to wield influence. Sweden's campaign for a 2017-18 UN Security Council seat would be a good place to start.

7.2. DENMARK

- ***Country Analysis***

Like its Nordic neighbors, Denmark boasts a model society with enviable policy outcomes for its residents. Danish government - whether the real-life or televised Borgen version - is studied by public policy and management researchers the world over. On the global stage, the Danes have enjoyed outsized influence. In the previous NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Danes had a leader at the heart of the West's most important alliance. Denmark has also been a crucial global voice in the debate on climate change. But on the domestic front, there could be trouble ahead. The populist right-wing Danish People's Party had their best ever showing in an election in June 2015. These elections saw the defeat of Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt's center-left coalition and the leading center-right party will need the support of the right-wing Dansk Folksparti to build a coalition. A heavy shift to the right could challenge the Dane's long standing reputation as easy going 'happy people'.

- ***Strengths***

When it comes to design, architecture and urbanism, Denmark is truly world-class. As Winston Churchill said, 'we shape our buildings and then they shape us'. If we hold this true, the Danes have mastered functional design that leads to an effective, efficient, and above all happy society.

- ***Weaknesses***

Looking at the scores across each category of our index, Denmark ranks lowest in Culture. Danish TV has scored some international hits lately, but in other pop-culture formats, Denmark is much less visible. If the success of 'Borgen', 'The Killing', and 'The Bridge' could translate into other media, Denmark could crack the top 10.

- ***Portland Recommends***

Denmark's excellence in design is certainly among its top soft power assets. The Danish government has put this expertise to work by creating a design-led problem-solving agency called Mind Lab. Denmark should roll this model out to the rest of the world, bringing design-thinking to bear on major development and governance challenges.

7.3. FINLAND

- ***Country Analysis***

In soft power terms, Finland punches well above its geopolitical weight, scoring 15th place in the Soft Power 30. Unsurprisingly this is no thanks to its cultural output, with the country struggling to attract as many tourists as its neighbors in northern Europe, or convince many foreigners to take up the notoriously difficult Finnish language. Where Finland does impress, its performance in the field of enterprise, where it takes 5th place. A competitive economy and extremely low levels of corruption have fostered a strong culture of innovation, with Finland registering proportionately more patents than all other countries in the index save Japan and South Korea. Evidence suggests this feverish economic activity might be built on unhealthy foundations, since the Finns are the world's biggest coffee drinkers, gulping down no less than 12 kg of the black substance annually. In any case, the 4% of its GDP spent on research and development efforts should ensure that number doesn't fall anytime soon.

- ***Strengths***

Finland's brand is closely associated with the world-renowned 'Nordic model' of social democracy. Although this can make it hard to stand out from its neighbors Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, on balance Finland gains hugely from association with the Nordic success story.

- ***Weaknesses***

A small population. Finland is the most sparsely populated country in the European Union, with only 16 inhabitants per km_. Cultural and commercial ambassadors for the nation are hard to come by.

- ***Portland Recommends***

Finland should make use of its digitally savvy citizens - 92% of whom are internet users - creating an army of digital brand ambassadors to spread the gospel online. The more Finland can do to promote its excellence in design, the better. The quasi-government agency SITRA could be a huge soft power asset.

CHAPTER VIII: THE NORDIC MODEL`S BASIC FEATURES

As judged against the key points illustrated in previous section, one may shortly list the following basic features of the respective Nordic model:

- An elaborate social safety net in addition to public services such as free education and universal healthcare.[86]
- Strong property rights, contract enforcement, and overall ease of doing business.[87]
- Public pension plans[88].
- Low barriers to free trade[89]. This is combined with collective risk sharing (social programs, labour market institutions) which has provided a form of protection against the risks associated with economic openness.[90]
- Little product market regulation. Nordic countries rank very high in product market freedom according to OECD rankings.[91]
- Low levels of corruption.[10] In Transparency International's 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index all five Nordic countries were ranked among the 12 least corrupt of 176 evaluated countries, and Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway all ranked within top 5.[92]
- High percentage of workers belonging to a labour union. In 2010, labour union density was 69.9% in Finland, 68.3% in Sweden, and 54.8% in Norway. In comparison, labour union density was 12.9% in Mexico and 11.3% in the United States[93]. The lower union density in Norway is mainly explained by the absence of

86 Torben M. Andersen, Bengt Holmström, Seppo Honkapohja, Sixten Korkman, Hans Tson Söderström, Juhana Vartiainen. *The Nordic Model – Embracing globalization and sharing risks*., ISBN 978-951-628-468-5 ISSN 0356-7443 Printed in Yliopistopaino, Helsinki, 2007.

87 http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings

88 Torben M. Andersen, Bengt Holmström, Seppo Honkapohja, Sixten Korkman, Hans Tson Söderström, Juhana Vartiainen. The Nordic Model – Embracing globalization and sharing risks

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

92 *"CPI 2012 table". Transparency International. Retrieved 2016-02-19.*

93 "Trade Union Density" OECD Stat Extracts. 2010. Accessed: 3 May 2013.

a Ghent system since 1938. In contrast, Denmark, Finland and Sweden all have union-run unemployment funds[94].

- A partnership between employers, trade unions and the government, whereby these social partners negotiate the terms to regulating the workplace among themselves, rather than the terms being imposed by law[95]. Sweden has decentralized wage co-ordination, while Finland is ranked the least flexible[96]. The changing economic conditions have given rise to fear among workers as well as resistance by trade unions in regards to reforms[97]. At the same time, reforms and favorable economic development seem to have reduced unemployment, which has traditionally been higher. Denmark's Social Democrats managed to push through reforms in 1994 and 1996.
- Sweden at 56.6% of GDP, Denmark at 51.7%, and Finland at 48.6% reflect very high public spending[98]. One key reason for public spending is the large number of public employees. These employees work in various fields including education, healthcare, and for the government itself. They often have lifelong job security and make up around a third of the workforce (more than 38% in Denmark). Public spending in social transfers such as unemployment benefits and early-retirement programmers is high. In 2001, the wage-based unemployment benefits were around 90% of wage in Denmark and 80% in Sweden, compared to 75% in the Netherlands and 60% in Germany. The unemployed were also able to receive benefits several years before reductions, compared to quick benefit reduction in other countries.
- Public expenditure for health and education is significantly higher in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway in comparison to the OECD average[99].

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94 Kjellberg, Anders "The Swedish unemployment insurance – will the Ghent system survive?", *Transfer – European Review of Labour and Research* no 1 2006,

95 OECD. *Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries.* Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. 2008. p. 232, 233.

96 Torben M. Andersen, p.22.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 "Skattetrykket". Danish Ministry of Taxation. Retrieved 2012-06-24.

- Overall tax burdens (as a percentage of GDP) are among the world's highest; Sweden (51.1%), Denmark (46% in 2011)[100], and Finland (43.3%);
- The United Nations *World Happiness Report 2013* shows that the happiest nations are concentrated in Northern Europe. The Nordics ranked highest on the metrics of real GDP per capita, healthy life expectancy, having someone to count on, perceived freedom to make life choices, generosity and freedom from corruption[101].
- The Nordic countries received the highest ranking for protecting workers rights on the International Trade Union Confederation's 2014 Global Rights Index, with Denmark being the only nation to receive a perfect score[102].

Of course, in addition to the above, there are a number of other aspects of the Nordic model, which deserve to be illustrated in more detailed way, but the present Thesis may not provide sufficient room for that aim. In any case, just for illustration, it is about the following aspects:

8.1. Labor market policy

The Nordic countries share active labor market policies as part of a corporatist economic model intended to reduce conflict between labor and the interests of capital. The corporatist system is most extensive in Sweden and Norway, where employer federations and labor representatives bargain at the national level mediated by the government. Labor market interventions are aimed at providing job retraining and relocation[103].

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[100] Carolyn Gregoire (10 September 2013). The Happiest Countries In The World (Infographic). *The Huffington Post.* Retrieved 1 October 2013

[101] David Wearing (22 May 2014). Where's the worst place to be a worker? Most of the world. *The Guardian.*

[102] Ibid.

[103] Rosser, Mariana V. and J Barkley Jr. (July 23, 2003). *Comparative Economics in a Transforming World Economy*. MIT Press. p. 226. ISBN 978-0262182348. Liberal corporatism is largely self-organized between labor and management, with only a supporting role for government. Leading examples of such systems are found in small, ethnically homogeneous countries with strong traditions of social democratic or labor party rule, such as Sweden's Nordic neighbors. Using a scale of 0.0 to 2.0 and subjectively assigning values based on six previous studies, Frederic Pryor in 1988 found Norway and Sweden the most corporatist at 2.0 each, followed by Austria at 1.8, the Netherlands at 1.5, Finland, Denmark, and Belgium at 1.3 each, and Switzerland and West Germany at 1.0 each…with the exception of Iceland all the Nordic countries have higher taxes, larger welfare states, and greater corporatist tendencies than most social market economies.

The Nordic labor market is flexible, with laws making it easy for employers to hire and shed workers or introduce labor-saving technology. To mitigate the negative effect on workers, the government labor market policies are designed to provide generous social welfare, job retraining and relocation to limit any conflicts between capital and labor that might arise from this process[104].

8.2. Economic system

The Nordic model is underpinned by a free market capitalist economic system that features high degrees of private ownership[105] with the exception of Norway, which includes a large number of state-owned enterprises and state ownership in publicly listed firms.[106] The Nordic model is described as a system of competitive capitalism combined with a large percentage of the population employed by the public sector (roughly 30% of the work force)[107]. In 2013, *The Economist* described countries as "stout free-traders who resist the temptation to intervene even to protect iconic companies" while also looking for ways to temper capitalism's harsher effects, and declared that the Nordic countries "are probably the best-governed in the world"[108]. Some economists have referred to the Nordic economic model as a form of "cuddly" capitalism, with low levels of inequality, generous welfare states and reduced concentration of top incomes, and contrast it with the more "cut-throat" capitalism of the United States, which has high levels of inequality and a larger concentration of top incomes[109].

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[104] Ibid, p.240.

[105] James E. McWhinney (June 25, 2013). "The Nordic Model: Pros and Cons". Investopedia. Retrieved February 16, 2015. The Nordic model is a term coined to capture the unique combination of free market capitalism and social benefits that have given rise to a society that enjoys a host of top-quality services, including free education and free healthcare, as well as generous, guaranteed pension payments for retirees. These benefits are funded by taxpayers and administered by the government for the benefit of all citizens.

[106] "Norway: The rich cousin". *The Economist*. 2 February 2013. Retrieved 20 February 2016.

[107] "The Nordic countries: The next supermodel". *The Economist.* Retrieved 20 February July 2016.

[108] "The Nordic countries: The next supermodel" *The Economist.* Retrieved 12 February 2016. See also The secret of their success". *The Economist*. 2013

[109] Jonathan Hopkin, Victor Lapuente and Lovisa Moller (25 January 2014). Lower levels of inequality are linked with greater innovation in economies. *London School of Economics.*

Beginning in the 1990s, the Swedish economy pursued neoliberal reforms[110] that reduced the role of the public sector, leading to the fastest growth in inequality of any OECD economy[111]. However, Sweden's income inequality still remains lower than most other countries[112].

8.3. Nordic welfare model

The Nordic welfare model refers to the welfare policies of the Nordic countries, which also tie into their labor market policies. The Nordic model of welfare is distinguished from other types of welfare states by its emphasis on maximizing labor force participation, promoting gender equality, egalitarian and extensive benefit levels, the large magnitude of income redistribution, and liberal use of expansionary fiscal policy[113].While there are differences among different Nordic countries, they all share a broad commitment to social cohesion, a universal nature of welfare provision in order to safeguard individualism by providing protection for vulnerable individuals and groups in society, and maximizing public participation in social decision-making. It is characterized by flexibility and openness to innovation in the provision of welfare. The Nordic welfare systems are mainly funded through taxation[114].

Despite the common values, the Nordic countries take different approaches to the practical administration of the welfare state. Denmark features a high degree of private sector provision of public services and welfare, alongside an assimilation immigration policy. Iceland's welfare model is based on a "welfare-to-work" model, while part of Finland's welfare state includes the voluntary sector playing a significant role in providing care for the elderly. Norway relies most extensively on public provision of welfare[115].

[110] Michal Rozworski (27 February 2015). Beyond the Swedish Model. *Jacobin.*
[111] Swedish riots rage for fourth night. *The Guardian.* 23 May 2013.
[112] Higgins, Andrew (26 May 2013). "In Sweden, Riots Put an Identity in Question. "*The New York Times.*
[113] Swedish riots rage for fourth night. *The Guardian.* 23 May 2013.
[114] *The Nordic Council. "About the Nordic welfare model". Norden. Retrieved 20 February 2016.*
[115] Ibid.

8.4. Poverty reduction

The Nordic model has been successful at significantly reducing poverty[116]. In 2011, poverty rates, before taking into account the effects of taxes and transfers, stood at 24.7% in Denmark, 31.9% in Finland, 21.6% in Iceland, 25.6% in Norway, and 26.5% in Sweden. After accounting for taxes and transfers the poverty rates for the same year became 6%, 7.5%, 5.7%, 7.7%, and 9.7% respectively. Compared to the US, the effects of tax and transfers on poverty in all the Nordic countries are substantially bigger[117]. In comparison to France and Germany, however, the taxes and transfers in the Nordic countries are smaller on average[118].

In concluding this part, one may recall that those on the political left in the Scandinavian countries believe that the equality, prosperity, social solidarity, and quality of life enjoyed by the citizens of these "consensual democracies" reveal utopian qualities worthy of emulation. Conservatives, however, question the sustainability of societies characterized by an extensive state welfare system, high taxes, numerous regulations, and the social engineering of the lives of its members. But, in any case, *the strengths and weaknesses of the Nordic model are better appreciated when one understands how the model developed over time*. To this aim, one may refer to Mary Hilson, who provides a comprehensive review of the historical evolution and significance of the Nordic model[119]. However, Hilson further examines the similarities and differences in the historical processes of the Nordic countries within the framework of the Nordic model to challenge the common perception of Scandinavia as one coherent region. By exploring the historical meanings of the term Scandinavia rather than confront national identities, Hilson explains that the term came to be viewed as a "*second nationhood*" by the countries in this region[120]. She then surveys the political histories of the individual Nordic countries to trace the roots of the Nordic model. She finds that despite differences in state-building, these countries shared political cultures that supported collectivism and conformism. Hilson argues that although this image of Scandinavian democracies continues to persist,

116 Kevin Drum (26 September 2013). We Can Reduce Poverty If We Want To. We Just Have To Want To. *Mother Jones.*

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Hilson Mary, The Nordic Model: Scandinavia since 1945 (London: Reaction, 2013 (2008).

120 Ibid.

it may be more a reflection of "collective nostalgia" for a past era than a true picture of reality today. She points to recent events such as the cartoon of the Prophet Muhammed in Denmark in 2006 that cast doubts about Scandinavian democracies being remarkably different from the rest of Europe.

The welfare state, however, continues to be what Hilson calls "*the epitome of Scandinavian distinctiveness*"[121]. Is there a Scandinavian economic model? Notwithstanding some differences in economic development, Hilson states that the Nordic economies remain highly organized with a strong commitment to preserving their distinct welfare system. Focusing on the Nordic welfare model, Hilson goes on to argue that while there are similarities between the Nordic welfare states, it may be better to refer to the Nordic model as "one model with five exceptions". Turning her attention to the role Scandinavia has played in international relations, Hilson describes how the Scandinavian model of social justice and "we-ness" came to be seen as a model worth pursuing in peace-building efforts in other parts of the world. However, issues of ethnicity, multiculturalism, and mass immigration have challenged the reputation of humanitarianism in Scandinavian societies. Policymakers in this region debate whether the welfare state should support assimilation, integration, or multiculturalism[122].

In the context of the key points as illustrated above, however, one should reaffirm that the nation brand is an important concept in today's world. As stated above, globalization means that countries compete with each other for the attention, respect and trust of investors, tourists, consumers, donors, immigrants, the media, and the governments of other nations: so a powerful and positive nation brand provides a crucial competitive advantage. It is essential for countries to understand how they are seen by publics around the world; how their achievements and failures, their assets and their

[121] Ibid, p. 144.

[122] Ibid, p.157. As further stated by Hilson: "*Recent political and cultural responses to mass immigration also challenge the Scandinavian self-conception as the home of tolerance and social justice" and their moral leverage in terms of foreign policy*". Hilson's final discussion focuses on the future of this region in light of current economic and social forces and the potential significance of the Baltic Sea as a regional focal point. Hilson's book challenges preconceived ideas of Scandinavia as a homogeneous geo-political region. Her analysis provides a solid background of the historical processes in the evolution of the Nordic model and its significance over time. Her abovementioned book is helpful to anybody being interested in Scandinavia, the Nordic welfare state model, and the lessons to be learned from the economic and social forces influencing its development over time.

liabilities, their people and their products are reflected in their brand image[123]. At this point, one should also mention the **Anholt Nation Brands Index** being the first analytical ranking of the world's nation brands[124]. This adds up to a clear index of national brand power, a unique barometer of global opinion. **Anholt Nation Brands Index** measures the power and appeal of a nation's brand image, and indicates **how consumers around the world see the character and personality of the brand**. The nation brand is the sum of people's perceptions of a country and its people across six areas of national assets, characteristics and competence. Together, the following areas make the Nation Brand: ***tourism, exports, governance, investment and immigration, culture and heritage, and people***.

In above context, and despite the increasing role of the Nordic (above illustrated) model of soft power, one should not underestimate the sudden **local events which may decrease and/or damage and/or destroy the soft power of any country and/or its nation brand**. The Nordic countries are also not immune to such developments: Namely, in this regard, one may single out (for example) the case of 2005, when the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* published a set of editorial cartoons, many of which depicted Muhammad. Consequently, in late 2005 and early 2006, Danish Muslim organizations ignited a controversy through public protests and by spreading knowledge of the publication of the cartoons. According to John Woods, Islamic history professor at the University of Chicago, it was not simply the depiction of Muhammad that was offensive, but the implication that Muhammad was somehow a supporter of terrorism[125]. In **Sweden,** an online caricature competition was announced in support of *Jyllands-Posten*, but Foreign Affairs Minister Laila Freivalds and the Swedish Security Service pressured the internet service provider to shut the page down. In 2006, when her involvement was revealed to the public, she had to resign[126]. On 12 February 2008 the Danish police arrested three men alleged to be involved in a plot to assassinate Kurt Westergaard, one of the cartoonists[127]. This was followed later by the Lars Vilks Muhammad drawings

[123] Af Simon Anholt, government adviser, http://kommunikationsmaaling.dk/artikel/denmarks-international-image/ Publiceret torsdag 4. december 2008.

[124] http://placebrandobserver.com/en/tag/nation-brands-index

[125] See at Gruber, Christiane J.; Shalem, Avinoam (eds), *The Image of the Prophet Between Ideal and Ideology: A Scholarly Investigation*, De Gruyter, 2014, ISBN 9783110312386.

[126] "Swedish foreign minister resigns over cartoons". *Reuters AlertNet*. Archived from the original on 22 March 2006.

[127] Staff. Danish cartoons 'plotters' held BBC, 12 February 2008.

controversy (in July 2007) starting with a series of drawings by Swedish artist Lars Vilks which depicted Muhammad as a roundabout dog. **Several art galleries in Sweden declined to show the drawings, citing security concerns and fear of violence**. The controversy gained international attention after the Örebro-based regional newspaper *Nerikes Allehanda* published one of the drawings on August 18 to illustrate an editorial on self-censorship and freedom of religion[128]. While several other leading Swedish newspapers had published the drawings already, this particular publication led to protests from Muslims in Sweden as well as official condemnations from several foreign governments including Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt and Jordan, as well as by the inter-governmental Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)[129]. The controversy occurred about one and a half years after the *Jyllands-Posten* Muhammad cartoons controversy in Denmark in early 2006.

The above list of Nordic negative local stories includes also the case of **Anders Behring Breivik,** the perpetrator of the 2011 Norway attacks. On 22 July 2011, he killed eight people by detonating a van bomb amid the government quarter *Regjeringskvartalet* in Oslo, then shot and killed 69 participants of a Workers' Youth League (AUF) summer camp on the island of Utøya[130]. In August 2012, he was convicted of mass murder, causing a fatal explosion, and terrorism. His trial began on 16 April 2012, with closing arguments made on 22 June 2012, and on 24 August 2012, Oslo District Court delivered its verdict, finding Breivik sane - and guilty of murdering 77 people. He was sentenced to 21 years in prison, in a form of preventive detention that required a minimum of 10 years incarceration and the possibility of one or more extensions thereof for as long as he is deemed a danger to society. This is the maximum penalty in Norway.

On the day of the attacks, Breivik electronically distributed a compendium of texts entitled *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*, describing his militant ideology. In them, he lays out a world view encompassing opposition to Islam and feminism[131]. The

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[128] Ströman, Lars (2007-08-18). "Rätten att förlöjliga en religion" (in Swedish). Nerikes Allehanda. Archived from the original on 2007-09-06.

[129] *"The Secretary General strongly condemned the publishing of blasphemous caricatures of prophet Muhammad by Swedish artist" (Press release). Organization of the Islamic Conference. 2007-08-30.*

[130] *Rayment, Sean (25 July 2011). "Modest boy who became a mass murderer". Sydney Morning Herald. Retrieved 25 July 2011.*

[131] Turrettini, Unni, and Kathleen M. Puckett. *The Mystery of the Lone Wolf Killer: Anders Behring Breivik and the Threat of Terror in Plain Sight*. New York: Pegasus Crime, 2015.ISBN 9781605989105 .

texts call Islam and "Cultural Marxism" the enemy, and advocates the deportation of all Muslims from Europe based on the model of the Benes decrees[132]. Breivik wrote that his main motive for the atrocities was to market his manifesto[133]. Six hours before the attacks, Breivik posted a picture of himself as a Knight Templar officer in a uniform festooned with a gold aiguillette and multiple medals he had not been awarded. In the video he put an animation depicting Islam as a Trojan horse in Europe. **Analysts describe it as promoting physical violence towards Muslims and Marxists who reside in Europe[134].**

[132] Borchgrevink, Age Storm, and Guy Puzey. *A Norwegian Tragedy: Anders Behring Breivik and the Massacre on Utøya*. 2013. ISBN 9780745672205 (translated from the Norwegian).

[133] *Matthew Taylor (26 July 2011). "Breivik sent 'manifesto' to 250 UK contacts hours before Norway killings". The Guardian (UK). Archived from the original on 28 July 2011.*

[134] Beatrice de Graaf, Liesbeth van der Heide, Daan Weggemans & Sabine Wanmaker, *The Anders Behring Breivik Trial: Performing Justice, Defending Democracy,*(International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague, 2013).

CONCLUSION

Following the end of the Cold War, international agendas changed considerably - changing with them the character of the very diplomacy. The diplomacy has today become more global, complicated and fragmentary". The changes in diplomacy are especially visible by the involvement of many new actors in the area of international cooperation. A fast developing international system opened doors to many new actors, including international organizations, transnational corporations, and important interest groups. *Modern diplomacy* is increasingly defined as a multisided, loosely constrained and multidimensional game. There is not just one mode of play. Modern diplomacy is a far-ranging communications process; consequently, new terminology appeared in the diplomatic repertoire including (among others) "**new public diplomacy**" and "**cultural diplomacy**" the latter being defined as the deployment of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy, is now frequently seen as a subset of the practice of public diplomacy, a government's communication with foreign audiences in order to positively influence them. As indicated, the later in nothing else but very clear reflection, i.e. a direct consequence of **the increasing role and meaning of the culture** in foreign policy which has grown into an unimaginable level over the last decade. The Thesis tried to illustrate the where *the boundaries between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, and between cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations, lie.* In this regard, one may see the increasing role of the "s**oft power in foreign policy"**: using cultural operations, dialogue and attempts to convince others, in contrast to hard power, the use of military intervention and political power. The intangible soft power today is an engine that drives the relations among nations or groups of nations. Soft power comes from such side factors as ideologies, social systems, organization mechanisms, lifestyles, development models, cultural traditions, values, ethnic characteristics, religious beliefs, information resources, interdependence, mutual trust, etc. In this sense, soft power can be called cultural power.

In today's international society, competition over comprehensive national power focusing on cultural power has been an important phenomenon in the development of international relations. *No country has a monopoly on soft power. Any organization,*

country and culture, can develop soft power. Namely, the question is not who can or cannot develop soft power but *to whom it is soft power*. But, clearly, culture *per se* is not soft power but sources of *potential* soft power. Whether a cultural asset can be converted into soft power depends on other factors. As to **how a country can effectively use soft power, one may underline** Joseph Nye's model for the conversion of soft power into a desired outcome comprises five steps; the first step in the process of *converting soft power into a successful outcome* is identifying the resources that will affect the target(s) in question.

Taking into account of the above mentioned, in the today`s world where inequality is on the rise alongside an increase in income, it becomes of paramount interest for anyone to find a nation or a group of nations which manage to have well-performing economic and social indicators. This curiosity about finding a 'successful model" leads also to the Nordic Model. Namely, for decades the Nordic countries (including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) have served as a successful example of modern democracy, where political and economic developments have come simultaneously with the protection and promotion of civil and human rights. In the *2012 Soft Power Survey*, which ranked countries based on their attractiveness and international influence, all four made it into the top thirteen most powerful states in the world. Some of the Scandinavians have been again among the "most visible" countries *in the ranking made by the Soft Power 30.* Despite historical, cultural, and societal similarities, each of the four Scandinavian countries has managed to develop an individual and tailor-made public diplomacy strategy that reflects their society's own values and characteristics but also differentiates between them. This outstanding and unique example that the Nordic countries have set has inspired many regions across the world, leading many countries to partially follow the Nordic framework of development, cooperation, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.

In dealing with all of the abovementioned aspects, the Thesis has outlined *de facto* the basic framework within which one may start analyzing the possible answer on CAN THE BALKAN STATES (among other group of European states, such as the Visegrad states) EMULATE THE SCANDINAVIANS?

The thesis itself clearly indicated that although there are largely newcomers to public diplomacy in terms of soft power, the Balkan states still have a fair chance of emulating

the Scandinavian success in building a strong international reputation: with a total population of over 55 million (versus 26 million Scandinavians), a common and/or similar historical legacy, geographical position, multinational character of their societies, and recent transformation achievements, Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania and others Balkan states may have their own compelling and ORIGINAL story to tell to international publics. But this can only be achieved if the intensifying public diplomacy endeavors undertaken by each of the states is matched by an equal effort to craft a regional foreign policy message that is consistent for all those countries. The basic prerequisites to success are already in place: all these Balkan countries share a common historical past, foreign policy goals (UN-based, Council of Europe, OSCE, EU & NATO-related aspects) and hopes for the future; the region has experienced the existence of important multinational and multi-religious empires characterized by their openness and democratic structure. Balkan state's soft power may be generated by use of at least two factors: individualized public diplomacy strategies and the ability to use regional cooperation as a tool for advancing foreign policy goals.

But, most importantly, without having a full and clear picture of their resources, there can be little hope of deploying soft power in a strategic, coordinated, and – ultimately – effective way by any of the Balkan state. Making national and regional inventory of soft power assets is thus essential. The first challenge is easy enough to identify, while the second is much more difficult since those resources should be properly addressed. Categorizing and quantifying soft power at national level is of course case a complex and demanding task with few methodological precedents on which to build. The impact of hard power is normally direct and immediate, straight and visible, while the effect of soft power is indirect and takes much longer to appear. It may take years to produce the desired outcome. The Balkan` states should make nevertheless firstly the first decision: making national and regional inventory of soft power assets. This would be the real challenge as well as an opportunity for any of the Balkan states.

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