



# DOCTORAL STUDIES – THIRD CYCLE STUDIES

## INTERETHNIC CONFLICT PREVENTION THROUGH COORDINATED MANAGEMENT OF MEANING AND STIMULATION OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

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PHD THESIS

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# FACULTY OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCES



## STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

### PhD Dissertation

I, Blerim Limani, MA, born in August 21st 1982 in Presevo, Serbia, am the author of the PhD Dissertation: Interethnic Conflict Prevention through Coordinated Management of Meaning and Stimulation of Political Tolerance in the Western Balkans.

I confirm that the work and the research done for the purpose of the PhD are a result of my individual scientific work and the wide range of databases with the most updated scientific records.

This work has a enormous role is raising awareness in the interethnic conflicts and offering a lens by applying the Coordinated Management of Meaning framework.

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Tetovo, \_\_\_\_\_

Sign: author \_\_\_\_\_

**Dedicated to my son JON**

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## Abstract

Political toleration has been promoted in Western Balkans for the last two decades with partial success. This is partially due to ethnocentric approach on interethnic tensions in the region. We argue that there is an imminent need to look at these relations from another prism where we suggest that applied communication theory (Coordinated Management of Meaning) in combination with main concepts from political toleration can yield rather fresh views and ideas on how to approach this problem. One of the ways is to look at the narrative that usually fuels interethnic tensions in the Western Balkans which can often be traced to medieval myths such as the one of the Battle of Kosova in 1389. Same battle was the main theme of Milosevic's Gazimestan (Kosovo) speech in 1989, which is considered to be the main catalyst of the Balkan wars. Author borrow heavily from social constructivists theory to illustrate how the same narratives can be re-constructed so they can promote the creation of a better social reality for the region. We argue that Milosevic's Gazimestan speech, has been carefully crafted so it fits perfectly to what is also known as the purpose of myths which are: to provide a "heightened sense of authority, sense of continuity, and sense of choice" (Hard and Daughton, 2005). In order to better understand interethnic tensions in the Western Balkans, one cannot avoid asking questions like "how the story was told," and "where does the story begin," is a valid start to understand otherwise complex sources of tensions which as described can be traced centuries ago. Present thesis borrows Pearce's (2007) concepts and argues that constructing richer story about what happened, constructing systemic description of what happened, facilitating an increased awareness of the roles of participants (in our case governments of Western Balkans) play in making the world in which they live, and changing the context is what we should do to better manager interethnic tension in the Western Balkans. Results of the present thesis were also based on data from European Value System Study Group (EVSSG) where two sets of variables from Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia have been selected for the descriptive analysis. Namely, the first set dealt with the respondents' preference for neighbors with different political views and cultural backgrounds compared with the second set of variables which were focusing on respondents' view on immigrants. According to the quantitative results of each presented country of the Western Balkans, we argue that the level of toleration is higher when it comes to the questions on social relationships only, and it starts dropping down when same respondents faced with questions that require political action in forms of laws for immigrants in our case. Finally, a model of synergy between political tolerance

and CMM is offered based on notions of Galeotti (2014), Köker (1996), Besson (2012), and Pearce (2007).

## **Abstrakti**

Toleranca Politike është promovuar në Ballkanin Perëndimor gjatë dy dekadave të fundit me një sukses të pjesëshëm. Kjo ndodh pjesërisht për shkak të qasjes etnocentrike ndaj çështjeve ndëretnike në regjion. Ne argumentojmë se ekziston një nevojë e menjëhershme që këto marrëdhënie të shihen nga një prizëm tjetër që në rastin tonë ne sugjerojmë teori nga komunikimi aplikativ në kombinim me konceptet kryesore të tolerancës politike do ti hapin rrugë një pikëpamjeje të freskët dhe ide të reja se si t'i qasemi këtij problemi. Një nga mënyrat është të shihet narracioni që zakonisht nxit tensionet ndëretnike in Ballkanin Perëndimor e që shpesh mund të datoj nga mitet e mesjetës siç është miti i Betejës së Kosovës në 1389. E njejta betejë ka qenë tema kryesore e fjalimit të Millosheviqit në Gazimenstan të Kosovës të dhënë në vitin 1989, që njëherit konsiderohet të jetë katalisti kryesor i luftërave të Ballkanit. Autori huazon shumë nga teoria e konstruktivistëve social që të ilustroj se si narracioni i njejtë mund të rindërtohet në mënyrë që të promovojnë krijimin e një realiteti më të mirë shoqëror për regjionin. Duke analizuar fjalimin e Millosheviqit dhënë në Gazimestan, ne argumentojmë se si ky fjalim ka qenë i ndërtuar në mënyrë që t'i përshtatet në mënyrë të përsosur asaj që quhet qëllimi i mitit e që janë: të ofroj një “ndjenjë të lartësuar të autoritetit”, një ndjenjë të vazhdueshmërisë si dhe ndjenjën e zgjedhjes (Hard and Daughton, 2005). Në mënyrë që të kuptojmë më mirë tensionet ndëretnike në Ballkanin Perëndimor, nuk mund të anashkalojmë pyetjen se “si është treguar një storje” dhe se “ku fillon storja” është një fillim valid për të kuptuar burimet komplekse të tensioneve që siç janë përshkruar mund të datojnë shekuj më parë. Tëza e këtij punimi të doktoratës poashtu huazon nga konceptet e Pearce (2007) dhe argumenton që ndërtimi i një narracioni më të pasur mbi atë se çka ka ndodh, si dhe ndërtimi i një përshkrimi sistemik i asaj se çka ka ndodh, mundësimi i vetëdijësimit të roleve që pjesmarrësit (në rastin tonë Qeveritë e Ballkanit Perëndimor) luajnë në krijimin e një realiteti (bote) në të cilin ata jetojnë, si dhe ndryshimi i kontekstit është ajo se çfarë duhet të bëhet në mënyrë që të menaxhohen më mirë tensionet ndërtenike në Ballkanin Perëndimor. Rezultatet e këtij disertacioni poashtu janë bazuar në të dhënat e nxjerrura nga European Value System Study Group (EVSSG) ku më sakt dy sete të variablave nga Kosova, Serbia, Maqedonia si dhe Bosnia dhe Hercegovina janë përzgjedhur për analizën përshkruese statistikore. Domethënë, seti i parë i variablave kishte të bëjë me preferencat e të anketuarve lidhur me komshinjtë që kane pikëpamje të ndryshme kulturore krahasuar me setin e dytë të variablave që fokusoheshte në pikëpamjet e të anketuarve për imigrantët. Sipas rezultateve kuantitative të vendeve të përzgjedhura nga Ballkanit Perëndimor, ne argumentojmë që niveli i tolerancës është më i lartë kur kemi të bëjmë me pyetjet mbi marrëdhëniet shoqërore, dhe fillon të bjerë me pyetjet që

kërkojnë veprim politik nga të anketuarit në formën e ligjeve mbi imigrantët. Përfundimisht, një model i sinergjisë në mes të tolerancës politike si dhe CMM-it është ofruar, bazuar në nocionet e Galeotti (2014), Köker (1996), Besson (2012), dhe Pearce (2007).



Политичката толеранција е промовирана во Западен Балкан во последните две децении со делумен успех. Ова делумно се должи на етноцентричниот пристап кон меѓуетничките тензии во регионот. Тврдиме дека постои непосредна потреба да се погледнат овие односи од друга призма каде предлагаме дека применетата теорија на комуникација (координирано управување со значењето) во комбинација со главните концепти од политичката толеранција може да даде прилично свежи погледи и идеи за тоа како да се пристапи кон овој проблем. Еден од начините е да се погледне во наративот што обично горива меѓуетнички тензии во Западен Балкан кои честопати можат да се следат во средновековните митови како онаа на Битката на Косово во 1389 година. Истата битка беше главна тема на Газиместан на Милошевиќ (Косово) говор во 1989 година, кој се смета за главен катализатор на балканските војни. Авторот позајмува многу од теоријата на социјални конструктивисти за да илустрира како можат да се реконструираат истите наративи за да можат да промовираат создавање подобра социјална реалност за регионот. Тврдиме дека говорот на Газиместан на Милошевиќ е внимателно направен, така што совршено се вклопува во она што е исто така познато како цел на митовите: “да се обезбеди зголемено чувство за авторитет, чувство за континуитет и чувство за избор” (Хард и Даџон, 2005). Со цел подобро да се разберат меѓуетничките тензии во Западен Балкан, не може да се избегне поставувањето прашања како “како се раскажува приказната” и “од каде започнува приказната” е валиден почеток за да се разберат инаку сложените извори на тензии кои, како што е опишано може да се проследи пред векови. Ова теза ги позајмува концептите на Пирс (2007) и аргументира дека конструирање на побогата приказна за тоа што се случило, конструирање на системски опис на она што се случило, олеснување на зголемената свест за улогите на учесниците (во нашиот случај владите на Западен Балкан) учествуваат во правењето на светот во кој тие живеат, а промената на контекстот е она што треба да го сториме за подобро управување со меѓуетничката тензија на Западен Балкан. Резултатите од оваа теза беа засновани и на податоци од Европската Студија за Средности на Системот за Вредности (ЕСССВ) каде се избрани две групи на променливи од Косово, Србија, Македонија и Босна за описна анализа. Имено, првиот сет се занимаваше со претпочитањето на испитаниците кон соседите со различно политичко гледиште и културно потекло споредено со втората група варијабли кои се фокусираа на погледот на испитаниците за имигрантите. Според квантитативните резултати на секоја презентирана земја на Западен Балкан, ние аргументираме дека нивото на толеранција е повисоко кога станува збор за прашањата само за социјалните односи, и започнува да се спушта кога истите испитаници се соочуваат со прашања кои бараат политичко дејствување во форми на закони за

имигранти во нашиот случај. Конечно, се нуди модел на синергија помеѓу политичката толеранција и КУЗ врз основа на поимите Галеоти (2014), Кекер (1996), Бесон (2012) и Пирс (2007).

Chapter

# Introduction



[I.1 INTRODUCTION AND THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH](#)

[I.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM](#)

[I.3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS](#)

[I.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH](#)

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Introduction and Scope of the Research

The purpose of the present thesis is to introduce the concepts of Coordinated Management of Meaning as a lens to examine interethnic relations in the Western Balkans. At the same time Political Toleration concepts will be used to better measure and understand the toleration trends in the Western Balkans. Additionally, the purpose of this research is to contribute to the existing body of knowledge regarding interethnic conflicts by looking at applied communication and political tolerance theories and how they can be used to study interethnic issues in a more effective way.

We argue that the main key players with capacities and resources to change current interethnic relations in the Western Balkans are Government and Civil Society organizations including NGO. Consequently, the main recommendation deriving from the present PhD thesis will be given to the aforementioned institutions. Governments and NGO's are spending larges sums of money in order to improve our interethnic relations by applying various methods like capacity building, civic engagement, neighborhood policy and intercultural training (see Civil Society Facility established by Directorate-General for EU enlargement, and Instrument for Pre-accession- IPA, [https://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/en/funding/ipa/](https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/funding/ipa/), retrieved on 10<sup>th</sup> of January 2019). They also promote "toleration" as a solution to interethnic tensions in the Western Balkans and as something that is essentially good for the society. We maintain that the concept of "toleration" itself is not enough in order to create better interethnic relations in the Western Balkans.

For the present PhD thesis, it is incremental to avoid ethnocentric claims regarding the right punctuation of an event; thus, we will not analyze anything related to ancient historical contexts (Illyrians, Romans or Byzantium era). Instead we will examine important political artifacts such as speeches, symbols, historical myths, and narrative that surround those artifacts by cultures that used to share same state in the Western Balkans.

## 1.2 Research Problem

Social sciences advance constantly and employ new ways of discovering human condition. Science stands for knowledge (Latin: scientia) and it is now well-established definition that it refers to the “systematic and organized body of knowledge in any area of inquiry that is acquired using the scientific method “(Bhattacharjee, 2012, p. 1). This can be considered as a unified definition regardless if we are discussing natural or social sciences. Conversely, natural or exact sciences differ methodologically from social sciences. The prior uses strict and precise approaches to test hypothesis or develop an experiment by always trying to exclude the human impact on the process. One might argue that the best way to conduct research in natural sciences is if machines that would be superior in applying objectivity toward a problem lead the process. Another important element of natural sciences and especially experimentation is that same research should always deliver same results no matter how many times it is replied. This process helps achieve reliability of the research steps and results. The same is hard to achieve in social sciences because of the complex human nature. Completing a research on people’s preferences toward certain TV shows differ regionally and culturally among many other factors. Therefore, repetition of the same research will almost always get different results. Of course, these arguments are not definitive and conclusive since it is somewhat hard to discuss the differences between these “two cultures” of scientific inquiry in only one chapter.

Since the purpose of scientific inquiry is to create knowledge, we have to keep in mind that this is done by having organized wide-ranging body of concepts and theories that are used to explain a phenomenon or behavior that is of our interest. The knowledge in this context has to be acquired by using the scientific method. Here we have to make a distinction between laws which are “observed patterns of phenomena or behaviors”, and theories which are “systematic explanations of the underlying phenomenon or behavior. Needless to say, social sciences employ theories in its scientific inquiry and natural sciences among others have laws to

describe patterns or behaviors for example Newton's Law of Classical Mechanics (Bhattacharjee, 2012, p. 2).

One might argue that research in social sciences, as we know it today has gone through different paradigms, which were shaped by different schools of thought. It is well-accepted thesis among scholars that one of the most prominent shifts in research came from British philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who argued that knowledge could be gathered through observations of the real-world phenomenon. This premise was named empiricism among scholars and it is still one of the most influential philosophical approaches to knowledge. Empiricism entails the use of "systematic observation, measurement, and experimentation," which consequently might have contributed in the viewpoints that supports atheism since the theological percepts cannot be observed (Bhattacharjee, 2012, p. 7).

Real-world problem could be considered as a justified starting point for a research. This venue is closely related to the social real-world problems. This justification however, would affect the methodology that is deemed appropriate for the research as well (Gustafsson & Hagström, 2018). There is a need for elaborating on how the present research will contribute the overall literature in the field of political sciences. Nevertheless, as Gustafsson & Hagström point out, this cannot be the only motivation for the new research. If something has not been yet analyzed yet, then perhaps that particular concept will not yield any significant research. Authors like Gustafsson and Hagström suggest what they call "Research Puzzle" as an approach that will enable researchers construct their research by following few important steps. They recommend steps like narrowing down the research interest from a topic to something resembling a research puzzle. Moreover, they also recommend explaining motives and preconceptions that are the basis of the research interest in analyzing some problem. Of course, since having knowledge is the main ingredient of constructing a research puzzle, reading broadly the literature close to your research interest is a must. There are few other tips that are part of the "recipe" for the research puzzle which will not be mentioned here since our interest is not promoting one particular way on how to approach research except exemplifying that there are several approaches that would be helpful to anyone undertaking research in political sciences.



Coordinated Management of Meaning is described as an applied theory, which is led by the premise “How can we make better social worlds?” Moreover, according to Pearce (2004, p. 45-46) “one way of making better social worlds is to help people enrich the communication patterns on which they are a part and to intervene so that the participants see previously obscured possibilities.” This leads us to the current research problem which underlines the complex interethnic tensions, conflicts and possible future wars in the Western Balkans, and how they can be prevented if political, state and civil society entities employ CMM approach to better understand and manage interethnic relations.

### **1.3 Research Hypotheses and Research Questions**

In order to have a better insight on this PhD thesis proposal, the following historical myth of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo will be analyzed through the lenses of CMM and Political Toleration.

Emplotment describes where an episode begins and ends; between those points is a story (Pearce, 2007, p.140). Continuing from this, CMM ask the following question: “what story do you have about that?” This question explains that regardless of how the other perceives part of the social world, which means that the particular story is theirs. Furthermore, this question expresses the needed attention about how the narrative emplotment is done by the other. The following example of Vidovdan (Serbian celebration of the “victory” over Turks in 1389 in Gazimestan, Kosovo) shows how ethnocentric emplotment can lead to interethnic tensions.

Gazimestan is the place where Kosovo battle between the Turks and several Balkan nations happened (See Bieber, 2002). Once a year they celebrate the Vidovdan in Gazimestan, which is a place between Prishtina and Mitrovica. On June 28 more than 100 bikers came down to Gazimestan to celebrate Vidovdan. Members of Russian army were there too to show the support that they have for Serbs in Kosovo. A strong police escort followed the event since the situation was very intense and clashes were expected. Few bikers were stoned and send to the nearest hospital for treatment.

It is important to mention that Kosovo Albanians majority never expressed their “story” behind this very important national and religious event for Serbs. One of the solutions that CMM can offer relies on a newly created punctuation about Vidovdan where Albanians and other nations would be considered as an integral part of this historical event (see Di Lellio 2009).

This leads us to our first hypothesis:

**H1: Coordinated Management of Meaning offers alternative form of communication to better manage interethnic tensions in the Western Balkans.**

Toleration is overused term that represents Western Balkan’s current reality. Many governmental organizations and NGO (both domestic and foreign) are promoting the idea of ‘toleration’ as it is the magical solution. However, the mentioned cases of parallel institutions, the Vidovdan celebration, and the 1999’s war shows that ‘toleration’ is always used by a stronger side and whoever was ‘tolerated’ always finds a way to rise against oppression (Before 1999’s war Albanians were tolerated minority in Kosovo, and now it is the opposite).

Instead of focusing on ‘toleration’ of the ‘other’ it is quite essential for Western Balkans interethnic issues to focus on how to use practical interethnic communication solutions that can be applied by all individuals and organizations in order to create better social worlds. CMM offers the right set of tools to identify the main punctuation, employment while having a set of questions that can identify key problems which is the most important step to go beyond the loop of ‘toleration.’

This leads us to our second hypothesis:

**H2: Low level of political tolerance empowers continuous inter-ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans.**

## **Research Questions**

In order to have valid and reliable research results we suggest the following research questions:

## **1. Is the Political Tolerance affecting the policy making that focuses on improving inter-ethnic relations in the Western Balkans?**

### **1.4 Significance of the Research**

It is imperative for the Balkans to detach from historical myths that fuel interethnic conflicts. All narratives that fueled tensions in the past should be reconsidered through theories like CMM in order to have an alternative view on their purpose. In order to achieve this, all Balkans states should consider to avoid narratives such as “Balkan for the Balkans” (Advocate of Peace through Justice, June 1927, p.328, Fisher, 1935), which blamed powerful countries at that time for interfering in the internal issues of the Balkans rather than letting them find solutions on their own. Sadly, this standpoint is still shared by Balkan leaders whenever they have internal affairs problems. These semi-utopian viewpoints from the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century never came into being precisely because of suggestions of “Balkan Pact” or similar, where the so called Balkan federation would be able to deal with questions regarding Balkan itself (see Fisher, 1935, p.244).

Even though one might think that the current interethnic relations in the Balkans are finally settled, this proposition is far from the present political reality because of the frequency of the interethnic incidents. Authors like Sletzinger (2011), argue that superficially, the situation in the Balkans looks significantly better than it was several years ago. He continues by arguing that all six countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia are democracies. At the same time, countries like Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have failed to move ahead. It is important to mention that for Balkan states were strongly recommended to preserve the shaky multiculturalism of their societies. One of the Sletzinger’s points is that same states have failed to preserve ethnic diversity that was distinctive for most of the countries in the region (p.43-44). Hence, in order to improve interethnic relations in the Western Balkans we must offer something more than merely promoting the concept of Toleration.

Chapter

# Literature Review



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## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 Toleration

The literature for the present research is mainly divided between two main theoretical frameworks and one theoretical concept:

- The literature from toleration and political toleration in particular.
- Using concepts from rhetorical criticism to analyze the political speech and,
- Coordinated Management of Meaning and its practical approach to interethnic relations, which bridges the gap between political toleration and rhetorical criticism by offering an alternative form of communication.

One of the definitions of toleration offered by the Oxford English Dictionaries is “the ability to tolerate the existence of opinions or behaviors that one dislikes or disagrees with” (retrieved on 6.04.2016, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/tolerance>).

In the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the Netherlands and England were the two countries where individual religious freedoms were discussed by the ruling powers. During these times in the Netherlands, the book titled “Toleration and Enlightenment in the Dutch Republic” was published. In the beginning, religious freedoms were the main topic and it was discussed through the religious-political role of the Reformists Church of the Dutch Republic, who prior to being established as such, it enjoyed a privileged status. This was the time where the un-reformed citizens were often looked as second-class citizens (Grell & Porter, 2000, p. 10-11). Since 1750’ and on, the non-reformed population often engaged in campaigns for an increased level of toleration and equal rights. This continued until 1796 where in the Batavian Republic the church was officially separated from the state, and in this ways the domination of the Reformists Church was ended. However, the questions about the “limits of toleration” were often actual during the 1760’ and 1770’ where speculation about the salvation of the virtuous pagans. This was the time when the conceptual problems of toleration were at focus. How would you behave towards non-Christian religions was the question that elucidated the

conceptual issues of toleration during the enlightenment period of the Dutch society (Grell & Porter, 2000, p.11).

However, the present research will not focus on religious toleration but rather on political toleration. The latter contains a mixture of both religious and inter-ethnic toleration and as such present more complex relationships, which ought to be analyzed with a new set of standpoints. These standpoints arise from communication sciences and political sciences, the coordinated management of meaning (CMM) and Political Toleration. One should defy the generally accepted principle of religious toleration and describing its conflicts as simply lack of “tolerance.” It is easy to fall in the deception of “toleration” as a solution to all religious or ethnic “intolerance.” As McClure points out, the “toleration is no more the ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of intolerance than health is the ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of disease or peace is the ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of war (1990, p. 365). Continuing from this, it will be utterly simplistic to overuse the term “toleration” as the only “solution” to all religious and inter-ethnic “problems” in the Western Balkans. Just as the 17<sup>th</sup> century perspective of religious toleration was re-interpreted by the political discourse in order to find ways in which the civil and political perspective would offer a better understanding of the old viewpoint of “two opposing truths.” Rather, this new concept describes the religious tolerance not as something where the conflicting truths required pro and contra standpoints, but the as politically indifferent matters of private life (McClure, 1990, p. 366).

During the literature review, we came across some remarkable historical examples where cultural diversity and coexistence were possible much earlier than modern liberal democratic governments were established. Moreover, authors like Thorne (2013), offer a rather interesting solution to coexistence, which will be characterized by lasting diversity. Thorne uses the model of the “watchful coexistence” founded in Spain and which for centuries offered a model of lasting diversity (2013, p.491). This was known, as Spanish *convivencia*, where destructive interactions were rejected, and separate “ghettos” were not allowed. The focus of public administration was practices where a diverse and yet interconnected tolerant society was refreshed (Thorne, 2013. 491). The historical context to which Thorne is referred is the medieval Spanish re-conquest of Moorish Spain. According to Thorne, the fact that the

Christian monarchs did not focus on destroying everything Moorish and were against “dehumanization” of the other.

Using examples of cultural and religious co-existence that were applied centuries ago yields possibility for more critical approach towards modern applications of political toleration in general. One might think that since these diversity focused actions were applied so long ago, the present political toleration policies should be much more effective than they actually are. Even though we do support utopian views on “perfect” historical examples of toleration, we acknowledge the aim to provide a solution to the existing maledicted influence of fundamentalism and nationalism worldwide. Once again, the authors focus on the “good” examples and the use of masterworks like “Alhambra” which is a product of intercultural Moorish influence in Spanish architecture, to promote co-existence is rather important. Overall, the claims which support the need to stop or criticize concepts where constant strive for “pure” or secular society is promoted and rather to promote living with conflict (Grey, 2003 as cited by Thorne, 2013, p. 517).

## 2.2 Political Toleration

Even though the idea of toleration was part of the political thought for centuries now, the scope of studies that focuses on toleration as a concept worthy of study has grown only in the last few decades. Considering the latest political development and inter-ethnic conflicts worldwide, we can argue that toleration or the lack of it more specifically, presents a need for more studies on this subject. Authors like Edyvane and Matravers (2011, p.282) offer interesting thoughts regarding toleration and its re-examination by many other authors in the field of political philosophy. For this reason, the present thesis will not immediately offer clear solution regarding the concept of toleration and its applicability to support better manage interethnic relations in the Western Balkans. This is partly due to the complex evolution of the toleration and its reliance on being applied by dominant culture (establishment), which was used as a tool to manage religious freedoms from the 17<sup>th</sup> Century to the modern times of liberal political philosophy. The dualistic approach to toleration in the present thesis where on

one-hand tolerations is seen as positive and empowering concept for solutions to cultural, ethnic and religious issues; and on the other hand we also criticize toleration concepts as not being effective enough in long-term solutions to the same above-mentioned issues due to its need to be used and applied by a dominant culture or institutions. Both approaches will be used accordingly in the present thesis in order to attempt more objective conclusions and recommendations.

When discussing on how toleration is used and applied by public institutions, mainly governments, we correspondingly have to acknowledge how the same concept of toleration is applied by the civil society, mainly NGO's in the Western Balkans. Moreover, public institutions during the 90' all over Western Balkans were focused on justifying their discriminatory policies while hiding behind the concept of toleration described through cultural autonomy while NGO's promoted co-existence and inter-ethnic equality. When two ethnicities in the Balkans engaged in conflict rather than dialogue, social institutions or governments simply could not do anything to change the outcome of the events that led to conflicts. Authors like Edyvane and Matravers, after analyzing works by John Rawls on social institutions and justice, concluded, "if justice is the first virtue of social institutions, toleration is the virtue of social life" (2011, p.283). While there are voices that lately have been overly critical toward the ineffectiveness of toleration, which mostly come from far-right political parties and associations both in USA and Europe, we argue that there is a need for more research on this topic since toleration itself in complex forms and therefore dismissing it would be a misstep.

Unfortunately, the word "Balkan" has still some negative connotation when it is mentioned in different political contexts. Usually it is followed by a verb that implies division, lack of toleration and political instability. Authors like Kolstø (2016) pretty much support the previously stated claim about Balkans by adding that it is a stigma which according to a 2011 survey it showed that people in the Western Balkans think of regional countries as Balkan or Europe depending on membership in the Western organizations and particular EU membership. Author also depicts that the actual term "Western Balkan" also started to be used in order to make a distinction between Balkan countries already members of EU and the ones that are either candidate countries or the ones that simply aspire to be one in the future.



Depending with whom you have a conversation about previous conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo, you will get a dualistic answer about one side being “separatists” and the other “freedom fighters.” Therefore, Kolstø argues that an entire political statement can be into one of these two words when referring to the group of armed people involved in the conflicts of 90’ in Ex-Yugoslavia. In the spirit of dualistic approach toward political developments in the Western Balkan, Europeanization is used as an antidote to Balkanization. Kolstø cites famous Czech novelist Milan Kundera and his article “The Tragedy of Central Europe” published in 1984 where he states that “Central” part of Europe were the ones that culturally belonged to the West but ended up in the “East” after Second World War. He pleaded for the acceptance of “Central Europe” as an old and we-established region that belongs to Europe. His arguments are based in the early medieval era where the region was divided depending if it belonged to the Rome or the Catholic Church or the Byzantium or the Orthodox Church (Kolstø, 2016, p. 1251).

Another important political theme in the Western Balkans is the nostalgia for the ex-Yugoslavia, especially by the older people. Consequently, regardless our constant attempt to provide individuals and key political players in the Western Balkans with practical tools to manage interethnic relations, sometimes we have to take into account collective hypnotically charged views for the past. Consequently, we have to include the infamous group of people who still think that the breakup of Yugoslavia was a bad thing for the region. This view is supported by the Gallup World poll of May 2016 where Keating and Ritter, offer a descriptive view on this question. According to the poll results:

- 81% of the Serbian respondents think that the breakup of Yugoslavia was more harmful than good, compared to only 4% who thought it was beneficial and 8% either chose the option: don’t know or refused to answer.
- Similar answers were collected from Bosnia and Herzegovina where 77% of the respondents agreed that the breakup caused more harm than good compared to 6% who thought this breakup was beneficial and 7% either chose: don’t know or refused to answer.

- Same trend is followed by Montenegro and Macedonia where 65% and respectively 61% thought the breakup caused more harm than good and 15%, and 12% thought it was beneficial where 9% and respectively 21% chose: don't know or refused to answer.
- Nevertheless, this trend start to slowly change with Slovenian respondents where 45% think the breakup of Yugoslavia harmed their country and 41% thought it benefited the country, while 10% either did not answer or chose the: Don't know option.
- Finally, same question received different results in Croatia and Kosovo where 23% respectively 10% thought the breakup of Yugoslavia harmed their countries compared to 55% respectively 75% who thought this breakup benefited their countries, while 9% and 10% either chose: don't know as an answer option or refused to answer (<https://news.gallup.com>, retrieved on 3<sup>rd</sup> of December 2018).

Same poll reveals that ethnic minorities living in the above-mentioned countries are more likely to see harm from the breakup of Yugoslavia, except for Albanian ethnic group in Macedonia. Correspondingly Serbian respondents, regardless where they lived they consider the breakup of Yugoslavia to be harmful. It is important to mention that usually older adults were more likely to see harm in the Yugoslavian breakup (<https://news.gallup.com/poll/210866/balkans-harm-yugoslavia-breakup.aspx>, retrieved on 3<sup>rd</sup> of December, 2018). From these results we can draw a conclusion that the Western Balkans is still unable to break from the past regardless objective reasons to do so considering ethnic tensions, wars and constant provocations even decades after the breakup. It is not surprise that Serbs as a dominant culture in the ex-Yugoslavia feel more nostalgic about those times since they consider themselves to be the main engine behind the Yugoslavian state.

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia on the other hand are open topics that should be further analyzed in relation with nostalgia for the past. They represent two inherently different historical cases since Bosnia and Herzegovina went through a war that left the country still fragmented compared to Macedonia who did not face such war against what was known as

the common war denominator during those time, the Serbian led Yugoslavia. However, Macedonia faced with an armed conflict in 2001 when Albanians fought for equal rights. All ex-Yugoslavian countries except for Montenegro and Macedonia had open armed conflict that escalated to wars with what was then known as Serbian led Yugoslavia.

In order to continue to explain the connotation of the word Balkan it is almost inevitable not to mention themes like Orientalism and Balkanization. Many authors commonly use those two in order to describe the cultural divide between Europe and East from the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. This is described by K.E. Flemings essay on *Orientalism, the Balkans and Balkan Historiography* (2000, p.1218-1233, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 105), when he offers Maria Todorova's justification of how Balkanism and Orientalism is not the same thing. This claim is based on many factors like the one of many differences in the acceptance of the geopolitical importance of the Balkans compared to the Orient, the diminished lack of colonial legacy and significantly Christian makeup of the Balkans compared to the largely Muslim Orient.

What is even more interesting is the fact that Fleming (2000, p. 1218), uses fictional comic strip character of Tintin and his many international adventures including the ones regarding imagined countries like "Syldavia," and "Borduria," where he sees war with anarchists, corrupt military police, and different bandits while depicting Balkan buffoons smoking narghile. The author continues to offer other examples of writings where certain negative characteristics as the one mentioned above to describe the Balkans. It the belief that the Balkans are so hopelessly confused and impenetrable that is useless to try and distinguish between them. Therefore, a cartoonish and novelistic approach will suffice. In this essay, sentences like: *Balkan people should stop making distinction between themselves, and to stop killing one another senselessly over those distinctions. "Killing one another" is not just a sort of "national hobby" but an intention or imperative that must be obeyed, and that it can only be exhausted, not avoided* (Fleming, 2000, p.1219), are used to describe the main themes that novelists and other authors used as a source of inspiration when writing their pieces.

One can argue that the above-mentioned themes are full of negative connotation that derive from the lack of proper understanding of the Balkan and its cultural diversity. On the other hand, Fleming's essay also argues that because of the existence of Balkans as the region

that is geographically in Europe but has some oriental elements in it, makes it harder to divide concepts of Orientalism as simply something that exists purely East of Europe. Hagen (1999) argues that it is not right to explain the Balkan interethnic problems through the ancient hatreds or to the rise of post-communistic nationalism fueled by the rise to power by Slobodan Milosevic. He gives us another path of getting into the historical roots of the Kosovo war by looking at the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of nationalism

Considering that the Ottoman Empire organized the subjected population, the well-known “millet system” by their religion (Barkey & Gavrilis, 2016), the language and other cultural traits of its population were not as important. Furthermore, Croats, Bosnians and Serbs all speak same language, but they belong to three different religions. Croats belong to the Roman Catholic Church, Bosnians are Muslims, and Serbs belong to the Eastern Orthodox Church. Three quarter of the Albanians are Muslims (majority Sunni and Shia minority), the rest belong to the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Church. When the Ottoman Empire started declining in the eighteenth century, the nationalism as an ideology started to develop in the Balkans. This situation was used by almost all ethnicities in the Balkans starting with Serbian independence in 1815, Greece in 1830, Romania in 1856, Bulgaria in 1878 and Albania in 1912. These new states did not represent the ideal national territories according to their newly founded national elites. Consequently, they started to feed ideas that contained the word greater in them, like Greater Serbia, Greater Albania, and Greater Greece. The main theme around the unredeemed national territories was developed and was used in many ways to fuel interethnic conflicts since then (Hagen, 1999, p.52-53).

The foundations of what was considered to be a greater Serbia can be traced to 1840s. During this time the main agenda was to conquer and include Serb-inhabited lands in Bosnia, in Ottoman-ruled southern Serbia stretching into Macedonia, in the Vojvodina and Banat district in Southern Hungary, in the Krajina district in Croatia, in Serb-speaking Montenegro, and in Kosovo, so-called the cradle of medieval Serbian monarchy. However, the notion of southern Slavic federation, which was a nineteenth-century Yugoslav idea, appealed very little to Serbian nationalists. This was not seen as essential to their national liberation, as it was for the Croats and Slovenes living under Hapsburg Austrian rule (Hagen, 1999, p. 56).

Some authors (Joseph 2005, p. 111, Sletzinger 2011, p.46) argue that even though Balkans importance diminished significantly because of events such as September 11, and conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and the region, Balkan still remains fractured and capable of producing unrest. The author also points out that because of consistently undermining the seriousness of the region's problems, officials have delayed dealing with those issues until crises force their hands. He offers several examples of this being the case, from Kosovo Albanian riots in March 2004, Macedonian interethnic issues since 2001 war and name disputes with Greece (p.115, 116). We have to keep in mind that articles like the one by Joseph (2005) should be analyzed with critical approach since they fail to predict few important elements of the Balkan developments that proceeded with article since the year 2005. Moreover, he argues that Balkan Muslims have strong pro-European and pro-American orientation and therefore do not make good recruits for Islamic terrorist groups. Unfortunately, this situation has changed recently where the number of Balkan Muslims in terrorist groups is significantly higher than before.

We strongly agree with Joseph's claim about how important is to focus on how minorities are treated in the Balkans. Failing to do so will make achieving peace in the Balkans rather hard. Authors sees Serbia in the future to attempt annexing the part or all Republika Srpska into Serbia proper, and the same will be tried regarding Serbian minority in Kosovo. Kosovo's independence might leave Serbs in a permanent grudge; however, Albanians living outside borders of Kosovo might see the accommodation of Serbian minority in Kosovo as a call for reciprocal treatment of their rights in southern Serbia (2005, p.119).

The current negotiations between Serbian and Kosovar Governments are focused on their past and divisive narratives in terms which side will gain and loose at most. None of the narratives shared by the negotiators uses themes, which will elucidate the future co-existence. Joseph uses the metaphor of the divorce to illustrate this approach (Joseph, 2005, p. 120). Consequently, this will benefit radical political parties who always feed on nationalistic rhetoric based on how "the other side is mistreating our people." One might argue that Serbia will actually benefit from Kosovo's final status and progress, which will enable the country to focus

more on domestic political and economic reforms that are necessary for becoming a EU member.

Dealing with the Balkans does not always require focusing on little things, but rather dealing with obvious obstacles is the key to finding a solution. Letting obvious problems aggravate and believing that somehow the problems will vanish after a certain time is plainly insufficient. In addition, the U.S. relationship with the Islamic world is also important for the Balkans considering there are majority Muslim populations in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, with strong U.S. leadership the stalemate of the Balkan development can be broken, this will also enable Washington focus on other more compelling concerns (Joseph, 2005, p. 122).

### **3.3 A critique of the Toleration concept**

When trying to discuss concepts of political toleration in average social settings, it is like talking about a concept that is understood only by a small number of intellectuals and aimed at how the “rest of the population” should behave in order to attain better society. The closest we get to the group discussions about political tolerance or tolerance in general is when an NGO calls for a conference in the nearby hotel and prepares press releases about that activity after the end of the conference. However, even in this case, most of the people invited to discuss political toleration are either members of the government, political parties or distinguished professors. In other words, there is a feeling that these concepts are out of the grasp for the general public.

Gibson & Duch addressed this issue and are referring to it as one of the problems of “democratic elitism” in the Western European politics is entangled in what can be named as “elitist theory of democracy” where elites are seen as the ones that are more committed to democratic values of political tolerance compared to the ordinary citizens (1991, p. 191). It should be noted though that Gibson and Duch had slightly different view on who “elites” are and according to them the define elites as people who have strong opinions and find themselves persuading friends, relatives and co-workers in sharing their views. The frequency of this kind of interchange between these people and their environment, more precisely 17% of

the respondents of their sample claimed to persuade other often. So, not necessarily the ruling elites but the ones, who have strong opinions and often find they trying to persuade people around them, like opinion leaders (1991, p. 195).

Finally, they concluded that elites are not necessarily more focused on democratic values than ordinary citizens, and often in these systems, the difference between opinion leaders and members or the public is not significantly different. They also argue that there was somewhat limited evidence that elites in the less democratic systems are less politically tolerant compared to the mass public (1991, P. 206). Here one should keep in mind that this study was focused in more matures democracies compared to the new democracies where opinion leaders differ the most from the ordinary citizens. This is an important point since the focus of the present thesis are the countries with relatively young democratic systems since prior to 90' all of the Western Balkans was under a Communist one-party regime.

Additionally, Gibson and Duch focused on how tolerant their respondents were towards fascists, which can be considered as not enough broad of a question to face with and were taken from the 1988 European Omnibus Survey. For this reason, the questions in the present thesis from European Value Survey were not only focused on difficult discordant questions (even though we included the ones with people holding extreme right-wing or left-wing views), but also on the ones that are focused on immigration and their integration in one's country.

According to the Gibson & Gouws (2001), a significant part of studies on political tolerance concentrate on mostly abstract and behaviors not affected by the context, using measures such "suppose (an) admitted communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?" Following this, toleration is conceptualized as a generalized willingness to allow unpopular political views to be expressed (2001, p. 1067). Authors point out the lack of research around the specific contextual factors that are often crucial in the decision-making process.

Also, the importance of the leaders presenting certain groups is vital when the public decides to tolerate or not that particular group. We should keep in mind that most research has been done within the context of established western democracies such as the U.S., Canada and UK. The general understanding of the precise role of contextual factors in the decision making

to tolerate or not are limited (p.1069). In order to illustrate how contextual factors, influence tolerance judgments Gibson & Gouws (2001, p. 1069) explain how a highly realistic experimental vignette presented to a representative sample of the South African mass public gave unexpected results. The hypotheses regarding the willingness to tolerate a demonstration by one's political enemies is affected by:

- 1) The community's antipathy toward the proposed demonstration;
- 2) Whether the demonstration is expected to result in law breaking and violence;
- 3) The position of community leaders; and
- 4) The effect on deliberation and debate.

Their general findings argue the following: *"The specific context of the civil liberties controversy matters little to South Africans. Instead, attitudinal predispositions-in particular, preexisting threat perception seems to shape all aspects of tolerance judgment."* Gibson & Gouws conclude that the context is important for tolerance, but at the same time the South African context, the immediacy and realism of the threat posed by one's political enemies that is more influential, not the elements of the situation itself.

Context matters, but not always in direct and simple ways (Gibson & Gouws, 2001, p. 1069). Another important thing to mention while looking at the importance of context is the connection of a current question about tolerating certain group with a previous memory same or similar to the situation the respondents are asked. Surveys often ask a hypothetical situation on whether the respondents would or would not tolerate certain political group hold public rallies. If that group celebrates an extreme viewpoint, then that respondent is likely to answer by drawing from his or her previous standpoints or experience about that group (Gibson & Gouws, 2001, 1070).

Authors also pointed out that after respondents had completed the survey they were asked additional counterarguments to determine whether they might be willing to change their initial views. Consequently, 33.1% of the respondents gave at least one tolerant response after the three efforts to persuade them to support allowing the rally (initial question had to do with allowing an enemy group to hold a rally). These additional arguments had some influence on the way South Africans thought about tolerating a certain group. One of the three



counterarguments was *“suppose that the group fearing it won’t be allowed to hold the rally, promise to obey all laws during the rally, and it further promises not to attack the opposition party of its supporters. A local judge accepts their promises. Do you think the rally ought to be allowed to take place?”* (Gibson & Gouws, 2001, p. 1086).

Authors argue that the act of toleration happens when one or most of the citizens refrains from preventing or censoring an action that is rather disliked under most conditions (Owen & Dennis, 1987, Newey, 2011). And most societies do exercise some power over certain individuals’ rights to their rights to publicly oppose those holding political power against the system (Owen & Dennis, 1987, 548). Consequently, most of the responsibility goes towards the actual system that is in charge of the political life. Usually this is possible through a key player (an agent) that is either chosen or self-appointed to exercise power over the masses. Following this, Newey gives a detailed explanation of toleration by implying that the agent's power to intervene is what should we be focusing on. It is clear that one should have been accoutered with power to intervene and when the same makes the choice not to, regardless the dislike or objection, toleration occurs.

One of the questions that may arise when analyzing this view or toleration is what happens when the agent loses its power to intervene? Does toleration require set of powers in order to function, and if so how sustainable it can be? Balkan wars in the 90' have shown that the dominant culture (ethnicity) exercised its power on other cultures in such way that led to ethnic cleansing and mass killings. Nevertheless, after each war in ex-Yugoslavia, the sub-culture gained the status of dominant culture and then exercised power (toleration) on the ethnicity that one’s was the dominant one. By this vicious circle of political domination, the concept of toleration suffered a lot by being misused by all dominant cultures in all Balkan newly formed states. We refer to this phenomenon as *“Toleration Loop.”*

On the other hand, in everyday presentation, the concept of *“toleration”* is often referred to permission or permissiveness, to peaceful existence etc. (Waltzer, 1997, p.2, as cited by Newey, 2011, p.364, Bessone, 2013). He argues that toleration *“answers to a distinct set of political concerns”* alongside with other concepts such as equality, permission etc. (Newey, 2011, p. 364). We can see here that concepts such as equality, permission and

toleration are all important when studying how all these concepts were applied from the political institution of countries in the Balkans. Some concepts were used, or should we say “misused” constantly by different Government in the Balkans in order to justify their own political agenda. What is more, taking into account the consequences of highly ethnocentric policies employed by nationalistic political parties in the Balkans, we can argue that none of the applications of toleration, equality or permission concepts were led by what is known as conception of the good life.

This concept is part of the more general political design that tries to organize political processes and institutions on the basis of normative aspects such as the one of justice. This presents a particular hardship when modern states want to implement toleration. Overall, they want to achieve basic political need for equal and democratic society. Authors like Newey offer a well-based critique regarding this attempt in the United States. As an example, he explains how neutrality or liberal neutrality as he puts it, presents a constraint on justification bear upon toleration. Even though both toleration and liberal neutrality are developed by liberalism, the later does not necessarily support toleration. Once again, it is important to distinguish between political liberalism and postmodern liberalism. Fortier further explain this distinction by noting that the former cannot do without a basis in truth (2010, p. 1012).

Newey uses Guttman’s and Thompson’s explanation on why organizing a society on the basis and principles of toleration wouldn’t serve the purpose of democracy. Moreover, it lacks of basis on which people can hope to resolve their moral disagreements and therefore would inhibit the collective moral progress of the society as a whole (2011, p. 370). Similar problem arises when one tries to apply the model of toleration based on two-party case. Let us take an example when a model of toleration is proposed to resolve ethnic issues of two main parties. This becomes a political issue when issues between two parties prohibit them to act tolerantly. Here the state will be forced to use political means that is exercising its power on the matter. This in itself presents a problem in the case of the Balkan inter-ethnic issues. Because the state is led by one dominant ethnicity or culture, whatever model to resolve the dispute by employing the tool of toleration becomes a problem in itself. This it is important to differ from interpersonal and political toleration. Most of the post 90’ war in the Balkans have been

characterized by inter-ethnic toleration projects led by international NGO' who focused on interpersonal toleration rather than political. It was the later that caused ethnic cleansing and not the mere interpersonal lack of toleration.

If one behaves in a way that the other thinks it is intolerable, this can be passed by the choice of the latter to exercise the self-restrain. In other words, not because he or she does not have the power to act on an intolerable behavior bur rather the choice to apply this ability to restrain and let the situation pass. This is not the case when the power of self-restraint is not exercised. Here we can see the state acting by using its power to act upon the dispute where one side decided not to self-restrain but rather act upon intolerable behavior (see Newey, 2011, p.372-373).

There is another interesting concept offered by Dovi (2009) that helps view current state policies of Balkan countries that aspire inclusion from a different angle. Moreover, she argues that more often than not today's democracies tend to over justify the inclusion of historically disadvantaged groups and instead suggests the limitation of the influence of the groups that are overrepresented and privileged. Author uses the "oppression principle" where democracies can marginalize those who oppress and the ones that benefit from the same. Some form of this type of marginalization can be justified and beneficial to democracy. We have to keep in mind that the ethics of marginalization helps understand the difference between the one that is beneficiary and the one that is not justified (Dovi, 2009, p. 1181).

Just as the act of toleration depends on the ethics of those who employ it, in our case the official institutions and NGO's, the ethics of marginalization or exclusion also depends on how it will be used. Even though in this part we are contemplating the ideas of how ethical marginalization can be beneficial for democracies, it is imperative to align our opinion with Dovi and the rest of the authors who do not support any formal categorical exclusions such as the right to vote, run for office or any other political, civil, class or gender rights (2009, p. 1181).

The present discussion only illustrates situations where in some cases the right of the individuals to form an association that presents a democratic right, which in itself allows the same citizens to exclude the others. At the same time, we support Dovi's argument about

allowing the ethics of marginalization to be applied on informal exclusions that allow democratic institutions to create better social environment (p. 1181).

In order to make the oppression principle clearer, Dovi offers two-part explanation about it. The first deals with the need of democracies to marginalize those who oppress and the second are to marginalize those whose privileged status upholds oppression (2009, p.1182). This presents us with a fresh approach toward managing inter-ethnic relations in general and in the Western Balkans in particular. Western Balkans policy makers seldom take into considerations that the power of the dominant culture makes subcultures feel discriminated and therefore cause social uprisings that essentially led to several wars in the region.

Consequently, the present thesis, among other things also suggests that Governments of countries that consists the Western Balkans consider policies where dominant cultural groups are held accountable and their rights are revisited rather than only focusing on short lived “inclusive” policies toward sub-cultures that usually end up being rather ineffective. Governments in the Western Balkans offer only short-term solutions where certain group or members of sub-cultures are integrated through quotas and other instruments of equal inclusion and the same leave out most of that particular population un-integrated.

## **2.4 Coordinated Management of Meaning CMM**

### **2.4.1 Social Constructivism**

Growing up in a post-communist country where one social reality was abruptly replaced by another one, presented a challenge for everyone who now had to adapt to a new set of social behaviors. The author of the present thesis had witnessed different political turmoil's in ex-Yugoslavia since late 80', which then transformed into several wars from early 90' (Croatia, Bosnia) to the late 90' and early 2000' (Kosovo and Macedonia). This presented an opportunity to see firsthand all-important social political changes. We faced the worst hyperinflation (see Lyon, 1996, p. 293) where one day you had banknotes with six zeros that could buy only few cans of food, and another day the state would change the name, passports and so on.

The fact that country borders changed, with them countries' flags, national anthem and other symbols, did present a new social reality that whole nations faced with. It was extremely hard for a then teenager to witness all these events that changed lives forever and not being able to act upon them. The main reason for this mindset was that the "adult" world is out there and all one could do is wait his or her turn to be one in the future. It was something that was already "designed" for the rest of the people. The seemingly perfect system of cultural reproduction with previously designed parts worked perfectly fine. Even when the system obviously did not work, no one dared to ask "why"? Since the reality was out there and should not be questioned. After being part of higher education, the author of the present thesis and his peers faced with different viewpoints that challenged the preconceived notion of social reality. Additionally, facing these new theoretical concepts was highly empowering and started a new phase of social development in the Western Balkans. It was extremely slow-paced social development but nonetheless hopeful and constructive.

The foundation of the present PhD thesis is strongly based on the concept that new social realities are created and as such we should be more knowledgeable about theoretical concepts that gave birth to this concept. Consequently, understanding current issues in inter-ethnic relations in the Western Balkans would be more achievable if we use CMM and Political Toleration which are in the essence theories deriving from the concept that borrow heavily from Social Constructivism.

Often communication has been considered as a process that occurs automatically as some sort of "vehicle of thought and expression," and often was overlooked in different debates, scholarly essays etc. (Pearce, 1989, p. 17). Pearce points out that now scholars look at communication as a substance of "paradigms" or as a structure of philosophic problems that is part of questions such as morality, economics, politics and so forth. He continues by arguing that the phrase social construction of reality is been used to elucidate the communication in rather mundane aspect of social life (1989, p. 17). Concept of social construction of reality presents a challenge to simple social activity, just as the linguistic turn presents a challenge to philosophy where instead of communication being "about" something else, now it is seen as the integral part of the experience itself (Pearce, 1989, p.18). From this perspective, events like

having a dinner with friends, personalities, emotions, purposes, universities, ships, and similar are all what he calls “found things.” However, author argues that these are not simply things that are external to us but rather they are created and are product of “social action, whose continued existence depends on their reconstruction in patterns of communication,” (Pearce, 1989, p. 19).

According to Schipani (2013), Social Construction is a sociological theory of knowledge, which explains how social objects of consciousness work within a social context. Social construction refers to all meanings, notions and implications regarding objects and events in our surroundings and to the notions of people, which are interacting with these objects. In other words, to some people it comes natural to accept the concept that we create our social reality. The main idea of social constructivism attempts to be quite clear. When saying that something is socially constructed, it is emphasized its reliance on dependent features of our social selves. ‘It is to say: this thing could not have existed had we not built it; and we need not have built it at all, at least not in its present form’ (Boghossian, 2001). There are born certain questions for instance: had we been a different kind of society, had we had different needs, values, or interests, maybe the thing we constructed may have been different, or built differently.

The unavoidable distinction is with an object that already exists, it existed separately from ‘us’ and ‘we’ did not have an influence in creating it. Unquestionably there exist many things and facts about these things, which are socially constructed and were specified by one main idea, for instance: money, newspapers, citizenship etc. All these things could not have existed if there was no society; and each of those things could have been assembled in a different way if ‘we’ had chosen so. (Boghossian. 2001)

The awareness for social construction is not quite created. Us people are living in segregation separated in gender, race, class etc. Does race, class, or gender mean anything? Not really, they have a meaning because society gave them a meaning. Social construction is the way society groups’ people and how it privileges some groups more than others. Gender is an entity socially constructed; represents ways of talking, describing, or perceiving men and women (Social Constructs, 2008). Socialization process attempts to distinguish notions

of gender by constructing masculine or feminine identities. The concept of a woman or for a man is defined by society, 'you are a woman or man because society says so, not because you choose to be one or the other'. Society tells what race you are and what social class, and so on. This can be defined as a social process that makes us differentiate between what is 'normal', and what is not 'normal'. (Flores, 2012)

As an example of social constructed entities can be also taken the games that are played. Games exist because of a set of conventional rules created by society. The sets of social conventions and agreement to abide by them give games their meaning in any given social context. The rule about the game of football have been created over the years about the players, spectators, and the game organizations, even though this game could have been played in any other way. Because of these sets of rules, the meaning of games is consequently socially constructed. (Social Constructs, 2008)

According to Ian Hacking in his monograph, *The Social Construction of What?* (1999), social construction is not only applied to items, things, and facts but also to certain beliefs people have about those things. *The Social Construction of Women Refugees* (1992) by Helene Moussa, has an intent not only to insist on the obvious fact that certain women come to be refugees as a consequence of social events. The idea is to expose the way in which a particular belief has been shaped by social forces: the belief that there is a particular kind of person – the woman refugee – deserving of being singled out for special attention (Boghossian, 2001).

There are required some amplifications on the main idea when elaborated about social construction of belief. 'The unimportant simple truth of any belief that we have that it is not necessary that we should have had it and that we might not have had it had we been different from the way we actually are (Boghossian, 2001). If we look into the belief that dinosaurs once wandered the earth, we find the apparent not foreseeable that we should have come to this belief. The question may have never been considered; if considered the conclusions may have been different because of diverse causes. The conclusions may have been different because we may have not been interested in the truth, we may have not been as clever to figure it out, and we might have stumbled transversely the germane proof, which are the fossils. It is very essential to differentiate between a construction claim that goes to a thing or a fact, and a

construction directed at beliefs; they are diverse sorts of claims and necessitate unlike forms of justification. The first amounts are directed to the metaphysical statement that something is real but of our own creation. While the second to the epistemic statement that the accurate clarification for why we have some exacting belief has to do with the role that that belief plays in our social lives, and not absolutely with the proof adducted in its support (Boghossian, 2001).

**Socially Constructed Things:** The things such as money, newspaper and citizenship could not have existed without the society that is why they are socially constructed things. Just as obviously, it would seem, anything that could have – or that did – exist independently of societies could not have been socially constructed: dinosaurs, for example, or giraffes, or the elementary particles that are supposed to be the building blocks of all matter and that physicists call “quarks” (Boghossian, 2001). If they existed before societies, how could they have been socially constructed? The existence of this question is elaborated in some texts in the social construction literature where it is stated that an inundation of claims to the effect that it is accurately such outwardly mind-and-society independent items that are socially constructed.

**Socially Constructed Belief:** While based in some considerations, it can be said that social construction talk does not coherently apply to the facts given and studied by natural science. Then there is the raise of the question; of whether it does fare any better when applied to the beliefs about those facts produced by those sciences? Science can be considered as a social enterprise, and human beings who come equipped with values, needs, interests and prejudices conduct it cooperatively. The behavior of the people can be influence by these needs and values if diverse reflective ways: they may determine what questions they show an interest in, what research strategy they place their bets on, what they are willing to fund, and so forth (Boghossian, 2001). None of this has significance to the believability of a particular statement produced by science, if that statement is sufficiently supported by the accurate proof.

The common distinguish among what philosophers of science call the ‘context of discovery’, and what they call the ‘context of justification’, is frequently done. It is reasonable that social values play a role in the perspective of discovery, but it is not reasonable that they play a role in the perspective of justification. There is a frequent denial that social



constructionists about knowledge have, they consider it naïve to sustain that while social values may enter into the one context, they need not enter into the other (Boghossian, 2001).

When changing the viewpoint and depending on the constructionist perspective, social construction might be the end result of the human choice rather than of unchallengeable laws of nature. When seen from this perspective lays the main issue, which social scientists deviate. 'Are human ideas and conceptions generated more on subjective criteria than on objective realities?' There is this constant debate of social sciences for the divide of science against objective truth. In social construction of reality there is this question mark on how much can be extended the claim for knowledge supported by reality, so how much is this claim a social construct? There are different opinions as a result of this question; some say that knowledge is united with reality, it approximates objective truth, anything less symbolizes a social construct. Based on this thinking mortality is a social construct. Nevertheless other scientists state that all knowledge is social constructed.

#### **2.4.2 Coordinated Management of Meaning**

In today's interconnected world through communication technology, the word communication itself presents possibilities and limitations of human potential. A constant access to information is sometimes overwhelming particularly when trying to navigate through the complex web of information and translate this into meanings. One might argue that the more information we have about certain social phenomenon, more understanding we would have for the same. Unfortunately this often is not the case. Some decide to use this flow of information to strengthen and enforce their divisive opinions and use persuasion to get more people into their side.

According to Pearce (1989, p. 7), the industrial revolution had a bigger effect than the one is being attributed; it helped shape a new relationship between wealth and land. He argues that before industrial revolution, one of the ways to increase wealth was through conquest, buying or annexing a new territory. With the industrialization however, this changed since wealth now could be produced and created. Now the technological advancement determined the level of wealth that could be created. In a rather similar way, the communication revolution

could be considered a paradigm shift as well. In this context “information” is considered to have important properties, which had to be followed by new ethical and legal principles. From the days where in American society some words were considered “fighting words” and had equal legal effect as fighting, now we have to discuss the “big data” access and use from different corporations.

Once again, we live in times where another communication revolution is on its way. Few communication companies have gathered vast data that are often used to change collective viewpoints on important political decisions. Therefore, whoever has access and control of this data has also the power to initiate and complete political and cultural changes worldwide. Many authors had similar discussion almost thirty years ago. The question whether Government should sell lists of names and addresses to direct-mail advertisers or to solicitation agencies was asked by Pearce in his 1989 book titled “Communication and Human Condition.” Also he asked the question whether individuals have the right to privacy or may some branch of the government give its information to another? These questions are still relevant and will be in the future as well. The technological development will change the context in which these questions are asked, however, the moral and ethical ground of critical thinking on these matters will continue to be important.

Lately there are enough development worldwide that can illustrate how communication (through technology and otherwise) is used by individuals and organizations to persuade their particular audiences in changing their opinions or behaviors. Politics is the easiest example to elucidate the use of persuasion. However, in order to be more effective, we choose to focus on one particular communication theory that we think the study of toleration and interethnic relations in particular might benefit from. Considering that in the present days both children and adults are glued to their ipads or cellphones, smart TV’s with Netflix pay per view platforms, online shopping etc., the capitalist viewpoint considers these audiences simply as “markets.” Every person became a commodity simply by the data that he or she generates by being active participant in the digital society. Let us explain what we mean with big data since it is not always related with the “quantity” per se. According to Schroeder (2018, p. 127) big data can be understood as “research that represents a step change in the scale and scope of

knowledge about given phenomenon.” Here the concern is not only with the quantity but also with the relation to the given object or phenomenon being studied, which might have so many data, points that before it was hard or impossible to collect and analyze on a sufficiently large scale (Schroeder, 2018, p. 127).

In order to illustrate the complex relationship between data created and gathered through social media and different companies that use or rather misuse those data to change political opinions we offer a glimpse of the scandal known as Cambridge Analytica and Facebook. Tim Adams (2018) wrote an article in the Guardian titled “Facebook’s week of shame: the Cambridge Analytica fallout”, where he elaborates the relationship between Trump, Leave EU campaigns in UK, and the Breitbart which was previously investigated by his colleague Carole Cadwalladr. Even though we will not explain the details of this rather complex relationship between different companies, it is important to mention that Cambridge Analytica did not use data from social media (primarily from Facebook) to influence U.S. elections only. They were hired to do the same by different political parties in Europe and elsewhere. Being able to publish thousands or more propaganda materials that will be viewed billions of times, for sure it will have an effect in elections as well (retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/24/facebook-week-of-shame-data-breach-observer-revelations-zuckerberg-silence>).

Considering that CMM is suggested by the present thesis as the main theoretical framework, which will provide in-depth insight into our complex interethnic relations, it is important to describe concepts which are: Coordination, Coherence and Mystery. Yet, the purpose of the thesis is not the advancement of the CMM theory as such, but rather the application of its most important concepts into analyzing interethnic relations in the Western Balkans and beyond. While explaining each mentioned concept we will offer an insight or an example of how these concepts can elucidate some of the past and present issues in interethnic relations. Often we will apply examples from Pearce’s examples on how they observed two or more individuals in the level of two or more nations. Consequently, examples in our case represent nations rather than individuals since the communication issues are the same in their nature regardless if they are happening in the interpersonal or in interethnic level.

According to Pearce (1989, p. 20), coordination focuses on those practice in which persons attempt to call into synergic representation of their visions of the good, the desirable and the expedient, and to prevent synergic depiction of what they envision as bad, ugly and obstructive. Nevertheless, this does not mean that those who coordinate their actions have a full understanding of the intentions of the other communicator, or that they fully “agree” about what they are doing.

This is the reason why Pearce goes on and explains that coordination here is in opposition with what is understood as “functionalism.” He emphasizes how functionalists accept a certain social order and that people do live and have their being in that particular social order. They see objects and events of the social worlds as a response to some “need” and as to have some “function.” This is seen as fallible since actors involved in the communication process often if not always face with non-desirable “outcomes” of this process and sometimes is counterproductive which does not reflect their initial intention at all. Pearce mentions in his book “Human Condition” a case when two of his colleagues started an argument which was quite frequent and after some time became in a way rather predictable. When interviewed, both actors in the fight declared that they did don’t like to fight with each other there and they did everything to avoid fights but still continued to do so.

Before analyzing what was happening and this will practice pattern it was required to accept the premise that these people were telling the truth when they said that they did not want to fight. Additionally, both sought out their friends asking for advice and help. They often went out of their way to avoid the other person but that was not an effective strategy because eventually they would meet the fights continued. Afterwards Pearson’s colleagues observe the five more closely. They found out that these people fight only about certain topics and always with each other on the same topics. They did not fight with other persons on the same topics. This required a more in-depth look at the issue since it had to do with the combination of their relationship with each other and with specific topics only.

Many interviews followed, where first they were asked what it felt to be in these fights. None of them liked the fact that they were getting out of control despite their claim to try and avoid fighting and basically feeling that they had no other choice but respond to the fight. It

was interesting to see the repetitive theme of “there is nothing I could do” to avoid fighting. Even though the actual content of these unwanted, repetitive patterns is unique for every individual and thus relationship, Pearce argues that the experience seems quite common, especially where “you find yourself in a highly predictable situation where you feel that you must say or do something even though you know it will set off an unpleasant, undesirable pattern of interaction (Cronen, Pearce and Snavely, 1975 as cited by Pearce 1989, p. 20). Likewise, we argue that this particular can be further adapted to the interethnic relations by treating two ethnicities as two individuals facing hard choices when facing with situations where they feel like they should do something or act upon something even though knowingly it was cause unpleasant repetitive hurtful rhetoric.

Coherence refers to the process by which people create and share stories for others and themselves in order to interpret and understand the world. What is important for this concept and for the main premise of the present thesis is the necessity of not assuming that these stories are the only accurate description of us. Consequently, coherence as described by Pearce (1989, p. 21) opposes claims that there is an irreducible actual foundation for human interpretation of the world. From here derives the proposition that it is rather dangerous to claim that there is a true interpretation of the world and that other interpretations are merely false.

We can try and understand the existence of multiple stories for the same “facts” as something that makes the human experience richer but unfortunately, the actual ethnocentric interpretation of “facts” is what helped causing interethnic tensions in the Western Balkan and beyond. Since we understand the world around us through stories (narratives) we cannot stop but tell them to make the world coherent, it is in our intrinsic nature to be storytellers. Conclusively, we all construct our own stories to make the world coherent but at the same time not all stories are similar, and not all stories work as well as others and they actually do contradict each other quite often (for more see Pearce, 1989, p.22).

Lastly, the third CMM concept has to do with mystery. Pearce describes this concept as sternly contradictory with the attempt to impose the so-called “rational” perspective on the stories and the coordinated patterns of actions in which we live. Furthermore, mystery is the

reminder of how complex is the process of social construction of reality since we live in a multiverse of stories, which are interpreted in different ways which increases the chances for our attempt to create particular events or objects in the social world.

The main reason why the present thesis employs the communication perspective to analyze complex cultural and political phenomenon is that this perspective enables the researchers to see as Pearce points out “all forms of human activity as a recurring, reflexive process in which resources are expressed in practices and in which practices (re) construct resources.” (1989, p. 23). Once again by practices we understand actions such as creating tools, playing games, interethnic negotiations, and as resources we understand all stories, beliefs, symbols including institutions that we use to make our world meaningful.

From the CMM perspective, we admit that author’s decision of choosing the specific “plotline” or an episode to describe complex historical events is not entirely objective. Examples of peaceful co-existence and the respect for diversity can be easily traced earlier than the used medieval battle described at the present thesis. The contemporary society requires some sort of new forms of communication and Coordinated Management of Meaning can provide valuable resource for comprehending and facilitating these new developments (Pearce, 2004).

The initial developments of CMM started in mid 70’ as political scene in the United States was highly dynamic due to civil rights movements and the war in Vietnam, and many other events that influenced culture and social landscape in general. Here scholars like Pearce and Cronen started developing CMM as an interpretive theory focused on interpersonal communication, which developed into practical theory applied by practitioners from dealing with organizational development to political consulting and training (Pearce, 2004 p. 37).

The present thesis uses CMM concepts to analyze and offer a different set of applied notions to the existing interethnic relations in the Balkans. Moreover, Holmgren points out *“You can learn ‘Culture of CMM theory’ by participating in it, by using it. You do not learn it by reading or hearing about it. By the practice of reading you only become a better reader. Through the practice of playing and experimenting with the notions of CMM theory you might get a better insider knowledge and understanding of what CMM theory can be used for*

(Holmgreen, 2004, p. 99). On the other hand, the actual analysis and surveys will derive from political toleration theory.

Holmgreen uses the Kirkeby's (as cited by Holmgreen, 2004, p.96), term "the principle of translocutionarity" to explain the idea that you do not know what you think until you have heard yourself say or seen yourself write your thoughts. This goes align Bateson's idea of how "we learn to be human from the context we grow up and are active over time" (p.96). Moreover, Holmgreen argues that we hear many stories about ourselves, and have various models that originate from "copies". Growing up we "copy" people around us (parents, grandparents, teachers), and others like film heroes or persons that we seen act and whose narratives we have heard or read about (p. 96).

CMM accepts that the self is created in stories, which are seen as guidelines (scripts) for actions. Thus, one can explore himself/herself, experience, change through different practices of telling and re-telling his or her stories. One of the examples offered by Holmgreen has to do with being interviewed, being listened to or by having the opportunity to listen to others talk about what the person has just said (re-telling practice). He also points out that it is only the person him/herself who has "the truth" about his/her own life (p.96). It is important to mention the author's standpoint regarding how the self is constituted through words and meanings one borrows from culture. Culture sometimes limits us in the sense that we can only express our experiences in words that our culture allows us to use (Holmgreen, 2004, p.97). Accordingly, CMM supports the idea that the self is always emerging through the processes of conversation, storytelling and making meaning from actions others and we preform and from stories we hear or tell ourselves (p.97).

Since one of the main keywords in this paper is communication, we feel the need to offer a short description of this process without entering the oceans of different paradigms where different researchers have tried to give a definition about communication just to agree that that there is no definition about communication. Nevertheless, since we are using CMM lens to analyze an interethnic conflict it is somewhat convenient for us to offer one of the Pearce's definition about communication as well. Moreover, Pearce argues that communication is not everywhere and at all times the same thing. In other words, is neither an either-or choice,

which one does or does not perform: nor is it a continuum along which one may do more or less, better or worse. Rather, communication is a ubiquitous aspect of human functioning, constitutive of being human (Pearce, 1989, p.91).

Social constructionism maintains that people should take a critical standpoint toward taken-for-granted ways of understanding the world. Moreover, this paradigm invites us to be critical of the idea that our observations of the world yield its nature to us, to challenge the view that conventional knowledge is based upon objective, unbiased observation of the world. It is therefore in opposition to what is referred to as positivism and empiricism in traditional science-the assumption that the nature of the world can be revealed by observation, and that what exists is what we perceive to exist.

Social constructionism cautions us to be ever suspicious of our assumptions about how the world appears to be. This means that the categories with which we as human beings apprehend the world do not necessarily refer to real divisions. For example, just because we think of some music as “classical” and some as “pop” does not mean we should assume that there is anything in the nature of the music itself that means it has to be divided up in that particular way (Social Constructionism 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Vivien Burr, 2003). According to Montgomery (2004, p.350), human beings build constructions about the world both as individuals and as part of one or more groups, than act accordingly. In this paper, we are discussing both individual constructions that affected the group (Hate Speeches from the 90’s in Yugoslavia) and group socially constructed acts (like group protests and clashes fueled by historical myths) that had a negative impact in the existing interethnic situation in the Western Balkans. Therefore, we argue that there is a strong interconnection between individual and group coordinated acts.

Pearce (2007) argues that if he is a participant in a communication situation (in our case multiethnic) and has the opportunity or requirement of acting into it, these are the kinds of questions he’d pose:

- What are we making together?
- How are we making it?
- What are we becoming as we make this?
- How can we make better social worlds?



However, there is another set of questions that the author suggests in situations where he is both the participant and the observer of the certain communication process. According to Pearce, the probability of making better social worlds is higher by asking questions like these:

- How can I/we act in ways that prevent the occurrence of undesirable events and objects?
- How can I/we act in a ways that intervene in and improve already existing undesirable events and objects?
- How can I/we act in ways that call into being preferred events and objects?

In today's Western Balkan's social reality, the above-mentioned questions are barely present in everyday discussions regarding our political life. Consequently, the present interethnic tensions are not abridged in the past ten years as we expected. Today, the main rhetoric of the Western Balkan's political parties are consisted of only few keywords like: NATO, European Union, Toleration and Multiculturalism. As if the present interethnic conflicts would disappear if only we were the member of NATO and EU.

We are taking only the concepts of punctuation and plotment to illustrate few political and other events that shaped the present social reality of the Western Balkans. CMM concept of punctuation can be applied in Western Balkan inter-ethnic conflict framework where two opposed cultures claim to know the right way of dividing and organizing interactions into meaningful historical patterns. One of the socially constructed problems between Serbs and Albanians is the "right" punctuation of certain meaningful historical event.

### **2.4.3 CMM and Community Dialogue Process**

One might argue that CMM is an interpersonal communication theory that does not seem to be appropriate for analyzing inter-ethnic relations from the political sciences perspective. This approach could not be further from the truth. The main reason behind choosing such theoretical lens (CMM) to analyze inter-ethnic relations is its ability to explain communication process from interpersonal to public context. Furthermore, this theory has evolved and supports the approach where communication is viewed as core social process. Also it is applied in community action projects as part of the Public Dialogue Consortium, which is a

NGO that focuses on high quality communication in the public sphere. It is consisted of scholars and practitioners who use communication processes and patters to approach the dialogue and public conversations about social issues. It is important to mention PDC vision where among others they state *“We believe how people communicate determines the kind of world in which they live. If they communicate in hostile, polarized, problem-centered way, they make a world of destructive conflict. If they communicate in a collaborative and constructive fashion, they make a world in which problems can be solved creatively, differences can be explored appreciatively, and better futures can be constructed for the entire community”* (<http://publicdialogue.org/?p=38>, retrieved on 3.2.2018).

Peirce and Pearce (2000) argue that people usually focus on not so important issues such as who talks to whom, who is listening, how do they speak and what language do they use. Continuing from this, they suggest taking on communication perspective which is based on the premises that what persons involved in conversation say and do in relation to each other is the material that makes what one can describe a dominating reality such as class, gender, ideology, personalities etc. (p.408). This particular perspective takes a different approach towards communication than the more traditional top-down social theories. Moreover, focusing on the process rather than to desired outcomes or initial conditions. A process where efforts are put on creating conversations where they otherwise would not have existed and shaping these conversations in specific ways (Pearce and Pearce, 2000, p. 408).

In order to illustrate the capabilities of CMM of not being just interpretive but a practical theory as well, we use PDC’s approach to a case named Cupertino Community Project: Voices and Visions. Moreover, this approach can be replicated and adjusted for handling such complex social projects in the Western Balkan’s cities with prominent inter-ethnic population. The table below gives a description of what is usually being used to resolve or analyze different communication issues (Transmission model) and the more complex model of communication (CMM); which support creating new context in which communication process can take place. It opens up new possibilities that were not utilized until now in the inter-ethnic disputes.

<b>Transmission Model</b>	<b>CMM Model</b>
<p><b>Definitions:</b></p> <p>Transmission model explains communication as the mean to exchange information. Effective communication happens when the receiver understands the meaning of that message. It is suggested that communication works best when it is simply objective and neutral.</p>	<p><b>Definitions:</b></p> <p>CMM model relies on social constructivism. Moreover, it empowers participants in the communication process by pointing out that they are the ones who co-construct their own social worlds in that same communication process. Form and Content are equally important because they influence if that conversation helps or hinder relationships, personalities and institutions.</p>
<p><b>How communication works:</b></p> <p>What is being said, what is being meant and what is understood?</p> <p>What is said? What is meant? What is understood?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How clear is the information?</li> <li>• How accurately is it heard?</li> <li>• How completely is it expressed?</li> </ul>	<p><b>How communication works:</b></p> <p>What are we creating and making by what we say and do?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What contexts are created for the other?</li> <li>• What does the language used prefigure?</li> <li>• What form of speech is elicited?</li> <li>• Who is included and who is not?</li> <li>• Who is addressed and who is not?</li> </ul>
<p><b>The work communication does:</b></p> <p>What one gets?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is the uncertainty reduced?</li> <li>• Is the question answered?</li> <li>• Is the issue clarified?</li> <li>• Is the problem resolved?</li> </ul>	<p><b>The work communication does:</b></p> <p>What gets made?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What speech acts? (Insults, compliments)</li> <li>• What relationship? (Trust, respect)</li> <li>• What identities? (Shrill voices, reasonable persons, caring persons)</li> <li>• What cultures/worldviews? (Strong, weak or democracy)</li> </ul>

<p><b>The role of the facilitator:</b></p> <p>To create a context where defects in communication processes will not interfere with other, more important, processes of decision making, coalition forming, deal making, and persuading.</p>	<p><b>The role of the facilitator:</b></p> <p>To shape emerging patterns of communication so that multiple voices and perspectives are honored and the tensions among them are maintained.</p>
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Figure 2.4.3. 1 Two concepts of communication (Pearce and Pearce, 2000, p.413).

According to Pearce and Pearce (2000), PDC approached city manager of Cupertino, California in 1996 and proposed a project which was designed to identify the most pressing issue in their community and incorporate it in a productive form of communication. After certain amount of debates, the city manager and members of the city council agreed to the PDC’s project (p. 406). Before we continue to go into details about this project and how it was developed by using the CMM perspective, it is important to mention that a swift change in ethnic composition of the city was the main issue about which that community was concerned about (Pearce and Pearce, 2000, p.407). This change it is seen by many as a problem in the making which will eventually blow off. Even though there were no confrontations reported yet. According to the authors, the city has tried to increase capacities to deal with interethnic relations in a positive manner. Results of a survey applied by the city showed that majority of the respondents thought that city” is doing enough in to ensure that members of all ethnic groups feel welcome in Cupertino” (p.407).

One of the main ideas of CMM’s approach is to avoid the existing cause-effect communication process and see opportunities that are not used except can be socially created. Related to the Cupertino communication process between city officials and the community members, it was about “creating conversations where they otherwise would not have existed and shaping these conversations in specific ways” (Pearce and Pearce, 2000, p. 408). One might argue that this approach as it is explained by Pearce and Pearce, requests from the researcher to go beyond existing dialectical view on political procedures as supporters vs. opponents which solely depends on taking polls to evaluate the support or the opposition of particular political

decisions. The list continues by including what is known as vote counting, persuasive political speeches, rallying supporters, targeting the uncommitted, and disempowering those who disagreed (Pearce and Pearce, 2000, p.408). Unfortunately, even though these arguments derived from a case study applied in an American city (Cupertino) where interethnic change of the population was the main issue of the project, this also describes the political reality of interethnic relations in the Balkans as well.

Our political reality is filled with dialectical tensions such as described above where you are either a supporter or the enemy of the political cause. It is either you are a patriot or a traitor, someone who uses political speeches to support national cause or someone that wants to “tear” the society’s fabric apart by promoting “toleration.” Consequently, if one dares to disagree with current main political forces in the Western Balkans will immediately face disempowering techniques which include firing from a workplace (not solely reserved for public positions since political parties have “loyal” private enterprises under their control), or threatening your family members to be fired from a workplace. These are only few of steps taken by our political elite to ensure their unthreatened reign in their respective states.

The Cupertino City manager (Brown, in press) asked a following question “How do political leaders deal with an issue that is generating strong community feeling but is not being openly talked about? How do professional managers tackle an issue that cannot be defined and any potential solution involves risks that it could blow up in your face?” (Cited by Pearce and Pearce, 2000, p. 409). In the case of the Western Balkan political situations, those issues were “talked” about only by using extreme rhetoric by all sides, which caused irreparable damages in interethnic relations. When dealing with such complex issues, taking on conventional approach to deal with them is often ineffective. Moreover, Cupertino City manager pointed out that traditional approach of dealing with problems where you establish certain commissions that receive complains and prepare responses; which sometimes take a form of mediation to legal prosecuting of illegal discrimination or hate crimes are not proven to be effective (see Pearce and Pearce, 2000, p. 409). These practices are usually taking place after something happens rather than preventing the problem. They function on the basis of one side is to blame and the

other is the victim. Therefore, there is a need for a different approach in tackling these issues, which is offered by CMM.

During the Cupertino project, practitioners were faces with different situations where amongst others were the unequal distribution of power. Since the purpose was to create a public dialogue process, this however, elucidated another important point of the project. Researchers realized that “Politics and dialogue are not at all the same thing; and politics has to do with the exercise of power, a context in which there are winners and losers-who are powerless. And there is no dialogue between powerful and those without power (Kingston, 1999, p.3 as cited by Pearce and Pearce, 2000, p. 411). There was an attempt to replace the conventional understanding of power as something that people have in different levels and as something that dominate all other types of relationships; with something that is constructed in a process of unfinished interactions. In this case, it is important to observe interactions between those who were labeled as having power and those who do not have it.

## **2.5 Political rhetoric based on ethnocentric myth**

Political speeches have been shaping social realities for thousands of years. Trying to find the roots of the first use of political speeches among people is rather impossible task. One way of elaborating this matter is to look at the Greco-Roman philosophy. It is not a complete representation of political development of human history except merely a starting point of our discussion. One can trace the source of many modern political concepts from Roman time. Their ideas regarding citizenship and constitution are considered to be the basis of the Western political thought (Connolly, 2007).

In this day and age, whoever attempts to study law has to undergo through what is considered to be one of the hardest subjects to master, the Roman law. Political systems were influenced by orators like Cicero, Vergil and the rest to undertake tremendous changes and offer replacements for those systems since medieval times. Connolly approaches to what is known as republican political thought in Rome from a standpoint on treating “notions of civic virtue and collective identity in texts that seek to guide since Plato’s time as rhetoric (2007, p. 1). The author here treats the figure of the orator as someone whose ethos cannot be

distinctive from the ideals of the republican citizenship that might be promoted by orator's rhetoric as well. She does not treat rhetoric in Roman time as just the art of delivering the speech but rather as a reflection of their rich and complex self-reflective view, which helped this particular art survive centuries.

All of us in one way or another are members of a political community and at the same time we are individuals intertwined in our own isolation of sensation, imagination, memory and desire (for more see Connolly, 2007, p. 1-2). Again, the common denominator of the political practice is communication, where no act of communication exists in isolation from ethics (Connolly, 2007, p.3). Furthermore, we will use one particular political figure of the ancient times, Cicero, to give a context on why we argue political speeches are important for the present thesis.

According to Oxford World's Classics, Cicero Political Speeches (translated by D.H. Berry, 2006), Marcus Tullius Cicero is considered to be the greatest orator of the ancient world. Same book offers an amazing and detailed description of this great Orator and his great skills on what is known as "forensic" – the oratory of the forum and judicial oratory; the "deliberative" – oratory of political gatherings; and the third type the "epideictic" – the oratory of praise and blame. All of these types of speeches are considered to be strongly political in their nature. Considering that Cicero wrote extensively and left a great legacy of letters, it enables us to know more about him as a figure and the historical context where political speeches were developed. There was a period where Cicero was not allowed to exercise in free political debates because of Cesar's dictatorial rule. During this time, he attended senate's meetings but without speaking. However, he used this time to write lots of philosophical and rhetorical treatises and teach rhetoric to chosen students (D.H. Berry, 2006, p. 23).

Cicero was murdered on 7<sup>th</sup> December year 43 BC, his head and hands had been displayed on the rostra at Rome on Mark Antony's order. His set of speeches titled Philippic II (an epideictic speech) was aimed to Mark Antony's constant attack against him, especially after Caesar's murder. These sets of 14 speeches are also known as *In Antonium* (against Antonius), which later became known as Philippics because Cicero sent a letter to Brutus, which humorously approved the title. This has to do with the four speeches which Demosthenes, an

Athenian orator wrote against Philip of Macedon between 351 and 240. The purpose of the speeches was to defend the freedom of the state against the ones who are threatening it. However, beside the name derivative, Cicero's speeches do not necessarily have common content.

This speech was written after Antony attacked him in the Senate when Cicero was not present. One day after, Cicero started delivering his speeches now known as Philippics. By the fourth one, he was directing the senate in its war against Antony (for more see D.H. Berry, 2006, p. 229 – 270). Even though Cicero was murdered, and Antony, Octavian and Marcus together declared and formed "second triumvirate" which meant the end of the republic, his speeches against tyrannical injustice are powerful and still resonate in any modern political context where similar struggles are evident.

After the above-mentioned ancient orator's tragic end, we move the discussion to what can be considered our modern times in order to broaden the reasoning behind the importance of analyzing political speeches. Depending on historical contexts, many political figures and otherwise have been classified in two main categories as far as the political speeches go. In the first category of orators belong figures like Cicero, Churchill, Thatcher, Kennedy and thousands of figures, which have made a huge impact on how oratory can change social realities. The second category however is much less popular and is consisted of people like Cesar, Hitler, Mussolini, Franco and more recently Le Pen. These figures are considered demagogues by the standards of political speeches and their intentionality.

Even though this is a generalization that needs to be further analyzed and explained, we can agree that it is a good start while trying to position ourselves in supporting the first category rather than the second one. Sauer (1997, p.99) starts his chapter of analyzing Queen Beatrix speech in front of Israeli's parliament by offering the mentioned categorization and he continues by adding that the problem is the general untruthfulness of rhetoric and particularly of political rhetoric. He continues by adding that often-skillful orators are perceived to be more arrogant because great skills are portrayed during the delivery of the speech, which sometimes leads audience to believe that orator has a hidden agenda. On the other hand, the struggling



orator is usually met with greater sympathy because he or she is seen as someone average and demonstrates something normal.

Needless to say, using this type of evaluations has problems since it is based on rhetorical concept that is not been made explicit. Mentioned elements of arrogant versus the struggling orator are not mutually exclusive and do not support that particular evaluative approach on political speeches. Both types of orators had to follow the concept known as the “art of speaking well in front of an audience” and always focusing on the actual context. We will focus our discussion on the type or rhetoric used in public political context. This leads to us to another type of speeches known as persuasive speech. The art of persuasion is something that orators from both ancient Greek and Rome tried to master to perfection. Let us not forget that in some contexts, like the one if judicial lawsuit or political debate, one side can be considered to win only at the cost of their opponents. We expect from the ideal orator to be highly ethical, by following truthfulness and justice. Moral attribution to the orator is considered to be important especially when they deliver viewpoints that might be so powerful that they can change social realities.

It is important to mention the main distinction between classical rhetoric and modern political communication speech. The prior deals with certain type of intentional speech in front of an audience where orator deals with a particular debatable question. Orator takes a position on it and after the end of the speech audience decides whether orator was successful or not in his persuasion. Nowadays we are dealing with complex communication contexts where orators have to take into account so many factors in order for them to be successful in conveying their political message to their audience. In the case of classical orators, they spoke on their behalf mostly. They build their careers on their personal strength for debating opponents among other things.

Today, our public figures usually represent a larger group of interest with a sole purpose of gaining power within particular audience in local, regional and global scale. Of course, we cannot undermine the power of classical orators when it comes to their power of changing political course of their times. Cicero presents a powerful figure not only in terms of being amazing orator but also an important political figure of his time. As we mentioned here before,

his speeches influenced certain political decision that changed the course of the development in the Roman Empire. Nevertheless, in the present times we do not make decision about an individual or a bigger important matter after someone's deliver a speech in a city square. Today's political systems are complex, and they require detailed processes to be followed in order for important political decisions to be made. Yet, there are few significant exceptional cases where an individual used classical orator's style (they were mostly demagogues of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) to actually cause a revolution or a sudden change of political development by delivering a powerful emotional speech in city squares or elsewhere. One of the biggest demagogues of South East Europe was without a doubt Slobodan Milosevic whose decision involving political oppression followed by wars and ethnic cleansing were only matched by Mussolini, Franco and other fascists of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

There is a certain category of highly emotional speeches that sometimes authors classify as not reliable in sense of being uttered in a non-balanced state of mind. These speeches are known as "excitable" speech acts which according to Butler they, especially the legal context, cannot be used in courts because they are not the real reflection of the person's conscious communication. Since they are uttered in a high state of emotional and excitable moment, one cannot take them as proper speech acts that can have consequences (1997, p.15).

Chapter

# Methodology



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## CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

### 3.1 METHODOLOGY

The present thesis will employ qualitative and quantitative research methods in order to get a better understanding of inter-ethnic issues in the Western Balkans. This section is separated in two different set of data analysis:

- Artifacts like a political speech based on historical myth will be analyzed through qualitative content-based methodology, grounded theory (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002) and rhetorical criticism (Hart and Daughton, 2005).
- Whereas in order to measure Political Tolerance we will use quantitative data from the European Value Study (2015), a longitudinal data file from 1981 to 2008 (GESIS Data Archive, Cologne). It is important to mention that this is one of the most wide-ranging researches on people's values in Europe. It concerns with opinions about family, work, religion, politics and society in general.

When undergoing research in political sciences one should not be prone to finding the so called "pure" methodological tools in this field primarily because no such tools exists in the first place. In political sciences the focus falls on the substance rather than in its specific set of research tools used in the process of research. Authors like Beck argues that methodological choices are usually defined by the political questions one tries to answer, and thus researchers use whatever methodological solutions available; and borrowing from "econometrics, psychometrics, sociology, and statistics" is suitable especially since the trend is to rely on your own research experience (2000, p. 651). At the same time, author points out that political scientists should treat the problem of the missing data very seriously since it might lead to "incorrect inferences in important substantive arenas" and as such make practices used by political scientist wrongful (Beck, 2000, p. 652-653). Precisely while trying to avoid this conundrum, the present thesis uses statistical data from GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences that collect survey results since 1986 when there were three legally independent

institutes, which merged in 2007 into one infrastructure (for more: <https://www.gesis.org/en/home/institute/>).

### 3.2 The Speech

We maintain that one of the most powerful and important speeches that had an irreversible effect in creating new political and social reality in the Western Balkans is the Slobodan Milosevic's speech in Gazimestan (Kosovo) on the 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1989 in front of a million people. However, it is important to acknowledge that this speech alone started the war but instead offer an analysis on how powerful political speeches can and did change lives of millions of people; by fueling rhetoric supporting ethnic supremacy of one nation over all the rest of ex. Yugoslavian nations. Below you will find the transcript of the whole speech with a continuation of analysis from rhetorical criticism perspective on myths.

#### **Slobodan Milosevic's speech transcript:**

*"By the force of social circumstances this great 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo is taking place in a year in which Serbia, after many years, after many decades, has regained its state, national, and spiritual integrity. Therefore, it is not difficult for us to answer today the old question: how are we going to face Milos [Milos Obilic, legendary hero of the Battle of Kosovo]. Through the play of history and life, it seems as if Serbia has, precisely in this year, in 1989, regained its state and its dignity and thus has celebrated an event of the distant past which has a great historical and symbolic significance for its future.*

#### *Serbian Character -- Liberational*

*Today, it is difficult to say what is the historical truth about the Battle of Kosovo and what is legend. Today this is no longer important. Oppressed by pain and filled with hope, the people used to remember and to forget, as, after all, all people in the world do, and it was ashamed of treachery and glorified heroism. Therefore, it is difficult to say today whether the Battle of*

*Kosovo was a defeat or a victory for the Serbian people, whether thanks to it we fell into slavery or we survived in this slavery. The answers to those questions will be constantly sought by science and the people. What has been certain through all the centuries until our time today is that disharmony struck Kosovo 600 years ago. If we lost the battle, then this was not only the result of social superiority and the armed advantage of the Ottoman Empire but also of the tragic disunity in the leadership of the Serbian state at that time. In that distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire was not only stronger than that of the Serbs, but it was also more fortunate than the Serbian kingdom.*

*The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history. Even in the last war, this lack of unity and betrayal led the Serbian people and Serbia into agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral sense exceeded fascist aggression.*

*Even later, when a socialist Yugoslavia was set up, in this new state the Serbian leadership remained divided, prone to compromise to the detriment of its own people. The concessions that many Serbian leaders made at the expense of their people could not be accepted historically and ethically by any nation in the world, especially because the Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others.*

*Their national and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of history and through two world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and when they could they also helped others to liberate themselves. The fact that in this region they are a major nation is not a Serbian sin or shame; this is an advantage which they have not used against others, but I must say that here, in this big, legendary field of Kosovo, the Serbs have not used the advantage of being great for their own benefit either.*

*Thanks to their leaders and politicians and their vassal mentality they felt guilty before themselves and others. This situation lasted for decades, it lasted for years and here we are now at the field of Kosovo to say that this is no longer the case.*

### *Unity Will Make Prosperity Possible*

*Disunity among Serb officials made Serbia lag behind and their inferiority humiliated Serbia.*

*Therefore, no place in Serbia is better suited for saying this than the field of Kosovo and no place in Serbia is better suited than the field of Kosovo for saying that unity in Serbia will bring prosperity to the Serbian people in Serbia and each one of its citizens, irrespective of his national or religious affiliation.*

*Serbia of today is united and equal to other republics and prepared to do everything to improve its financial and social position and that of all its citizens. If there is unity, cooperation, and seriousness, it will succeed in doing so. This is why the optimism that is now present in Serbia to a considerable extent regarding the future days is realistic, also because it is based on freedom, which makes it possible for all people to express their positive, creative and humane abilities aimed at furthering social and personal life.*

*Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. National composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together more and more frequently and more and more successfully.*

*Socialism in particular, being a progressive and just democratic society, should not allow people to be divided in the national and religious respect. The only differences one can and should allow in socialism are between hard working people and idlers and between honest people and dishonest people. Therefore, all people in Serbia who live from their own work, honestly, respecting other people and other nations, are in their own republic.*

### *Dramatic National Divisions*

*After all, our entire country should be set up on the basis of such principles. Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can survive only under the conditions of full equality for all*

*nations that live in it.*

*The crisis that hit Yugoslavia has brought about national divisions, but also social, cultural, religious and many other less important ones. Among all these divisions, nationalist ones have shown themselves to be the most dramatic. Resolving them will make it easier to remove other divisions and mitigate the consequences they have created.*

*For as long as multinational communities have existed, their weak point has always been the relations between different nations. The threat is that the question of one nation being endangered by the others can be posed one day -- and this can then start a wave of suspicions, accusations, and intolerance, a wave that invariably grows and is difficult to stop. This threat has been hanging like a sword over our heads all the time. Internal and external enemies of multi-national communities are aware of this and therefore they organize their activity against multinational societies mostly by fomenting national conflicts.*

*At this moment, we in Yugoslavia are behaving as if we have never had such an experience and as if in our recent and distant past we have never experienced the worst tragedy of national conflicts that a society can experience and still survive.*

*Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its economic and social prosperity. In this respect Yugoslavia does not stand out from the social milieu of the contemporary, particularly the developed, world. This world is more and more marked by national tolerance, national cooperation, and even national equality. The modern economic and technological, as well as political and cultural development, has guided various peoples toward each other, has made them interdependent and increasingly has made them equal as well.*

*Equal and united people can above all become a part of the civilization toward which mankind is moving. If we cannot be at the head of the column leading to such a civilization, there is certainly no need for us to be at its tail.*

*At the time when this famous historical battle was fought in Kosovo, the people were looking at*



*the stars, expecting aid from them. Now, 6 centuries later, they are looking at the stars again, waiting to conquer them. On the first occasion, they could allow themselves to be disunited and to have hatred and treason because they lived in smaller, weakly interlinked worlds. Now, as people on this planet, they cannot conquer even their own planet if they are not united, let alone other planets, unless they live in mutual harmony and solidarity.*

*Therefore, words devoted to unity, solidarity, and cooperation among people have no greater significance anywhere on the soil of our motherland than they have here in the field of Kosovo, which is a symbol of disunity and treason.*

*In the memory of the Serbian people, this disunity was decisive in causing the loss of the battle and in bringing about the fate which Serbia suffered for a full 6 centuries.*

*Even if it were not so, from a historical point of view, it remains certain that the people regarded disunity as its greatest disaster. Therefore it is the obligation of the people to remove disunity, so that they may protect themselves from defeats, failures, and stagnation in the future.*

#### *Unity brings Back Dignity*

*This year, the Serbian people became aware of the necessity of their mutual harmony as the indispensable condition for their present life and further development.*

*I am convinced that this awareness of harmony and unity will make it possible for Serbia not only to function as a state but to function as a successful state. Therefore I think that it makes sense to say this here in Kosovo, where that disunity once upon a time tragically pushed back Serbia for centuries and endangered it, and where renewed unity may advance it and may return dignity to it. Such an awareness about mutual relations constitutes an elementary necessity for Yugoslavia, too, for its fate is in the joined hands of all its peoples. The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our creativity for 6 centuries, and has been feeding our pride and does not allow us to forget that at one time we were an army great, brave, and proud, one of the few that remained undefeated when losing.*

*Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without resolve, bravery, and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle now concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people will live in the 21st century. For this battle, we certainly need heroism, of course of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which nothing serious and great can be achieved remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary.*

*Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and European society in general. Therefore today it appears not only unjust but even unhistorical and completely absurd to talk about Serbia's belonging to Europe. Serbia has been a part of Europe incessantly, now just as much as it was in the past, of course, in its own way, but in a way that in the historical sense never deprived it of dignity. In this spirit we now endeavor to build a society, rich and democratic, and thus to contribute to the prosperity of this beautiful country, this unjustly suffering country, but also to contribute to the efforts of all the progressive people of our age that they make for a better and happier world.*

*Let the memory of Kosovo heroism live forever!*

*Long live Serbia!*

*Long live Yugoslavia!*

*Long live peace and brotherhood among peoples!"*

*Speech by Slobodan Milosevic, delivered to 1 million people at the central celebration marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, held at Gazimestan on 28 June, 1989. Compiled by the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce of the U.S. <http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/spch-kosovo1989.htm>, accessed on 6<sup>th</sup> of September 2017).*

### 3.2.1. Power of myth

Prior to essentially analyzing the above-mentioned speech through the lens of rhetorical criticism, it is important to offer a descriptive standpoint on the power of the myth. This will be followed by analysis of political narrative that derives from the Milosevic's speech in Gazimestan in 1989; which in return offers a glimpse of the social trends developed by political actors that had tremendous consequences on around 22 million people living in then what was known as Yugoslavia (Szayna, T. S. 2000). There is a significant body of research supporting the claim about "myth" centered discourse having an effect on political practice by adding to the political rhetoric language of power, shaping the legitimacy of political systems, and motivating people to act. Political myth is crucial to the study of legitimization in political discourse. Authors like Esch describe myths like the one of *"American Exceptionalism and Civilization vs. Barbarism"* to explain how policy changes such as the ones pushed by the "War on Terror" were used by Bush Administration (2010, p. 386). According to Esch, there is a complex approach toward political myths that goes beyond conditions which is believed are dismaying critical discussion on them rather than the one trying to understand if the myth is itself "good" or "bad." Author continues to argue that the power to create and establish a "new version" of reality underlines different forms of political, economic or even coercive powers; and it is important part of legitimization in political discourse (2010, p.386).

Myth is seen as a place where means of interpretation in a given society are understood; and political myth is a "process of constructing significance-it is not propaganda" (Esch, 2010). As we will see further in this chapter, myths are indeed used to create new social realities and through them new policies are being constructed all the time. Through this process of legitimization through myths and political constructs, policies of "War on Terror" were made possible. The more timeless dialectics of "Good vs. Evil" and "Civilization vs. Barbarism" made possible for the newly constructed political myths.

Cattini's work on myths and symbols in the political culture of Catalan nationalism from 1880 to 1914 provides a good ground to understand the importance of myths and symbols in creation of political movements (2015). Author claims that the rise of "national question" is

related with myths and symbols in contemporary societies especially with the collapse of the socialist states around the globe (2015). In the case of the collapse of Yugoslavia, then a socialist-communist country, there was re-emergence of nationalist parties using hardline political rhetoric toward different nationalities. In the late nineteenth century, the evolution of the Catalan politics went along with nationalization of the cultural elements from the historical perspective by creating symbols, holidays and elements of identity.

Beside other symbols, the flag with four vertical red bars on a yellow field was one of the most important Catalan symbols dating from around the twelve centuries (Cattini, 2015, p. 448). At the same time, Cattini explains how Spain's flag came into being much later (lots of changes from 1785, 1812 and 1908) which relatively correspondent with the changes in national flags of UK (1801, France (1789, and the change in 1794); also flags that are currently used by Basque and Galician nationalism are of recent creations (for more see Cattini, 2015, p.449). In addition, Cattini gives a rich array of explanations of myths and legends on how the Catalan flag came into being, even the ones dating from Roman Empire (2015).

Even though Catalan flag and its symbolism are largely important for the Catalan identity, there are other cultural factors such as folkloric elements of dances, music and clothing helped in enriching national identity. All this culminated with the First World War where Catalan Nationalist movement achieved an early form of self-government in 1914 with the Mancomunitat of Catalonia and depicted the above-mentioned national symbols and elements (Cattini, 2015, p. 457). Similar development of the national myths and symbols happened throughout Europe. Points made by Esch (2010) and Cattini (2015) are important because among other things they prove that political myths are complex and can have different effect on the overall social reality of a community, region, state or even global developments. This is true especially about the discussed myths of "Good vs. Evil" and "War on Terror" and policies made based on those myths which is still having an effect on how we view safety and terrorism in our days.

It seems like myths and especially political myths are powerful tools that can be both used to improve existing political systems or initiate conflict and divide among nations. Nevertheless, current thesis will not dive into analysis of nationalism and identity but rather on

the relationship between political myths, inter-ethnic relations and simulation of toleration through Coordinated Management of Meaning as a concept to better manage current inter-ethnic relations in the Western Balkans.

Political myths were largely used by political organizations and individuals in the late 80' in then what was known as Yugoslavia. The more historically relevant myths of battle were seen as a good basis for more contemporary myths of nationalism and ethnically based policies. One should keep in mind that all sides, not just by legitimate leaders, use this development of political myths. On the contrary, all illegal and terrorist organizations have developed complex web of rhetorical messaging through constant use of myths.

### **3.2.2. Analysis of myth through rhetorical criticism**

The relationship between rhetoric and situation/context is an important aspect of political speeches that has been researched by many authors. Moreover, Hart and Daughton's (2005) clarification of the rhetoric and situation/context focuses on it as the act of speaking in the first place. Hart and Daughton (2005, p. 37) start their "analyzing situations" chapter with a speech made by Rabi Joachim Prinz in 1963. This speech took place in Washington D.C, at the Lincoln Memorial, with around 200,000 civil right marchers. One of the ways to go upon analyzing the this speech was to ask question like "what does message/situation tell us?" In other words, they ask questions about message (rhetoric speech-act product) and situation (the particular time and place, circumstances, intention, purpose etc). The conclusion about the rhetoric and situation/context offered by Hart and Daughton (p. 53) elucidates that the choice to communicate can be a significant type of social action and that a variety of elements of rhetorical situation often become imprinted upon the message. In other words, they did support the correlation between rhetoric and situation and gave a rather balanced view in their description of whether situation is creating rhetoric or vice versa.

While being immersed in political rhetorical criticism one might get the impression that every message is created in particular time and space with specific intention, while this standpoint is not wrong there are other factors to keep in mind. The above-mentioned

impression was upgraded slightly after looking at the Bitzer's explanation of the relationship between rhetoric and situation/context. Lloyd F. Bitzer (1968, p. 1) explained that by asking question like "what is rhetorical situation?" things like the nature of those contexts in which speakers or writers create rhetoric discourse are implied. Furthermore, he argues that situations are not always accompanied by discourse (Bitzer, p. 2). Therefore, assuming that rhetorical address gives existence to the situation is wrong; it is the situation that gives existence to the discourse.

According to Bitzer (p. 3), rhetorical discourse does obtain its character as rhetorical, from the situation that generates it. On the other hand, Richard E. Vatz seems to share different view regarding Bitzer's explanation of the situational characteristics (p. 154). Therefore, Vatz claims that Bitzer's statements about rhetorical discourse being into existence by situation, or that rhetoric is situational, are producing unfortunate implications for the rhetoric (p. 154). Vatz offers his view on the relation between the rhetoric and situation/context, by explaining situation as something discrete and discernible (p. 155). Furthermore, he clarifies his standpoint toward situation by describing it as something that has a life on its own, independently in meaning of those upon whom they impose (Vatz, p. 155).

Consequently, we have to pose the following question, if somebody views meaning as intrinsic to situations, rhetorical study becomes parasitic to other fields of study as philosophy, political science or other discipline that inform us as to what "real" situation is (p. 158). For the most part of the present thesis, we try to promote social constructivism as a foundation of our main theoretical approaches toward the topic being CMM and Political Toleration. Vatz's explanation of the relation between rhetoric and situation is clearer because of the statement that "situations are rhetorical" therefore, as he says, "when George Aiken suggested that the USA should declare victory from Vietnam War and get out, it was declaration of rhetorical determination of meaning" (p. 159). However, this was a result of rhetoric's surroundings and not from "situation" in Vietnam because no one understood the "situation" there (p. 159).

Based on importance to the discipline, insight to the rhetorical process and breadth of the methods, we argue that Political Sciences would mostly benefit from three important rhetorical criticism theories: Cultural criticism, Generic criticism and Ideological criticism. We

believe that previous mentioned theories with their particular methods are with great significant social importance because of the possibilities that they offer and the applicability of the results that derives from applying those methods. In general, culture has many features that characterize some of the most important elements of human life. Therefore, according to Hart and Daughton (2005, p. 236), three features of culture are most important ones to study: One of the cultural features is value. Hart and Daughton (2005, p.236) describe values as something that is “deep-seated, persistent beliefs about essential right and wrongs that express a person’s basic orientation to life.”

Furthermore, another important feature of culture are Myths, which according to Hart and Daughton (2005, p.236) are “master stories describing exceptional people doing exceptional things and serving as moral guides to proper action.”

Finally the last culture feature of culture is Fantasy theme, in other words, “abbreviated myths providing concrete manifestation of current values and hinting at some idealized vision of future” (Hart and Daughton, 2005, p. 236). In very short explanation of cultures features and importance to the field of rhetoric criticism, we can realize that there is no part of human life that has not been affected by culture one way or another.

Every researcher who uses the above-mentioned three features of the culture to create persuasive messages has different rhetorical goal and different style, and no one knows whether they will succeed in their goals. Therefore, Hard and Daughton argue that cultural criticism helps with the guessing because we do not know what will happen to the rhetoric messages or artifacts created by people who use these cultural features in fulfilling their rhetorical goals. (2005, p. 257). Yet, when particular rhetorical artifacts like political speech, as it is one of the main analysis of the present thesis, is carefully delivered then we face the consequences of the newly created social environment with different set of cultural values being shaped.

Generic criticism is second most important rhetoric criticism method because of the effect over the everyday modern lifestyle. By creating different types of various rhetorical artifacts that would alter the future production of the same artifacts, the need for generic criticism is obvious in order to send the critical voice to the genre producers. According to Foss

(1989, p.225), generic criticism is embedded in the assumption that certain types of situations provoke similar needs and expectations among audiences and thus call for particular kinds of rhetoric. On the other hand, Chandler offers very explicit limitation of genre classification process. Furthermore, Chandler (1997, p. 1), explained how the “classification and hierarchical taxonomy of genres is not a neutral and ‘objective’ procedure.” This limitation explains lack of objectivity about the process of classification about where specific rhetoric text belongs. According to Hart and Daughton (2005, p. 121) research on genre recommends several approaches to the critic for variety of reasons: a) generic study exposes cultural tastes, b) generic study explains rhetorical power, c) generic study reveals psychological style, d) generic study uncover latest trends and e) generic study provides evaluative standards. These approaches give enough information about the breadth, importance to discipline and insight to rhetorical process.

Lastly, Hart and Daughton provided us with simple but important explanation of the third method, which is ideological one. They claim “ideological critic sense a certain, systematic unfairness in the world, therefore, they see rhetoric as a tool for turning such unfairness into social routines and thenceforth into public policy” (Hart and Daughton, p. 2005, 333). We argue that this particular method, the ideological aspect of the rhetorical artefact, is the most common one used in political speeches. In the Western Balkan the underpinning of the view that “there is a systematic unfairness in the world” which is “usually aimed” at their own nation (ethnicity) practically appears to be a default framework for the politicians. And this is not only used in their political speeches but also as an outline when creating state level policies.

We maintain that ideological critics, even though often not supported by classical school of critic, are doing a significant job in identifying particular rhetorical artifacts and criticizing (analyzing) them in order to understand their intentions in the first place. There are three types of ideological criticism that are discussed by Hart and Daughton (2005): the first one is deconstructionist critique (intensely skeptical of all claims to truth). The second one is Marxist critique (the ruling classes use rhetoric to justify their exalted positions, rationalize the meager existence of the subjugated, and inhibit insurrection), and Postcolonial critique (postcolonial critics practice resistance to Western ideals, emphasizing the ways in which established forms



of thought and action have colonized peoples' mind long after their bodies were ostensibly freed).

Even though Hart and Daughton (2005, p. 32) claim that no message is inherently worth to study, there are some standards that help evaluate those messages. If rhetorical message meets the moral, psychological and artistic standards, then we can assume that the message is worth of studying. When we talk about moral standard of specific rhetoric message we have to keep in mind if that message can advance the "good" and encourage public virtue. Consequently, the following question should be asked "did the rhetor provide sufficient moral instruction to move the audience toward worthy, not just convenient goals?" (Hart and Daughton, 2005, p. 34).

Psychological standard asks question about the messages effect in purging the emotions of the rhetor, or did it help decrease a fear and if people were motivated by the message that social energy and personal commitments were renewed. Artistic standard on the other hand, deals with the language usage or other symbol exceptional. Did the artifact meet the highest standards of beauty and formation, and did the message stimulate the imagination that it brought new ideas to life?" (Hart and Daughton, 2005, p. 34). While these standards are used in message evaluation, we argue that same standards can be used before deciding to analyze one rhetorical message.

Hart and Daughton argue that rhetorical criticism documents social trends (2005). Furthermore, they point out the importance of the critic being in the middle of the whole events but at the same time to be able to stay apart in order to have more objective viewpoints. A good critic, according to them is the one who "*magnifies without distorting, focusing upon rhetorical characteristics that, while humble, may nevertheless be important*" (Hard and Daughton, 2005, p. 23). Furthermore, rhetorical criticism provides understanding through the use of case study method as part of the research methodology. Focusing on the small number of "textual artifacts" in our case will enable the critic to restrict the range of other available artifacts, insights and analysis.

In order to make sure that the case study is carefully chosen, it must have a certain power to provoke and have intriguing conclusion. Hart and Daughton offer the example of an

“anthropologist who finds in the smallest ritual a complete depiction of tribal history and culture” to elucidate the critics actions. Even the smallest and not significant artifacts can be important and explain a whole social phenomenon (2005, p. 25). One can argue that on the daily basis we are overexposed to rhetorical messages like commercials on TV and smartphones, emails, magazines etc. Every day we try to choose what message concerns us, and they are getting more complicated by the time.

The reason behind the decision to employ rhetorical criticism and CMM on analyzing one particular political speech is based on the premises that rhetorical criticism “invites radical confrontation with others and their cultures” (Hart and Daughton, 2005, p. 27). Indeed, as the authors also pointed out, this claim has a dramatic sound to it. Yet this is important for it is required by the critic to get outside oneself comfort zone. A mix of stereotypes and ethnocentric viewpoints help reinforce negative portraits of something that we do not know. Something along “their beliefs are destructive and ours are peaceful,” or believing that your own set of values are enlightened and theirs are bizarre. Before getting the feeling that we are discussing a moral injunction in terms of (criticize others as you would have them criticize you), authors are talking about an intellectual injunction where one cannot understand others unless one appreciates how they reason and behave (2005, p.27).

Following the discussion on using rhetorical criticism in order to better understand particular cultural phenomenon leads us to the myths that were often used by political parties and other institutions throughout Western Balkans. Certain myths had such a strong influence on the general population such as Milosevic’s use of a medieval battle to lay the basis of his nationalistic movement that is largely believed to have cause all the wars in the Western Balkan. Many authors agree on the influence that myths have over national values.

Hart and Daughton defined myths as “**Master Stories** – describing exceptional people doing exceptional things.” (2005, p. 242). This correlates with the first paragraph of the Milosevic speech where he talks about Milos Obilic, a legendary hero of the Battle of Kosovo. Also, he asks a question “how we are going to face Milos” which can be understood as we are not worthy of our heroes and we should try much harder in order to make them proud.

However, the part where authors argue that these stories serve as moral *guides to proper actions* elucidates events where individuals and sometimes-larger part of a society excuses themselves from real consequences on basing their actions on myths. Milosevic speech sets the moral ground and action in the very beginning where he puts “Through the play of history and life...Serbia, precisely this year, in 1989, regained its state and dignity,” and thus makes his political moves legitimate where he pushes for Serbia to take the “rightful” leadership of ex-Yugoslavia.

It is important to mention that not all myths are used to influence ethnic cleansing or start a war. Some stories deriving from myths such as **Cosmological stories**, they as the question of why we are here, where we come from and similar. On the other hand, **societal myths** are focused on teaching the proper way to live. They take historical figures and describe them as honest, kind, brave and altruist. These myths can be evaluated by the power of evocative potential by presenting a “Truth” of an event not necessarily filled with all the facts surrounding that event. In relation with societal myths, the second paragraph of Milosevic’s speech deals with it in a very careful way.

What is more, in a way he admits the limitation of societal myth by stating the following: *“It is difficult to say today whether the Battle of Kosovo was a defeat or a victory for the Serbian people, whether thanks to it we fell into slavery or we survived in this slavery.”* However, at the same time, he supports his main claim that not only superiority of numbers and overall military power of Ottoman Empire was the winning factor, by adding that the lack of unity in the leadership of Serbian state at that time was actually the crucial reason why the war was lost. So he calls for his audience to not repeat the same mistake from 600 years ago where Serbs were not united. At this point, the crowd was already excited and carefully listening to the messages articulated by Milosevic.

**Identity myths** are the ones that describe what makes one cultural group different from others. We can consider stories like “USA is peacekeeper of the world” vs. “Russia committed to world conquest” or “Japan, fiercely dedicated” but somewhat fanatical etc. In relation with the speech, here Milosevic is carefully crafting the identity of a victim. He does this by claiming how disunity among Serbs was the main reason behind their agony and lack of success. From

battle of Kosovo in 1389, he jumps to the Second World War and finally to the socialist Yugoslavia by mentioning how only Serbs suffered great deal of unfairness even though they were the biggest nation within Yugoslavia. The notion of the victim saying “enough is enough” he justifies actions that will prove to be terrible for the region. Towards the end of the speech, he carefully includes a sentence that his audience was long waiting for.

Even though one might think that the overall purpose of the speech is to emphasize lesson learned from disunity in the past and focusing on economic and political prosperity for the future. The sentence where he states “*Six centuries later, now we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet,*” is the one that should be seen as critical messaging because it lives open the possibility of a war. Well, there was not just one but several wars only a couple of years after this speech were held in front of around one million people in Kosovo.

Finally, **Eschatological** are myths, which help people project their futures, like the short-term (full employment) or a long-term future (heavenly rewarded) and similar (Hart and Daughton, 2005, p.243). The last paragraph of Milosevic’s speech depicts eschatological elements by claiming that Serbia was always part of Europe and will support building a rich, democratic and prosperous society.

Overall, a significant portion of political rhetoric is dependent on myths in order to achieve its effect. From a political perspective, when a minister delivers news that the private sector employees are entitled to the same number of days for the holiday leave, the private sector will jump from joy. There is a strong believe in the Western Balkans that public sector have it way easier than the “unpredictable” private sector who always looks for ways not to apply the labor law. Alike, if one cannot understand ethnic jokes without being familiar with the supposed story behind those particular jokes.

After the discussion on why rhetorical criticism matters and why there are several types of myths, a question arises on why to we use myths at all? We will provide Hart and Daughton’s explanation on this question by offering following arguments:

- Myths “*provide a heightened sense of authority,*” here the rhetors (in our case political figures) expect from the audience to take myths very seriously. Stories

based on myths are used to stir change rather than merely to add to the body of discussion. Authors like Mc'Donald (1969, as cited by Hart and Daughton, 2005, p. 243), claim that *"without myths there is no authority and without authority there is no politics,"* which resonates with the main purpose of why Western Balkan's political figures decided to employ powerful historical myths in order to establish an authoritative change in social movements. This is especially true for Slobodan Milosevic who continuously used myths in order to create a broader sense of an authority that is almost impossible to question precisely because it was "supported" by myths.

- In addition, myths also provide a sense of continuity. Their use of time references can be quite flexible and sometimes include thousands or more people in order to create a pattern which explains some events. Many cultures have stories related to death and rebirth in order to give the sense of continuity and make connections between ancestors and descendants. This is best shown through Milosevic's speech where he says: *"In the memory of the Serbian people, this disunity was decisive in causing the loss of the battle and bringing about the fate of which Serbia suffered for a full 6 centuries."* Here we have a six-century timeline that is used to prove one message that of how destructive is the price of disunity among Serbs.
- Myths also prove a sense of coherence by not only reaching across time but also across intellectual space by molding complete stories out of pieces of ideas. To illustrate this authors used how Adolph Hitler created a Nazi wholecloth by using bits a pieces from British nationalism, Marxist imagery, Roman Catholic pageantry, and Freemason eschatology (Bosmajian, 1974, cited by Hart and Daughton, 2005, p.243). Unfortunately, this type of "pick and choose" attitude regarding pieces of historical events mixed with nationalistic values was used largely by political figures in the Western Balkans. From the actual speech that is part of this analysis, we argue that the way the myth is used actually supports the argument of having a sense of intellectual

coherence. This is done by carefully admitting that the actual battle of Kosovo in 1389 might have been lost but lessons learned from it are far more important than what actually happened historically.

- Myths provide a heightened sense of community because it is when people respect, praise and revere same heroes the same time in history. Even though this might sound as a generalization, it is easily confirmed.
- Myths provide sense of choice when people rarely are willing to change their values and behaviors unless a choice is forced upon them. Here myths come into play by offering rather dialectical options like the one with Good vs. Evil.

### 3.3 European Value System Study Group

The European Value System Study Group (EVSSG) started this tremendous endeavor in the late 1970s consisted of established social and political scientist in search for reliable data creation and processing. The EVS foundation continues this work and from 1981 to 2008 four waves of survey were conducted in Europe and other countries. Nevertheless, we focus only on the fourth wave data. These data are from 2008 and only Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia are included in our study and *“all EVS data and documentation is openly accessible and available for free of charge through EVS and GESIS websites ([www.gesis.org](http://www.gesis.org)).”* The fourth wave included 47 European countries and focused on a large range of values, a representative of multi-stage or stratified random samples of the adult population were drawn for each country; interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2010 (Gesis, Leibniz Institute for the Social Services) on the topics of Employment, Cultural and national identity, religion and values, social conditions and indicators, social behaviors and attitudes, mass political behavior, attitudes and opinions, and family and marriage. Codebook together with the complete set of survey questions will be added in the appendix of the present PhD thesis.

Data analysis were analyzed using SPSS by offering frequencies for the following variables, VARIABLES=v46, v47, v48, v49, v50, v53, v54, v55, v56, v57, v58, v60. These variables answered questions regarding one’s preferences for their neighbors depending on their

political views, religion etc. Example: don't like as neighbors: people of different race, left wing extremists, right wing extremists, Muslims, Jews, Christians, etc. The second part of the frequencies were from variables, VARIABLES=v266 v268 v269 v270 v271 v272 v273 v274 v275. This set of variables was related to people's views on immigrants. Example: receiving people from less developed countries for work, whether immigrants are taking over jobs, immigrants increasing crime problems, undermining country's cultural life etc. Same set of variables was taken from the pool of data for Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia. Below are results of the European Value Study that were retrieved from the SPSS data set that is allowed for the use of PhD research.

This combination of descriptive political rhetoric analysis and descriptive quantitative method suits the present attempt to create a bridge between political toleration and applied communication theory (CMM). Moreover, descriptive research is focused on making detailed observations and documentation of the phenomenon of interest. In our case, this is the part of quantitative secondary data that are carefully selected and filtered to give us results that are related to our hypothesis. In combination with explanatory research, which seeks to explain observed phenomena, we will get more complete discussion part of the research and hence more reliable results of the same discussion. Here we will try to "connect the dots" between quantitative results about toleration and results gathered from analyzing cultural artifacts and political speeches (Bhattacharjee, 2012, p.6).

### **3.3.1 Results from Kosovo survey:**

As it is previously mentioned, only certain questions and variables will be used to illustrate political toleration hypothesis. Full tables of frequencies will be available in the appendix, while only the ones used in the analysis and discussion part will be described below.

There are two main themes of the analyzed variables offered in this thesis. First theme has to do with diversity in the sense of having a neighbor that has certain political beliefs, certain lifestyle and race and respondent's view on those types of neighbors. The second theme is dealing with people's attitudes toward immigrants.

While analyzing variables related to the likability of different type of neighbors, we can see a pattern where people tend to dislike other people with criminal record, rather than when neighbors are of a different religion or prefer certain political ideology. Here we have 69% of them mentioned that they do not like people with criminal records as their neighbors, while 31% do not mention having a problem with having people with criminal record as a neighbor. Here clearly, the majority of people have an issue with someone with a criminal record living in a close proximity to them.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	1067	66.6	68.8	68.8
	not mentioned	483	30.2	31.2	100.0
	Total	1550	96.8	100.0	
Missing	na	25	1.6		
	dk	26	1.6		
	Total	51	3.2		
	Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 1 Don't like as neighbors: people with criminal record (Q6A)

Nevertheless, when asking questions on neighbors belonging to a different race, the results show that majority of people do not have an issue if neighbors belong to a different race. From the total of answered surveys, 29.2% of the people mentioned not liking having a people of different race as a neighbor, while 70,8% did not mention not liking people of different race as their neighbor.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	429	26.8	29.2	29.2
	not mentioned	1041	65.0	70.8	100.0
	Total	1470	91.8	100.0	
Missing	na	79	4.9		
	dk	52	3.2		
	Total	131	8.2		
	Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 2 Don't like as neighbors: people of different race (Q6B)



Even though anything that contain the phrase “extremism” in it is considered to be not generally socially acceptable, below we have results which show that majority of people do not have an issue with having left wing, or right wing extremists as neighbors. While 17.9% of people mentioned that they don’t like left wing extremists as their neighbors, the majority or 82.1% of the did not mentioned not liking left wing extremists as their neighbors. Almost identical results we have when asking the question regarding the opposite spectrum of political ideology. From the total of answered surveys, majority of people, 83%, did not mention not liking right wing extremists as their neighbors, while only 17.3% of them mentioned that they don’t like right wing extremists as their neighbors. This illustrate a surprisingly high level of political tolerance toward extreme political ideologies and likelihood of people sharing the neighborhood with people belonging to left or right wing extremist political ideology.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	260	16.2	17.9	17.9
Valid not mentioned	1195	74.6	82.1	100.0
Total	1455	90.9	100.0	
Missing na	84	5.2		
Missing dk	62	3.9		
Missing Total	146	9.1		
Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 3 Don’t like as neighbors: left wing extremists (Q6C)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	251	15.7	17.3	17.3
Valid not mentioned	1199	74.9	82.7	100.0
Total	1450	90.6	100.0	
Missing na	88	5.5		
Missing dk	63	3.9		
Missing Total	151	9.4		
Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 4 Don’t like as neighbors: right wing extremists (Q6E)

Similar trend goes for the questions about neighbors' religiosity. Only 19.6% mentioned not liking Muslims for neighbors, while 80.4% did not mentioned not liking Muslims as neighbors. Only 15.5% mentioned not liking Christians as their neighbors while 84.5% answered did not mentioned not liking Christians as their neighbors. Only when questions had to do with Jews, the percentage was slightly higher than for Muslims or Christians, but nonetheless not significantly different. Moreover, 22.5% mentioned not liking Jews as their neighbors, and 77.5% did not mention not liking Jews for their neighbors. From this we can conclude that the overall toleration towards religion is high with the slightly expressed lack of toleration for the Jewish community.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	297	18.6	19.6	19.6
	not mentioned	1219	76.1	80.4	100.0
	Total	1516	94.7	100.0	
Missing	na	71	4.4		
	dk	14	.9		
	Total	85	5.3		
	Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 5 Don't like as neighbors: Muslims (Q6H)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	232	14.5	15.5	15.5
	not mentioned	1260	78.7	84.5	100.0
	Total	1492	93.2	100.0	
Missing	na	82	5.1		
	dk	27	1.7		
	Total	109	6.8		
	Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 6 Don't like as neighbors: Christians (Q6O)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	337	21.0	22.5	22.5
	not mentioned	1159	72.4	77.5	100.0
	Total	1496	93.4	100.0	
Missing	na	75	4.7		
	dk	30	1.9		
	Total	105	6.6		
Total		1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 7 Don't like as neighbors: Jews (Q6M)

Results start to change when people were asked questions regarding immigrants and people with medical conditions. Here we have, 35.7% of the respondents who mentioned not liking immigrants or foreign workers as their neighbors, while 64.3% did not mention not liking immigrants or foreign workers as their neighbors. When people were asked about not liking a neighbor with AIDS, results showed that 55.5% of people supported the claim, while 44.5% did not mention not liking a neighbor with AIDS. The toleration toward people who are drug addicts is even lesser. Majority of respondents mentioned that they don't like drug addicts as neighbors while only 28.8% did not mention not liking drug addicts as their neighbors. When talking about sexual orientation, majority of respondents mentioned that they did not like homosexuals as their neighbors, 62.1% while 37.9% did not mention not liking homosexuals as their neighbors. One might argue the level of toleration starts to decrease toward immigrants, different sexual orientations and people with medical conditions.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	534	33.4	35.7	35.7
	not mentioned	962	60.1	64.3	100.0
	Total	1496	93.4	100.0	
Missing	na	77	4.8		
	dk	28	1.7		
	Total	105	6.6		
Total		1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 8 Don't like as neighbors: immigrants/foreign workers (Q6I)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	849	53.0	55.5	55.5
	not mentioned	682	42.6	44.5	100.0
	Total	1531	95.6	100.0	
Missing	na	50	3.1		
	dk	20	1.2		
	Total	70	4.4		
Total		1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 9 Don't like as neighbors: people with AIDS (Q6J)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	1092	68.2	70.4	70.4
	not mentioned	459	28.7	29.6	100.0
	Total	1551	96.9	100.0	
Missing	na	37	2.3		
	dk	13	.8		
	Total	50	3.1		
Total		1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 10 Don't like as neighbors: drug addicts (Q6K)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	954	59.6	62.1	62.1
	not mentioned	581	36.3	37.9	100.0
	Total	1535	95.9	100.0	
Missing	na	48	3.0		
	dk	18	1.1		
	Total	66	4.1		
Total		1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 11 Don't like as neighbors: homosexuals (Q6L)

The second set of variables complemented the first set by adding more questions regarding immigrants, jobs and culture. Moreover, on the question about whether people from less developed countries had the right to a job; only 9.9% answered anyone who wants to can access jobs. 33.8% said come when jobs available, while 40% said they prefer strict limits on the number of foreigners, and 13% agreed to prohibit people come here from other countries for work. Here clearly the majority agrees with strict limits on numbers of foreigners coming for work or prohibiting them from coming for work.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid anyone come who wants to	149	9.3	9.9	9.9
Valid come when jobs available	510	31.9	33.8	43.7
Valid strict limits on the number of foreigners	646	40.3	42.8	86.5
Valid prohibit people coming here from other countries	203	12.7	13.5	100.0
Total	1508	94.2	100.0	
Missing na	37	2.3		
Missing dk	56	3.5		
Missing Total	93	5.8		
Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 12 Work: people from less developed countries (Q76)

Below you will see that more than 60% of respondents agree with the claim that immigrants take away jobs from their own nationality, while 15% were neutral and 25% do not agree with this statement. This contradicts the results regarding having immigrants as neighbors where around 64% did not mention that being a problem.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
take away	228	14.2	15.1	15.1
2	234	14.6	15.5	30.7
3	235	14.7	15.6	46.3
4	228	14.2	15.1	61.4
5	224	14.0	14.9	76.2
6	77	4.8	5.1	81.4
7	51	3.2	3.4	84.7
8	39	2.4	2.6	87.3
9	29	1.8	1.9	89.3
do not take away	162	10.1	10.7	100.0
Total	1507	94.1	100.0	
Missing				
na	29	1.8		
dk	65	4.1		
Total	94	5.9		
Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 13 Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality] (Q78A)

On the question about immigrants increasing the crime problems, around 57% answered as in they make it worse, while 20% are in the middle and only around 13% say that immigrant do not make it worse in relation with the increase of the crime problems. The general stigma of immigrants and crime problems pertains to be a part of Kosovo's public opinion as well.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Valid	make it worse	300	18.7	19.7	19.7
	2	209	13.1	13.8	33.5
	3	159	9.9	10.5	43.9
	4	198	12.4	13.0	57.0
	5	307	19.2	20.2	77.2
	6	97	6.1	6.4	83.6
	7	68	4.2	4.5	88.0
	8	37	2.3	2.4	90.5
	9	15	.9	1.0	91.4
	do not make it worse	130	8.1	8.6	100.0
	Total	1520	94.9	100.0	
Missing	na	30	1.9		
	dk	51	3.2		
	Total	81	5.1		
Total		1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 14 Immigrants increase crime problems (Q78C)

The following question closely related with toleration and culture gave attention-grabbing results. Almost 60% of respondents agree with the claim that immigrants undermine country's cultural life, while 16% took a neutral stance and 27% do not agree that immigrants undermine country's cultural life. Contrary to the general belief that the immigrants present an added value on any country's cultural life; one might argue that the immigrants' acceptance is heavily determined by the dominant culture, which in this case is not expressed by the majority of the respondents. In addition, 54% of respondents agree with the claim that immigrants maintain distinct traditions and customs rather than accepting the country's cultural tradition and customs, while 24% were neutral and 22% do not think immigrants do such thing.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
undermine cultural life	261	16.3	17.1	17.1
2	196	12.2	12.8	29.9
3	190	11.9	12.4	42.3
4	230	14.4	15.1	57.4
5	243	15.2	15.9	73.3
Valid 6	85	5.3	5.6	78.9
7	56	3.5	3.7	82.5
8	51	3.2	3.3	85.9
9	30	1.9	2.0	87.8
do not undermine cultural life	186	11.6	12.2	100.0
Total	1528	95.4	100.0	
Missing na	32	2.0		
dk	41	2.6		
g Total	73	4.6		
Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 15 Immigrants undermine country's cultural life (Q78B)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
maintain distinct customs and traditions	212	13.2	14.2	14.2
2	159	9.9	10.7	24.9
3	214	13.4	14.3	39.2
4	218	13.6	14.6	53.8
Valid 5	356	22.2	23.9	77.7
6	97	6.1	6.5	84.2
7	43	2.7	2.9	87.1
8	33	2.1	2.2	89.3
9	28	1.7	1.9	91.2
take over the customs of the country	132	8.2	8.8	100.0
Total	1492	93.2	100.0	
Missing na	32	2.0		
dk	77	4.8		
g Total	109	6.8		
Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 16 Immigrants maintain own/take over customs (Q78F)



The next question has to do with immigrants becoming a threat to society where 55% of respondents agree with the statement, a considerable 22% were neither agreeing nor disagreeing and only around 13% did not agree with this statement. Also around 53% of the respondents agree with the claim that immigrants are a strain to the welfare system. While 22% were undecided and only around 20% do not agree with this claim. Moreover, 54% of respondents agree with the statement where immigrants living in their country make them feel like strangers, 22.3% neither agree nor disagree and 21% disagree with the statement.

Also 49% of respondents think that there are too many immigrants in their country, 31.6% were undecided while only around 18% did not agree with the statement of having too many immigrants in the country. Overall, one might argue that the level of toleration toward immigrants is low since they are viewed as a cause of problems and not being culturally integrated in the country.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	209	13.1	13.8	13.8
2	218	13.6	14.4	28.3
3	197	12.3	13.0	41.3
4	235	14.7	15.6	56.9
5	332	20.7	22.0	78.9
6	100	6.2	6.6	85.5
7	56	3.5	3.7	89.2
8	33	2.1	2.2	91.4
9	18	1.1	1.2	92.6
10	112	7.0	7.4	100.0
Total	1510	94.3	100.0	
Missing	37	2.3		
dk	54	3.4		
Total	91	5.7		
Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 17 Immigrants will become a threat to society (Q78E)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
are a strain	244	15.2	16.2	16.2
2	178	11.1	11.8	28.0
3	191	11.9	12.7	40.6
4	225	14.1	14.9	55.6
5	334	20.9	22.1	77.7
Valid 6	93	5.8	6.2	83.9
7	56	3.5	3.7	87.6
8	55	3.4	3.6	91.2
9	34	2.1	2.3	93.5
are not a strain	98	6.1	6.5	100.0
Total	1508	94.2	100.0	
na	34	2.1		
Missing dk	59	3.7		
Total	93	5.8		
Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 18 Immigrants are a strain on welfare system (Q78D)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
agree strongly	397	24.8	27.0	27.0
agree	411	25.7	27.9	54.9
Valid neither agree/nor disagree	342	21.4	23.2	78.1
disagree	159	9.9	10.8	88.9
disagree strongly	163	10.2	11.1	100.0
Total	1472	91.9	100.0	
na	47	2.9		
Missing dk	82	5.1		
Total	129	8.1		
Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 19 Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger (Q79A)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
agree strongly	307	19.2	21.5	21.5
agree	406	25.4	28.4	49.8
neither agree/nor disagree	452	28.2	31.6	81.4
disagree	184	11.5	12.9	94.3
disagree strongly	82	5.1	5.7	100.0
Total	1431	89.4	100.0	
Missing				
na	49	3.1		
dk	121	7.6		
Total	170	10.6		
Total	1601	100.0		

Table 3.3.1. 20 Immigrants living in your country: there are too many (Q79B)

### 3.3.2 Results from Serbia survey:

The tables found below are gathered from the Serbia’s field surveys from the same previously mentioned dataset. Current results are gathered from the same set of variables used in Kosovo and later in the Bosnia surveys. In addition, the two main themes continue to be described here as well. The first one has to do with what people considered liking or disliking certain kind of people as their neighbors, and the second theme dealt with people’s attitude toward migrants.

The trend of having much more expressed dislike toward people with criminal record compared to the ones with different religious beliefs is also present here. From the total of 1512 surveyed people, 71% of them mentioned that they do not like people with criminal records as their neighbors compared to the 29% who did not mention such thing.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	1019	67.4	70.7	70.7
Valid not mentioned	422	27.9	29.3	100.0
Total	1441	95.3	100.0	
Missing na	42	2.8		
Missing dk	29	1.9		
Total	71	4.7		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 1 Don’t like as neighbors: people with criminal record (Q6A)

When the participants were asked about the like or dislike toward the people of different race, majority of them, 80% respondent do not mention having a problem with people from different race, against 20% who mentioned to have a problem with this.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	270	17.9	20.0	20.0
	not mentioned	1083	71.6	80.0	100.0
	Total	1353	89.5	100.0	
Missing	na	109	7.2		
	dk	50	3.3		
	Total	159	10.5		
Total		1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 2 Don't like as neighbors: people of different race (Q6B)

From the total of 1310 answered surveys, 80% of people did not mention having an issue with left wing extremists as their neighbors, compared to 19.4% who mentioned having an issue with having left wing extremists as neighbors. Similar, from 1319 surveys, 79% did not mention not liking right wing extremists as their neighbors, that is to say only 21.2% mentioned not liking right wing extremists for neighbors. These results go against popular belief that people with extreme political viewpoints are not well acceptable in their neighborhoods.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	254	16.8	19.4	19.4
	not mentioned	1056	69.8	80.6	100.0
	Total	1310	86.6	100.0	
Missing	na	115	7.6		
	dk	87	5.8		
	Total	202	13.4		
Total		1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 3 Don't like as neighbors: left wing extremists (Q6C)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	279	18.5	21.2	21.2
	not mentioned	1040	68.8	78.8	100.0
	Total	1319	87.2	100.0	
Missing	na	114	7.5		
	dk	79	5.2		
	Total	193	12.8		
Total		1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 4 Don't like as neighbors: right wing extremists (Q6E)

When respondents were asked about neighbors with different religious beliefs and whether they like or don't like them, 27% mentioned that they do not like Muslims and their neighbors, against 72% who did not mention such thing. When they were asked about having Christians as neighbors, 17% mentioned not liking them as neighbors against 83% who did not mention such thing. Here we can see slightly larger preference for Christians against Muslims for neighbors, but this does not present a significant difference nonetheless. When the same questions was asked for the Jews as neighbors, 18% mentioned not liking them as neighbors against the majority of 82 % who did not mentioned having a problem with Jews as neighbors.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	368	24.3	27.0	27.0
Valid not mentioned	996	65.9	73.0	100.0
Total	1364	90.2	100.0	
Missing na	107	7.1		
Missing dk	41	2.7		
Missing Total	148	9.8		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 5 Don't like as neighbors: Muslims (Q6H)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	230	15.2	16.7	16.7
Valid not mentioned	1144	75.7	83.3	100.0
Total	1374	90.9	100.0	
Missing na	111	7.3		
Missing dk	27	1.8		
Missing Total	138	9.1		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 6 Don't like as neighbors: Christians (Q6O)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	238	15.7	17.6	17.6
Valid not mentioned	1118	73.9	82.4	100.0
Total	1356	89.7	100.0	
Missing na	112	7.4		
Missing dk	44	2.9		
Total	156	10.3		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 7 Don't like as neighbors: Jews (Q6M)

When the respondents were asked about if they do not like immigrants for their neighbors, from 1352 people, 23% of them mentioned such thing against the 77% who did not mention not liking immigrants for neighbors.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	307	20.3	22.7	22.7
Valid not mentioned	1045	69.1	77.3	100.0
Total	1352	89.4	100.0	
Missing na	111	7.3		
Missing dk	49	3.2		
Total	160	10.6		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 8 Don't like as neighbors: immigrants/foreign workers (Q6I)

The respondents were slightly more sensitive when they were asked about people with AIDS and if they do not like them as neighbors. From 1389 people, 52.6 % did not mention not liking people with AIDS as their neighbors, and 47.4% mentioned not liking people with AIDS as their neighbors. This trend changes when questions deals with people with drug problems. More precisely, when they were asked if they do not like drug addicts, 72.4% mentioned not liking

them as neighbors, and 27.6% did not mention not liking drug addicts as their neighbors. When asked about homosexuals, 56% mentioned that they don't like them as neighbors compared to 44% who did not mention such thing. One can say that the level of toleration toward people with drug problems, infective disease and sexual orientation is significantly lower compared with people who belong to an extreme political ideology or have different religious affiliation.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	658	43.5	47.4	47.4
Valid not mentioned	731	48.3	52.6	100.0
Valid Total	1389	91.9	100.0	
Missing na	80	5.3		
Missing dk	43	2.8		
Missing Total	123	8.1		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 9 Don't like as neighbors: people with AIDS (Q6J)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	1049	69.4	72.4	72.4
Valid not mentioned	400	26.5	27.6	100.0
Valid Total	1449	95.8	100.0	
Missing na	39	2.6		
Missing dk	24	1.6		
Missing Total	63	4.2		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 10 Don't like as neighbors: drug addicts (Q6K)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	796	52.6	56.0	56.0
Valid not mentioned	626	41.4	44.0	100.0
Valid Total	1422	94.0	100.0	
Missing na	58	3.8		
Missing dk	32	2.1		
Missing Total	90	6.0		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 11 Don't like as neighbors: homosexuals (Q6L)



The second set of variables delivered different view on toleration since it focused on immigrants and how the respondents perceive them. Moreover, when asked about people from less developed countries having access to jobs in their country, 27.4% answered that anyone who wants to can access those jobs compared to 29.2% who answered that they can come one jobs are available. It is important to see the change of respondent's views on the same question when given the option to choose to strict limits on the number of foreigners as their answer, 34.9% choose this one over 8.4% who choose the answer that prohibits foreigners coming from other countries to access the jobs.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid anyone come who wants to	383	25.3	27.4	27.4
come when jobs available	408	27.0	29.2	56.6
Valid strict limits on the number of foreigners	488	32.3	34.9	91.6
prohibit people coming here from other countries	118	7.8	8.4	100.0
Total	1397	92.4	100.0	
Missing na	27	1.8		
Missing dk	88	5.8		
Total	115	7.6		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 12 Work: people from less developed countries (Q76)

Below you will see that more than a half of the respondents 64.7% leans toward agreement with the claim that immigrants take away jobs from them, and 35.3% do not think immigrants are taking away jobs from them. One can argue that even though some respondents did not mind so much having immigrants as their neighbors, everything changes when asked about taking away jobs.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
take away	266	17.6	18.6	18.6
2	119	7.9	8.3	27.0
3	170	11.2	11.9	38.9
4	128	8.5	9.0	47.8
5	241	15.9	16.9	64.7
Valid 6	84	5.6	5.9	70.6
7	78	5.2	5.5	76.1
8	110	7.3	7.7	83.8
9	72	4.8	5.0	88.8
do not take away	160	10.6	11.2	100.0
Total	1428	94.4	100.0	
na	14	.9		
Missing dk	70	4.6		
Total	84	5.6		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 13 Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality] (Q78A)

On the question regarding immigrants and if increase crime problems, 67.5% do agree with the statement that immigrant make it worse against 32.5% who think immigrant do not make it worse in increasing crime problems. The tendency to blame immigrants for the increase of crime is noticeable in Serbia as well as it was in the previous survey from Kosovo.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
make it worse	250	16.5	17.7	17.7
2	125	8.3	8.9	26.6
3	148	9.8	10.5	37.1
4	158	10.4	11.2	48.3
5	270	17.9	19.2	67.5
Valid 6	86	5.7	6.1	73.6
7	82	5.4	5.8	79.4
8	111	7.3	7.9	87.3
9	61	4.0	4.3	91.6
do not make it worse	118	7.8	8.4	100.0
Total	1409	93.2	100.0	
na	16	1.1		
Missing dk	87	5.8		
Total	103	6.8		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 14 Immigrants increase crime problems (Q78C)

Half of the respondents, that it to say 51.1% think that immigrants do undermine country's cultural life compared to 48.9% who do not think that immigrants undermine country's cultural life.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
undermine cultural life	205	13.6	14.3	14.3
2	81	5.4	5.7	20.0
3	124	8.2	8.7	28.7
4	105	6.9	7.3	36.0
5	216	14.3	15.1	51.1
Valid 6	94	6.2	6.6	57.7
7	92	6.1	6.4	64.1
8	151	10.0	10.6	74.6
9	113	7.5	7.9	82.5
do not undermine cultural life	250	16.5	17.5	100.0
Total	1431	94.6	100.0	
na	14	.9		
Missing dk	67	4.4		
Total	81	5.4		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 15 Immigrants undermine country's cultural life (Q78B)

Majority of respondents, 65.7% think that immigrants maintain their distinct customs and traditions compared to 34.3% think that they take over customs and traditions of the country where they are staying.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
maintain distinct customs and traditions	295	19.5	21.3	21.3
2	100	6.6	7.2	28.5
3	146	9.7	10.5	39.0
4	100	6.6	7.2	46.2
5	274	18.1	19.8	66.0
Valid 6	91	6.0	6.6	72.6
7	73	4.8	5.3	77.8
8	89	5.9	6.4	84.3
9	55	3.6	4.0	88.2
take over the customs of the country	163	10.8	11.8	100.0
Total	1386	91.7	100.0	
na	24	1.6		
Missing dk	102	6.7		
Total	126	8.3		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 16 Immigrants maintain own/take over customs (Q78F)

Around 65.6% of the respondents do think that immigrants will become threat to society and 34.4% do not agree with such statement. Once again we have a negative attitude toward immigrants and welfare system where 70.6% agree that they do present a strain to the welfare and 29.4% do not think immigrant present a strain to country's welfare system.

It is interesting to see that 23.7% of the respondents either strongly agree or just agree that immigrants feel like strangers in their country Here 22.2% were undecided and 54.1% disagrees or strongly disagrees with this claim. Once again there is a tendency for people to try and be neutral toward sensitive questions nonetheless even though less than one third of the respondents agree with such claim it is not something to be overlooked when dealing with issues like toleration toward immigrants.

Contrary to the general opinion that Serbia and other Balkan countries might not be the most attractive places for immigrants, Serbian respondents, 36.9% think that there are too many immigrants in their country. Only 25.7% are neutral toward this question and 37.4% disagrees with the claim that there are too many immigrants in the country.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1 will become a threat	209	13.8	15.3	15.3
2	107	7.1	7.9	23.2
3	152	10.1	11.2	34.3
4	127	8.4	9.3	43.7
5	298	19.7	21.9	65.5
Valid 6	91	6.0	6.7	72.2
7	84	5.6	6.2	78.4
8	98	6.5	7.2	85.5
9	69	4.6	5.1	90.6
10 will not become a threat	128	8.5	9.4	100.0
Total	1363	90.1	100.0	
na	21	1.4		
Missing dk	128	8.5		
Total	149	9.9		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 17 Immigrants will become a threat to society (Q78E)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
are a strain	300	19.8	21.8	21.8
2	145	9.6	10.5	32.3
3	167	11.0	12.1	44.4
4	129	8.5	9.4	53.8
5	231	15.3	16.8	70.5
Valid 6	84	5.6	6.1	76.6
7	79	5.2	5.7	82.4
8	77	5.1	5.6	88.0
9	61	4.0	4.4	92.4
are not a strain	105	6.9	7.6	100.0
Total	1378	91.1	100.0	
na	19	1.3		
Missing dk	115	7.6		
Total	134	8.9		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 18 Immigrants are a strain on welfare system (Q78D)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
agree strongly	129	8.5	8.9	8.9
agree	214	14.2	14.8	23.7
Valid neither agree/nor disagree	322	21.3	22.2	45.9
disagree	467	30.9	32.2	78.1
disagree strongly	317	21.0	21.9	100.0
Total	1449	95.8	100.0	
na	19	1.3		
Missing dk	44	2.9		
Total	63	4.2		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 19 Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger (Q79A)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
agree strongly	176	11.6	12.8	12.8
agree	333	22.0	24.1	36.9
neither agree/nor disagree	355	23.5	25.7	62.6
disagree	335	22.2	24.3	86.9
disagree strongly	181	12.0	13.1	100.0
Total	1380	91.3	100.0	
Missing				
na	24	1.6		
dk	108	7.1		
Total	132	8.7		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.2. 20 Immigrants living in your country: there are too many (Q79B)



### 3.3.3 Results from Bosnia survey:

Below you will find frequency tables from Bosnia survey for the same questions as previously presented Kosovo and Serbia results. Moreover, these results are analyzed by using frequency tables of questions that were related to the concept of toleration. Same as in other two sets of surveys presented here, there are two main themes that dominated the survey. The first theme was related with liking or disliking certain kind of people as neighbors, whereas the second theme described people's attitude toward immigrants.

Once again, as it was expected from two previous surveys from Kosovo and Serbia, here also we have somewhat expressive rejection on not liking people with criminal record as neighbors, with 83% agreeing with the statement versus only 17% who did not express such objections when asked the same question. One can argue that at this particular survey questions, Bosnia had highest percentage of people who don't like people with criminal record as neighbors compared with Kosovo and Serbia.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	1220	80.7	82.9	82.9
Valid not mentioned	252	16.7	17.1	100.0
Total	1472	97.4	100.0	
Missing na	23	1.5		
Missing dk	17	1.1		
Total	40	2.6		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 1 Don't like as neighbors: people with criminal record (Q6A)

When they were asked the same question with only one change where instead of people with criminal records they had to express their likability for people from different race as their neighbors, 14% expressed an issue with such neighbors compared to the majority of 86% who did not mentioned not liking people from different race as their neighbors.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	207	13.7	14.3	14.3
Valid not mentioned	1243	82.2	85.7	100.0
Valid Total	1450	95.9	100.0	
Missing na	39	2.6		
Missing dk	23	1.5		
Missing Total	62	4.1		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 2 Don't like as neighbors: people of different race (Q6B)

When same respondents were asked about having left wing extremists for their neighbors, as predicted by the results from Kosovo and Serbia, also here merely 23% mentioned having an issue with them as neighbors compared to the majority of 77% who did not mention not liking them for neighbors. Similarly, same attitude are true for right-wing extremists where only 25% answered not liking them as neighbors compared to the 75% who did not mention not liking them for neighbors. We argue that in Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia, people have a high tolerance toward extreme political beliefs because the majority of them have no issues in having those particular people that share extreme left wing and right-wing political ideologies as their neighbors.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	326	21.6	22.8	22.8
Valid not mentioned	1105	73.1	77.2	100.0
Valid Total	1431	94.6	100.0	
Missing na	42	2.8		
Missing dk	39	2.6		
Missing Total	81	5.4		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 3 Don't like as neighbors: left-wing extremists (Q6C)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	356	23.5	24.8	24.8
	not mentioned	1078	71.3	75.2	100.0
	Total	1434	94.8	100.0	
Missing	na	43	2.8		
	dk	35	2.3		
	Total	78	5.2		
	Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 4 Don't like as neighbors: right-wing extremists (Q6E)

As it is expected for country such as Bosnia where religion is part of the national identity, only 13% mentioned not liking Muslims as neighbors compared to 87% who did not mention not liking Muslims for their neighbors. There were slightly different percentages from Kosovo and Serbia survey where the number of people who mentioned not liking Muslims as their neighbors was higher. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that this trend of religious tolerance continues in Bosnia survey for other religious as well. Moreover, when the same question was asked but instead Muslims neighbors, it was about Christians, 5% mentioned not liking them as neighbors compared to the 95% who did not express such views. This percentage was lower even when survey was done in Serbia, which is predominantly Christian country. Lastly, when they were asked about Jews as their neighbors, majority of Bosnian respondents, 85% of them did not mentioned having an issue with them compared to 15% who mentioned not liking them as neighbors. This was similar to other two above-mentioned countries.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	189	12.5	13.0	13.0
	not mentioned	1262	83.5	87.0	100.0
	Total	1451	96.0	100.0	
Missing	na	43	2.8		
	dk	18	1.2		
	Total	61	4.0		
	Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 5 Don't like as neighbors: Muslims (Q6H)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	79	5.2	5.5	5.5
Valid not mentioned	1365	90.3	94.5	100.0
Total	1444	95.5	100.0	
Missing na	51	3.4		
Missing dk	17	1.1		
Missing Total	68	4.5		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 6 Don't like as neighbors: Christians (Q6O)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	221	14.6	15.2	15.2
Valid not mentioned	1232	81.5	84.8	100.0
Total	1453	96.1	100.0	
Missing na	42	2.8		
Missing dk	17	1.1		
Missing Total	59	3.9		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 7 Don't like as neighbors: Jews (Q6M)

When Bosnian respondents were asked about not liking immigrants/foreign workers as their neighbors, only 15% mentioned not liking them compared to 85% who did not mention such problem. Once again, here we have highest percentage compared to Kosovo and Serbia, of respondents who do not have problems with having immigrants/foreign workers as their neighbors.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	211	14.0	14.5	14.5
Valid not mentioned	1243	82.2	85.5	100.0
Total	1454	96.2	100.0	
Missing na	41	2.7		
Missing dk	17	1.1		
Missing Total	58	3.8		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 8 Don't like as neighbors: immigrants/foreign workers (Q6I)

Conversely, as it was expected from two previous survey results, Bosnian respondents were also more sensitive toward questions dealing with people with medical problems, in this case the ones with AIDS. Here, 54% of Bosnians mentioned not liking people with AIDS as their neighbors, compared to 46% who did not mention such thing. Same trend continues when they were asked about people with drug problems as their neighbors, where 83% mentioned having a problem with them as neighbors compared to 17% who did not mention such problem. Sexual orientation still represents a toleration issue in the Western Balkans as we saw in the previous results, which continue to be similar for Bosnia as well. Likewise, 62% of them mentioned not liking homosexuals as their neighbors compared to 38% who did not mentioned such problem. Overall, as it is stated in the previous two surveys for Kosovo and Serbia, here as well we can see that tolerance drops towards people with drug problems, infective disease and sexual orientation and it is acceptable towards the ones with different religion or extreme political viewpoints.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	795	52.6	54.3	54.3
Valid not mentioned	670	44.3	45.7	100.0
Total	1465	96.9	100.0	
Missing na	31	2.1		
Missing dk	16	1.1		
Missing Total	47	3.1		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 9 Don't like as neighbors: people with AIDS (Q6J)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	1229	81.3	82.8	82.8
Valid not mentioned	255	16.9	17.2	100.0
Total	1484	98.1	100.0	
Missing na	19	1.3		
Missing dk	9	.6		
Missing Total	28	1.9		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 10 Don't like as neighbors: drug addicts (Q6K)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	mentioned	909	60.1	62.1	62.1
	not mentioned	554	36.6	37.9	100.0
	Total	1463	96.8	100.0	
Missing	na	37	2.4		
	dk	12	.8		
	Total	49	3.2		
	Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 11 Don't like as neighbors: homosexuals (Q6L)

Now let us see results from the second sets of chosen variables for the analysis of the level of toleration in the Western Balkans that is to say in countries like Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia. The trend of answers is similar regarding questions on whether people from less developed countries should be working in respondent's country. Here, 24% answered that anyone can come and work in the country; while 37% answered when jobs are available they can come to work. On the other hand, 30% of respondents chose the option where strict limits on the number of foreigners was offered as an option and only 8% answered that people from less developed countries should be prohibited to come in their country to work.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	anyone come who wants to	349	23.1	23.9	23.9
	come when jobs available	536	35.4	36.7	60.5
	strict limits on the number of foreigners	455	30.1	31.1	91.7
	prohibit people coming here from other countries	122	8.1	8.3	100.0
	Total	1462	96.7	100.0	
Missing	na	11	.7		
	dk	39	2.6		
	Total	50	3.3		
	Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 12 Work: people from less developed countries (Q76)

When respondents were asked if they agreed with the statement that immigrants take away jobs from them, around 60% leaned toward an agreement with that statement, compared with 40% who think immigrants do not take away jobs from them. One can argue that people’s perception on immigrant changes depending on their status. The first set of variables had questions in relations with likability of immigrants as neighbors where majority of respondents did not have an issue with such statement, which changes when the same respondents were asked about immigrants taking jobs from them.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
take away	217	14.4	14.8	14.8
2	98	6.5	6.7	21.5
3	160	10.6	10.9	32.5
4	157	10.4	10.7	43.2
5	256	16.9	17.5	60.7
Valid 6	104	6.9	7.1	67.9
7	87	5.8	6.0	73.8
8	82	5.4	5.6	79.4
9	62	4.1	4.2	83.7
do not take away	239	15.8	16.3	100.0
Total	1462	96.7	100.0	
na	10	.7		
Missing dk	40	2.6		
Total	50	3.3		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 13 Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality] (Q78A)

On the question whether immigrants increase problems, around 59.2% leaned toward supporting this claim compared to 39.8, which leaned toward not supporting such claim. The trend is continuing from Kosovo and Serbia survey results as well.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
make it worse	192	12.7	13.4	13.4
2	104	6.9	7.2	20.6
3	136	9.0	9.5	30.1
4	129	8.5	9.0	39.0
5	289	19.1	20.1	59.2
Valid 6	117	7.7	8.1	67.3
7	88	5.8	6.1	73.4
8	86	5.7	6.0	79.4
9	63	4.2	4.4	83.8
do not make it worse	233	15.4	16.2	100.0
Total	1437	95.0	100.0	
na	12	.8		
Missing dk	63	4.2		
Total	75	5.0		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 14 Immigrants increase crime problems (Q78C)

Almost half of the respondents 49.4% leaned toward supporting the claim that immigrants undermine their country's cultural life, compared to the other half, 50.6% did not support such claims. Here respondents from Bosnia answered similarly to the ones from Kosovo and Serbia where around half of the respondents supported and the other half did not support the claim derived from the question about immigrants undermining country's cultural life.



	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	142	9.4	9.7	9.7
2	91	6.0	6.2	15.9
3	92	6.1	6.3	22.2
4	140	9.3	9.5	31.7
5	260	17.2	17.7	49.5
Valid 6	141	9.3	9.6	59.1
7	102	6.7	7.0	66.0
8	100	6.6	6.8	72.9
9	77	5.1	5.3	78.1
do not undermine cultural life	321	21.2	21.9	100.0
Total	1466	97.0	100.0	
Missing na	11	.7		
dk	35	2.3		
g Total	46	3.0		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 15 Immigrants undermine country's cultural life (Q78B)

When respondents were asked about immigrants maintaining their own customs and traditions, more than half of them, 60% agreed with such statement compared to 40% who did not agree with such statement by choosing answers on the scale that supported the claim of immigrants taking over customs and traditions in the country they live.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
maintain distinct customs and traditions	185	12.2	12.9	12.9
2	88	5.8	6.1	19.1
3	125	8.3	8.7	27.8
4	140	9.3	9.8	37.6
Valid 5	325	21.5	22.7	60.3
6	149	9.9	10.4	70.7
7	92	6.1	6.4	77.1
8	69	4.6	4.8	82.0
9	33	2.2	2.3	84.3
take over the customs of the country	225	14.9	15.7	100.0
Total	1431	94.6	100.0	
Missing	22	1.5		
dk	59	3.9		
g Total	81	5.4		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 16 Immigrants maintain own/take over customs (Q78F)

Finally, below we will find results from the last three questions of the second set of variables. Around 56% of the respondents leaned toward the scale that supports the claim of immigrants becoming a threat to the society compared to 44% who do not think immigrants will become threat to society. It is interesting to point out that Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia are not known as countries where people would migrate for economic or any other reason. Nevertheless, responses are either neutral or against immigrants in general. When asked about immigrants becoming a strain for the welfare system, 58.4% support such claim compared to 41.6% who do not think immigrants present such problem for the welfare system. We can see that Bosnian respondents have slightly less agree with immigrants presenting a strain for the welfare system compared to around 70% of Serbian respondents who support the question's claim that immigrants present a stray to the welfare system.

When Bosnian respondents were asked about if immigrants feel like strangers in their country, around 23.2% supported such claim compared to 28.2% who neither agree nor disagree with this claim, and 48.6% disagree or strongly disagree with the claim. Once again,

just like in Kosovo and Serbian responses, a significant number of respondents prefer to choose the neutral answers rather than having a standpoint about this question.

Bosnian respondents, that is to say 25.6% agree with the statement that there are too many immigrants in their country, compared to the 34.6% who are neutral regarding this question and 39.8% who do not agree with the claim that there are too many immigrants in their country.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	123	8.1	8.6	8.6
2	109	7.2	7.6	16.3
3	153	10.1	10.7	27.0
4	130	8.6	9.1	36.1
5	279	18.5	19.6	55.6
Valid 6	145	9.6	10.2	65.8
7	104	6.9	7.3	73.1
8	87	5.8	6.1	79.2
9	54	3.6	3.8	83.0
will not become a threat	243	16.1	17.0	100.0
Total	1427	94.4	100.0	
Missing na	18	1.2		
dk	67	4.4		
g Total	85	5.6		
Total	1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 17 Immigrants will become a threat to society (Q78E)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Valid	are a strain	169	11.2	11.8	11.8
	2	92	6.1	6.4	18.2
	3	137	9.1	9.6	27.8
	4	151	10.0	10.6	38.4
	5	286	18.9	20.0	58.4
	6	138	9.1	9.6	68.0
	7	92	6.1	6.4	74.4
	8	88	5.8	6.1	80.6
	9	55	3.6	3.8	84.4
	are not a strain	223	14.7	15.6	100.0
	Total	1431	94.6	100.0	
Missing	na	16	1.1		
	dk	65	4.3		
	Total	81	5.4		
Total		1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 18 Immigrants are a strain on welfare system (Q78D)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Valid	agree strongly	63	4.2	4.2	4.2
	agree	283	18.7	19.0	23.3
	neither agree/nor disagree	419	27.7	28.2	51.4
	disagree	489	32.3	32.9	84.3
	disagree strongly	234	15.5	15.7	100.0
	Total	1488	98.4	100.0	
Missing	na	9	.6		
	dk	15	1.0		
	Total	24	1.6		
Total		1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 19 Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger (Q79A)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	agree strongly	86	5.7	5.9	5.9
	agree	289	19.1	19.7	25.6
	neither agree/nor disagree	508	33.6	34.6	60.2
	disagree	396	26.2	27.0	87.2
	disagree strongly	188	12.4	12.8	100.0
	Total	1467	97.0	100.0	
Missing	na	8	.5		
	dk	37	2.4		
	Total	45	3.0		
Total		1512	100.0		

Table 3.3.3. 20 Immigrants living in your country: there are too many (Q79B)

### 3.3.4 Results from Macedonia

Below you will find frequency tables from Macedonia survey for the same questions as previously presented Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here are presented frequency tables of questions that were related to the concept of toleration, just like the case of the other mentioned countries. The measured trend is the same as there are two main themes that dominated the survey; first theme was related with liking or disliking certain kind of people as neighbors, whereas the second theme described people’s attitude toward immigrants.

Lastly, the final frequency tables are from Macedonia. Here mostly we can see similar responses with other Western Balkans countries. Moreover, when presented with the question of “don’t like as neighbors: people with criminal records,” 70% of the respondents agreed with the statement compared to 29% who did not.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	1028	68.5	70.1	70.1
not mentioned	439	29.3	29.9	100.0
Total	1467	97.8	100.0	
Missing	22	1.5		
dk	11	.7		
Total	33	2.2		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 1 Don’t like as neighbors: people with criminal record (Q6A)

On the question regarding neighbors belonging to a different race, 21.2% mentioned not liking them, and 78.8% did not mentioned not liking people of different race as their neighbors.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	316	21.1	21.2	21.2
not mentioned	1172	78.1	78.8	100.0
Total	1488	99.2	100.0	
Missing				
na	5	.3		
dk	7	.5		
Total	12	.8		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 2 Don't like as neighbors: people of different race (Q6B)

When asked about extreme right wing or left wing neighbors, Macedonian respondents give slightly different answers compared to as an example the Kosovan respondents. First, 34% of Macedonian respondents mentioned not liking neighbors who are left wing extremists compared to 66% who did not mention such thing. Compared with Kosovo results for the same question, people who don't like a left wing extremist for a neighbor increased double, from 17% (Kosovo) to 34% (Macedonia).

Almost identical results are gathered when asked about not liking a right wing extremists for neighbors, 34% of the respondents mentioned not liking them as neighbors compared to 66% who did not mention not liking right wing extremists as their neighbors. Correspondingly, the above-mentioned comparison with results from Kosovo applies to the question about right wing extremists as well.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	491	32.7	34.1	34.1
not mentioned	948	63.2	65.9	100.0
Total	1439	95.9	100.0	
Missing				
na	15	1.0		
dk	46	3.1		
Total	61	4.1		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 3 Don't like as neighbors: left wing extremists (Q6C)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	489	32.6	34.1	34.1
not mentioned	947	63.1	65.9	100.0
Total	1436	95.7	100.0	
Missing	19	1.3		
dk	45	3.0		
Total	64	4.3		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 4 Don't like as neighbors: right wing extremists (Q6E)

When it comes to neighbors' religious affiliation, 27% of the respondents mentioned not liking Muslims as their neighbors compared to 73% who did not mention not liking Muslims as their neighbors. Only 6% of the respondents mentioned not liking Christians as their neighbors, compared to 94% who did not mention such thing. This is almost expected since the majority of the nation belongs to the orthodox Christian church. And lastly, 16% mentioned not liking Jews for their neighbors compared to 84% who did not mention this.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	398	26.5	26.8	26.8
not mentioned	1088	72.5	73.2	100.0
Total	1486	99.1	100.0	
Missing	10	.7		
dk	4	.3		
Total	14	.9		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 5 Don't like as neighbors: muslims (Q6H)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	85	5.7	5.7	5.7
not mentioned	1401	93.4	94.3	100.0
Total	1486	99.1	100.0	
Missing	10	.7		
dk	4	.3		
Total	14	.9		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 6 Don't like as neighbors: christians (Q6O)



	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	240	16.0	16.1	16.1
not mentioned	1248	83.2	83.9	100.0
Total	1488	99.2	100.0	
Missing na	6	.4		
dk	6	.4		
Total	12	.8		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 7 Don't like as neighbors: Jews (Q6M)

When asked about not liking immigrants/foreign workers as their neighbors, 20% of the Macedonian respondents agreed with the statement compared to 80% who did not agree (not mention) this to be case. Similarly to other results from other countries discussed in this section, 61% of Macedonian respondents mentioned not liking people with AIDS for their neighbors, compared to 39% who did not mention such thing. Percentage goes even higher when asked about drug addicts for their neighbors, where 78% mentioned not liking them and only 22% did not mention having an issue with having drug addicts as their neighbors. 58% of the Macedonian respondents mentioned not liking homosexuals as their neighbors and 42% did not mention not liking them as neighbors.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	303	20.2	20.4	20.4
not mentioned	1185	79.0	79.6	100.0
Total	1488	99.2	100.0	
Missing na	7	.5		
dk	5	.3		
Total	12	.8		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 8 Don't like as neighbors: immigrants/foreign workers (Q6I)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	914	60.9	61.5	61.5
not mentioned	572	38.1	38.5	100.0
Total	1486	99.1	100.0	
Missing na	6	.4		
dk	8	.5		
Total	14	.9		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 9 Don't like as neighbors: people with AIDS (Q6J)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	1162	77.5	77.9	77.9
not mentioned	330	22.0	22.1	100.0
Total	1492	99.5	100.0	
Missing na	4	.3		
dk	4	.3		
Total	8	.5		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 10 Don't like as neighbors: drug addicts (Q6K)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid mentioned	864	57.6	58.0	58.0
not mentioned	626	41.7	42.0	100.0
Total	1490	99.3	100.0	
Missing na	5	.3		
dk	5	.3		
Total	10	.7		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 11 Don't like as neighbors: homosexuals (Q6L)

Finally, the last set of answers deal with questions about immigrants, jobs and culture and how the Macedonian respondents perceive them. This concludes the set of answers previously offered for Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and conclusively Macedonia. When asked about allowing people from less developed countries to come and get jobs, 29.5 % of the Macedonian respondents agree with anyone who wants to come, compared to 29% who answered only when jobs are available, 34% chose the option where strict limits on the number of foreigners was offered and only 8% answered that their country should prohibit people coming here from other places.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid anyone who wants to come	387	25.8	29.5	29.5
when jobs available	380	25.3	29.0	58.5
strict limits on the number of foreigners	442	29.5	33.7	92.3
prohibit people coming here from other countries	101	6.7	7.7	100.0
Total	1310	87.3	100.0	
Missing na	58	3.9		
dk	132	8.8		
Total	190	12.7		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 12 Work: people from less developed countries (Q76)

Even though when asked about having an immigrant as neighbors, 80% of the respondents did not mention such thing, when same respondents are asked about immigrants taking away jobs from their nationality things started to change. Moreover, around 31% do agree with a statement that immigrants take away jobs from their nationality, while 11% are neutral and the rest, around 58% do not agree with this statement.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid take away	191	12.7	13.5	13.5
2	88	5.9	6.2	19.8
3	81	5.4	5.7	25.5
4	73	4.9	5.2	30.7
5	154	10.3	10.9	41.6
6	44	2.9	3.1	44.7
7	72	4.8	5.1	49.8
8	140	9.3	9.9	59.7
9	178	11.9	12.6	72.3
do not take away	391	26.1	27.7	100.0
Total	1412	94.1	100.0	
Missing na	27	1.8		
dk	61	4.1		
Total	88	5.9		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 13 Immigrants take away jobs from [nationality] (Q78A)

On the question about immigrants increasing crime problems, around 50% of the respondents agree with the statement compared to 16% that are neutral and around 33% do not think immigrants make it worse when asked about increasing crime problems.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid make it worse	385	25.7	27.1	27.1
2	168	11.2	11.8	38.9
3	78	5.2	5.5	44.3
4	89	5.9	6.3	50.6
5	224	14.9	15.7	66.3
6	76	5.1	5.3	71.7
7	77	5.1	5.4	77.1
8	89	5.9	6.3	83.3
9	71	4.7	5.0	88.3
do not make it worse	166	11.1	11.7	100.0
Total	1423	94.9	100.0	
Missing na	25	1.7		
dk	52	3.5		
Total	77	5.1		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 14 Immigrants increase crime problems (Q78C)

When asked about immigrants undermining country's cultural life, around 35% thinks they do so, while 8.4% are neutral and around 52% do not agree with the statement. When asked about immigrants being a strain on welfare system, 40.5% do agree with this while 11.3% are neutral and 48% do not think immigrants are a strain on a welfare system.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
undermine cultural life	192	12.8	13.6	13.6
2	168	11.2	11.9	25.5
3	78	5.2	5.5	31.0
4	61	4.1	4.3	35.3
5	118	7.9	8.4	43.7
6	60	4.0	4.2	47.9
7	83	5.5	5.9	53.8
8	120	8.0	8.5	62.3
9	126	8.4	8.9	71.2
do not undermine cultural life	407	27.1	28.8	100.0
Total	1413	94.2	100.0	
Missing				
na	30	2.0		
dk	57	3.8		
Total	87	5.8		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 15 Immigrants undermine country's cultural life (Q78B)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
are a strain	244	16.3	17.3	17.3
2	166	11.1	11.8	29.1
3	86	5.7	6.1	35.2
4	75	5.0	5.3	40.5
5	160	10.7	11.3	51.8
6	90	6.0	6.4	58.2
7	80	5.3	5.7	63.9
8	122	8.1	8.6	72.5
9	93	6.2	6.6	79.1
are not a strain	295	19.7	20.9	100.0
Total	1411	94.1	100.0	
Missing				
na	25	1.7		
dk	64	4.3		
Total	89	5.9		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 16 Immigrants are a strain on welfare system (Q78D)

When asked about immigrants will become a threat to society, 41.3% do agree with the statement compared to 12% who were neutral and 47% do not agree with the statement. On the question about if immigrants maintain own or take over customs, 30.5% said they think immigrants keep their distinct customs while 20% were neutral and 50% think they take over

customs of the country. Furthermore, respondents were asked if they think immigrants feel like strangers from whom 18% agreed so, 17.7% were neutral, and 64.4% disagree with the statement. And finally, when the respondents were asked if they think there are too many immigrants living in their country, 28.2% agree with the statement, 22.4% are neutral and 50% disagreed.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid will become a threat	257	17.1	18.5	18.5
2	164	10.9	11.8	30.3
3	81	5.4	5.8	36.2
4	72	4.8	5.2	41.4
5	165	11.0	11.9	53.2
6	91	6.1	6.6	59.8
7	98	6.5	7.1	66.9
8	108	7.2	7.8	74.6
9	93	6.2	6.7	81.3
will not become a threat	259	17.3	18.7	100.0
Total	1388	92.5	100.0	
Missing na	29	1.9		
g dk	83	5.5		
Total	112	7.5		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 17 Immigrants will become a threat to society (Q78E)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid maintain distinct customs and traditions	215	14.3	16.4	16.4
2	52	3.5	4.0	20.3
3	61	4.1	4.6	25.0
4	72	4.8	5.5	30.4
5	257	17.1	19.6	50.0
6	115	7.7	8.8	58.8
7	62	4.1	4.7	63.5
8	104	6.9	7.9	71.4
9	57	3.8	4.3	75.7
take over the customs of the country	319	21.3	24.3	100.0
Total	1314	87.6	100.0	
Missing na	50	3.3		
g dk	136	9.1		
Total	186	12.4		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 18 Immigrants maintain own/take over customs (Q78F)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
agree strongly	86	5.7	5.8	5.8
agree	179	11.9	12.2	18.0
neither agree/nor disagree	260	17.3	17.7	35.6
disagree	701	46.7	47.6	83.2
disagree strongly	247	16.5	16.8	100.0
Total	1473	98.2	100.0	
Missing				
na	12	.8		
dk	15	1.0		
Total	27	1.8		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 19 Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger (Q79A)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
agree strongly	167	11.1	11.9	11.9
agree	229	15.3	16.3	28.1
neither agree/nor disagree	315	21.0	22.4	50.5
disagree	522	34.8	37.1	87.6
disagree strongly	174	11.6	12.4	100.0
Total	1407	93.8	100.0	
Missing				
na	13	.9		
dk	80	5.3		
Total	93	6.2		
Total	1500	100.0		

Table 3.3.4. 20 Immigrants living in your country: there are too many (Q79B)

Chapter

**IV**

# Discussions and Data Analysis



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## CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSIONS AND DATA ANALYSIS

### 4.1 DISCUSSIONS

There is a trend of similarity when it comes to how countries that are part of the research answered questions about diversity when it comes to having different neighbors than themselves and toleration when it comes to their perception of immigrants. Moreover, when respondents were asked if they don't like a person with criminal record as their neighbor, all of the respondents from all these countries strongly opposed liking such type of a neighbor. Similarly, according to the results, majority of the respondents did not mention not liking their neighbors if they belong to a different race. However, when the respondents were asked if they don't like their neighbors if they are left wing or right-wing extremists, here also we have the majority of them not having an issue with this.

One might argue that if the majority of the respondents themselves do not have an issue with their neighbors belonging to a different race, they should have a standpoint when they are asked about neighbors with extreme political viewpoints since it is known that extreme right wing political parties consider diversity to be a problem. An example of this might be that in Italy third country nationals are not allowed to be members of right wing political parties (Divpol, 2014, p. 6).

In the research done by Van Assche published in the website of international society of political psychology (2018), it is argued that there is a connection between pre-existing right-wing beliefs and standpoints and the support for populist parties, which in return has an effect of a mixture of "political cynicism" and "mistrust." Consequently, the authors suggest that there is a need for a more coherent political-psychological model which would provide a more valuable insight to further comprehend the connection between how high level of diversity may push people with right-wing beliefs into populist and far-right political parties (Van Assche, 2018).

Comparably to the answers regarding the political views, the religious related questions also followed the same trend. Here also we see the religious toleration playing an

important role since according to the results; there is no significant animosity towards people with different religious background. On the other hand, having 20 -28 percentage of respondents agreeing with the statement on not-liking for a neighbor a Muslim, a Christian or a Jew, might be seen as something unsettling by some researchers.

When the respondents were asked about having as neighbors people with medical conditions, drug addicts, homosexuals and immigrants, the answers started to break the previously mentioned trend. Around half of the respondents of every country presented in this study mentioned not liking someone with AIDS as their neighbor. Also, when asked about immigrants, the responses started to go beyond 30% toward not preferring them as neighbors.

Considering that the present research deals with concepts of political toleration we analyzed a second set of variables that mostly dealt with immigrants. We noticed that the shift in responses happened when questions included immigrants and their effect on the resources such as jobs. While there was no significant issue regarding having an immigrant for a neighbor, everything changed when the respondents were asked if immigrants from less developed country should have the same right to a job. Here majority of them (as seen in the result section of the research) agreed with strict policies, strict limits on their number when it comes to the same rights for a job.

At this point, we are breaking from understanding toleration as a concept that deals with social relations, which is in our case is represented by the first set of the variables, to the concept of a more complex situations where a political understanding and action is required, which is in our case represented by the second set of the variables dealing with immigrants and their rights to job amongst other things. In other words, the shift from using toleration to describe a social relationship where respondents were asked about a situation where they approve or not having a neighbor different from themselves, to using toleration as a part of a political analysis which among other things regulates the legal relationships between the immigrants and the right to a job (see Galleoti, 2014, Besson, 2012).

According to the quantitative results of each presented country of the Western Balkans, we argue that the level of toleration is higher when it comes to the questions on social relationships only, and it starts dropping down when same respondents faced with questions

that require political action in forms of laws for immigrants in our case. Consequently, the second suggested hypothesis in the present thesis, which states that; “Low level of political tolerance empowers continuous inter-ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans” is partially supported. This conclusion is based on the quantitative results dealing with toleration from four different countries where the decrease in toleration was significant when questions shifted from toleration and social relationships to toleration and political actions especially directed towards immigrants.

We argue that diversity is respected as long as the questions were focused on the relationship between the respondents and their “possible neighbor” from different ethnicities, religion or political vies. Yet when questions focused on the respondent’s attitude towards the immigrant’s rights for a job, and if they are creating problems, increasing crime rates, if they affect the domestic culture, then the toleration rates start to drop. Since the majority of political parties do not deal with the actual social relationships between different ethnicities anymore and they focus on the legal aspect of it, this becomes a source of continuous interethnic tension usually fueled by the dominant culture. Example of this is the law on the language by the Macedonian government.

As Deskoska (2017) points out, the last armed conflict in Macedonia (2001) elucidated if governmental policies chose to ignore interethnic issues for a long time can actually cause them in the first place. Generally, we agree with Deskoska’s claim that the failure to properly answer the requests to improve ethnic rights can lead to conflicts in the state and consequently diminish social unity of that country (Deskoska, 2017, p. 66). She further argues that the actual legal provisions that regulate official use of languages in Macedonia were rather unclear and open to different interpretations, which in return were misused by politicians of all sides that led to additional ethnic mistrust (2001, p. 67). Joseph argued same point where he states that there is a need for a focus on how minorities are treated in the Balkans (2005, p.119).

Following this, we argue that the research question posed in this thesis: Is the Political Tolerance affecting the policy making that focuses on improving inter-ethnic relations in the Western Balkans? This research question is also partially supported since there is a lack of research that would prove the real correlation between political tolerance and policy making

that is focused on improving inter-ethnic relations. The present thesis found out that these changes are usually initiated after an armed conflict happens, such as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. Therefore, we maintain that there is a need for further research on political toleration that focuses on governmental policies and their actual implementation regarding interethnic relations rather than only analyzing this phenomenon from the perspective of social relationships which even though are highly important they fail to offer a foundation for better interethnic relations in the Western Balkans.

## **4.2 Synergy between Political Toleration and Coordination Management of Meaning**

This part will incorporate several standpoints on political toleration especially from the perspective of their intentions and application by the political system. Our aim here is to elucidate the multilayered implications of actions taken by certain democratic system toward what is considered as tolerating individual choices while ignoring political implications of such choices. Consequently, the following discussion will help clarify this implication by describing real example. It is not an easy task to envision changes after the concept of “political toleration” is applied in systems that belong to the liberal-democratic countries since it implies serious changes especially to the pluralist bases of legitimacy (Köker, 1996, p. 315). Moreover, author takes a very sensitive subject case known as “headscarves affair” which had to do with women students who insisted wearing their religious headscarves in France (Islamic tradition). This particular case and its political implications has been studied by other authors as well, specifically by Galeotti and Moruzzi, who according to Köker (1996) did not treat this case as an act of individual choice or belonging to a “private” realm by hiding its political importance. Contrary to this, Galeotti pointed out of the attempt to treat the case as a private choice deriving from the concept of separation between public and private sphere by leaning toward the more “neutral” treatment by the general public (as cited by Köker, 1996, p. 316). Even though one might argue that the “left” political sphere would be more tolerant to such acts, in this case it was left who oddly enough agreed with the Christian Catholic right-wing movement

which were joint here since the act according to both sides challenged what is known as French national identity. This reaction is explained by what author calls French modern national citizenship which was invented by French Revolution that promotes somewhat Unitarian values for all men and women (Köker, 1996, p. 316-317). Nevertheless, Köker maintains that since liberal-democratic vision of what is freedom, equality and justice should be understood as a universal standards then it should not be blind toward individual or group differences, and should be able to provide with solid interpretation without falling for conservative hermeneutics nor absolute relativism (Köker, 1996, p. 318).

We purposefully decided to include the above-mentioned case of political toleration since it shows how important is for a society to have clear strategic policies regarding political toleration. Likewise, similar discussion invokes slight dialectic tension between researchers who view toleration as a concept that is applied only by liberal-democratic states as an obligation and the ones who take political toleration and toleration concept in general as a social phenomenon not necessarily attached to one political system. Consequently, we support arguments, which are aligned with a more critical approach towards the misuse of “freedom of expression” where cases of “racism,” “anti-Semitism,” “call for ethnic cleansing,” should not be respected and possibly not “tolerated.” Trying to put the example of headscarves in the same category of “racism” or “anti-Semitism” just because some view it as a sign of fundamentalism, then the concept of toleration does not suffice the standards or principles of liberal-democratic state based on principles of freedom, equality and justice. It should be part of “political respect” rather than an element of oppression (Köker, 1996, p. 318). Once again we are pointing out that attempting to clarify views, beliefs, and attitudes from the diversity lens it is problematic since it requires that one make a distinction between what can be “politically respected” and “tolerated.” If we start to create categories of views, beliefs and attitudes that can belong to either political respect or toleration we would end up with endless list that can be questioned by everyone with a different approach on political toleration.

The dialectics between individual and group specific cultural characteristics and how one chooses to tolerate them is part of an ongoing debate. Moreover, considering that we are using the concepts of interethnic relations along with intercultural and multicultural concepts.

One way of making this argument more clear is to use Bessone's research on multicultural toleration (2013). Bessone's looks at what it means to use the "multicultural" concept when talking about "multicultural toleration" and when doing so why not simply using the liberal concept to describe both mentioned concepts. Moreover, Bessone maintains that "what makes toleration specifically multicultural, as opposed to simply liberal, is that it comes to refer to recognizing as distinct, and refraining from interfering with, the beliefs, attitudes or ways of life of *cultural groups* or their members" (2013, p. 271). There are several other questions asked by the author regarding what characteristics a cultural group should have in order to be tolerated.

Nevertheless, author poses several conditions that should be discussed in order to understand what multicultural toleration actually is. The first condition deals with the necessity to make a distinction between toleration and acceptance, where the later comes to play when there is no significant deviation between tolerator and the when being tolerated. The second condition deals with the differences between the possible tolerance (internal attitude and readiness to do so) and the one that involves action and behaviors to tolerate. And the last condition deals with the non-rejection of the disapproved or dislikes practices by the group (Bessone, 2013, p.273). Bessone also mentions Forst's elaboration of toleration which deals with the concepts of "permission concept" and more desirable concept of "respect" which always requires a dominant culture (political group) to permit the minority's beliefs and conditions and sometimes to repress the same (2013, p. 273).

On the other hand, author also discusses that toleration can take a form of the "respect conception" also discussed by Köker (1996) where both tolerating and tolerated parties acknowledge each other as political and moral equals regardless their differences (2012, p. 273). In order to illustrate how hard it is to achieve such conception, we will use Galeotti's research on the range of toleration (2014). She presented three conception of toleration including "standard notion, the political conception based on neutrality principle and toleration as recognition" (2014, p. 93). Similarly to Köker's approach, using the toleration as recognition or as a respect was seen as the suitable concept for political issues of toleration in democratic societies. In addition, she offers an example where Muslims of the city of Vercelli (Italy)

requested a place of worship and were denied to one which represents a limited interpretation of standard notion, and as such is not acceptable for democratic politics (2014, p.93).

The reason why standard notion is the type of toleration that explained the above-mentioned issue has to do with what it entails as a concept. Moreover, standard notion of toleration deals with contexts where there are differences of values, attitudes, lifestyles, opinions which are disliked or disapproved but at the same time are acknowledged as being important both to tolerator and the tolerated. If this is not the case, then we are dealing with the indifference (neutrality). Conclusively, these situations can be altered only by the tolerator's resources (Galeotti, 2014, p. 94). Going back to the example of the Vercelli's Muslim community request for a place of worship, Galeotti argues that the denial for such place was somehow replaced with the "toleration" by allowing them to use a warehouse to complete their religious rituals (at least from 2004 to 2011). This is what she categorizes as "disrespectful tolerance" which has a restrictive version of what is described by standard notion of toleration, which in this case one side is literally the political authority. For this reason, the standard notion of toleration should be acknowledged as appropriate for dealing with social relationships only; since the more complex situations requiring political settlement are dealt with concepts of political conception closely related with toleration as recognition, then we would have a better understanding of toleration as part of democratic justice (Galeotti, 2014, p. 107).

Often research on political toleration focuses on particular cultural group, which is distinctive from dominant culture. Other research deals with political toleration while focusing on individual rights and freedoms. Regarding this distinction, Besson argues that it is not enough to apply what is known as the non-interference dimension towards the tolerated groups but rather more political toleration. This has to do with the "readiness to grant specific rights, or exemption from specific duties to group members of cultural groups, in the name of the acceptance of specific and inherently signifying ways of life or practices (2012, p. 277). Of course, this also has its deficiencies since it requires identifying who belongs to those particular groups and that it doesn't necessarily has to be rigid but rather necessary in order for the toleration to be applied.

Therefore, for the purpose of the present thesis we will not go beyond discussions on political toleration that requires the cultural group identifications and pragmatic steps in integrating those groups within one distinctive political system. Most of the debate revolves around the critique on the necessity for a legal framework on what will be the details of political toleration. Who can and cannot be part of it (from that group), when groups should be exempted from obligations and when it can be considered as integrated (the dispute on quotas and positive discrimination) and other important implications that require much more research in the future. One of the dangerous aspects of having a never-ending debate on political toleration is more of a philosophical in nature rather than political or pragmatic.

Moreover, today's liberal-democratic systems are based on political parties which also appoint individuals to represent their communities and then go to the parliament as an extension of people's political will. This system however is not without flaws. Hence, even when the parliament approves certain laws that pertain to the whole society in that particular country, this not necessarily is the real depiction of people's will. Similar deficiencies happen when a political system tries to apply certain policies on cultural groups that do not belong to the dominant culture. Simply asking for a perfect democratic political system and perfect political toleration approach is not entirely possible.

On the other hand, there is an imminent need for public discussion regarding the later in the Western Balkans. In Eastern Europe we have ethnic and cultural groups like Roma who are either "left alone" or "forcefully integrated" but cannot be considered integrated in the society. As Silverman pointed out in her article about the persecution and politicization of Roma in Eastern Europe, when socialist governments tried to integrate Roma people their goal was to attack their culture by trying to disperse their extended families through assimilation (1995). So should the state come up with active toleration policy where that particular community would be given chance to be heard and accepted as equal members of the society? We often face situations when a government in the Western Balkans decides to apply positive quotas during national elections and consequently make a member of Roma community a Member of Parliament. Sadly, the actual impact in overall group or cultural progression is



almost non-existed. One person's inclusion in the highest policy making institution does not correlate with the inclusion of their whole community in the political system.

We maintain that “permissive” approach is important for the beginning and it should evolve into “respect” toleration concept, which would be sufficiently effective to start the dialogue of toleration and interethnic relations in the Western Balkans. Only by holding accountable both public institutions in terms of “permissive” policies and civil society in terms of “respect” campaigns we can have a more sustainable tolerance among different cultures and ethnicities in the Western Balkans. Consequently, these groups should be regarded as able to participate in policy making and given the chance for “equal narrative” partnership. This will diminish the role of some individuals (spokespersons) claiming specific rights or exemptions by not giving the chance to all cultural or subcultural branches to express views.

Even though this particular approach is not merely multicultural since insists on the differences between cultural and political setting, and also argues that issue of toleration fundamentally is related to political dimension (Besson, 2012, p. 282). Elevating the interethnic dialogue beyond individual likelihood to be tolerated or not, and to include organizations and other formal groups. The main reason why we included NGO’s as one of the main key players in making Western Balkans a more inclusive region is precisely because the notion of “culture” itself is rather complex and can be easily misunderstood. Therefore, when involving NGO’s as institutions that have established their political existence through civic engagements, and it is more inviting since it is voluntarily based organization (Besson, 2012, p. 282).

Yet, we do not agree with Besson’s claim that toleration is first a political and not a cultural question. As we mentioned before, one of the first concepts of political toleration were applied in the 17<sup>th</sup> century in the Dutch kingdom due to a different cultural group with specific religion different from that of the majority. The questions of political tolerations cannot dismiss the importance of cultural and therefore ethnic aspect of it. Except that we agree that the current debate is focused so much on cultural aspects that it forget to look the political aspect. Rather than a group being simply an object of non-interference (when we discussed the Roma community), it should be treated by the “ideal of non-domination (being individual or collective) political agents, and all equal subject to the rule of law, and as such participating

equally, as peers, in the conception, formulation and implementation of public policies intended to ensure freedom and equality for all members of the society (citizens and residents), (Besson, 2012, p. 283).

Galeotti argues that discussing toleration as “means of coping with reasonable disagreement seems to forget that the many examples of intolerance in our world are in fact the product of unreasonable disagreement. In that sense political theory cannot give up responding to intolerance” (2014, p. 254). Therefore, there is a need to explain the possible causes of these disagreements to begin with and then suggests solutions on how to identify and act on situations that produce these disagreements before they become harder to deal with. It is rather understandable when authors like Besson (2012) and others are critical toward applying the non-effective “permission” based toleration when dealing with a cultural group that is different from the dominant culture. Additionally there is lack of support for what is known as the non-interference dimension of political tolerance. Yet, we argue that there is still a theoretical gap regarding more pragmatic approach in dealing with these complex toleration-related situations.

Surely we agree that there is need for the ability and obligation from the tolerator’s side to be able to grant specific rights and exemption from specific civic duties of a certain cultural group in the spirit of integration and positive discrimination, but by no means we should rely on these strategies for the long-term solutions to let’s say interethnic tensions. When talking about interethnic relation we cannot simply treat this as toleration and social relationship or as toleration and political conception since these relations involves both approaches. Furthermore, discussing interethnic relations cover both relationship between ethnicities within one state and the intercultural aspect of interethnic relations (when ethnicities belong to different countries).

Accordingly, it makes the applicability of many aspects of theoretical approaches from political toleration hard. For this reason, we need to once again focus our research goals for the present thesis and at the same time offer many theoretical approaches related to political toleration. Following this line, we can argue that until the present times, most of the toleration related approaches in the Western Balkans were mostly what can be labeled as what Galeotti

describes as “disrespectful tolerance” (2014). This type of tolerance is perhaps the least favored extension of what we know as “permissive” approach if it does not evolve into what we discussed earlier to be a toleration based on “respect” (see Galeotti, 2014). Thus, adding a theoretical approach from the field of applied communication that pushes to look at the communication process (from interpersonal to interethnic) by celebrating dialogic approach (Pearce 2007), presents an opportunity to take one step further in understanding and researching political tolerance in the context of interethnic relations.

Adding to Galeotti’s standard notion, political conception based on neutrality principle, and toleration as recognition (2014, p. 93), and Köker’s argument of freedom, equality and justice being universal standards that are not blind toward individual or group differences (1996); we suggest incorporating Pearce’s description of ethnocentric, modernistic and cosmopolitan forms of communication as a common denominator for the previously mentioned toleration concepts. It is only a natural progression in the attempt to incorporate political toleration concepts and CMM. Furthermore, we will also discuss below how supporting one form of communication against the other actually gives birth to a “certain social world.”

One of the ways to support and justify integration of political toleration concepts and CMM is to do it through a visual representation of the same. Consequently, in the following pages we will develop a chart based on the above-mentioned political tolerance concepts and CMM. In order to give context to the political toleration notions used in the present thesis we use Pearce’s explanation of forms of communication such as ethnocentric, modernistic and cosmopolitan. We purposefully did not include monocultural form of communication in the chart since when discussing political toleration the nominal condition for the exercise of toleration is to have the tolerator and the tolerated. If we include the monocultural concept in the chart it would hinder the purpose of the synergy between Political Toleration and CMM. Nevertheless, a short explanation through an analogy will be provided for monocultural form of communication as well. This multifaceted theoretical approach is beneficial for the present thesis since it subsequently offers a solid perspective on how would an applied theory of communication help elucidate the complex frameworks of political toleration in general.

Even though we decided not to include monocultural form of communication in the chart, we feel obligated to include it in the general description of forms of communication as it is offered by Pearce (1989, 2007). Moreover, Pearce draws on Marvin Brown (2005, as cited by Pearce 2007, p. 159) depiction of corporate integrity where an example of a trade show was offered to illustrate these forms of communication. Conversely, we will additionally alter the explanation of forms of communication by using the analogy of the Coffee Shop rather than the one with the trade show used in the book by Pearce (2007, p. 159-160). Our example consists of one street with four different coffee shops:

- a) First coffee shop has a big sign outside with a description that they serve only one taste of coffee (espresso Arabica) and nothing else. Inside every employee is dressed the same and they can address customers only by using the phrase “welcome.” They are not even aware of different types of neither coffee nor different forms of communication.
- b) Second coffee shop has a big sign outside with a list of several types of coffee but only one is highlighted and the rest is marked with an X sign. They emphasize that their blend of coffee is the only one worth serving, and the rest are inferior to it. Also, they have a description where they criticize three other coffee shops as not the “right one,” “not pure coffee experience” and that their customers are worse customers ever. The story continues where they claim to have known “the only right way to blend the coffee.”
- c) Third coffee shop has a big outside sign where it says, “only Bitcoin accepted.” The coffee shop itself is filled with the latest gadgets. They change their coffee machines as soon as the new model comes out. Also, they are never satisfied with the existing coffee offer and simply add new flavors and versions all the time. No one is really interested to serve customers since they all stare at screens all the time and feel anxious about the latest coffee making gadgets and electronic payments. This coffee shop’s interior changes every week since they follow the latest trends. They also laugh at other coffee shops as not being “hype” enough and too “old fashioned.”
- d) Fourth coffee shop has a sign where multiple types of coffee blends are served. You could tell that this coffee shop takes pride in being able to offer variety of blends and considers this to be an advantage rather than weakness. They do accept Bitcoins as a

mode of payment, however they also accept cash. Tables are put in a manner to encourage conversations and exchange of ideas. There are many coffee flavors with the coffee of the day that is chosen by full consensus from the employees. Employees do not have uniforms and they cannot be distinguished from clients except when they engage clients by addressing them first and welcoming them in the coffee shop.

Even though there are many ways to study forms of communication, we chose to stay loyal to Pearce's (2007, p. 160-161) explanation of forms of communication in order to give proper analysis of our artifacts and theoretical discussion on political toleration and CMM. Hence, once again we heavily borrow from his book "Making Social Worlds – a communication perspective (2007). Here he argues that monocultural form of communication requires total disregard for other cultures since they are not seen as native which means perceiving things in a same way and know same things. Everything else is simply not noticed. However, things get a bit more interesting when discussing ethnocentric forms of communication.

Now we have to deal with sharp distinction between "us" and "them," "right" and "wrong" or the most prevalent one in political speeches "good" and "evil." Consequently, this form of communication requires full commitment to one of the patterns of communication otherwise you would be considered as "them" or as "evil" for that matter. This form of communication is often used in political speeches since it delivers very clear message without the need to use more complex speech codes. Modernistic form of communication however celebrates differences for a specific amount of time. The reason why use the concept of time here has to do with the constant need for something new in order to replace the "old."

The way both International and domestic NGO's operated in the Western Balkans is similar to the modernistic approach of communication. The present thesis mentions how NGO's in Kosovo and the rest of the Western Balkans have duplicated the work and were not coordinated among each other while trying to constantly apply and get funds for projects that were mostly just being repetitive since they were constantly going after "new" topics. This form of communication requires from people to be seen and to see other depending on what position they take upon "progress." Essentially if you oppose a certain change then you must be

against “progress” and therefore not appropriate. Finally, when taking cosmopolitan form of communication one has to acknowledge differences as something normal which can be worth exploring more. Here “differences” don’t have to be “resolved” and the main focus is finding ways to coordinate which each other in a social world which itself is comprised of other social worlds; here people are not simply different but they should be different (Pearce, 2007, p.161). One should not mistake these forms of communication for non-intentional processes or simplistic. They are rooted in human consciousness and used to navigate social lives on a daily basis. For this reason, trying to alter these forms of communication and possibly shift from one form to another is not an easy mission.




Figure 4.1. 1 Synergy of Pol.Tolerance and CMM: This chart borrows from Political Tolerance notions of Galeotti (2014), Köker (1996), Besson (2012), and Pearce (2007).

When taking the communication perspective, we are bound to take into account the past conversations or actions that pretty much determined our present realities. It is about those critical moments of looking closely at turn-by-turn process of communication that can be

used to improve our ability to discern those moments, which in turn can create a different “afterlife” (Pearce, 2007, p.3). Consequently, this opens up a wide array of possibilities for the political and policy studies among other fields of social sciences. If people involved in direct policy making process are more aware of their actual power of creating new realities or altering the old ones, perhaps there is a chance for better outcome of their policies. Reducing this possibility to a merely technical process of politics and policymaking seems rather unfair and contra productive.

Often, we have the feeling that people involved in politics and policy making are exempt from responsibility since they “have” to follow technical processes that cannot be changed. This could not be further from the truth. The narrative of untouchable political figures and complex policymaking that is not envisioned to be understood by the masses has been dominating social landscapes in the Western Balkans especially after the WWII. During communist times no one dared to question political system, even less the people that were responsible for policymaking. This type of narrative unfortunately has been recycled and it is still very much alive even in the present times where all Western Balkans countries are seldom democracies. There are many campaigns started from the civic society regarding the accountability of government in the Western Balkan, except regrettably they are having either minimum or no effect at all. Basically, the political life cycle of the Western Balkans starts with the beginning of elections and end when elections end. In addition, there is a significant drop in protests as well. Political apathy is a real threat to the democratic process in the Western Balkans.

As Pearce points out, critical moments take place every time people creating meanings and coordinating among each other; this happens all the time, during family gatherings, political rallies, listening or giving lectures, when answering questions in an interview and consultations, political campaigns etc., (2007, p. 12). At this point, Pearce offers a rather unique analysis and perspective of how CMM can be employed in such critical moments. He proposes detailed description of the 9/11 speeches by President Bush and why was that seen as a critical moment that was not used and as such presents a missed opportunity. Present thesis draws a parallel comparison between this speech and the ones delivered by Milosevic in Gazimestan in 1989, as another missed opportunity to create different social reality from the one both

speeches have helped created. Nevertheless, it is crucial to mention that the comparison of these two speeches is done solely from the academic perspective and by no means the author of the thesis claims that there is a similarity between them; besides only being important in the sense of creating situations which have shaped altered social realities in different time for different regions, even though the 9/11 speech had global effect and the one delivered by Milosevic was somewhat limited to the Western Balkans.

We will not provide the full transcript of the Bush's 9/11 speech since the purpose of this analysis is not the speech comparison but rather just describing the importance of how to act in critical moments, so we can help shape better social outcome. Also, it is pivotal to admit that the actual motivation for finding other ways to analyze Milosevic's speech was precisely Pearce's elaboration of the critical moments' of 9/11 speech in his book "Making Social Worlds: a Communication Perspective (2007, p. 12-27). On the other hand, it is no surprise that we use this book since it is also the main theoretical lens used in the present thesis. Pearce asks few important questions regarding how 9/11 speech was delivered and what effect it had globally.

He begins by asking the question **how the story was told?** In other words, in such periods of immense crisis, leaders needs to try and help broader audience comprehend what is going on, and to reassure them that the matter is being handled by competent people by also letting them know what will be done in a response. All these intentions were present in Bush's speech according to Pearce (2007, p.13).

**Where does the story begin?** Is the next questions which in the case of the Bush's speech was at "8:45 A.M. on September 11, this particular way of storytelling basically left everything that could be considered important to give context to why this horrendous terrorist act happened, consequently adding to the overall confusion about what was going on (Pearce, 2007, p.13). Pearce goes on and mentions how this speech could have taken a hint from other famous speeches throughout history, starting with examples of Pope Urban speech in November 1095 where he called Christians to mount a Crusade to aid the Byzantine emperor in his war against Seljuk Turks. There were several other examples offered here just to illustrate that starting a speech about 9/11 while trying to give a better context would have been much more effective. After all, the World Trade Center has been attacked in 1993 by Ramze Ahmed



Youssef who later admitted and declared that he was proud of what he did since it was USA who actually “invented” terrorism etc. (Pearce, 2007, p. 14-15). Consequently, Pearce suggests that if President Bush had used these events of stories to start his speech perhaps he would have been criticized for not being direct enough and tough, but at the same time he would have laid down foundation for a more nuanced and careful American policy that might cause less negative reaction from Muslims worldwide.

### 4.3 How should we frame what happened?

Pearce starts this explanation by referring to the timeline between the two speeches delivered by President Bush and its shift from “a response to a terrorist act” to a “war on terrorism.” He continues by arguing that this shift is hugely important since by the end of the week when the speech was delivered, Congress granted the President extraordinary powers, similar to a state of war (2007, p. 15). According to Pearce, this is where from the usual “war” metaphor other concepts like “us” vs. “them” was established as the basis of the legitimate conflict. Of course the concepts of “we are good” and “they are evil” was nothing new and was used by many political figures throughout history of politics. Here there is no place for the third category. It is the time when “friends” should be clearly marked and distinctive from “enemies.”

When posing the question on could President Bush have acted and responded in another way. Pearce suggested that instead of just “talking American” which can only be a basis for a continuous bloody conflict, sometimes instead of inventing alternatives to “talking American” we would acknowledge that “ordinary people can communicate more productively if they are in well-designed meeting or have the service of a skillful mediator or facilitator, or by simply experiencing other more productive forms of communication (2007, p.18).

Below we will one of the ways proposed by Pearce that would arranged what can be known as an alternative form of communication between parties involved in a dispute, misunderstanding, organizational or political crisis (2007, p. 18):

1. Constructing a richer story about what happened, including:
  - An understanding of other;

- An understanding of ourselves; and
  - An understanding of the historical context.
2. Constructing a more systemic description of what happened:
    - Beyond “us” and “them” to the patterns that “we” are involved in; and
    - Beyond “win” and “lose” to win-win outcomes.
  3. Facilitating an increased awareness of the roles the participants play in making the world in which they live:
    - Noting their responsibility for making patterns in which they find themselves, not just blaming the other; and
    - Noting their opportunities for acting in novel ways, not just responding in the most obvious ways.
  4. Changing the context:
    - Providing a new interpretation of what’s important or relevant (including “common ground”);
    - Moving to a different space or place; and
    - Changing the set of participants.
  5. Minding and caring about the kind of energy that is involved.

Following the maxim that what we pay attention to grows, it makes a difference whether the participants in a moral conflict attend to that which is wrong/missing/bad or to that which is right/present/good. These differences in attention summon very different kinds of energy and thus resources to act into difficult situations. In general, “appreciative” energy is far more productive than “deficit” energy.

Pearce continues to elaborate the famous Abraham Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address” and how his ability to act in critical moments without pointing precisely at alternatives but rather naturally speaking as if that particular version of the future is already developing in the present times. Nevertheless, considering that the present thesis deals with the Western Balkans we use same suggested forms of alternative communication that would be suitable for the political developments in this region. Furthermore, as an outcome we will create a model of how to

design and deal with all intercultural events happening in the Western Balkans, starting from activities initiated by Civic Society or Governments.

Regarding Civic Society, let's go back again to Nick Scott-Flynn's recommendation in his article about the need of a Council that would coordinate NGO sector in order to be more effective (2003), unfortunately such Council never came to realization and Kosovo ended up having hundreds of NGO's who's mission and vision were more than similar. Even though the actual impact of NGO's in Kosovo regarding improving interethnic relations cannot be measured quantitatively, the current situation where you still have Serbian enclaves not being integrated or refusing to be integrated in their new country can be taken as a serious indicator of non-efficiency of hundreds of NGO's interethnic campaigns and projects. This lack of coordination between NGO's was partly because of modernistic form of communication applied by this sector.

Below you will find the already suggested productive forms of communication hypothetically applied by an NGO when designing project proposals or different campaigns for the interethnic relations in the Western Balkans:

**Context:** a hypothetical situation where Milosevic's speech in Gazimestan would have taken the communication perspective and more cosmopolitan viewpoint instead of ethnocentric approach. This can be done without ignoring all other factors that actually led to that particular tension between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs in 1989, which later involved almost all other nations in ex- Yugoslavia. We adapt Pearce's alternative forms of alternative communication, which would have helped create different social reality.

**1. Constructing a richer story about what happened, including:**

- **An understanding of other.** This part needs to include researched material on the topic of culture, empathy and emotional intelligence. Instead of starting the speech by mentioning the 600<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo by making a connection between this important historical date and Serbia gaining power that it deserved, the speech should have started with the simple statement about how this battle united all nations in the region. In addition, the part of his speech where he

mentions that *“it is not difficult for us to answer today the old question: how are we going to face Milos (as in Milos Kopilic the legendary hero who died in the Battle) could be replaced with “let us remember today that Milos Kopilic sacrificed himself for everyone who cherished freedom regardless their ethnicity.”* This small change in the introduction would present to be a good foundation for other part of the speech where more inclusive tone in mind.

- **An understanding of ourselves.** This presents another opportunity by letting your audience know that being aware of your own culture does not translate to hating other cultures. In the contrary, understanding ourselves is crucial in our attempts to learn about others as we have a solid foundation for further comparisons. Here one should be careful of not ignoring celebrations of cultural values by classifying them as *“backward act”* since in today’s world there is only *“us the global interconnected society.”* This is a problem that CMM describes as Modernistic Approach which has short-term effect and is always based on what is the latest and greatest and overlooking whatever they consider *“old”* and *“backward.”* At this point, we suggest a sentence like *“We understand the responsibility that we have as the largest ethnic group and as such we will make sure the rest of our fellow-citizens don’t feel left out.”*
- **An understanding of the historical context.** Third aspect on constructing a richer story about what happened is rather hard since it relies on objective approach on historical context of an event. Since every point in the project will have to include some historical context, trying to do so and not fall victim of ethnocentric communicative patterns is hard especially for the young and untrained professionals. Most of the interethnic issues in the Western Balkans are related to historical dispute on territory, myths and political power. However, if the above-mentioned first and second sub points were done correctly, the third one would be much easier to construct. Asking from participants to do a literature review together before designing interethnic project would be of a benefit for all. This is due to the

more objective requests by the researchers when researching interethnic relations regardless cultural contexts.

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## 2. Constructing a more systemic description of what happened:

- **Beyond “us” and “them” to the patterns that “we” are involved in.** Almost all of the daily political rhetoric in the Western Balkans revolves around “us” and “them” and suggesting using the term “we” would be hard especially for the politicians who usually gain lots of popularity by misusing the “us” vs. “them” terminology. The late 80’ in Yugoslavia started to be shaped by nationalistic movements in almost all regions of the country. In the actual speech, Milosevic masterfully uses the ethnocentric appeal by claiming that regardless Serbs being the major nation in the Yugoslavia, they did not use this against others but also did not use this for their own benefit. Milosevic’s calls for Serbs to take on their destiny as the largest nation in the region and he did this by condemning past leaders for not being united but that this was no longer the case or as he said *“This situation lasted for decades, it lasted for years and here we are now at the field of Kosovo to say that this is no longer the case.”* It is indeed astonishing how the myth was used to put the Serbian people against every other nation that lived under Yugoslavia at that time. The sheer of ethnocentric standpoint that was celebrated by Milosevic was no match for any other politician for decades to come in the region. The battle of Kosovo myth was supported by the *“nation of heaven”* myth and both were often used as a foundation for nationalistic rhetoric and policies. Whenever you would hear “we” in Milosevic’s speech was addressed to Serbs and “others” for everyone else living in the region regardless of the brief mentioning that *“...for saying that unity in Serbia will bring prosperity to the Serbian people in Serbia and each one of its citizens, irrespective of his national or religious affiliation.”* And continues by devoting a whole paragraph to the fact that other nationalities lived there and that should be seen as an advantage. Nevertheless, this was smoke and mirrors where behind the scenes included political imprisonments, closing of Universities and basically

whoever was seen as unsuitable the regime could take any action against that particular citizen.

- **Beyond “win” and “lose” to win-win outcomes.** The political reality in the Western Balkans always yields the way to the untested ways of achieving and measuring results. Furthermore, the concept of *“ask for much more and then bring down the level of requests”* is encouraged and applied by the politicians in the daily basis. This is done mostly because of the unawareness of ways and questions that needs to be asked before undertaking interethnic negotiations. Instead of the approach where one side pretends to know how the *“other”* side will behave, and instead of asking questions like *“well what do you mean by this or that?”* CMM suggests questions like *“What are we making together?” “How are we making it” and “How can we make better social world”* by not even considering that their side has to *“win” or “lose.”* In this way, the win-win outcome is rather possible. There is an imminent need in the Western Balkans, especially from the media and the NGO sector to focus more on projects that will help detach our collective mindset from dualistic *“black and white”* approach. This binary collective conciseness cost the region a lot. Having options only to *“win”* and *“lose”* undermines the possibilities that human condition can achieve by simply employing different language when discussing crucial things like the future of interethnic relations.

### **3. Facilitating an increased awareness of the roles the participants play in making the world in which they live:**

- **Noting their responsibility for making patterns in which they find themselves, not just blaming the other.** Taking responsibility for their action and accountability were never a forte of a typical Western Balkan political leader. The tendencies to blame the *“other”* side for every problem is something that the Western Balkan is known for. In the Gazimestan speech, Milosevic carefully plays on the blaming the past Serbian leaders for not being *“united”* enough and therefore all sufferings happened because of such lack of unity. This rather epideictic approach used by Milosevic was tremendously successful since it was followed by several wars and conflicts in the

Western Balkans. Since according to Sullivan (1993, p. 339) epideictic rhetoric is seen as a part of homogenous culture and celebrates dominant ideology, we can see why this was a choice made by Milosevic for his historic speech. Considering that today's interconnected world makes impossible for hegemonic societies to exist (at least in parts of the world with access to technology), there is a need for a more progressive approach that empowers the individual with choices and options about better future. Though, as we mentioned several times before there is a necessity for training programs that focuses on social constructivism and how powerful is this concept when dealing with interethnic issues. When key players (Governments and NGO's) are more aware and comfortable with these concepts, it will be easier for them to employ the same in the actual negotiations or other interethnic actions. Public Education system in the Western Balkans still lacks of proper strategies that would go slightly beyond information reproduction and more into imagining and designing the future. Mechanistic approach to education will cost the region the price of experiencing same loop of interethnic tensions without a hope for a better future. Even though the integration in international organizations and especially European Union is seen as a salvation, one forgets that it is what we bring to the European Union is equally important as what we get. If we bring our fragile and non-effective way of dealing with economics and interethnic issues, then we will automatically reduce the chances of becoming a stabile region.

- **Noting their opportunities for acting in novel ways, not just responding in the most obvious ways.** In order to be able to identify an opportunity for acting in a more constructive way and getting beyond the trap of cause-effect thinking one needs to be aware of the proper communication tools to do precisely that. First part of this goal was achieved by Milosevic's speech since he was aware of the large number of people that would be present on that day in Gazimestan. However, instead of using this opportunity to respond in a more constructive manner, he carefully relied on the cause-effect strategy by stirring the masses (around 1 million people listened to

this speech) into conflicts that would last for decade and tens of thousands of victims.

#### 4. Changing the context:

- **Providing a new interpretation of what's important or relevant (including "common ground").** This phase of what an alternative form of communication should include can be considered essential if identified properly and used to promote what is known as a "common ground" rather relying on divisive rhetoric. In the actual speech, Milosevic moves the discussion from capital mistakes done by Serbian leaders sine medieval time to the modern time by following the same self-victimization pomposity. Furthermore, when transitioning from medieval to the modern times, he emphasizes how *"Even later, when a socialist Yugoslavia was set up, in this new state the Serbian leadership remained divided, prone to compromise to the detriment of its own people. The concessions that many Serbian leaders made at the expense of their people could not be accepted historically and ethically by any nation in the world, especially because the Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others."* Arguably, this statement that Milosevic made is not entirely true considering Balkan wars of 1912-1913 where Serbia wanted beside northern Macedonia to siege the parts of Albania as well if not stopped by Austria (<https://www.britannica.com/topic/Balkan-Wars>).

However, as speech progresses, there is little space for building the "common ground" as he always goes back to how treacherous Serbian leaders were towards their own nation and that has to stop. Everything in the speech revolved around Serbs being the victims of their own disunity and other circumstances for hundreds of years.

- **Moving to a different space or place; and Changing the set of participants** can be quite useful for someone who's intention is to bring the political spectrum together, but not for the one that believes in divide and conqueror. In the case of Milosevic's speech, the place where the speech took place and participants were carefully



planned ahead. Moreover, choosing the famous Battle of Kosovo date, the 28<sup>th</sup> of June, and delivering it in front of Serbian public helped his goal of planting the seed of Serbian supremacy on other nations living in the ex-Yugoslavia. The content of the speech was not suitable for any other contexts since its message was not universal or cosmopolitan in its essence (regardless how many cosmopolitan paragraphs he actually put on the speech).

##### **5. Minding and caring about the kind of energy that is involved.**

At first this might seem as something that derives from the metaphysical standpoint. Yet, the actual dialectics between the involvement to something that is wrong/missing or bad, against what is right/present and good is what all of us experience in our daily lives. Now let us take this to the level of someone's actions having an effect in everyone's lives in the country. The ability to identify the dramatic situation where the choice of actions leads to unprecedented effects is pivotal for what reality do we want to live in. CMM accepts the fact that "appreciative" energy is significantly more productive compared "deficit" energy. In our present times, we are aware of which path did Milosevic choose.

Consequently, based on the above-mentioned discussion, the first hypothesis for the present PhD thesis which is: **Coordinated Management of Meaning offers alternative form of communication to better manage interethnic tensions in the Western Balkans**, is supported. This is due to CMM being an applied theory which indeed offers alternative forms of communication that can be directly applied in better managing inter-ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans.

Chapter

**V**

# Conclusions and Recommendations



[V.1 CONCUSSIONS](#)

[V.2. RECOMMENDATIONS](#)

[V.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH](#)

## CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 CONCLUSIONS

The use of myths for nationalistic rhetoric was not by any means an exclusivity of Serbian political leaders only. Every other nation in the ex-Yugoslavia in one-way or another used historical myths to put their nation above others. However, the rationale behind the decision to focus only in the medieval myth used by the Serbian political leader was based on the fact that they were the largest ethnic community in Yugoslavia and as such had the greatest political and militaristic power. At the same time, decisions that were made or supported by the Serbian political leaders led to ethnic cleansing and other atrocities in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

It is regrettable to witness all these missed opportunities to act on dramatic event with the intention of creating better social reality by the leaders of the Western Balkans. The latest attempt to misuse the past to undermine the possibility for a better future is done by the Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic on the 8<sup>th</sup> of September 2018. In his speech during the visit to the Gazivoda lake (which is highly strategic lake for Kosovo), Vucic echoed the infamous Gazimestan speech by Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 where the 14<sup>th</sup> century Battle of Kosovo took place (Circic, 2018, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vucic-s-kosovo-speech-promoted-a-dangerous-fantasy-09-10-2018-1>).

Circic in his article argues that Vucic being an experienced “political manipulator” he send both threatening messages as well as “messages of peace,” which were well received by his followers from the government and his political party who later praised him for delivering such a magnificent speech (2018). What was also interesting according Circic is that international community was also pleased by this speech since Vucic did not use this opportunity to cause riots and call Serbs to take on arms. This did not make the speech less toxic according to him, since Vucic used coded language that actually send nationalistic messages to the Kosovo Serbs (2018, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vucic-s-kosovo-speech-promoted-a-dangerous-fantasy-09-10-2018-1>).

More or less everything that Vucic does politically is somewhat inline with Milosevic's policies of grandeur national values of "Greater Serbia" and "Heavenly Serbia." Vucic's figure remains normalized by the West regardless his ultra nationalistic standpoint when he was member of the Serbian Radical Party by making him almost a figure that "get things done" and make "hard deals" for the greater cause, which is often seen as a peace among Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. However, there is a hint on the past Gazimestan speech where he actually mentions that "My job isn't myths or dreams or hallucinations or twisted visions of Kosovo without Albanians or Kosovo without Serbs. My job is reality. What it is today, here and now, in today's Kosovo, in today's Serbia, not some heavenly Serbia. We fell from that heaven. We fell and seriously injured ourselves. Our heads are covered in blood, our arms are broken." (<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vucic-s-kosovo-speech-promoted-a-dangerous-fantasy-09-10-2018-1>).

At first, this is exactly what everyone was waiting to hear. Finally, a political leader that detaches from the past where myths were the force behind political movements that caused mayhem in the Western Balkans. Some critics are not so happy with this speech after all. Other news outlets like Reuters were more moderate toward this event. Moreover, they emphasized Vucic's part of the speech where he calls for compromise, which is hard but necessary for both parties (Retrieved on September 15, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-serbia/serbias-president-says-he-is-committed-to-compromise-with-kosovo-idUSKCN1LP05Q>). Yet the European Commission criticized the subtle but yet visible references to the past. An article by the Internet portal Euractiv cites Vucic's speech where he said, "Milosevic was a great Serbian leader whose intentions were certainly for the best, but our results were very poor. Not because he wanted that but because our wishes were unrealistic, while we neglected and underestimated the interests and aspirations of other nations" (Retrieved on September 15, 2018, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/commission-frowns-at-serbian-presidents-praise-of-milosevic/>).

Here we can see an uncanny similarity between this and the Gazimestan speech, which is one of the main artifacts analyzed in the present thesis. Especially the part where Vucic says, "Because of that, we paid the largest and more severe price. We haven't become bigger,"

draws from the same speech style delivered by Milosevic in Gazimestan in 1989. Milosevic also in his speech mentioned, *“The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of tis history. Even in the last war, this lack of unity and betrayal led to Serbian people and Serbia in agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral sense exceeded fascist aggression. Even later, when a socialist Yugoslavia was set up, in this new state the Serbian leadership remained divided, prone to compromise to the detriment of tis own people.”* Here clearly Milosevic wants to blame the lack of unity for all bad things that happened to Serbian people and consequently portray them as victims of this disunity. Just like Vucic’s claim of Serbs being victims of political myths (seemingly critical towards past speeches) Milosevic claimed that they were victim of disunity. Regardless how much Vucic attempted to sound more progressive with his speech, the fact that he claims that Milosevic “was a great Serbian Leader” in a country where his actions led to ethnic cleansing and massacres, clearly is not a right message aimed at better future for both ethnicities in Kosovo. After all, Milosevic was indicted by the UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for crimes against humanity in Kosovo. Accordingly, this type of rhetoric was criticized by the European Commission who unlike few media outlets was able to take a critical stance into the speech and through the EU’s foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini spokesperson said that the reconciliation and normalization of relations are possibly only if the policies of the past which brought decades of misery and suffering to the Western Balkans are rejected.

There is still a hope even though many ethnocentric leaning political figures and parties are betting on EU enlargement fatigue in order to continue to preach division through nationalism. On the other hand, some authors believe that the year 2018 presents an opportunity for the Western Balkan EU integration regardless issues such as refugee crisis, Brexit, and Greek debt crisis. Perry, (2018) wrote an article about “De-Balkanization” where she cites EU foreign Policy chief Federica Mogherini’s statement that “the door is open” and that “there is a clear path for the Western Balkans to finally join the European Union” (2018, p. 6). Even though this article starts on the positive note, once again the author reminds us about few threats that can undermine the process of integration. These threats are mostly related with

Russia's influence in Serbia on one hand and the Turkish influence in Albania and Kosovo. These influences are merely based in common religion, which is Orthodox in the Serbia's case and Muslim in Albania and Kosovo's case (Perry, 2018, p. 6). Author continues to express the view that despite wishes and attempts by EU to embrace the Western Balkans in the Union, there are still significant roadblocks which means no country from the region is expected to become an EU member before 2025 (Perry, 2018). Countries like Serbia and Montenegro are seen as the front-runners despite the fact that they have met only a small number of what is known as Copenhagen Criteria related to economic and political conditions (Perry, 2018, p. 6).

There are many cases thorough history where people acted responsibly in sensitive and dramatic situations where the outcome was the one that changed the life for the better. One of those events was the famous Abraham Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" in November 19, 1863. The context was harsh since the speech took place in a battlefield in the ceremony of the Union soldiers. However, President Lincoln never used phrases such as "us" and "them" or "losers" and "winners" but rather focused on the rhetoric that will be much more constructive for the future plans. Rather, he focused on the proposition that "all men are created equal" and that all these men that lost their lives it was because they believed that "government of the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth" should be guiding premise (Pearce, 2007, p. 19). Furthermore, in the midst of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the European Recovery Plan known as Marshall Plan that was initiated by the USA in order to help Europe recover from the Second World War was precisely the kind of act that helped create a better future for all. This process required from people to go beyond temporary emotions and be part of something bigger. Both Gettysburg Address and the Marshall Plan, Pearce argues, are cases where the above-mentioned divisive rhetoric was not part of the mindset. Focused on creating a better world, both situations created productive energies that had an effect larger than just solving problems indented by their founders (Pearce, 2007, p.21).

The present thesis mentions several times how interethnic relations can be improved among others through applied communication theory (CMM) and political toleration even in situations when there is little hope for a particular interethnic conflict to resolve. However, in order to better understand how this can be contextually applied in certain interethnic conflict it

requires from key actors to have particular set of resources. Everyone uses his or her set of resources when engaging in communication process (including in interethnic conflict resolutions). The very fact that every person holds dearly to their resources makes negotiations a very complex undertaking. Let's first look at what do we mean by these resources through CMM perspective. One cannot discuss CMM without mentioning how narratives, perceptions, beliefs, memories shape one's "resources" and so forth, which in turn help the person make their world coherent.

For more, even the present conversations are led by resources so much that even the memory of that conversations becomes part of the resources that guide future conversations (Pearce, 1989, p. 39). According to Pearce, resources are expressed in practices since they comprise a "logic" of meaning and action that define what is obligatory, legitimate, dubious, or prohibited (1989, p. 39). Consequently, this logic also makes people to have different type of interpretations about their events, environment or social events. The term "logical force" is used by Pearce as an explanation of the force of an argument rather than physical force or a law.

Here it is important to mention that people often try to avoid what Pearce describes as undesirable repetitive patterns by reporting in an honest way that they had no choice and had to act this way. This is followed by an example of a study of domestic violence where the man after being questioned about his violent actions he replied by saying "It's not my fault, I can't control myself." Even though the same person replied, "I'd never do that" when was asked why he did not kill his wife. Consequently it seems that even though person's resources enabled him to act in a violent way since he did not know (had proper resources) how to manage an argument, he still was relatively in control of his actions and did not kill his wife (this refutes his previous statement of not being in control) (Pearce, 1989, p. 39). What is more, the team of researchers when analyzing domestic violence came into a conclusion that violent acts happened when the logic of meaning and action demanded that the person do something at the same time (like simply walking away or dismissing the tension with a smile or a hug was rather unthinkable), and prohibited every thinkable act (Pearce, 1989, p.39).

In the perspective of intercultural and interethnic relations, there are many logics of meaning and action, which differ from each other. Pearce argues that cultures, groups or publics are defined since their logics of meaning and actions are similar at least as compared with other alien standard (1989, p.40). He continues by adding that even within these categories individuals may have quite different logics so much that even within individuals there may be different logics when facing with specific situation or a person. Furthermore, one can be sophisticated when dealing with religion and naïve about science or vice versa (1989, p.40). Once again we used part of CMM concepts to illustrate certain human communication phenomenon by not necessarily describing the whole development of CMM since that is not the purpose of the research. Additionally, it goes for the description of resources within the context of CMM, which as Pearce points out practices express resources but not all at one.

The actual relationship between object and events of social reality are not developed in one single act but are rather a product of a complex sequence of messages development constantly and simultaneously by multiple persons who may want to express different resources (1989, p. 41). Intercultural misunderstanding is not only intrinsically noteworthy in terms of language barriers. Most of the times it starts when some might assume that others think, reason and perceive in the same way as they do (Klope, 1995, p. 205). Inevitably, this viewpoint is an indication that such a person does have a lack of knowledge on other cultures. This presumption may cause considerable misconstruction when engaging in conversations with people from different cultures. On the other hand, Park (as cited by Klope, 1995, p.204) states that differences may "...cause people to regard each other as strange or barbaric". The latter indicates a manifestation of ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism takes place when a certain group sees their own group as "We alone are the people" and all other cultures and co-cultures are seen as inferior.

Furthermore, it is an expression of the in-group preference deriving from general syndrome of attitudes and behavior where attitudes include viewing your won group and superior and values as universal (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). It should be noted that ethnocentrism itself as a notion has been part of an important debate regarding its conceptual analysis and political implications. Bearing in mind that the present thesis focuses on inter-



ethnic issues and political toleration among other things, we should provide a clarification of ethnocentrism in relation with these two dimensions. Therefore we will provide Bizumic's and Duckitt's discussion on the topic by helping clarify the concept of ethnocentrism (2012). Furthermore, they argue that "ethnocentrism is re-conceptualized as a strong sense of ethnic group self-centeredness, which involves intergroup expressions of ethnic group preference, superiority, purity and exploitativeness, and intragroup expressions of ethnic group cohesion and devotion (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012, p. 887). Additionally it is important to mention that it is conceptually and empirically different from other concepts concerning outgroup negativity and mere ingroup positivity (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012).

Mach (1993, p.13) suggests that people's unique cultural identity should be preserved while still taking other cultures into consideration. He writes that technical unity is possible worldwide but with due allowance of cultural pluralism, and we argue that this is the only way we can expect to have a sustainable peace in the Western Balkans. The 'culture' debate has focused attention on the importance of communication between people of totally diverse cultures. Formal learning, according to Klope (1995, p.124), "...tends to be highly verbal". It is important to keep in mind that the same words and behavior may mean totally different things in different cultures.

People might, therefore, misunderstand each other completely if they do not know each other's cultures well. Obviously, this could be problematic. We agree with Jacob and Jordan (1993, p.6) notice that it is virtually impossible to know any culture in all its subtle, multifarious variety. Such position is strongly supported in the present thesis where even though there are several research framework used to provide a good ground for analysis of interethnic relations, one cannot simply state that all parts of one nation's culture have been taken into account. The reader will face author's explanation that methodological decisions taken here are only one of many that researchers can take while studying interethnic relations. Continuing from this, the present thesis chooses to take a stance, one of many there are, which is closer to interdisciplinary approach in its undertaking rather than purely one field of academic enquiry.

All theoretical frameworks here belong to the one of social sciences and it follows the tradition of post-positivistic methodological approach. One of the main reasons why such

explanations are used more than once in the present thesis has to do with one of the main CMM principles. This is based on the premises of social constructivism and its foundation on the creation of social reality through human interaction and communication. The importance and implications of effective intercultural communication stretch far beyond the boundaries of what could be understood from the outside. To appreciate its significance requires an examination of culture and communication within the multicultural environment. Research suggests that educational managers frequently do not know much about effective communication in general.

The aforementioned problem illustrates two sides of the coin. On one hand there is a push for a more cosmopolitan Western Balkan, better and equal society; on the other hand there is people's need to preserve their culture, which sometimes evolve in not accepting anything different. People always look for cultural similarities (Samovar and Porter, 1991, p.275-282). We also admit that people naturally seek out the companionship of their own cultural group, and by no means we are not suggesting ignoring such phenomenon would be more beneficial than embracing it. We consider to be very important the ability to distinguish between ethnocentrism and being aware of your own cultural values.

The existence of and changes in any nation in this world must have been shaped by its history and will be greatly determined by its present and future conditions. Emergence of global era has marked considerable changes in society both nationwide and worldwide.

In spite the fact that the dominance of globalization prevails, there has been a tendency that nationalism and local identity are growing strong, making it paradox to the today's use of it as a buzzword. While this thesis is being written, Europe's ethnocentric political parties are getting ground. (Pazzanese, 2017, retrived November 2018, <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/02/in-europe-nationalisms-rising/>). On the contrary, we would like to share unintentional optimism deriving from Machida's research on whether globalization render people more ethnocentric, where he argues that cultural globalization supports homogenization or hybridization of cultures rather than polarization or ethnocentric values (2012, p.457). He claims that people show more tolerant attitudes toward

foreign cultures because globalization renders individuals more accepting toward other cultures by creating deeper integration (2012, p. 457).

However, it is also true that both nationalism and local identity are inseparable in people's everyday life. These conditions may be attributed to internal factors of the society or its reaction toward globalization. To a large extent, the rapidly changing social trends and situations have also influenced the way people hold and live their national identity and national culture. A nation shall survive among other nations in the world when its people strongly hold their national identity, which took root from the people's established self-identity and social identity. Therefore, this issue must be taken into thorough consideration and steps to address it should be well planned and conducted accordingly by both the people and the government.

Western Balkans is now going through the above-mentioned processes. However, the people are inclined to developing their own local ethnic identity on the cost on global identity; and this something that has become one of our great concerns. People's nationalistic euphoria in upholding individual rights seems to neglect their responsibility as citizens to promote the toleration and co-existence. This may be understandable since ethnic differences are reinforced by political disparagement based on the rhetoric of war myths. It is considered necessary to redefine and revitalize our both ethnic and regional identity by encouraging people to constructively criticize and build national identity on the basis of well-balanced national/translocal cultures, fairness, and exchange of discourses between or among cultures.

Western Balkans has a political national identity shaped by its past. Nevertheless, during the course of its social and cultural development as a nation, this identity seems to have lost its real meaning, leading to the search of a new identity for the region. This search for new identity should be based, once again, on well-balanced national/translocal cultures, fairness, and exchange of discourses between or among cultures.

The effectiveness of revitalizing both national and regional identity greatly depends on the effort of optimizing the social capital, namely the people's value systems that need to be lived on and respected by everyone else. The cosmopolitan "openness" incurred by political toleration concepts that are ineffectively applied, has put these value systems on the verge of extinction. To maintain social cohesion and integration, these value systems must be developed

in accordance with the ongoing changes. Continuing from this, any social reconstruction aimed to sustain these value systems must incorporate multicultural-based society that enables interaction and internalization of local and translocal values affected and resulted from the ongoing changes. In conclusion, it must be made aware that identity is not static, but it is subject to change parallel with the time when such identity exists. Accordingly, there must be intellectual, creative and responsible citizens of the nation to take charge of the transformation.

It takes more than just being existent for a person to become a whole human being. A life of a man should not be taken for granted. There are some obligations that can be attributed to it that a man can fully develop his humanness. It should be reflected by “humane span” where a man lives in coexistence with other men and beings (H.A.R Tilaar, 2003). What is meant by humane span in this case is the human culture within the boundary of space and time. Not a single civilization on this earth is without its unique culture. For that reason, we need to look for more broadly defined national and regional identity, as a culturally based process, to shape our future as part of organizations such as the European Union.

Unfortunately sometimes inter-ethnic issues are labeled as eternally complicated therefore there is no proper long-term solution for them. A number of studies show that conflicts occur because of the inability of individuals and societies to communicate on multicultural and multilingual bases. Discrepancies among individuals and societies may go further into more unfavorable situations for a state’s life. Instilling global awareness on any society without having to uproot the society’s own culture requires a carefully-designed and integrated steps of education, starting from early children education to higher education, and this education may be better provided by using multicultural approach.

## **5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS**

Education has been viewed as a source of political tolerance in developed countries such as USA (Crockett, Jr. 1976, p. 409). We should not assume that there is always a positive correlation between education and political toleration. As Crockett points out, the more education people are (at least in the US study) the higher the level of political toleration compared to the less-education population, at the same time, this does not mean a sharp increase of toleration towards what is perceived as internal threat or danger from ideologies such as Communism (1976, p. 411).

We acknowledge that this argument was based on a research regarding political toleration in 50' and 60' of the previous century in USA. Nevertheless, arguments deriving from the mentioned research by Crockett are important since they support the claim that political tolerance is multifaceted process and changes over time. This is supported by Mueller's argument that the dynamics of political tolerance are changing by examining the America's level of tolerance on Communisms changed followed by the Socialists since they were not seen as big of a threat to the society anymore; similar trend happened when considering toleration towards groups like American Nazi Party and domestic Japanese during World War II. This happened since after the Second World War the mentioned groups did not pose any threat (1988, p. 18).

Consequently, Mueller's supports the claim that when attitudes change positively for a group they usually follow other similar groups as well. Mueller argues that even though when measuring political toleration people (in his research Americans) say that they support free speech but not atheists and would actually deny them the freedom to speak in public but in turn not do anything to prevent this group from speaking then the same people cannot be simply labeled as "intolerant" (1988, p. 19-20). Discourses on multicultural education and its implementation have permeated in many countries and of course have posed problems. The idea of multicultural education may be responded differently due to the fact that each country or society has its own value system or worldview by which they perceive the issue. If we agree that exposing preadults or teenagers to different political viewpoints might increase their level of tolerance, then suggesting long-term changes in the educational curriculums in the Western Balkans is not far-fetched. As Owen and Dennis (1987, p. 559) argue that older children are

more tolerant than their younger counterparts and are more aware of the consequences of a political conflict

An example on how hard it is to generalize data gathered from specific groups of people that are asked whether they are tolerant toward an extremist group is Sullivan and Markus's article on trends in political tolerance (1988). This article was written after John Muller criticized their research for having content-controlled results. Sullivan and Marcus respond to this criticism by pointing out that tolerance attitudes were not coming into play if people were not facing with questions depicting strong objections to a political group (1988, p. 26). Additionally, as authors argue, depending what type of questionnaire and scale you use you will get somewhat different results when trying to understand the level of political toleration and ideology or education.

Moreover, the main difference is when a researcher is using one group (ethnicity, political views or similar) and asks the other how toleration are they against that group (here mostly left-wing respondents tend to be more tolerant than right-wing respondents) compared to asking what is the least-favored group within that particular set of possible answers you will get different answer depending what other option you give to be the least favored group (1988, p. 30). Needless to say, Sullivan & Marcus argue that the conceptualization, which uses the least-liked approach, is a more valid measurement than the more content-biased as they refer to the Stouffer questions (1988, p. 30).

Empowering people through political tolerance may be interpreted in different ways. This is understandable since the concept goes beyond simple understanding and appreciating political and cultural differences – it promotes awareness and attitude of democracy in which every human is considered having equal rights and opportunities regardless of his cultural background, ethnic group, and faith. Through effective interethnic communication supported by CMM concepts, people can identify what are the causes of misunderstanding and at the same time decide to take another route that will create different and wishfully better social reality for them. Conclusively, we push supports accounts such as the one made by Grobler's where he maintains "people are social beings who can only lead a significant existence through their relationships with other people in a community or society (1994, p.14)."

The current PhD thesis will add to the body of knowledge in the field of Political Science regarding interethnic relations. Moreover, we hope that discussions and results from this thesis will be taken into account by regional key players (Governments, Political Parties and NGO's) on how to better manage these relations in order to have sustainable interethnic relations in the Western Balkans.

The present thesis argues coordinated management of meaning does indeed offer another way of looking at the current interethnic relations by employing several questions, which help better understand the socially constructed source of interethnic problems in the Western Balkans. Completing an updated pretest on the survey about the level of the political tolerance in the Western is crucial for both hypotheses. This is due to the latest developments in the region that do not show any sign of proper sustainable improvements in interethnic relations.

One of the main conclusions of this thesis expresses the importance of the relationship between education and the level of tolerance. Almost 40 years ago Dubey (1979, p.66) in her research on complex relationship between positive discrimination and ethnocentric attitudes among the scheduled castes in India, found out that "when higher and lower castes live together in mixed housing colonies their attitudes toward each other seem to be affected in different directions. The higher castes tend to become less ethnocentric toward the lower castes, while the lower castes tend to develop reverse ethnocentrism- prejudices against higher castes." Similarly author argues that within higher castes young and more educated individuals expressed less ethnocentric values compared to the older and non-educated individuals. Here we can see a connection between education and ethnocentrism being negatively correlated.

Research on interethnic relations and political toleration in the Balkans mostly reflects on cause-effect strategy where one historical event has been connected with another event characterized with ethnic tensions. Whereas the present research suggests that even though the historical and political context is important, we need more complex approach toward this social problem. Avoiding the cause-effect trap is not easy indeed. Since the industrial revolution our societies have often used cause-effect or more mechanistic viewpoint on explaining social phenomenon because it suited the current reality at that time. However, the last couple of

decades have been characterized with tremendous social development where analyzing and looking at the ethnic or cultural relationship from the mechanistic lenses is not sufficient to say the least.

Part of the literature on toleration that uses contemporary post-positivistic research paradigm is completed and describes mostly western cultures where research done in UK and US dominates the field. We maintain that research in political toleration was mostly focused on how the dominant culture is willing to tolerate non-traditional (sometimes extremists) groups. There are different names used to describe co-cultural and sub-cultural groups. One of the terms that has been influential enough for the present research is the one used by Golebiowska (1995) where she uses terms like “unpopular minorities” to describe the group which acted and shared values that had to undergo the test of toleration by the dominant culture. Golebiowska also asks an important question in the field of political toleration that is also supported by the present thesis.

Moreover, the question of “why higher levels of education should indeed produce higher levels of tolerance” (author acknowledges Bob and Licari’s account for the effect of education on tolerance by suggesting that “a substantial fraction of the education effects on tolerance is mediated by cognitive sophistication, 1989), (Golebiowska, 1995, p.24). Golebiowska claims that the individual value priorities are closely related to political tolerance; where in theory the nonmainstream viewpoints are protected by the human rights. In other words, there is a strong correlation between individual value priorities and the extent of individual political tolerance (p.24). Additionally, author expands on how individual value priorities are often seen as either conducive or obstructive to greater tolerance.

This comes as a result of ones exposure to multifaceted academic resources coming from different schools of thoughts and different historical contexts. Golubiowska draws from Inglehart (1990) the argument of economic prosperity and how this helps create personal security that somehow translates to greater toleration of diversity. This happens partly because of the decrease of the sense that external environment presents a threat. If one does not feel that their physical survival is at threat, the level of toleration of diversity is increasing (Inglehart as cited by Gulobiowska, 1995, p.28).



Consequently, higher education and economic prosperity is key to having greater political tolerance in one society. Balkans have been known as a region full of political turmoil since Middle Ages and onwards. Higher education in the Balkans has been seen as corrupted and not academically competitive with its Western Europe counterparts. Quality assurance system in higher education has been only introduced in less than a decade ago. It needs much time for any viable results to be achieved through the help of the European Commission programs, USAID and other international organizations.

Even though there is a strong historical cue that Serbia and its neighbors will find their way to a peaceful future without outside help (Sletzinger, 2011, p. 48.), there is a chance to change this situation by keeping international presence in Bosnia and Kosovo as a stabilizing factors. Furthermore, seen from the communication perspective, we support Pearce's claim of not doubting that humans will be able to achieve coordination, nevertheless what it matters is *how* and in what *form* they will do that. According to the author, humans are capable of doing great things, and it is frustrating that we as humans are "often able to produce only faint shadows of blazing visions, to bring into being only flawed versions of our image of what is good, true, and beautiful. All this makes coordination something difficult to achieve (Pearce, 1989, p.66).

Cosmopolitan communicators are aware that their stories are original to their group, and that other groups tell other stories. However they operate under the proposition that their own stories are legitimate, just as the stories told by other groups (Pearce, 1989, p.192). In general, few forms of Cosmopolitan communication are explicit attempts to conserve and protect "alien" stories, not for pragmatic purposes, but because "humanity" is enriched by including many diverse local stories (Pearce, 1989, p. 192).

Even though the following example discusses the Kosovo case only, it is important for the present research because it offers a critical insight about lack of coordination by country's main key players in social life. According to Nick Scott-Flynn (2003), the general coordination of the international missions such as UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is organized under the four pillars of humanitarian, economic, institution building and governance, and civil administration action. However, the author also recognizes that the main problem is how do the existing NGOs

fit into this model of organization in Kosova? (<https://odihpn.org/magazine/coordination-in-kosovo-the-challenge-for-the-ngo-sector/>) .

The main suggestion by Flynn is that the NGOs must learn how to coordinate among themselves. Knowing that in Kosova there are more 300 INGOs this is much harder. It is important to mention that NGOs being that are under the pressure by their donors and their own constituents, they sometimes show an expressed unwillingness to share information, while seeing themselves as competitors for the huge amounts of donor money available. Scott-Flynn also describes that some INGOs in Kosova have tried to facilitate NGO coordination through and NGO council. Furthermore, he supports the idea where this council would provide an accessible forum where the NGO voice can be developed and if the information is shared than duplication can be avoided and this will increase their efficiency.

Unfortunately, Flynn's discussion is still relevant in Kosovo and as he points out in order to make the NGO coordination a reality the suggested Council will be accessible to all NGOs, not just the rich and powerful agencies, provide translation services so local organizations and staff can participate equally and ensure commitment from NGOs to put aside resources toward participation in and the operation such as council (as recommended in the Sphere project's 'Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response'). Scott-Flynn argues that this will save time and expense ten-fold in a long run.

Zizek points out that today there are many problems that are perceived as problems or intolerance rather than problems of inequality, exploitation or injustice. He also argues that the liberal multiculturalists' basic ideological operation is the "culturalization of politics." Therefore, now the differences conditioned by political inequality (in our case between Albanians and Serbs) are naturalized and neutralized into "cultural" differences, different "ways of life" which are something given, something that cannot be overcome but merely "tolerated." (<http://www.lacan.com/zizek-inquiry.html>)

We would like to use Mittleman's explanation of George Washington's letter which was send to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island in August of 1790 (Mittleman, 2002, p. 353). In this letter, George Washington explained the important enunciation of the novelty of American liberty by drawing a clear distinction between toleration and liberty. According to

Mittleman, in this letter Toleration implied the “indulgence of one class of people” toward another. In other words, it implies that a majority (or the ones that control certain power in a polity) gives a minority (or a politically powerless group) the privilege of following their own way of life unmolested. Regimes that applied toleration as a concept during many centuries allowed their subjects a generous latitude of belief and traditional behavior in the interest of civil peace, commercial prosperity, and so on.

Along with Mittleman’s discussion, we suggest that toleration as a concept is expressing only a partial short time solution for Western Balkan’s interethnic problems. The center of attention for all institutions in the Western Balkans institution including NGO’s should be liberty, while treating it as a requirement of our conscience. Toleration was grounded in politics, liberty in ethics; therefore using CMM concepts while focusing in general social ethical appeals might give more effective results for good interethnic relations in the region.

# Improving inter-ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans



## Political Toleration


- Depends on the dominant culture (establishment).
- Used by Public Institutions and Civil Society.
- Western Balkan's complex inter-ethnic past. Main political themes deriving from medieval time which are used to charge ethnocentric viewpoints.
- Focusing on how minorities are treated is imperative.
- Making political tolerance understandable beyond elites.
- Toleration should happen not only when institutions or citizens make a decision to not prevent or censor other individuals or a group to express their viewpoints or preferences which would make them uncomfortable or which in other circumstances they would totally oppose.

## Coordinated Management of Meaning

- Socially constructed world (constantly being created and re-created through communication).
  - Coordination: practices calling into a synergic representation of what is good, desirable and expedient, and preventing synergic depiction of what they envisioned as bad, ugly and obstructive.
  - Coherence: creating and sharing stories for ourselves and for others in order to interpret and understand the world around. There is no "one" true interpretation of the social world.
  - Mystery: goes against "rational" perspective on stories and the coordinated patterns of actions which we live. It reminds us about the complexity of socially constructed reality since we live in a multiverse of stories told and lived.
- Barnett Pierce (1989, 2007).



## PT + CMM



- Combining practices from Political Toleration and Coordinated Management of Meaning and approach inter-ethnic issues while employing concepts from both theories.
- Avoiding cause-effect approach and unveil opportunities that are not used.
- Analyzing Political artifact (speech) with rhetorical criticism and CMM yields useful topics.
- "Creating Conversations where they otherwise would have not have existed and shaped these conversations in specific ways (Pierce and Pierce, 2000, p. 408).
- Coordination between Public Institutions and NGO's in order to "upgrade" people's resources which in turn will enrich and make dialogue more effective.

## OUTCOME

- Longterm planning to reduce the division between dialogue and politics where the latter is entangled with exercising the power and not treating parties in the dialogue as equals. However, the conventional understanding of power is changing due to the developments in technology where now people of same beliefs and attitudes make a significant portion of the population and become influencers in global decision making (The Social Network State).
- Ideological "Marshall Plan" rather than financial for the Western Balkans, focusing on empowering people with tools to actively participate in creating a better social world for them. Including Political Toleration and CMM in the elementary education curriculum.
- Revitalizing national and regional identity in the Western Balkans by optimizing human capital and value systems through "cosmopolitan" openness which is supported by political toleration and coordinated management of meaning.



Figure 5.1 A Model: Improving inter-ethnic tensions in the Western Balkans

It is imperative to acknowledge several important limitations of the present thesis. Let us start with the question of objectivity, which is something that every researcher is concerned. Indisputably we have to follow certain methodological paradigm, in our case the post-positivist approach. One might ask the question what happens before that? What is the unconscious part of our conscious decision on what to research? Of course, literature review on political toleration and Coordinated Management of Meaning answers many of these questions, but there is always something more to it. In our case, it was a mixture of many elements. It starts with the acknowledgement of being born and raised in the Western Balkans. To some researchers this might present a problem in terms of subjective input in the research and to others is an added value. It mostly depends on what research paradigm is applied. Since we acknowledge approaching the present thesis from the post-positivistic tradition, it is much easier to predict what kind of methodology we will apply.

Personal experience is used only as a prelude for a bigger picture of complex inter-ethnic relations in the Western Balkans. Except by no means this is an ethnographic research. Our attempt to combine the world of applied theories (CMM) and social constructivist theories (Political Toleration) is supported by the effort to have a more unique approach towards interethnic relations. Even though it is reasonably safe to argue that we are not planting seeds of a new paradigm, the future outcome of similar approaches toward interethnic research is mostly unknown. Related to this, Kuhn (1970, P. 158) argues that the person who accepts new paradigm at an early stage of the research often has to go against the evidence provided by problem solving. He continues by adding that the same person must have faith in that new paradigm's success to explain large phenomenon's that it confronts, by keeping in mind the old paradigm as not been thoroughly successful.

Moreover, there is a combination of faith, good rational basis and personal or inarticulate aesthetic consideration that might help the transition to the new paradigm. An example on why this is important is that today some people are attracted to Einstein's general theory from aesthetic ground rather than only the ones familiar with physics of it (Kuhn, 1970, p. 158). However, one should be careful and not understand the above-mentioned elements as a blatant support for the metaphysical approach. The support for any new paradigm is usually

hard and has to go through different stages where the first one is being supported by other researchers. There is a constant need for improvement, extending its possibility and then slowly the scientific community will notice and start support it.

We are not alone in terms of questioning the objectivity as a concept in the social sciences or more specifically in intercultural research. As Rathbun (2012, p. 608) points out that perhaps there is an implicit and unconscious element that will make us be more supportive of some ideology against other when doing research in his case in International Relations. Among many elements described by him on this matter, he also points out to the fact that when being part of an academic institution and particularly studying political sciences, you might be affected by your Professors and the literature that you are exposed to, some of the ideology shared by authors that you read might find their way to your future research. This standpoint should not be easily dismissed. Before the decision to approach the topic of interethnic (intercultural) relations in the Western Balkans, the author of the present thesis faced the ontological and epistemological inquiries.

The very decision to go avoid realist approach and replace it with a more nominalist leaning method shows a certain level of unconscious decision on how to approach the research in the present thesis. Finally, the social constructivist approach won since it was the best of both worlds ontologically speaking. Epistemologically speaking, it was necessary to have both quantitative and qualitative data in order to achieve better results and consequently better recommendations. Retrieving data from the European Value Survey database and select variables that were related with the toleration concept completed the former. And later was achieved by choosing a political speech (artifact) analyze it through rhetorical criticism and Coordinated Management of Meaning lenses.

Another important argument for further research is based on Dyrstad's claim that there is a need for more focus on the effect of post-civil war in interethnic relations (2012, p.817). Arguably, long-term stability does not occur when the war stops and literature focuses mostly in the causes of the civil war rather than what happens afterwards. Dyrstad rightfully points out that there is an increase of ethno-nationalism after the war, which deserves attention for more research on this topic. Conveniently for our present thesis, author used a survey from 1989 just

after the war broke in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dyrstand claims that there is an important difference between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo when looking at the pre-existing ethno-nationalism. While in the Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina there was no subliminal pre-war ethno-nationalistic movement, in Kosovo this phenomenon was widespread decides before the war starter (2012, p. 828). When looking at the individual that were the most and the least affected by the war and their level of ethno-nationalism, in Bosnia the affected individuals did not express higher level of ethno-nationalism compared to Croatia or Kosovo. Therefore, this particular difference requires more research and it mostly depends to the context-specific explanations (Dyrstand, 2012, p. 828).

Considering that a theory must be parsimonious and fruitful, we had to approach the existing interethnic relations in the Balkans by employing somewhat heuristic function by trying to stimulate new research on this topic. Political toleration and CMM seems to fulfil this attempt the best since it is the combination of two seemingly separate theoretical approaches on human condition, and yet somehow want to achieve similar results. Once again, even though a theory should have a broad scope, we had to admit that the present theories used in the thesis could not be treated as universal for social sciences and that could be applied to all people in all situations from the perspective of social sciences. The ability of political toleration and CMM to be applied in wide range of interethnic relations issues and always give same results is rather wishful. In today's tech-centric world where cultural values are changing quicker than ever, having a unified theory of interethnic relations is virtually impossible.

In order for the discussion results to be generalized in other political and geographical contexts, the research itself should include political artifacts and quantitative data from more than few countries such as it is in our case. Another limitation comes with the lack of such research being done in the past in the Western Balkans, therefore comparing and contrasting our findings with a similar study will be hard.

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